ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: HOUSING DEVELOPMENT: HOUSING POLICY, SLUMS, AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL AND BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, 1948-1973

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This dissertation explores the role of low-income housing in the development of two major Latin American societies that underwent demographic explosion, rural-to-urban migration, and growing urban poverty in the postwar era. The central argument treats popular housing as a constitutive element of urban development, interamerican relations, and citizenship, interrogating the historical processes through which the modern Latin American city became a built environment of contrasts. I argue that local and national governments, social scientists, and technical elites of the postwar Americas sought to modernize Latin American societies by deepening the mechanisms for capitalist accumulation and by creating built environments designed to generate modern sociabilities and behaviors. Elite discourse and policy understood the urban home to be

owner-occupied and built with a rationalized domestic layout. The modern home for the poor would rely upon a functioning local government capable of guaranteeing a reliable supply of electricity and clean water, as well as sewage and trash removal. Rational transportation planning would allow the city resident access between the home and workplaces, schools, medical centers, and police posts.

As interamerican Cold War relations intensified in response to the Cuban Revolution, policymakers, urban scholars, planners, defined in transnational encounters an acute "housing problem," a term that condensed the myriad aspects involved in urban dwellings for low-income populations. The policy outcome of these encounters was the arrival of foreign economic and technical assistance dedicated to slum eradication and publically-financed popular housing. Within the policy and social sciences circuits of modernization theory during the Cold War context, housing policy emerged as a discursive and practical antidote to the problem of sheltering a burgeoning urban population and its attendant attributes of underdevelopment, poverty, and social unrest.

The dissertation demonstrates how a handful of selected cases of popular housing erected in Rio and Buenos Aires ultimately did not fulfill the stated goals embraced by the proponents of developmentalism and interamerican assistance. It shows the extent to which a shortfall of outcomes relative to goals was indicative in part of hemispheric transitions, but also of the particularities of the modernizing city in the second half of the twentieth century.

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To Paula

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TERMINOLOGY

The following are terms and corresponding English-language definitions for dwelling types commonly used during the period of study. In some cases English-language studies of popular housing used the original Spanish and Portuguese-language terminology; in other cases, an English-language approximate was used. "Slum" is perhaps the most important non-local term found in the English-language literature for a wide range of dwelling types, land uses, and zoning classifications that had a numerous local names and meanings.

It is important to note that in both the local and in the transnational context, terms like *favela* or *villa miseria* were used to characterize a social reality, and not merely describe a specific typology of dwelling or land title. This dissertation seeks to be attentive to these sociological readings of terms like *favelas* and *villas*, and their relationship with the historical evolution of the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.

bairro (Portuguese) or *barrio* (Spanish): neighborhood.

barraco (Brazil): shack or shanty house built with poor materials.

casas de alojamiento and *pensiones* (Buenos Aires): rooming houses.

casas de cômodo (Rio de Janeiro): rooming houses.

complejo habitacional (Spanish) or *conjunto habitacional* (Portuguese): Housing projects built particularly starting in the 1960s as a solution to the housing deficit for low-income populations. Although "projects" have acquired a stigma of prejudice and stereotype in the United States, in Argentina or Brazil, the local equivalent does not always invoke a negative connotation.

conventillo (Buenos Aires): tenements with small rooms that open out onto a central outdoor common patio. Kitchen and bathroom were for the collective use.

cortiço (Rio de Janeiro): tenements, the equivalent to the *conventillos* in Buenos Aires.

favela (Brazil): slums or shantytowns; informal settlements built in public or private lands, typically without public sanction or legal title to the occupied land. Original favelas constructions usually lacked access to urban infrastructure and public services.

favelado (Brazil): a favela resident. As it is the case with *villero*, the term can be used negatively to mark class, ethnic, and racial bias.

habitação (Brazil): housing, dwelling.

rancho (Argentina): rural housing of simple structure and austere characteristics.

villa miseria or *villa* (Argentina): slums or shantytown; informal settlements built illegally in public or private lands. They usually lacked any kind of urban infrastructure and collective equipment. Note that the Portuguese-language *vila* often described a neighborhood (e.g. Vila Isabel) or a housing development for residents of modest means, often factory workers (e.g., *vila operaria*). In these Brazilian cases, *vila* did not connote irregularity and stigma of its Spanish-language equivalent.

villas de emergencia (Buenos Aires): it is the official name that the Argentine authorities give to *villas miserias.*

villero (Argentina): a *villa* resident. *Villero* could be used pejoratively to mark class and ethnic bias in Argentina.

viviendas (Argentina): housing**,** dwellings**.**

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated portions of the Gulf Coast of the United States, especially the city of New Orleans. National and international media covered the horrific scenes of devastation. The general public saw with horror how the residents of the Crescent City who were unable to evacuate, mostly black and poor, were left alone in a flooded city, overcrowding the city's convention center, with no water, food, or functioning bathrooms. The worst images showed corpses floating along water-filled streets and dead bodies ill-covered sitting in wheelchairs in the convention center. Scenes of looting and police repression were equally troubling. Katrina destroyed more than 300,000 homes and displaced about 700,000 people.[1] The hurricane made visible the inequality, racism, and dispossession that poor, in this case black, urban dwellers face, notably at moments of "natural" disasters. With anger and frustration, many wondered how such a thing happened in the United States. The images of New Orleans, it was possible to hear in television and in academic conversations, resembled the Third World.

Coming from Latin America, I found those comments upsetting. It is true that natural disasters in Latin America and the Caribbean have a disproportionate impact on the poor. The earthquake in Haiti in 2010 is perhaps the best example of everything that is wrong in our region. There is no point in romanticizing our situation when comparing

[1] Joanne M. Nigg, John Barnshaw and Manuel R. Torres, "Hurricane Katrina and the Flooding of New Orleans: Emergent Issues in Sheltering and Temporary Housing,"*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 604, Shelter from the Storm: Repairing the National Emergency Management System after Hurricane Katrina (March 2006): 113-128; Patrick Sharkey, "Survival and Death in New Orleans: An Empirical Look at the Human Impact of Katrina," *Journal of Black Studies* 37, No. 4, Katrina: Race, Class, and Poverty (March 2007): 482-501;

the devastation of New Orleans and the poor response that one of the richest and most powerful nation in the world gave to its own citizens. There is no solace in witnessing the pain of others. And yet, Katrina put in question the very own notion of what a "modern" country should be. "Backwardness," with the regret of many, was not just a Third World attribute. Such discourse hindered how urban spaces of difference were the historical intersection of race, economics, and politics in postwar America laid the foundation for the social and economic downturn of US cities.

In the aftermath of the hurricane, debates revolved around what was to be done with the large numbers of dispossessed residents of New Orleans and other affected areas of the Gulf Coast, many of whom began to wander around the US. Academics, experts, policymakers, and the public in general debated whether it was advisable to rebuild New Orleans, especially the poor areas such as the Lower Ninth Ward, and wondered who might bear the responsibility for such reconstruction. The George W. Bush administration sent FEMA trailers as a short-term response to the urgent need for shelter but the big questions remained open. About the same time, I came across Thomas Sugrue's *Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (1996). There Sugrue argues that "Racially segregated neighborhoods are not alone the foreordained consequence of centuries of American racial prejudice; rather they are the result of the actions of the federal and local governments, real estate agents, individual home buyers and sellers, and community organizations. Economic and social structures act as parameters that limit the range off individual and collective decisions. The consequences of hundreds of individual acts or of collective identity, however, gradually strengthen, redefine, or weaken economic and social structures. The relationship between structure

and agency is dialectical and history is the synthesis." This passage, which I read in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, made me think about the historical causes that explain the development of urban spaces of difference and weak enfranchisement not only in US but also in Latin American cities.

Back then, at the time when I was defining my research topic some questions came up. Who is in charge of building the housing capacity to house for the poor and the dispossessed? What is the role of the local and federal state, if any, in providing housing for its population? How effective is the private market in attending such need? What is the relationship between housing, property, and citizenship in this context? And, perhaps most importantly, what is the specific role of housing when dealing with poor populations whose social situation is the result of the type of structural forces and political choices observed by Sugrue. Looking at New Orleans with an eye in the terrible situation of slums in the Global South I wondered about the meaning of such concepts as "modern" or "backward," "developed" or "underdeveloped," especially as they related to popular housing. Coming from Latin America, where slums and poor urban spaces are all too familiar part of the landscape of the "modern" city, I asked about the modern historical roots of poverty and housing. In this historical present of economic crisis and historical recession, housing, once again, has triggered the worst depression since the 1930s making visible the mechanisms of capitalist accumulation. In this rather somber scenario, this dissertation interrogates, historicizes, and transnationalizes the responsibilities of the modern, capitalist state to house poor populations. In thinking of New Orleans in 2005, and Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro in 1960, and Detroit in the year 2020, I ask how --- if --- public housing should be a matter of citizenship.

Definition of the Research Problem

This dissertation is a transnational history of the processes of modernization and development of Latin America urban societies in the postwar period. It interrogates the place of the urban poor, their built environment, and the role of public housing in the development of Latin American societies undergoing demographic explosion, rural-to-urban migration, and the structuration of urban inequality. The central argument treats popular housing as a constitutive element of urban development, interamerican relations, and citizenship, interrogating the historical processes through which the modern Latin American city became a built environment of contrasts and poor housing.

I argue that governments, social scientists, and technical elites of the postwar Americas sought to modernize Latin American societies not just by deepening the mechanisms for capitalist accumulation within the context of city-led developmentalism [Spanish: *desarrollismo*; Portuguese: *desenvolvimentismo*] but also by creating built environments designed to generate modern sociabilities and behaviors. Elite discourse and policy understood the modern urban home to be owner-occupied and built with a rationalized domestic layout. The imagined modern home would rely upon a functioning and responsive municipal government capable of guaranteeing a reliable supply of electricity and clean water, as well as sewage and trash removal. Rational transportation planning would allow the city resident easy access to places of employment, schools, medical centers, and police posts.

The postwar era of modernization and developmentalism was also an era of slumification. By 1960, almost ten percent of the residents of Rio de Janeiro lived in shantytowns known as *favelas*. In Buenos Aires, the relative figure at 1960 was a more

modest three percent, but the absolute number of residents living in slums would double by the end of the decade. The dissertation looks closely at the emergence of a transnational social science and policymaking imaginary that sought to understand the dramatic transformations in Latin American societies that produced such a slumification is these two South Americans megapoli. I argue that this imaginary, fed by modernization theory and developmentalism, came to be shared by both US and Latin American social scientists and policymakers who were called upon to implement their ideas within the context of the Alliance for Progress, the U.S. government program focused on social reform in order to avert the imagined spread of the Cuban Revolution. Policymakers, urban scholars, planners, and architects came to define in transnational encounters an acute “housing problem,” a term that synthesized a myriad of challenges for "decent" housing for burgeoning low-income urban populations. Within the policy and social sciences circuits of modernization theory and *developmentalism* created in the context of the Cold War, housing policy emerged as a discursive and practical response to the problem of housing and its attendant attributes of underdevelopment, poverty, and social unrest.

The policy outcome of these encounters was the arrival of foreign economic and technical assistance dedicated to slum eradication and publically-financed popular. In Rio de Janeiro, the government of the recently-created State of Guanabara worked with the technical and financial assistance from the United States Agency for International Development to build a series of housing complexes on the outskirts of the city. These developments are now known as Vila Aliança, Vila Kennedy, Vila Esperança, and Cidade de Deus. In Buenos Aires, a loan negotiated with the Inter-American

Development Bank helped finance the construction of more than fifteen thousand units in communities named Villa Lugano 1-2, located in Parque Almirante Brown, and Ciudad General Belgrano, situated in the neighboring *partido* [county] of La Matanza, in the Province of Buenos Aires.

The dissertation demonstrates how and why the housing stock actually built in postwar Rio and Buenos Aires unevenly fulfilled many of the goals embraced by the proponents of developmentalism. It shows how the particular outcome of these housing projects developed are indicative of hemispheric transitions, but also of the particularities of the modernizing city in the second half on the twentieth century in each of these places. The research demonstrates how, ultimately, the planning and building of modern residences in Buenos Aires and Rio did not solve the "housing problem." In a close analysis of public housing construction in the two South American metropolises, I argue that the popular housing intended to alleviate that housing problem actually contributed in the creation of new urban landscapes of poverty as a constitutive part of urban development and the transnational politics of developmentalism. In other words, the plans and hopes for modernity through housing may have been partially fulfilled, but a *poverty of housing* became an intrinsic part of the modern Latin American urban landscape.

Defining the "Housing Problem"

The housing question and the problem of modernization of Latin American societies were certainly not new in the postwar period. These questions had already emerged with the nation-building in the nineteenth century and continued over the

following decades of state-formation and regional integration. Since the late nineteenth century, in a period of rapidly expanding capital relations, the "housing problem" came to be part of the "social question," as the ruling elites defined the set of problems that emerged with the increasing complexity of cities. By the eve of the First World War, capital cities once known for their colonial architecture became modern metropolises vibrating with the incorporation of massive contingents of foreign immigrants (especially in Buenos Aires) and internal migrants (a group that included former slaves in the Brazilian case). Epidemics, overcrowding, and social turmoil in popular-classes neighborhoods were part of such rapid transformation of cities like Rio or Buenos Aires. The states' initial responses ranged from sweeping, highly successful public health campaigns to the criminalization and repression of any manifestation of popular disorder. Progress and modernization of Latin American cities required multiple forms of regulation for the urban poor and their material living conditions.[2] As what it was at stake was the health and the productivity of the nation, eugenics and hygienist approaches sought to contain poor urban environments, characterized as spaces of disease, pathology, and moral decadence. In some cases like in Rio, this understanding led to the razing of boarding houses and tenements.

In the following decades, industrialization and urbanization gave place to new anxieties about the character of the urban working classes. Political and social elites framed their concern about the social and moral (including sexual) living conditions of the popular classes as part of the question about the productivity of the nation. As recent

[2] Juan Suriano, *La cuestión social en Argentina: 1870-1943* (Buenos Aires: La Colmena, 2004); Sidney Chalhoub, *Trabalho, lar e botequim: o cotidiano dos trabalhadores no Rio de Janeiro da Belle Époque* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986); Amy Chazkel. *Laws of Chance: Brazil's Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

historiography has shown, an alliance of a disciplinizing state and national industrialists attempted to regulate the urban masses were not only confined to the workplace or the public sphere but also to those spaces relative to the reproduction of the labor force, particularly to those related to domesticity and intimacy.[3] State professionals, business and industrialists' organizations, and welfare administrations conceived of the urban household as a civilizing and disciplinizing space in the remaking of the urban working class. Industrialists in Brazil promoted vocational training programs, literacy campaigns, and social activities in working class neighborhoods to "modernize" the worker. Colombian textile entrepreneurs attempted to fashion the female workers with social and educational programs in consonance with the bourgeois moral codes of sexual behavior in the 1940s and 1950s. Popular-Front leaders in Chile produced a gendered perception of men as hardworking laborers and women as housekeepers and family caregivers as a way to contribute to the health of the popular classes, to raise their standards of living, and to promote national economic development. In the first half of the twentieth century, thus, the home, as one of the privileged spaces of domesticity and the private sphere, became an area of intervention and regulation as dynamic as other spheres, reinforcing traditional gender roles and racial prejudices.

The relationship between urban housing and the modernization of Latin American societies was, therefore, hardly new by the dawn of the post-WWII era. And yet, within these continuities, there is something particular about the housing problem in the postwar

[3] See, for instance, Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, *Dulcinea in the Factory: Myths, Morals, Men, and Women in Colombia's Industrial Experiment, 1905-1960* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Karin Rosemblatt, *Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mary Kay Vaughan, "Modernizing Patriarchy: State Policies, Rural Households, and Women in Mexico, 1930-1940," in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America,* ed. Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molineux, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Barbara Weinstein, *For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

era. Poverty and substandard forms of housing increased at an unprecedented rate accompanying the process of burgeoning urbanization. Overcrowded tenements and boarding houses packed the cities' downtowns. Meanwhile, *illegal* and *irregular* settlements occupied public and private lands located close to workplaces, usually in the outskirts of the city or, in the case of Rio, also on steep hills found throughout the city. Between 1940 and 1970 Rio's urban population more than doubled from 1.76 to 4.2 million. The rate of growth was thirty-nine percent between 1950-60. The corresponding increase of the city's *favelado* population was an especially striking feature of aggregate population growth. Slum dwellers increased almost threefold from 1950 to 1970 (169,305 in 1950 to 554,277 in 1970).[4] The population of Buenos Aires and its immediate periphery grew from about 3.5 inhabitants in 1936 to 11.4 million in 1970. There too, the rise in slum dwellers was a notable feature of overall population growth, especially in the period most closely associated with *desarrollismo*. By the mid 1950s, the number of *villas* and their residents was relatively low: just one percent of the city's population and a two percent of the overall population in Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). But in one decade, by the late 1960s, the *villa* population peaked hitting a half million residents in GBA alone, almost Rio's number for the same period. From the strict demographic point of view, urbanization and the widespread presence of slums and shantytowns reached unprecedented proportions in the postwar years.

The presence of new urban "others" — some representing the continuation of the urban poor associated with the era of mass Atlantic migrations, but a much larger share

[4] Population in Rio almost doubled from 1940 to 1960 from 1,764,141 inhabitants (1940); 2,377,451 (1950); 3,307,163 (1960) residents; and 4,250,000 in 1970, increasing a 39% between 1950 and 1960 2.3 million in 1950, 3.2 million in 1960, and 4.25 million in 1970. Estado da Guanabara, Secretaria do Govêrno, Coordenação de Planos e Orçamento. Divisão de Estadística, *Anuário estatístico* (Guanabara: Secretaria do Governo, 1961/2), 17.

representing post-1929 internal migration from the countryside — could be highly disruptive. The reformist administrations of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (president-dictator from 1930 to 1945; elected president in 1951-1954) and Juan D. Perón in Argentina (president, 1946-1955) politically mobilized the diverse urban population classes, bringing to national politics many longstanding social demands of the working poor, especially organized labor. As Daniel James pointed out in his work, the presence of Peronist masses in political rituals enacted on the streets of Buenos Aires represented a symbolic subversion of traditional spatial hierarchies consolidated during the "oligarchical" republic. Overall, the presence of dark-skinned and/or poor peoples in urban spaces acquired a radical (and new) material and symbolical dimension. Such cultural affront was significant considering that it was precisely in those years, when Buenos Aires middle classes consolidated their imagination of Buenos Aires as a white, European city –the "Paris of South America."[5] Well-heeled *porteños* (denonym for the resident of Buenos Aires) reacted with anxiety expressing class and racial hostility to these working masses that populated the suburbs of the city and the growing slums. Working class neighborhoods and slums became, therefore, scrutinized under a new interest, as those were the places were the popular support to the Vargas and Perón regimes was becoming stronger.[6]

[5] Adriana Gorelik, *Miradas sobre Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2004)

[6] In Argentina, workers took over the streets of downtown Buenos Aires with banners that announce their political identity with neighborhoods localized in the industrial belt surrounding in Greater Buenos Aires, such as Berisso or Avellaneda. In Rio de Janeiro, the relationship between urban politics and favelas began in the early 1930s, when Pedro Ernesto, the presidentally-appointed mayor of Rio, helped *favelados* in mediating evictions and land disputes, and providing subsidies for samba schools. *Favela* residents, however, did not constitute at that time a vast contingent of votes as the squatter population was not that significant quantitatively. In addition, low literacy and lack of personal documentation deterred electoral participation. This aspect, however, does not occlude the central point that the increasing identification of *favelados* with Ernesto and Vargas. In the case of Rio de Janeiro, in addition, the Brazilian Communist Party found strong support in local elections for the city council in 1947, when the ban against the party

In terms of the specificity of our time framework, the research shows that it was during the postwar regimes of Vargas and Perón — commonly described as populist — when the "housing problem" gained a new, transnational resonance. This was part of a broader process that Adrián Gorelik has defined as the emergence of the "Latin American city," a cultural "trope" born from the "intellectual desire to build it as an object of knowledge and action,"[7] This reflection among scholars, experts, policymakers, and technical elites about the Latin American city happened in a moment in which the whole region –Latin America- became a matter of discussion and debate as part of a postwar geo-political and social science/developmentalist spatialization of the globe. In this new Latin American era, the central preoccupation was to find the causes that explained the region's structural problems and also the policies that would lead to a new moment of development and growth.[8] Developmentalist thinking and modernization theory provided not only the methodological tools but also a set of general assumptions and a sense of optimism and mission about the progress of the region. By the end of our periodization, those initial hopes turned to a somber conclusion. Modernization could happen, *dependentistas* would say, but it had to come through more radical ways that could break the neocolonial relationship with the industrialized North.

In a global scale, the postwar period also witnessed the emergence of a global awareness about the development and "progress" of humanity that brought together international organizations, philanthropic agencies, technical experts, policymakers, and

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had been temporarily lifted. On the relationship between urban politics and *favelas* during the Pedro Ernesto, see for instance, Michael L. Conniff, *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-1945* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 107-111; Marly Silva da Motta, *Rio de Janeiro: De cidade-capital a Estado da Guanabara* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2001).

[7] Adrián Gorelik, "A produção da 'cidade latino-americana," *Tempo Social* 17, no. 1 (2005): 115.

[8] Tulio Halperin Donghi, "Nueva narrativa y ciencias sociales hispanoamericanas en la década del sesenta," *Hispamérica* 9, no. 27 (December 1980): 3-18.

social scientists to solve the problems associated with poverty and inequality in the Third World. As Akira Iriye has pointed out, nations and peoples of the world became aware of their shared interests and objectives and of the potentialities of combining and joining collective efforts and resources through transnational cooperation.[9] They participated in a universalizing understanding of the world and contributed in the production of knowledge that minimized unbridgeable difference in favor of comparability, standardization, and global applicability.

In the postwar geography of power, development became a universal language that framed an understanding of how to alleviate poverty and put underdeveloped nations at a path of economic growth and social change. As Frederick Cooper and Randal Packard have argued, development "appealed as much to leaders of 'underdeveloped' societies as to the people of developed countries, and it gave citizens in both categories a share in the intellectual universe and in the moral community that grew up around the world-wide development initiative of the post-World War II era."[10] The development discourse thus allowed for a universalistic operation that equated Latin America with Africa or Asia. In this way, Latin America became part of the underdeveloped world and received the attention of the recently created international organizations.[11]

As the dissertation will show, this new transnational moment prompted a reconfiguration of Pan-American exchanges, materialized in an unprecedented,

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[9] Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
[10] Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge*, (University of California Press, 1998), 1-22.
[11] Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Carlos Altamirano, "Desarrollo y Desarrollistas," *Prismas*, no. 2 (1998): 75–91; Barbara Weinstein, "Developing Inequality," *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 1 (February 2008): 1-18. On the anti-developmentalist position, Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Sachs, Wolfgang, ed, *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (N.J.: Zed Books, 1992).

increasing, and overlapping number of conferences, collaborative research initiatives, and published studies that covered most of the aspects of social life. Scholars, experts, policymakers that gathered at different meetings shared a vision of their historical times as one of sudden and unprecedented transformation that required the intervention of the state and the expert. They subscribed to the idea that, as Barbara Weinstein pointed out, "spatially organized inequalities would be addressed, corrected, and eventually erased through the proper modes of government and technical intervention."[12] Science, technological innovation, and rational planning were the fundamental tools that Latin American nations had to apply for their economic development and social modernization.

The lack of adequate housing for the middle and popular classes and the proliferation of illegal settlements was at the core of the urban question. A key meeting on the "Problems of Urbanization in Latin America," organized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL), scholars and experts of the region defined the widespread presence of slums and shantytowns as "perhaps the most serious social problems of urban areas in Latin America…they dramatize[d] the acute character of the housing problem in Latin American cities and reveal[ed] some of the worst physical and social consequences of poverty and the low level of living." Not surprisingly, many of the most influential Latin American sociologists of the time presented the results of their innovative field research on slums in that meeting, whose organizer was Philip Hauser, himself a central figure in the creation of networks of knowledge.

In this perspective, burgeoning squatter settlements, land invasions, tenements, and slums in cities like Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires became something different than

[12] Barbara Weinstein, "Developing Inequality," 3.

they had been understood in earlier period. For governments, policymakers, scholars, and experts alike these spaces of urban poverty also became the undesirable result of the structural situation of Latin American economies. The emergence of a new sociological and urbanistic understanding of poverty and landscapes of poverty emerged, coexisting with more traditional moralistic and eugenic characterizations of the poor, but also providing a new base for a technical set of solutions to overcome poverty through managed development.

For modernization theorists, slums and informal urban spaces were particularly significant to explore the settlement of migrant populations in the city and the degree of assimilation to the urban culture. Broadly speaking, the dissertation shows that within the antinomies of modernization theory, the city was conceived as a space of creation, change, innovation, rationality, secularism, and democracy. The model was the industrial European and American city that had given birth to an industrious class of entrepreneurs and middle classes. Cities were understood to be fundamentally democratic spaces. In contrast, the countryside was portrayed as rather static, associated with tradition, superstition, kinship, emotion, and paternalism. Slums, and their improvised homes, represented in this model, rural, pre-modern "enclaves" coexisting in an urban setting. In the city, they were the *loci* of tradition, rural ways of life, and personal disorganization that limited the full release of social, cultural, and productive forces necessary for the full development of Latin American nations. As Frank Bonilla has put it for the Brazilian case, Rio's favelas represented [paradoxically] "the rural slum within the city." Gorelik

has argued recently towards the concept of a "village" in the city.[13] With this logic, scholars and experts projected physical features into social attributes and life-styles. They assumed that the bad quality of the slums and the slums house was actually the manifestation of the internal qualities of slum dwellers. In addition, slums and working class neighborhoods were important to these scholars and policymakers because in the political history of Latin America these had been the places from where the populist regimes of Vargas in Brazil or Perón in Argentina received most support. Clientelism and populism were practices that these scholars associated with a limited or incomplete democracy and with the residual presence of rural and traditional elements in a society in transformation. In this context, governments and urban planners saw the provision of modern housing as an agent of transformation. It is in this sense that I argue that homeownership and modern housing were to remedy urban squalor, promote the integration and assimilation of new urban residents, stimulate middle-class habits and mass consumption, and moderate political behavior. Turning the "villages" into neighborhoods of the city was the urbanistic aspect of this modernizing imagination.

Key to the transnationalization of the housing problem and its solutions in the postwar period was the availability of foreign funds and technical assistance for the construction of affordable housing. In Latin America, developmentalist governments abandoned a strict economic nationalism and courted foreign countries and lending organism to finance development and social programs. The Cuban Revolution and expressions of anti-Americanism that US officials found in official visits in the region alarmed the US contributing to the reassessment of the place of the hemisphere within

[13] Frank Bonilla, *Rio's Favelas: The Rural Slum Within the City* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1961); Adrián Gorelik, "La aldea en la ciudad: ecos urbanos de un debate antropológico" *Revista del Museo de Antropología* (Buenos Aires) vol. 1, no. 1 (2008): 73–96.

Cold War geopolitics. The creation of the Alliance for Progress by president John F. Kennedy in 1961 sought to coordinate past and new channels of assistance with a new packaging, one that praised an era of pacific reform and growth in the region. In the area of housing, this basically meant the availability of new funds to boost the mortgage market, benefitting mostly the middle classes, and certain support for the financing affordable housing, community development, and aided self-help projects.

This context of circulation of ideas and capital described above, I will show, defined certain development of key urban renewal projects in cities like Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires as well as the organization of the mortgage market in this latter city. It was in the 1950s and 1960s when these cities initiated large-scale projects to reorganize the urban space according to the needs of the mass society (*sociedad de masas*) and the market. Part of such program were the eradication of certain slums and squatter settlements and the relocation in large-scale housing complexes. The construction of Vila Aliança, Vila Kennedy (originally named Progresso), Vila Esperança, and the first stage of Cidade de Deus in the city of Rio de Janeiro –by then the State of Guanabara- was the outcome of such new moment of collaboration between US and Brazilian authorities. In Buenos Aires, such examples were the urbanization of the Bañado de Flores, a large swampland area within municipal limits equal to almost ten percent of the total surface of the city, and the construction of Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano. The social imaginaries attached to these housing complexes emphasized the idea that homeownership and a respectable environment would contribute in the formation of citizens and consumers. In this way, home construction during the era of

developmentalism was about something more than the mere provision of a physical shelter to urban dwellers, it was part of the very project of modernization.

Chapter Summaries

To unravel this tangled history of housing, I have divided this dissertation in three parts. First, I analyze what I call the transnationalization of the housing problem. Second, I reconstruct the history of urban renewal and housing policies in Rio and Buenos Aires in the 1960s. Third, I seek an assessment of the distance between the social representation behind the housing projects and the way in which residents and experts experienced the new built environments.

In Chapter 1, I explore the way in which social scientists in the Americas problematized the urban problem and the centrality that slums had in such characterization. The chapter starts with a description of the urban and social transformations of Rio and Buenos Aires, especially since the 1930s. It pays attention to the way in which the mobilization of the popular classes during the Vargas's second regime and Perón contributed in the problematization of the urban and the housing question. Here, I pay particular attention to certain circuits of knowledge between Latin American and US counterparts and the points of contact between modernization theory and the developmentalist school of thinking in a context of the "Latin-Americanization" of the social sciences. Slums, I argue, became central in the study of the new era of mass society as they represented, in the minds of scholars and experts, the coexistence of rural/traditional behaviors in an urban/modern environment. The research shows how Latin American scholars found in the slums of Latin America alternative forms of

modernity to those prescribed by modernization theory scholars like Robert Redfield. In other words, scientific works produced in Latin America questioned the validity of the universalistic assumptions of modernization theory as they did not seem to fully apply in other context beyond the US, and perhaps not even in the US.

In Chapter 2, I look specifically at the way in which housing became a matter of debate and analysis at a regional scale in the postwar era. I show the growing influence of U.S. urban planning in the region, especially through the work of multilateral organization led buy as the Organization of American States. As mapping out the whole universe of networks would be impossible for the possibilities of this work, instead, I decided to focus on some representative institutions and figures that would show the intensity that urban planning, and housing in particular, reached in this period. In these transnational circuits of knowledge, I argue, housing became scrutinized under a more technical gaze that ultimately decomposed the problem in a myriad of specific issues. If experts and policymakers in the field of urban planning insisted that their actions be taken in the broad names of development and modernization, they nonetheless developed an understanding of the housing problem that was piecemeal and fractured.

For this reason, the second part of the chapter focuses particularly on the way in which the Alliance for Progress, from the standpoint of the US, characterized the problem of housing and the policies and actors involved in it during the 1960s. The analysis shows how the Alliance for Progress, that vague and amorphous institutional setting, actually favored housing for the middle classes and skilled working classes by pushing for the development of mortgage markets. To a lesser extent the Alliance also mobilized technical and economic assistance to social programs, particularly in self-help and

community development programs. The construction of housing complexes was a part of a broader program that sought to strength capitalist market relations, especially through bolstering the mortgage market and expanded homeownership. As I will explain below in this introduction, this dissertation agrees with Fernando Coronil's criticism to James C. Scott's *Seeing Like a State* (1998) in that "high modernist" projects were not solely the result of the rule of experts but also the outcome of the forces of the capitalist market in high modernism.[14] As Timothy Mitchell has explained for the case of Egypt, modernizing projects were intrinsic to the formation of "the market" and "the economy." The experts' knowledge, laws, private property were all part of the process in which Egypt made its entering into modernity.[15] In this dissertation, I asked about the relationship between housing developments in two Latin American cities, the role of the United States during the Alliance for Progress to avert a leftist turn and US corporations and capital to consolidate the mortgage market.

Chapter 3 reconstructs the history of the Guanabara Housing Program launched by Guanabara's first governor, Carlos Lacerda (1914-1977). The eradication of *favelas* and the relocation in new purpose-built public housing complexes as well as temporary shelters were part of a broader restructuration of the urban space. After describing the history of popular housing in Rio since the first decades of the twentieth century I recreate the history of the construction of the *vilas,* the eradication of *favelas*, and squatters' resistances to evictions. I pay particular attention to the relationship established between Brazilian authorities and the representatives of the United States Agency for

[14] Fernando Coronil, "Smelling Like a Market," *American Historical Review* 106, no. 1 (February 2001): 119-129.
[15] Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

International Development (USAID). The chapter also shows the extent in which transnational process were locally grounded and influenced by local contexts. In this sense, the particular social and political history of Rio in the first half of the 1960s is central to understand the construction of the *vilas.* In this sense, the *vilas* are an interesting window to explore the mediations, borrowings, and negotiations between USAID and Brazilian experts. Attention to detail in the description of the design and construction of the projects comes from the attempt to show how certain social representations materialized in the floor plans and the whole conceptualization of the housing program. This chapter also seeks to historicize the origins of the *vilas.* Their existence and their relationship with the Alliance for Progress were always mentioned in the literature about Lacerda's administration or the history of public housing in Rio without much detail about their history.[16] In this way, this chapter seeks to provide new elements for future work on this important chapter on the history of housing and Rio.

Chapter 4 takes a similar approach for the case of Buenos Aires to analyze the urbanization of Parque Almirante Brown (PAB) and the construction of two housing complexes, Villa Lugano 1-2 (later renamed Conjunto General Savio) and Ciudad General Belgrano (now popularly known as Barrio BID, in a somewhat ironic homage to the presence of Interamerican Development Bank financing). Public housing in Buenos

[16] Anthony Leeds and Elizabeth Leeds, *A sociologia do Brasil urbano* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1978); Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Licia do Prado Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978); Alba Zaluar, *A máquina e a revolta: as organizações populares e o significado da pobreza* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985); Victor Vincent Valla, *Educação e favela: politicas para as favelas do Rio de Janeiro, 1940-1985* (Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 1986); Cecília Azevedo, "Essa pobre menina moça: a estátua da liberdade da Vila Kennedy," in *Cidade vaidosa: imagens urbanas do Rio de Janeiro*, edited by Paulo Knauss and Ana Maria Mauad (Rio de Janeiro: Sette Letras, 1999); Lawrence F Salmen, "A Perspective on the Resettlement of Squatters in Brazil." *América Latina* (Rio De Janeiro) vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1969): 73–95. Chapter 3 provides a broader account of the literature on the *vilas.*

Aires offers a different perspective of analysis to understand the role of the Alliance for Progress. Different from Brazil, Argentina was, under both Argentine and North American eyes, already a "modern" country in the era of developmentalism. As a result, resources for social programs, such as subsidized housing for the urban poor were of a much lesser urgency in comparison to Rio de Janeiro in the early 1960s. U.S. assistance in the field of housing came primarily in the form of a capitalization of private mortgage market in times when public and private finance interests tried to formalize the savings and loan system that might generate a self-sustaining, market of middle-class home owners. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) provided partial funds for the construction of Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano, in La Matanza. Each housing complex were intended for different subsections of lower-income earners who resided in Buenos Aires and the surrounding suburbs. Homes in Villa Lugano 1-2 were to be destined for state employees and skilled working classes that could afford a mortgage. Units at Ciudad General Belgrano, comparatively cheaper that in Villa Lugano, were to house the existing slum population residing in Parque Almirante Brown as well as those residents of boarding houses or tenements affected by the bulldozing of blocks for the extension works of Avenue 9 de Julio, in central Buenos Aires. The results of such differentiations were decidedly mixed, as I will demonstrate.

The research shows how transnational flows that influenced specific interventions into the urban fabric were not confined just to North-South exchanges in the hemisphere. These flows were precisely global implying the existence of several vectors coming and going from and to the US, Europe, Latin America, and other areas of the so-called "underdeveloped" world. For such reason, I suggest that the architectural language of

Villa Lugano 1-2 offers a more complex understanding of the transnational history of housing. The chapter shows how IDB authorities determined the construction of tall towers as a requirement of density, leaving design to the independent discretion of the Municipal Housing Agency and its team of architects. These architects, many committed to the ideas of a social architecture, were also followers of the contemporary debates within the modernist movement. The Argentine architects, faced with the opportunity of symbolically creating a "city" or a neighborhood in the northwestern corner of Buenos Aires choose the ideas of the Team X, the group of architects that seceded from the *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (CIAM; International Congresses of Modern Architecture). Villa Lugano 1-2 is thus an interesting point of convergence of transnational architectural languages and local technical determinants.

Taking together, chapters 3 and 4 show how the housing programs in Rio and Buenos Aires worked to "develop" a new class of homeowners that participated in a new mortgage market. Yet, the research also shows how those unable to qualify for loans faced different prospects for a "right" to decent housing. In Buenos Aires, income would determine whether certain families had access to Villa Lugano 1-2 or Ciudad General Belgrano (or, for the large majority of *villeros*, neither). In Guanabara, those that did not meet the income requirement found themselves directed to temporary housing sites, many of substandard quality and difficult access to the amenities of the modern city. Both chapters argue that economic criteria for access to the low-income housing promoted within the Alliance for Progress organized a redistribution of space that created a new class of homeowners in one area of the city while at the same time socially and spatially segregated the poorest urban residents in another location.

Chapter, 5 goes back to the social imaginaries behind the design of the housing projects, particularly from the perspective of the state and the people involved in their construction. I make use of a cultural approach to explore the kind of modernization that the housing agencies promoted through housing. The chapter focuses on the way in which new residents and local and foreign experts responded to the new built environment in the short and longer-term. Here the evidence is incomplete and fragmented, which makes difficult easy generalizations. It combines the anthropological and sociological works produced in the years after the occupation, newspapers, and interviews with the residents. These interviews, however, do not constitute a representative sample but do help to point out many of the problems and positive aspects of the housing programs. The research demonstrates how the political and social situation determined many of the initial outcomes of the projects. While this study shows how disruptive the eviction and relocation in the new neighborhoods became, it also needs to bring to forefront that for many residents this was actually an opportunity to reach a "respectable" home and leave the slums and the stigmatization associated with life in the slums.

The chapter ends with the analysis of other alternative solutions that a group of progressive architects and social scientists in both Rio and Buenos Airs proposed to cope with the housing problem by the late 1960s and early 1970s. I pay attention to the experiences of the urbanization of the *favela* Brás de Pina by the Community Development Company (CODESCO) in Rio and the urbanization of Villa #7 into the Barrio Villa Justo Suárez in Buenos Aires by the Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda (CMV; Municipal Housing Commission). These experiences, I seek to show, participated

of emerging transnational trends in the field of housing that argued in favor of thinking of housing from the perspective of the slum dweller rather than that of the policymaker or the expert.

Theory, Methodology, and Historiography

In this dissertation, I understand urban space and housing as both material and cultural constructions set in particular social formations. When Raymond Williams analyses the cultural transformations associated with modernity, he establishes that the city and the country were part of the same symbolic operation in literary and social discourses in a moment of increasing growth of urban industrial centers in Europe since the seventeenth century.[17] Consequently, the city resulted in modern times a material and cultural construction. In Latin America, Angel Rama characterized the *lettered* city as an intellectual invention of "lettered elites" that had imposed their imagination and design over the physical geographies of the cities and their hinterlands since colonial times. Adrián Gorelik has built upon this notion to argue that from the 1940s to the 1970s the "Latin American City" emerged as a cultural "trope" born from the "intellectual desire to build it as an object of knowledge and action."[18] In a similar direction, Karin Rosemblatt has shown how scientific practices and theories, such as Oscar Lewis's notion of the "culture of poverty," were part of national and transnational scientific networks that emerged through cross-border debates, contributing in the construction of North and

[17] Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
[18] Adrián Gorelik, "A produção da "cidade latino-americana," *Tempo Social* (São Paulo), vol. 17, no. 1(2005): 115.

South geo-spatial and political difference, especially after the Second World War.[19] The Latin American social scientists present at the 1959 meeting began nevertheless to question the universalizing aspiration of modernization theory by showing how certain rural, traditional institutions were actually contributing to the adaptation to urban, modern life of the recent migrant from the countryside. In so doing they were opening the possibility to think of Latin America as an "alternative modernity."[20]

For Henri Lefebvre, modern urban life occurred in a planned society and power relations were embedded in the spatial dimension of the city that manifest in both material and immaterial ways as space is a social production.[21] In a mutually constitutive relationship, urban scholars like Gino Germani or several architects and urban planners were influenced by the particular relations of power that constitute the socially produced urban space and, at the same time, the particular prism through which they codified that reality contributed in defining specific interventions into the urban fabric. Therefore, scholars, professionals, and experts not only reflected about their cities and their housing conditions but they also contributed in the production of the city.

Methodologically, this dissertation is not a comparative work between two historical cases of housing policies in different Latin American countries. It is rather a study of two different experiences of two localities that experienced the influx of monies for public housing that were channeled through bilateral agreements with the United

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[19] Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, "Other Americas: Transnationalism, Scholarship, and the Culture of Poverty in Mexico and the United States," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 89, no. 4 (November 2009): 603-641.

[20] I borrow the term from Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

[21] Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991); Foucault, "Questions on Geography," (1977) in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 63-77; Helen Liggett and David C. Perry, eds., *Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social Spatial Theory* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995).

States government or though the multilateral organizations created in the post World War II period (i.e., ECLA, OAS, IDB). Although the two localities may not have directly coordinated their public housing programs, they shared and shaped the interamerican contexts of foreign aid and local development. The transnational approach thus provides an enriching understanding of local phenomena. It allows to put two major Latin American cities undergoing urban reorganization in a context of political turmoil, economic instability, and social anxieties within multileveled circuits of ideas, capital, and networks of interaction. Both cases provide evidence to see the way in which intellectual and technical imaginaries actually manifested in two different local contexts. In other terms, the research shows the importance of thinking transnational processes as they unfold locally to avoid easy generalizations and the erroneous temptation of seeing similarities instead of difference. Following Micol Seigel, comparison, therefore, is always present but as part of an analysis that seeks to put two cities within a more global setting. This does not mean that comparison is not important, or secondary. On the contrary, it is an inevitable component of this work which ultimately seeks to show how developments in Rio and Buenos Aires were part of hemispheric transformations, but also of the specificities of the modernizing city in the aftermath of the second post war.

By the same token, my work seeks to contribute to the growing field of transnational urban history. Over the last ten years, several works – mainly edited volumes — have sought to define the contours and specificity of a global approach. Sean Purdy and Nancy Kwak have put together a special issue on new perspectives on public housing in the Americas bringing a new, refreshing impetus to the study of dwellings in

the region.[22] Yet, transnationalism here is not a central element and more of the articles remain confined within national boundaries and narratives. *Another Global City: Historical Explorations into the Transnational Municipal Moment, 1850–2000* (2008), coedited by Pierre-Yves Saunier and Shane Ewen, has shown the possibilities of thinking how local histories of cities are connected between each other. Most recently, Janice Reiff and Philip Ethington have coedited a volume on transnational urbanism that seeks to interrogate the specificity of transnational when thinking about cities. The results show how different scholars are still defining the contours and specificities of the field. My dissertation seeks to intervene in a field, which has predominantly focused on Europe and the U.S., by to incorporating Latin America into those transnational circuits of capital and ideas.

In this dissertation, the election of the transnational approach implies decentering the nation. This does not mean that the nation-state is not important in this history. On the contrary, it was very much influential in the way in which foreign assistance arrived to the cities and in shaping local policies. In addition, the selection of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro— rather than São Paulo (the largest of all South American cities), Brasilia (a city built "from nothing") or San Juan (a colonial city rebuilt following a devastating natural disaster)— speaks to these cities' signal symbolic place in the imaginaries of Argentina and Brazil, and the global imaginary of postwar Latin American cosmopolitanism. Buenos Aires, the capital city, and a federal district until 1992 (still capital city) was politically and administratively shaped by the nation-state. Rio, on the other hand, remained the symbolic capital of Brazil even as it was defining its particular

[22] See the articles in Sean Purdy and Nancy H. Kwak, "New Perspectives on Public Housing Histories in the Americas," *Journal of Urban History* 33, no. 3 (March 2007).

relationship with the federal government as the city lost its status as the capital city of Brazil precisely in 1960, when Brasília was inaugurated. In addition, USAID assistance to the Guanabara Housing Program was certainly part of US geopolitics to influence national and local politics. In this way, the presence of the nation in this history is very important as far as it is connected to the history of the housing problem in Rio and Buenos Aires. As a result, this dissertation is not a history of public housing in Argentina or Brazil, but rather the history of low-income housing initiatives localized in global networks of interaction. Framed in this way, I tried to avoid the risk of oversimplifying and generalizing processes that are too complex to put under a similar prism. This was certainly a challenging task. The own nature of the historical problem required making certain analysis that would not totally satisfy a reader who wants only a history of housing in Argentina or in Brazil.

My work not only crosses several geographical borders but also disciplinary fields. This is in part the reflection of the object of study. Slums and low-income housing in the postwar period became such an object of concern for so many disciplines that this analysis had to incorporate such complexity. Interdisciplinarity was one of the salient points in the production of knowledge on cities and slums: sociologists, anthropologists, economists, architects, urban planners, policymakers, social workers, among other actors worked together, debated among them, and formed interdisciplinary working teams. My crossing of disciplines seeks to recreate this complex world and I take from each particular field of discussion the elements that are useful to historicize the housing problem.

Dealing with several scholarly corpuses from three different countries and in three different languages has not always been an easy task, especially in the context in which the literature on popular housing and especially slums in the Argentina, Brazil, and the United States can be overwhelming. Ten years ago, Licia do Prado Valladares, Filipina Chinelli, and Lidia de Medeiros documented more than six hundred publications just on the subject on Brazilian *favelas.*[23] In Argentina and Brazil, housing and the poor have been the *métier* of number of sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists who were particularly interested in understanding the formation of grassroots movements that, as it happened in the Brazilian case were important to push for a social agenda during the dictatorship. Social historians have also focused on the history of housing, urban renewal, and squatter settlements concentrating predominantly in the formative years of the modern cities, from the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. Classic works such as Oscar Yujnovsky's on housing policies in Argentina between 1955-1983 (1984) or Nabil Bonduki's on the origins of social housing in Brazil (1998) have paved the way for historically-sensitive research in this field from multiple perspectives.

New cultural approaches to urban Latin American history have opened the possibilities for new questions, topics, and sources. In Argentina, works like Anahí Ballent or Rosa Aboy on housing and Peronism, Valeria Manzano or Isabella Cosse on domesticity, gender relations, and youth in Buenos Aires have showed a renovated

[23] Licia do Prado Valladares, Lidia Medeiros, and Filippina Chinelli, *Pensando as favelas do Rio de Janeiro, 1906-2000: uma bibliografia analítica* (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará/URBANDATA, 2003)

interest in postwar periods, especially the 1950s and 1960s.[24] In Brazil Licia do Prado Valladares work on the social imaginaries on *favelas* since the late nineteenth century to more contemporary times, Brodwyn Fischer's history of urban poor in Rio, Bryan McCann's work on community organizations and neighborhood associations in shaping urban politics, just to mention a few, make evident the recent historiographical trends.[25]

I build upon these contributions to recreate the history of Rio's *vilas* and Villa Lugano1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano in Buenos Aires. These housing projects have been partially analyzed in different historical accounts but a thorough analysis was still pending. In the case of the *vilas,* most of the literature focused on the relationship between Lacerda's urban agenda and real estates interests. In addition, these plans became the first experience at *favela* eviction and relocation in Rio. After the military coup in 1964, the military government of Castelo Branco took the experience of the Guanabara Popular Housing Policy and, with certain modifications, made it the official federal policy toward low-income housing. On the other hand, more contemporary revisionists studies of the Lacerda administration that stressed his diligence and "efficiency" minimized the negative aspects of the housing program and even tend to downplay the degree of U.S. assistance.[26] In this accounts, the history of *vilas* appear as

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[24] Anahí Ballent, *Las huellas de la política: vivienda, ciudad, Peronismo en Buenos Aires, 1943-1955* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes/Prometeo 3010, 2005); Isabella Cosse, *Estigmas de nacimiento Peronismo y orden familiar, 1946-1955* (Buenos Aires: Universidad San Andrés/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006); Valeria Manzano, "Sexualizing Youth: Morality Campaigns and Representations of Youth in Early 1960s Buenos Aires," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14, no. 4 (2005): 433–461 and "The Blue Jean Generation: Youth, Gender, and Sexuality in Buenos Aires, 1958-1975," *Journal of Social History* 42, no. 3 (March 2009): 657–676.

[25] Licia do Prado Valladares, *A invenção da favela: do mito de origem a favela.com* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2005); Brodwyn Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

[26] See, for instance, Maurício Dominguez Perez, *Lacerda na Guanabara: a reconstrução do Rio de Janeiro nos anos 1960* (Rio de Janeiro: Odisséia, 2007).

part of an innovative urban agenda that prioritize popular the housing and education of the popular classes. On the other hand, few works on the history of US-Latin American relations mention the role of USAID building the alliance. Jeffrey Taffet's *Foreign Aid as a Tool of Foreign Policy,* for instance, touches upon the construction of the *vilas* to stress US geopolitical interests in Brazil but does not provide much detail beyond what others had already said. In all these cases, the history of the *vilas* vanished as fast as they appeared.

In the case of Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano and, more generally, the urbanization of the Parque Almirante Brown, have lacked a thorough historical treatment. In the case of the Parque and Villa Lugano, located in the southwestern corner of Buenos Aires, the area with highest density of slums within the capital city's boundaries, is a place relatively unknown for most of the *porteños* that do not live in the city's south.[27] Anahí Ballent has offered very interesting ideas to think about the new orientation of Buenos Aires to the west during the Peronista administration. During those years, the Peronista government urbanized the swamplands of Flores (as the Parque was formerly known), built the international airport, recreational areas in Ezeiza, and Ciudad Evita (a planned garden city), and designed the parkway that connected these places with central Buenos Aires. According to Ballent, this was part of a symbolic operation to challenge the traditional orientation of the city around the port and the Rio de la Plata, a symbol of the liberal project. Although Ballent's periodization ends before our study starts, her insights offered an excellent opportunity to think about the

[27] Beatriz Sarlo, *La ciudad vista: mercancías y cultura urbana* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2009)

development of that area of the city and the centrality of thinking urban planning, aesthetics languages, and social imaginaries in the intersection of politics and power.

One of the few works that explore the housing complexes within the modernization of Buenos Aires in the developmentalist era is Laura Podalsky cultural study *Specular City: Transforming Culture, Consumption, and Space in Buenos Aires, 1955-1973* (2004). Her insightful work offers a rich analysis of the cultural and urban modernization in the years after the ouster of Perón. Her main thesis is that the *porteño* middle-classes sought to reassert their hegemony over Buenos Aires after the irruption of the working class in the *peronista* through the material and discursive renovation of the city. Part of that project was the construction of apartment buildings and office towers in international styles that dialogued with the most advanced trends in the world. While this new cosmpolitanization of culture and architecture in Buenos Aires was certainly part of modernizing trends in the post-Peronist years, this hypothesis is too encompassing and requires a more nuanced analysis when studying particular cases to avoid easy generalizations. Still, her work is one of the few that has explored urban renewal in post 1955 Buenos Aires years from a cultural perspective and her portrayal of the spatial changes in connection to the new era of mass consumption and cosmopolitanism as well as to increasing levels of social inequality are important.

I build upon the contributions of these works to explain how state interventions into the urban fabric and landscapes of urban poverty were not merely short-term attempts to solve urgent needs for housing but rather the physical manifestation of expectations, hopes, but also fears, and desires transnationally built about the modernization of Latin American societies. In so doing, I seek to provide a nuanced view of the Cold War in Latin America, helping to refine a historiography of the post-war period

that has tended to focus on the hot spots of the Cold War, and all-out anti-communist struggles. The analysis is animated by the new cultural approaches to the history of US-Latin American relations that challenge us to think about hemispheric relations in terms of "contact zones." A formulation first coined by Mary Louis Pratt, such zones refer to that range of networks, exchanges, borrowings, discourses, behaviors, and meanings "whereby the external became internalized in Latin America; to the way in which foreign people, ideas, commodities, and institutions have been received, contested, and appropriated."[28] Contact zones are sites of transculturation. As Gilbert Joseph argued, "contact zones are not geographic places with stable significations; they may represent attempts at hegemony, but are simultaneously sites of multivocality; of negotiation, borrowing, and exchange; and of redeployment and reversal."[29] I argue that public housing in Rio and Buenos Aires is precisely one of these zones built by multivocality, by negotiation, and by unstable borrowings.

This conceptualization helped me to gradually modify the initial assumptions during the first stages of my dissertation. I was initially struck by the fact that housing for the poor was actually a matter of concern and policymaking for technical, intellectual, and governmental elites in Latin American countries, especially in the aftermath of the second postwar. Cities like Rio de Janeiro or Buenos Aires actually underwent major urban restructuration and housing for the poor became an important part of such governmental interventions into the urban fabric. Slum eradications and relocation in housing complexes were part of the solutions put in practice by local governments as

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[28] Gilbert Joseph, Catherine Legrand, and Ricardo Salvatore, eds, *Close Encounter of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations.* (Durham and London, 1998), 5.
[29] Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel, Writing and Transculturation* (London and New York, 1992); Gilbert Joseph and Daniela Spenser, *In from the Cold: Latin Americas New Encounter with the Cold War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).

foreign loans became available for social programs. The optimistic hopes of modernization and development in Latin America framed the conception and execution of these housing programs. In the longer term, however, these modernization projects intended to alleviate the housing problem and promote in the incorporation of the former squatter into citizenry ultimately contributed in the modernization of poverty in Latin American cities. Where my historical cases evidence of what James Scott defined as "high modernism," a state ideology "envisioning a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life in order to improve the human condition"?[30] This overall framework seemed very tempting initially but the implications of Scott's insights were not entirely convincing to me. As many scholars have argued, the notion of high modernism gave the state a high degree of autonomy from social formations. As Coronil has pointed out, what is missing in Scott's analysis is actually the problematization of the relationship between the state and the capitalist market.[31] High Modernism, Coronil would say, was not an ideology that came from the state, disarticulated from broader social and economic forces. Without denying the specificity of the state and the policymakers, Coronil helps us re-think about modernization projects also as part of the history of capitalism.[32] For that reason, thinking the construction of the housing complexes built in Rio and Buenos Aires as part of transnational flows of peoples and ideas (as contact zones) provides a more nuanced picture that the one that would result when applying Scott's model.

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[30] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998)

[31] See the special issue of the American Historical Review on the discussion of James Scott's work: *The American Historical Review*, particularly Fernando Coronil, "Smelling Like a Market," *American* Historical Review 106, no. 1 (February 2001): 119-129.

[32] Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997)

There is another element in Scott's insightful work that was also very influential in the initial stages of this dissertation and this is was the condemnation of certain high modernist projects as failures. At first, it was tempting to see the housing developments in Rio and Buenos Aires as failures, considering the rapid way in which these places fell into disrepair and social ills. Such perspective was, however, teleological and less historical. In addition, thinking failure or success historically imposes a series of problems: how would various historical actors evaluate their built environment in changing historical conditions? How would residents adequately address this question since they are always considering the limited alternatives: a home in the Vila could be better than living in a *favela* or a *favela* better than living on the street? Scholars also differed in their assessment of the *vilas* in the years that followed their inauguration. Scholars like Licia do Prado Valladares identified in her work on Cidade de Deus, how former *favelados* actually abandoned their new homes in the *vilas* rapidly to go back to the slum or to make a small profit that would allow them to move to the suburbs.[33] This movement of people allowed low- and middle-class sectors to move to the homes that the original residents were leaving behind. Other criticism also pointed out the poor planning of the housing programs and how isolated from the city's center the new neighborhoods were. On the other hand, scholars like anthropologist Alba Zaluar disagreed with Valladares' criticism to the housing developments and showed a more varied response from the residents, including their active appropriation and transformation of the new built environment.[34] As Janice Perlman's recent work also showed, the assessing of these

[33] Licia do Prado Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978).
[34] Alba Zaluar, *A máquina e a revolta: as organizações populares e o significado da pobreza* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985).

places really depend on the changing historical contexts and the individual life histories of the residents over the longer term.[35] For many, eradication meant getting rid of the negative stigma of *favelados* while for others it meant differently. In any case, there are no general answers to these questions. There is also the issue of how residents built their identity as residents of housing complexes and the relationship with the memory and representation of *favelados.* This dissertation seeks to move forward from the analysis of these housing developments as success or failure and to explore how the various actors involved in this history were re-imagining the urban landscape in an era when the urban population was growing very rapidly and new arrivals had few resources.

Finally, Scott criticism of the role of the state from the left could also be taken by right-wing ideologues to argue that welfare policies or state large-scale interventions are harmful. The debates about the reconstruction of New Orleans post Katrina is a good evidence of the kinds of misunderstandings that the reading of Scott may lead to. In my work, the critical assessment of the history of the housing programs implemented under the Alliance for Progress is not a reaction against state interventionism in social areas but rather the problematization of how the implementation and conception of such interventions contributed in the modernization of urban poverty. What is still pending is the debate about what to do, and whose the responsibilities are, to house the overwhelming number of people that live in terrible conditions in the "underdeveloped" spaces of the globe.

[35] Janice Perlman, *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

CHAPTER 1

THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE HOUSING PROBLEM IN THE ERA OF DEVELOPMENTALISM

Introduction

In July 1959, the United Nations' Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Bureau of Social Affairs, and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL) organized in Santiago, Chile at ECLA's headquarters, a key seminar on urbanization problems in Latin America. The conference's immediate objectives, as stated by the *rapporteurs* Philip M. Hauser (1909-1994) and José Medina Echavarría (1903-1977), were to produce knowledge on the impact of the rapid urbanization process in Latin American in order to assist the republics of the region in the formulation of policy.[1] In addition, the conference aimed to expand the exchange of

[1] Philip M. Hauser was an American demographer and a pioneer in urban studies. He was the director of the University of Chicago's Population Research Center for more than thirty years, and served as president of the American Sociological Association, the American Statistical Association, and the Population Association of America. He served as international consultant for different international organizations. Of particular interest for this dissertation is his work for UNESCO organizing the conferences on the problems of urbanization in Asia and the Far East and in Latin America in the 1950s. At that time, he was also appointed the Chair of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Urbanization (1958-1964), published several works on urbanization in different parts of the globe, including the organization of a special issue on World Urbanism for *The American Journal of Sociology* (1955). This publication was one of the first pieces to address urbanization beyond US borders written in the country. See Evelyn M. Kitagawa, "Philip M. Hauser (1909-1994)," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 140, no. 2 (June 1996): 241–244. José Medina Echavarría was born in Spain and exiled in Mexico in 1939 given his participation in the Spanish Republic during the Civil War, becoming an influential Latin American intellectual. In Mexico, Medina Echavarría was a professor in the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) and the Colegio de Méxcico. He also directed the collection on sociology for Fondo de Cultura Económica press (1939-1944). After a brief stay in Colombia, Echavarría worked in Puerto Rico until 1952. From there, his career will focus on the sociology of development, especially through his work at ECLA/CEPAL and the Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Planning (ILPES, Instituto Latinoaméricano de Planificación Económica y Social).

scholarship at an inter-American scale.[2] The conference participants included a number of social scientists from throughout the Americas who had been conducting fieldwork in slums and working class neighborhoods of Latin America. Chief among the participations were sociologists, Gino Germani (1909-1977), who had worked with *villas miserias* of Buenos Aires, José Matos Mar (1925-), who had studied the *barriadas* of Lima, Andrew Pearse, who had worked with *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, and Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes (1925-2011), who had conducted similar work in São Paulo.[3]

The meeting at ECLA identified the widespread presence of slums and shantytowns as "perhaps the most serious social problems of urban areas in Latin America," as "they dramatize the acute character of the housing problem in Latin American cities and reveal some of the worst physical and social consequences of poverty and the low level of living."[4] The "housing problem" became one of the salient aspects of the urban transformation that were rapidly transforming the cities' landscapes. The scholars present at the conference shared a vision of their historical times as one of

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[2] Philip Hauser, *Urbanization in Latin America* (Paris: UNESCO, 1961), 19; Nels Anderson, "Urbanism and Urbanization," *The American Journal of Sociology* 65, no. 1 (July 1959): 68-73.

[3] Gino Germani, was an Italian exiled durint Fascism who emigrated to Argentina. There, he began a prolific intellectual life especially that included his editorial work through the translation and diffusion of European sociology and social psychology. He is regarded as a salient figure in the institutionalization and professionalization of modern sociology in Argentina. José Matos Mar is a Peruvian anthropologist that pioneered research works in the *barriadas* (shantytowns) in Peru in the mid-1950s. José Matos Mar was also cousin of Modernist architect and urban planner Eduardo Neira. In the late 1950s, the architect introduced architect John Turner to Matos Mar and into the social aspects of squatter settlements in Lima; Andrew Pearse was a British sociologist who dedicated most of his carreer to the study of Latin American agrarian society. In the early in 1950s, Pearse conducted fieldwork in the Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago and the Grenadines) on popular culture. In late 1955, Pearse travels to Brazil as an expert in sociology of education to undertake a study for UNESCO and Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisas Educacionais about Brazilian education system and its role as an agent of cultural change. His fieldwork in Rio in the *Favela do Esqueleto* was presented at the meeting at ECLA in 1959. Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes was a Brazilian sociologist formed in the Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política (São Paulo) and did his graduate studies at University of Chicago, recommended in the 1950s. By then, Brandão Lopes worked on social mobility, the impact of mass education in the country, and the study of the emergent industrial working class in São Paulo. In this latter case, his focus was on the rural origins of the *paulista* working class, forms of solidarity, associationism, and political participation. His research interest aimed at questions of modernization and development of Brazilian and Latin American societies.

[4] Hauser, *Urbanization in Latin America,* 56.

sudden and unprecedented transformation that required the intervention of the state and the expert in guiding such process into an era of modernization and development. They subscribed to the idea that, as Barbara Weinstein has pointed out, "spatially organized inequalities would be addressed, corrected, and eventually erased through the proper modes of government and technical intervention."[5]

In the postwar era moment, the housing "problem" came to be defined as a challenge of physically building urban housing to the standards of Western capitalist democracy; defining the state's role as an agent of material modernization, democratization and the social integration of the urban dweller; and applying the social sciences to the technocratic administration of planned housing, redevelopment and urbanization. More specifically, the problem of housing was defined by the inadequacy of the housing stock for middle and working classes as a result of the lack of homes and the advanced degree of obsolete dwellings; the disorganization of the mortgage market and credit to facilitate access to homeownership; the paucity of the building industry; and the unregulated use of urban land. In addition, the housing question was directly associated with the productivity of the nation, as the home was the basic unit in which the workers reproduced its labor force. As a problem of productivity it was also a problem of development and its solution had to be part of broader comprehensive national planning. Within the sociological and political circuits of knowledge produced to address the Latin American path to post-war modernity, housing policy emerged as a discursive and practical antidote to underdevelopment, poverty and social instability.

[5] Barbara Weinstein, "Developing Inequality," *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 1 (February, 2008): 3.

The meeting at ECLA revealed a strong concern for the most dramatic manifestation of the housing problem which was the alarming growth of slums and other forms of substandard housing. From a sociological and anthropological perspective, the slum house, allegedly inhabited by rural migrants, was part of a landscape of urban misery that contributed in the reproduction of psychological and cultural traits associated with traditional-rural ways of life. As this chapter will show, slums were, therefore, rural "enclaves" in the city, which could impact negatively in the best efforts to unleash the forces of progress and modernization. Modernization theory and the *developmentalist* school of thinking associated with ECLA, identified the presence of a dual society in Latin American cities, characterized by the coexistence of "traditional"/"rural" and "modern"/"industrial" patterns of behavior. The question, then, was about the character of the integration, acculturation, and assimilation of the traditional into the modern.

Characterized as a mass living at the margins of urban society, urban scholars, but also policymakers, urban planners and experts, were mostly concerned with the presence of a "new type of personality," as the manifestation of the "psycho-social aspect of urban culture;" a mentality carried out by a "class of human beings with special attitude towards the world and his relations with the rest of mankind."[6] This depiction was certainly associated with the anxieties caused by the political and social mobilization of this mass of new urban residents that supported the populist experience. This support, according to the scientific and political elites considered, had been detrimental to the full development of truly democratic institutions in the region. With the overthrow of charismatic leaders, particularly Juan Perón in Argentina (1946-1955) and Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1930-1945; 1951-1954), elites asked how to promote economic modernization and social

[6] Hauser, *Urbanization in Latin America,* 25.

incorporation in a stable democracy or how to consolidate capitalist accumulation in a context of political moderation.

In locating traits of traditional-rural life in the slums, as evidenced, for instance, in the spontaneous and rudimentary construction of *ranchos* in illegal lands, these elites projected physical features into social attributes and life-styles. In so doing, they assumed that the bad quality of the poor urban environment and the kind of solution adopted by poor resident to their problem of shelter was actually the manifestation of internal qualities. The presence of slums and poor residents, therefore, posited the problem of what to do and how to incorporate them in order to unleash the social and cultural forces to modernization. As a result, the "housing problem" was both a physical and a socio-cultural problem. In the first case it required the complex articulation of solutions crafted by the urban planner, state experts, and economists. In the second case, it condensed the postwar expectations and cold-war anxieties about the "personality structure" in transitional societies. As slums, and their homes, became the *loci* where scholars sought to find the clues about the disruptive effect of traditional/rural ways of life and social and personal disorganization the housing "problem" became a central of the urban "problem."

By arguing that the problems of urbanization became inseparable from those of development, this chapter explores the role of low-income housing and urban landscapes of poverty at the historical confluence of *developmentalism*, social sciences, and urban planning in the late 1950s. I ask why the social sciences, urban experts, and governments of the Americas granted working class conditions and housing renewed attention. I contend that governments, social scientists, and technical elites of the postwar Americas sought to modernize Latin American societies not just by deepening the mechanisms for

capitalist accumulation but also by creating built environments designed to generate modern sociabilities and behaviors. Modern housing would remedy urban squalor, promote the integration and assimilation of new urban residents, stimulate middle-class habits and mass consumption, and moderate political behavior, especially among the poor. Community life would integrate the individual into the polity and socialize him for the responsibilities and duties of citizenship. Housing and urban planning came to be both a desired outcome of modernization and an antidote to underdevelopment and social disintegration.

The chapter begins with a statistical analysis of the demographic and geographic expansion of Rio and Buenos Aires since the late 19th century throughout the period under consideration. The analysis pays attention to the key political interventions of the populist governments of Vargas and Perón in the area of low-income housing. I explore the impact of the presence of the urban "other," the recent rural migrant, in the understanding of the problem. The attention then moves to the study of the way in which ECLA and U.S. modernization theorists met in the analysis of the urban problem. Here, I pay particular attention to the way in which U.S. sociologists and demographers became aware of the situation of Latin American cities, following a trend that anthropologists had opened in their studies of peasant indigenous societies in Latin America. I also explore the efforts of Latin American social scientists to renovate the social science at a national and regional level to demonstrate how the consolidation of social sciences in Latin America occurred in a time when urban studies were becoming central. The point is to verify how social studies undertaken in those years analyzed slums and their inhabitants and how those studies opened more native ways that confronted the original and

universalizing postulates of modernization theory. In concluding, the chapter summarizes the arguments that came to challenge the assumptions of modernization theorists in respect to the characterization of the "marginality" located in the "urban slums." I explore how dependency theory and Marxist theory begun to reassess the experience of the slums characterizing them as a "solution" rather than as a "problem."

Urban Growth and Substandard Housing: A Historical Review

The rapid process of urbanization that followed the end of the Second World War irreversibly altered the physical and social geography of cities in the so-called underdeveloped world. Massive rural to urban migration, industrialization, more and better job opportunities, lower mortality rates, and the general improvement of living conditions contributed to this change. Contemporary demographers like Kingsley Davis explained this growth as different from the historical experience of the advanced industrial countries whose cities grew as a "function" of industrialization.[7] In Latin America, the stagnation and decline of the rural sector aggravated by adverse weather conditions, offered little to the inhabitants of the countryside in comparison with the opportunities, real or apparent, of the city. Thus, massive migrations to urban centers became the independent explanatory variable of the demographic expansion of Latin American cities.

Urban centers in the region grew faster than in any other part of the world, at a rate of 55 percent between 1950 and 1960. By 1950, almost a quarter of Latin America's total population lived in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants and 17 percent resided

[7] Certainly, improvements in the mortality rate, health and dietary regimes, mechanization of the rural sector, and the own pulling forces of the cities were among the factors that explained urbanization.

in cities of 100,000 or more.8 This differed from the U.S. with more people living in smaller cities of 2,000 or 5,000 or more. Latin America was predominantly rural in 1950 with an average urban population living in cities of more than 2,000 residents at 39 percent (61 million people). Ten years later the rate of urbanized population had increased to 46 percent evidencing a trend that accelerated in the following decades. This situation varied from country to country: Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile were demographically speaking the most urbanized countries while the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Haiti showed the lowest levels by 1960.9 By 1950, almost a quarter of Latin America's total population lived in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants and 17 percent resided in cities of 100,000 or more. This differed, for instance, from the U.S. where more people lived in smaller cities of 2,000 or 5,000 or more.

Comparatively, Latin American was more urban than Asia and Africa but less than North America, Europe, and Australia. For contemporary demographers and social scientists like Kingsley Davis, Philip Hauser, Harley Browning, or Bert Hoselitz this demographic "explosion" exceeded the cities' productive capacity, creating a delicate situation in which urban growth surpassed economic productivity leading to rising inequality and social gap. Demographers and social scientists called this process "over-urbanization," defining urban growth as the result of the transference of rural poverty to

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[8] The use of urbanization in this analysis refers particularly to the technic-statistical and demographic emphasis that contemporary analysts used. The UN defined as "urban" the built-up areas over more than 20,000 inhabitants and metropolitan areas to those of over 100,000 inhabitants. Demographers and social scientists also classified as "urban concentrations of more 5,000 and 10,000 residents; see Kingsley Davis and Ana Casis' "Urbanization in Latin America," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (April 1946): 186-207 and vol. 24, no. 3 (July 1946); 292-314; Richard M. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 4 (July 1962): 473-493.

[9] Walter Harris, *The Growth of Latin American Cities* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1971), 39-70; Philip Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in *Industrialization and Society,* ed. Bert F Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (Paris: UNESCO, 1963), 203.

the city than a factor of industrialization.[10] For Hauser, over-urbanization was at the core of the social, economic, and technological problems that limited the development of underdeveloped countries.[11]

Cities became more populated, imposing stresses on the physical capacity of the urban infrastructure. Spaces of urban poverty proliferated, as housing options for middle- and working-class families became scarce. As a result, substandard forms of living intensified in central areas –overcrowding the existing tenements and boarding houses- while shantytowns, slums, and squatter settlements multiplied along the limits of the cities, or, when geography allowed, in the hillsides of cities like Rio de Janeiro or Caracas. The lower segments of the working class inhabited those places. They were usually unskilled workers employed in the service sector (petty trade, street vending, construction, domestic service) and, to a lesser extent, in industry. Semi-skilled workers and state employees also could live in slums as these places provided an affordable shelter and a proximity to the workplace, as it was the case with those workers who lived closed to Rio's port. A large part of these new residents had recently arrived from the countryside and settled in the slums, assisted by already settled acquaintances and family. Slums were an alternative to the lack of affordable housing. In many cases, new residents found people that had came from their same place of origin, and those networks provided some sort of initial support and opportunity. While the features of slums and shantytowns varied from country to country, from city to city, and from site to site, they shared certain similarities. Slums usually occupied illegally private and public lands; improvised shacks were generally single-room, rudimentarily built (at least initially) with unsuitable

[10] Waldemiro Bazzanella, "Industrialização e urbanização no Brasil," *América Latina* 6, no. 1 (1963): 3-26.
[11] Philip Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," 203.

materials, and for the most part lacked sanitary facilities and close access to urban services (hospitals or schools). Social inequality manifested increasingly in the growing segregated slums becoming one of the most striking features of the post-war modern Latin American city.

In the specific history of Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, both cities shared certain structural trends that affected each city in particular ways. Both port cities began their first cycle of modernization between 1880 and 1930 as a result of the expansion of capitalism led by the export sector and the modernizing government. In few decades, both cities turned from colonial capitals to modern, cosmopolitan cities. In the late nineteenth century, the Argentine export-driven economy and the massive European immigration altered the social and physical composition of the city with the population growing from 239,000 to 2,035,000 between 1869 and 1914.[12] In Rio, the coffee export boom, the abolition of slavery, and the end of imperial rule also altered the city. Overcrowded tenements and boarding homes, located in the cities' downtown, came to be the general solution for shelter that poor workers found. Exploitative rental conditions and the lack of hygienic conditions showed the inequalities of economic growth and precipitated social unrest. In the early twentieth century the state intervened first in a repressive way and then through an agenda of social engineering and eugenics. In Rio, the first *favela* emerged in Morro da Providéncia (Providencia Hill) at the end of the nineteenth century initiating the long process of occupation of Rio's hillsides.

[12] See the classics James Scobie, *Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb, 1870-1910* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), José Luis Romero and Luis Alberto Romero, *Buenos Aires, historia de cuatro siglos*, 2nd rev. ed. (Buenos Aires: Altamira, 2000); Adrián Gorelik, *La grilla y el parque: espacio público y cultura urbana en Buenos Aires, 1887-1936* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1998).

A new cycle of urban expansion began in the 1930s as a result of protectionism and incipient state-led import-substitution industrialization in a context of decline of the traditional rural export sector. The city's population grew from 3,457,000 in 1936 to 4,724,000 in 1947 to 6,739,000 in 1960 to 8,353,000 in 1970.[13] And while the population of the city of Buenos Aires remained constant over the period, the growth spread toward the suburbs of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), consolidating the metropolitan region.[14] Such an impressive growth was the result of a second wave of migrants this time coming from the countryside instead of abroad. By 1947 almost half of the population of the country was concentrated in this area. But while the percentages are impressive they nevertheless show that this considerable growth was still moderate: 2.7 percent comparing with the urban explosion that other cities in the region (e.g. São Paulo or Bogotá) began to experience at that same time. New neighborhoods and *villas miserias* appeared close to the industries, while existing working-class areas kept growing as new contingents of workers arrived.[15] In the mid 1950s, the number of *villas* and people living there was relatively low (just one percent of the city's population and two percent of the overall population in GBA) compared with other cities like Rio de Janeiro, although the number of slum residents doubled in the following decade.[16] As a result, what many

[13] Gino Germani, *Estructura social de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1955).
[14] Horacio A. Torres, "El mapa social de Buenos Aires en 1943, 1947 y 1960. Buenos Aires y los modelos urbanos," *Desarrollo Económico* 18, no. 70 (July 1978): 163-204; Zulma Recchini de Lattes, *La población de Buenos Aires componentes demográficos del crecimiento entre 1855 y 1960* (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1971); Charles Sargent, *The Spatial Evolution of Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1870-1930* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1974).
[15] Irregular settlements had already existed in Buenos Aires since the late nineteenth century but they were small in number and their existence was temporal; see Lidia de la Torre, "La ciudad residual," in *Buenos Aires, historia de cuatro siglos,* ed. José Luis Romero and Luis Alberto Romero (Buenos Aires: Altamira, 2000), 287-298.
[16] Oscar Yujnovsky, *Claves políticas del problema habitacional argentino: 1955-1981* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1984), 249.

initially regarded as a temporary housing solution was becoming a permanent aspect of the city.

Rio de Janeiro also grew spectacularly starting in the 1930s as new industries began to spread into the city's suburbs, especially to the north of the historical city center. Given Rio's hilly geography, urban expansion from the center was largely conditioned upon the railway network into the North Zone, and tunnel-construction and landfill projects in the South Zone. Chapter 3 describes this process in more detail the process of the differentiation of function, as industries settled in the north (Maracanã, Meier) while the middle and upper classes moved to the south (e.g., Botafogo, Copacabana). [17] The decline of mortality rates, the improvement in life expectancy, and especially migration from neighboring states set the conditions for a steady population growth starting in the 1940s. Rio's urban population more than doubled between 1940 and 1970 with a historical decennial growth rate of thirty-nine percent in the 1950s. [18] In contrast, Rio's rural population growth was negative in the 1960s. This was part of a broader, structural national process in which 39 million people moved from rural areas to urban centers between 1950 and 1970.[19] São Paulo, a metropolitan center like Rio and itself an industrial juggernaut, received more migrants than Rio.[20] By 1950, São Paulo's

[17] General Electric, Gillete, and the textile Nova América, for instance, settled close to the train's stations Maria da Graça, Jacarezinho e Bonfica, and Del Castilho, respectively.
[18] Population in Rio almost doubled from 1940 to 1960 from 1,764,141 inhabitants (1940); 2,377,451 (1950); 3,307,163 (1960) residents; and 4,250,000 in 1970, increasing a 39% between 1950 and 1960 2.3 million in 1950, 3.2 million in 1960, and 4.25 million in 1970. Estado da Guanabara, *Anuário estatístico* (Guanabara: Secretaria do Governo, 1961/2), 17; data on rural mobility in ECLA's *Boletín Demográfico. Edición especial. Urbanización y Evolución de la Población Urbana de América Latina (1950 -1990).*
[19] 8 million people migrated to the cities in 1950 (almost 24% of the Brazil's rural population), almost 14 million in the 1960s (26% of the rural population), and 17 million in 1970 (almost 40% of the rural population; Thomas Merrick, "A população brasileira a partir de 1945," in *A transição incompleta: Brasil desde 1945*, ed. Edmar Bacha and Herbert S. Klein (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1986), 62.
[20] This was surely a time of growth for Brazilian largest cities, such as Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, Salvador, Recife.

population began to overpass that of Rio and it almost doubled in 1970.[21] But Rio outmatched São Paulo in the number of *favela* residents: while the slum population of São Paulo represented a 1.1% of the municipal population in 1974, in Rio it increased almost threefold from 1950 to 1970 (169,305 in 1950 to 554,277 in 1970).[22]

The existence of *favelas* in Rio and its imprint in popular culture preceded the generalization of *villas miserias* in Buenos Aires.[23] Yet, both cities came to recognize that irregular settlements were part of the urban fabric. The first ever taken census of *favelas* in 1948, organized by the municipal government of the Federal District, established that almost 139,000 people lived in 105 *favela*s. The vast majority had settled in the suburbs of the north (44%), while the rest occupied in similar proportions the South Zone (24%) and the Centro-Tijuca area (22%). In terms of their place of origin, the census reported that 52% of *favelados* had come from the neighboring states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo, and that only 13% of them chose to live in a *favela*. Despite a general assumption that people of color constituted the vast majority of favelados, the data of the 1948 census and the numbers that emerged from the 1950 favela census indicated that *favelas* were racially diverse. 28.96% of favelados were

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[21] Total population for São Paulo's metropolitan region was 1.6 million in 1940; 2.6 million in 1950; 4.7 million in 1960, and 8.1 million in 1970. The 1950s was the decade with most spectacular rate of increase (6.1% annually). São Paulo, Prefeitura de "População nos Anos de Levantamento Censitário Município e Região Metropolitana de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo e Brasil, 1872 a 2010," in *Histórico Demográfico do Município de São Paulo,* accessed online, 28 May 2011, http://smdu.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/historico_demografico/tabelas/pop_brasil.php

[22] For the general process, Mauricio de Almeida Abreu, *Evolução Urbana Do Rio De Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: IPLANRIO, 1987). Statistics from Lucien Parisse, *Favelas do Rio de Janeiro: evolução, sentido, Cadernos CENPHA No. 5* (Rio de Janeiro: CENPHA, 1969), 97-112; Suzana Pasternak Taschner. "Favelas e cortiços: vinte anos de pesquisa urbana no Brasil," *Cadernos IPPUR* (Rio de Janeiro) X, no. 2 (1996): 89-115; Eva Alterman Blay, *Luta pelo espaço: textos de sociologia urbana* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1978) and *Eu não tenho onde morar: vilas operárias na cidade de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Nobel, 1985). Brazil became a predominantly urban country in the 1960s when it reaches 55.9% of the population (census 1970). This tendency began in the 1940s (36.5% census 1950) and 1950s (43.0% census 1960); ECLA, *Boletín demográfico,* p. 18

[23] On the influence of the favelas in popular culture see Bryan McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in The Making of Modern Brazil* (Durham, Duke University Press, 2004)

recorded to be whites [*brancos*], 35.07% blacks [*pretos*]; 35.88% mixed [*pardos*]; and 0.09% Asian [*amarelos*]).[24] In terms of occupation, 30% of the enumerated population worked in the secondary sector, 20% in construction, and 20% as domestic workers, being construction and domestic service concentrated in southern Rio. By the time our periodization begins, Rio's *favelas* were thus already present in Rio's geography and culture, but their imprint in the city would begin to increase dramatically since them.

In Buenos Aires, *villas miserias* were not as old as in Rio de Janeiro. Nevertheless, a history of irregular settlements stretched back into late nineteenth century.[25] These settlements localized in Retiro and in the city's south, were usually temporal or short-term. By then, it was more extended the practice of living in overcrowding tenements or housing boards (*conventillos* and *casas de pensión*). With the increasing industrialization of the city in the 1930s and 1940s, new *villas* appeared in the industrial areas, especially in the suburbs, as extensions of existing working class neighborhoods. By the mid 1950s, the number of *villas* and their residents was relatively low especially if compared with Rio: just 1% of the city's population and a 2% of the overall population in GBA.[26] The numbers changed markedly in the 1960s and the 1970s as a result of the regressive distribution of wealth after the ouster of Perón. By the late 1960s, the *villa* population peaked, hitting a half million residents in GBA alone by the end of the decade, almost Rio's number for the same period. If many thought of these settlements as logical and even inevitable temporary solution in a structural transition, it

[24] José Alípio Goulart, *Favelas do Distrito Federal*, Estudos Brasileiros n. 9 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento da Agricultura, 1957), 35; IBGE, Conselho Nacional de Estadísitica, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, *As favelas do Distrito Federal e o Censo demográfico de 1950.*
[25] Lidia de la Torre, "La ciudad residual," 287-298.
[26] See Cecilia Zannetta, *The Influence of the World Bank on National Housing and Urban Policies: The Case of Mexico and Argentina during the 1990s.* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), p. 190; Oscar Yujnovsky, 249; Lucien Parisse, *Favelas do Rio de Janeiro.*

would become later clear that they were a more permanent reminder of the social inequalities of economic modernization.

Quantifying the scope of housing stock for the case Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro is difficult due to inconsistency and lack of standardization of the data as well as the changing definitions of household and dwelling in the different censuses. Comparison between different historical periods and the disaggregation of statistics were usually done by approximation. This was mostly a problem that the own historical actors were well aware about almost over the whole period under analysis. International organizations, scholars, urban planners, policymakers throughout the Americas complained about the lack of reliable and comparable data to understand not only the housing market but also most social indicators. In this regard, the standardization of censuses across the region was also part of the demands of the OAS and the UN, as part of the attempts to modernize Latin American nations. Good planning, the basis for any rational development program, required a reliable source of information.[27]

In Argentina, there were three censuses in the period under consideration: 1947, 1960, 1970 and each of it have defined "household" and "dwelling" in different ways. The 1960 census, for instance, accounted only for occupied dwellings [*viviendas particulares ocupadas*], leaving aside those units that were temporally occupied or vacant.[28] The three censuses sought to account for most of the housing possibilities, ranging from the single-family home and apartment buildings to the most substandard form of shelter. Yet, the 1960 census considered particular dwellings as "the combination

[27] Not casually, the OAS created the Committee on the Censo de las Américas in 1946 to define a series of standard notions and methodologies to be implemented in the census that most of the countries of the region were organizing for 1950.
[28] It is not clear whether the 1947 and 1970 censuses used this same criteria or not, although scholars have assumed they did.

of one or more rooms, kitchen, and bath exclusively used by an individual or a group of people that conformed the 'census household.' What the census left aside was any form of collective dwelling –boarding houses (*pensiones* or *inquilinatos*) and tenements (*conventillos*)- in which individuals or families shared facilities (bathroom and kitchen). It also left aside the *villas*, *ranchos*, or any other form of substandard housing that rarely had bathrooms and kitchens.[29]

	1947	**1960**	**1970**
Capital Federal	763,000	659,000 (680,000)[a]	922,000
GBA	429,000	904,000 (961,000)[a]	1,532,000

Table 1 - Housing Censuses (1947, 1960, and 1970) – round values.
[(a)] between brackets the total amount of housing adding the unoccupied units.

In 1947, the housing stock was greater in the city than in the outskirts although Greater Buenos Aires was growing at a much rapid pace. The total number of rooms was 1,945,000, the ratio between residents and housing was 3.70, and the ratio between residents and rooms was 1.45. In general terms, the 1947 census show for the whole nation a situation of overcrowding [Spanish *hacinamiento*] in which almost three fourths of the total population (11.5 million people) lived in dwellings of no more than three rooms. For the cluster of people living in one-room homes, the percentage was 3.47 people per room and 1.92 for the cluster of two and three rooms. In the industrialized countries of the West, a "comfortable" proportion was one person per room.

[29] The data in this section comes mostly from the 1947, 1960, and 1960 national censuses; Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1965-1969* (Buenso Aires: CONADE, 1965), pp. 100-103; Consejo Federal de Inversiones, *Bases Políticas para una política nacional de vivienda* (Buenos Aires: CFI, 1964).

In 1960, the total number of private dwellings in the Federal Capital was 680,027, while in GBA the figure grew almost twofold from the last census to 961,000. In the city, almost the same proportion of residents owned or rented their primary dwelling (almost half percent each sector). The rate of homeownership grew significantly compared to the 17.5% in 1947. Taken together the city and GBA, the ownership grew from 26.8% to 58.1%.[30] This expansion was mainly due to the sanctioning of the 1949 Horizontal Property Law that allowed for the ownership of separate apartments in multifamily buildings. As Horacio Torres pointed out this situation shows the massive diffusion of the small urban property.[31]

Comparing the figures in the Federal Capital it is possible to see a slight decrease in the number of individual occupied homes. Yet, the number of rooms increased to 2,347,000 which might be due to the construction of apartment buildings as well as the replacement of older housing for office and corporative buildings in the city's center (downtown). The 1960 census also showed that the large majority of people (94.5%) lived in single-family homes and apartment buildings although an important percentage, the remaining 6.7%, lived in substandard housing, including boarding homes, tenements, and slums. The index of family composition in 1963 was, according to the National Housing Bank, 3.15 people per family.[32] As a result, there were more than one family (1.4) per dwelling, the average number of residents per housing was 4.4 while the average number of rooms per dwelling was 3.6, which led to an average of 1.3 people per

[30] Horacio Torres, "El mapa social de Buenos Aires en 1943, 1947 y 1960. Buenos Aires y los modelos urbanos," *Desarrollo Económico* 18, no. 70 (July 1978): 163–204.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1965-1969* (Buenso Aires: CONADE, 1965), 101.

room -still high. Of course, this quantitative information is based in aggregated figures and presents a rather static image of the housing situation.

The housing stock grew between 1960 and 1970, increasing 39.9% in the city and notably 69.5% in GBA. In the latter case, the most significant increase occurred in the outer ring, where most of working class dwellings had been recently built. In the case of the Federal Capital, the Municipal Housing Commission estimated in late 1969 that the housing deficit was at least 182,000 units, 20% of the total housing stock for the city (the percentage for the whole nation was in the late 1960s, 32%). One in every five families, according to the CMV, shared the same dwelling or lived in substandard conditions. The housing deficit affected fundamentally the low-income sectors. In the city of Buenos Aires, a fourth of the families in need of housing had no saving capacity and the remaining percentage could afford a home only in the long term if given cheap mortgages. Of a total deficit of 182,000 the CMV calculated that 120,000 units were the result of overcrowding (hacinamiento) while 62,000 the number of families living in boarding houses, tenements, and slums. The construction of the housing programs studied in this dissertation sought to intervene in the real estate market supplying few of the needed dwellings for the lower income sectors. [33]

In the case of Rio de Janeiro, the comparison across censuses is more consistent than in the Argentine case because there is more continuity in the definitions and methodologies. In the particular case of Rio, however, there was a significant jurisdictional transformation (the city of Rio became the State of Guanabara in 1960 when the Federal District moved to Brasília) that altered the organization of the census

[33] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, "Introducción al trabajo de evaluación de problema habitacional de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: validez y limitaciones," mimeo, 1969.

districts. The census of 1960 only accounted particular dwellings, not collective housing, which makes also difficult to determine the number of residents and rooms in boarding houses, slums, and other forms of substandard housing. Boarding houses, for instance, were considered as apartment building and each room were counted individually. The 1960 census also surveyed the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, which complements the information and shows the importance that understanding *favela* reached in those years.[34]

	1920	**1940**	**1950**	**1960**
Households			434,121	712,767
Dwellings	128,961	301,701	442,593	708,218
Particular	125,994	291,149	434,121	708,218
Collective	2,967	10,552	8,472	N/A

Table 2 - Households and dwellings in Rio de Janeiro
* Source: National Censuses.

The housing stock in Rio followed population growth and the expansion of the city, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. As we have seen before, these were the years of consolidation of Rio's suburbs, especially to the working-class suburbs to the north. It is also possible to see an increasing density in areas in the South Zone, particularly Copacabana. In 1962, the government of Rio de Janeiro (jurisdictionally the State of Guanabara between 1960 and 1975) estimated that around a million people out of 3.5 million lived in substandard housing.[35] The housing deficit, according to official information, was 200,000 dwellings, including the *favela* residents and the population of the *casas de cômodo* (boarding houses). Considering that the total population of Rio grew

[34] IBGE, Conselho Nacional de Estatística, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, *Censo Demográfico de 1950 – Distrito Federal*, Série Regional, Volume XXIV, Tomo; IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, *Censo Demográfico de 1960 – Guanabara, VII Recenseamento Geral do Brasil*, Série Regional, Volume I, Tomo XII, 1 parte; IBGE, Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística, Serviço Nacional de Recenseamento, *Censo Demográfico de 1960 – Favelas do Estado da Guanabara, VII Recenseamento Geral do Brasil*, Série Especial, Volume IV.

[35] Estado da Guanabara, *Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse sociais*, July 1962 (mimeo), p. 3-7.

from 2,377,000 (1950) to 3,281,000 (1960) at 3.36% annual rate, the government estimated an increase of more than 110,000 people a year. With an average of five residents per household, the calculation was that more than 23,500 homes had to be built every year just to keep pace with the population growth. In addition, there was also an average of 2,000 dwellings bulldozed every year as a result of dilapidation, condemnation decrees, public works, and replacement with new construction. In this backdrop, the number of new homes that the private market built in those years was around 14,000. As a result, there were only 11,000 new dwellings available every year, a number that fell short from the 23,500 required. The State projected an increase in the number of housing deficit with a rate of 5.7% a year, almost twice the rate of population growth. With this scenario in mind, the state considered that more people would live in the *favela*. For that reason, the state considered an intervention in the housing market, especially for the lower income sectors, urgent in the early 1960s.

While these statistics are very useful to size the transformation of Latin American cities, particularly Rio and Buenos Aires, they nevertheless present a static image that, without further analysis, may understate the dynamic structuration of those social and geographical spaces.

City and Housing under Vargas and Perón

In Brazil and Argentina, the pro-labor governments of Vargas and Perón, organized a redistributive model that based on a class alliance that favored the national industrial sector and the urban working class through state interventionism. The "democratization of welfare," during these populist regimes, recognized labor and social

rights, raised the living standards of the popular classes, and allowed upward social mobility.[36]

Housing became, for the first time in a massive way, the object of state direct intervention abandoning the previous liberal, free-market approach.[37] In Peron's social justice agenda, housing became a social right and a constitutive aspect of citizenship in the Constitutional Amendment of 1949 that sanctioned the "right to a home" for the working population.[38] Between 1946 and 1955, but especially during the economic bonanza of the first presidential term (1946-52), public housing construction reached unprecedented levels: 5,000 units in single-detached homes and apartment buildings. Additionally, indirect actions also sought to regulate the mortgage and housing market by capitalizing the National Mortgage Bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional; BHN) with state funds, loosening its lending policies, granting rent control laws, freezing rent prices, and sanctioning the Horizontal Property Law that allowed the subdivision of property in

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[36] I borrow the term from Juan Carlos Torre and Elisa Pastoriza in their work about the Perón's years in Argentina, "La democratización del bienestar," in *Nueva Historia Argentina: Los años Peronistas (1943-1955)*, Vol. 8, ed. Juan Carlos Torre (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2002), 257-312; for a recent cultural analysis of Peronism in English, see Matthew Karush and Chamosa, eds., *The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), Angela de Castro Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo* (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988), Barbara Weinstein, *For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Bryan McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil;* Michael L. Conniff, *Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-1945* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981).

[37] Before Perón, private initiatives carried out the few attempts at "social housing," including the Catholic Church, the Socialist Party, and upper class charitable organizations that competed for the organization and disciplinization of the working class; see Anahí Ballent, "Vivienda de interés social," *Diccionario histórico de arquitectura, habitat y urbanismo en Argentina*, ed. Jorge Francisco Liernur and Fernando Aliata (Buenos Aires: Clarin Arquitectura, 2004).

[38] On housing during the years of Peronism, see Anahi Ballent, *Las huellas de la politica: vivienda, ciudad, Peronismo en Buenos Aires, 1943–1955* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2005); Oscar Yujnovsky, *Claves políticas del problema habitacional argentino*; Rosa Aboy, *Viviendas para el pueblo: espacio urbano y sociabilidad en el barrio Los Perales, 1946 1955* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005) and "The Right to a Home," *Journal of Urban History* 33, no. 3 (2007): 493-518; Horacio Gaggero and Alicia Garro, *Del trabajo a la casa: la política de vivienda del gobierno peronista 1946-1955* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 1996); Mark Healey, *The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan After the 1944 Earthquake* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

apartment buildings in 1949.[39] This more active role of the state gave many working-class families the opportunity to achieve their dream of the "casa propia" (homeownership) for the first time.

In Brazil, Vargas did not establish housing as part of the *estadonovista* Constitution (1937-1945) but his government was the first in assuming a more active role in this field at the federal level. Public officials, industrialists, and businessmen linked the housing question with the productivity of the nation, which required state action. As Roberto Simonsen, Brazil's most influential industrialist, pointed out in 1942, housing was

> …A problem of difficult situation for the simple private initiative, because in a country were capital is scarce and expensive and where the average purchasing power is so low we cannot expect private enterprise to come on a scale sufficient to meet the needs of the mass providing them with economic housing. The problem of housing in large populous cities becomes a matter of urban planning (*urbanismo*), subordinated to the needs of individual, social, technical, demographic, and economic order. For their complete solution, it is essential the decisive intervention of the state.[40]

Simonsen's characterization of the housing problem represented a point of inflection among ruling elites about the role of housing in the modernization of Latin American societies.

Vargas's main initiatives in the area of housing were the Lei do Inquilinato (1942; tenancy law) that froze rents and established rent control; the subsidization of housing

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[39] Representatives of the construction industry, real estate businessmen, and the owners of the rented apartments complained of what they saw as the populist practices of the government that discouraged private investment in this area; Yujnovsky, *Claves políticas*, 44-71.

[40] Roberto Simonsen, "Jornadas de habitação económica," *Revista do Arquivo Municipal* (São Paulo) 82 (1942), cited in Nabil Bonduki, "Origens da habitação social no Brasil," *Análise Social* (São Paulo) 29, no. 127 (1994): 719. "(…) problema de solução difícil por simples iniciativa privada, porque num país onde o capital é escasso e caro e onde o poder aquisitivo médio é tão baixo não podemos esperar que a iniciativa privada venha em escala suficiente ao encontro das necessidades da grande massa, proporcionando lhe habitações econômicas [...]. O problema das moradias das grandes cidades populares passa a ser questão de urbanismo, subordinada às necessidades de ordem individual, social, técnica, demográfica e econômica. Para sua integral solução, torna-se indispensável a intervenção decisiva do Estado."

production through the Institutos de Aposentadoria e Previdência (IAPs; Retirement and Pension Institutes); and the creation of the Fundação da Casa Popular (Popular Housing Foundation) that made possible the financing of real estate operations.[41] [Chapter 3 describes this process in more detail] These policies were somewhat similar to those applied in Argentina during Perón's administration and sought to reduce the cost of rents in the purchasing power of working families.

Yet, as Bonduki pointed out for the Brazilian case, it would be wrong to characterize Vargas' housing policy as a systematic and coherent program to cope with the critical needs for dwelling. As it was also the case in Argentina, the lack of a well-structured strategy and the lack of adequate legislation and the institutional framework to coordinate all the areas involved in the planning and execution of housing resulted in the overlapping of authorities that offered different, conflicting solutions. In addition, Vargas and Perón's policies targeted the formal working class and state employees, leaving unattended an important (and growing) social sector of non-unionized or temporary workers. As a result, while the State assumed large-scale housing policies for the first time, the efforts remained short in relation to the needs of the most poor who kept engrossing *favelas* and *villas miserias.*

Yet, the impact of populist politics in the urban space was not only confined to the realm of housing. Varguismo and Peronismo became the political expression and the class identity of the workers, the poor, and the dispossessed. As part of the political ritual, these regimes mobilized crowds of workers into public demonstrations taking over the city's streets and public spaces, making visible this urban "other:" the masses that lived

[41] Nabil Bonduki, *Origens da habitação social no Brasil: arquitetura moderna, lei do inquilinato e difusão da casa própria* (São Paulo: Estação Liberdade; FAPESP, 1998).

in the periphery and in the hills. In Buenos Aires, the political mobilization of the working class occupying the public space and performing their identity in the streets to support their political leader signified, as Daniel James has pointed out, "a clear political content [that] represented a symbolic subversion of accepted codes of behavior and deference for the working class."[42] Middle and upper class *porteños* (denonym for the resident of Buenos Aires) reacted with horror and surprise to the presence of this urban "other," calling them derogatorily "cabecitas negras" (literally "black heads," a term used to mark the earth-colored faces of the recent migrants). This term that stressed their visible earthed colored faces reproduced a racist bias that targeted the ethnic and countryside origins of these Indian descendants, whose presence in the city challenged the imaginary of Buenos Aires as the "Paris of South America." Metaphors of enclosure and feelings of being seized by bestial popular forces showed social and spatial anxieties in literature, as it was the case in Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy Casares' short story "La fiesta del monstruo" or Julio Cortázar, "Casa tomada" (*A House Taken Over;* 1951). As Laura Podalsky has argued, "In these stories, the city becomes the space of the unknowable, threatening 'other': and the locus of an epistemological crisis."[43] *Villas miserias* appeared depicted in literature and film; Bernardo Verbitsky's book *Villa Miseria también es América* (1957) and Fernando Birri's film *Tire Dié* (Spare me a Dime, 1956/57) were almost sociological works that carefully narrated the situation of

[42] Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and The Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 32.
[43] For an interesting cultural analysis of the impact of Peronism in the public space and the reaction to it after the ousted of Perón, see Laura Podalsky, *Specular City: Transforming Culture, Consumption, and Space in Buenos Aires, 1955-1973* (Temple University Press, 2004), 3.

the poor residents of the *villa* while Lucas Demare's *Detrás de un Largo Muro* (1958) represented them with the language of Italian realism.[44]

In Brazil, middle and upper class reaction was perhaps less extreme as working classes were less directly defiant of spatial hierarchies. That did not prevent *favelas* and poor urban residents to become stigmatized by the local press in a series of editorials such as those of journalist –and later governor of the State of Guanabara- Carlos Lacerda in the journal *Correio da Manhã* under the title "The Battle of Rio" by. In a series of articles, Lacerda denounced the politics of Varguismo and the manipulation and perpetuation of misery and desperation of *favelados* by greedy local bosses and national politicians. For that reason, the "Battle of Rio" called for a social action in the *favelas* as a social duty to "rescue" slum residents out of the "pernicious" influence of populist leaders and agitators of "foreign ideologies." In addition, the Catholic Church also began to react with alarm to the popularity that the Communist Party received in municipal elections after the lifting of the political ban in a moment of increasing the anxiety about *favela* politics in 1947. The organization of the Fundação Leão XIII, named after Pope Leo XIII –the author of the encyclical Rerum Novarum- allowed the Church to settle in *favelas* to Christianize and discipline the poor. [See Chapter 3]

In this way, as Dulce Chaves Pandolfi and Mário Grynszpan have pointed out, *favelas* came to "gain visibility and attention, constantly occupying significant space in the media, constituting a recurring theme of discussions." The mentioning of *favelas*

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[44] The title of Verbitsky's novel paraphrases the final line of Harlem Renaissance's author, Langston Hughes and his poem "I too, sing, America." Horacio Verbitsky, personal interview, August 2007. For the representations of working class neighborhoods in cinema during Perón, Paula Halperin, "With an Awesome Realism that Beats the Best of the European Cinemas': the Making of Barrio Gris and the Reception of the Italian Neorealism in Argentina, 1947-1955," in *Global Neorealismo. The Transnational History of a Film Style*, edited by Robert Sklar and Saverio Giovacchini (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 125-140.

"produced, automatically, an effect of recognition and assent. This meant not only that the term became widely used, but also that its meanings had being shared and generalized. Everyone agrees about what a slum is, everyone can see them and clearly identify them."[45] For the general public, then, the separation between the "hill" and the "asphalt" (*o morro e o asfalto*) was one that divided criminality, disease, promiscuity, and immorality from the opposite, represented by the rational and formal city. Yet, the morro came to be romanticized and represented an ambiguous attraction to bohemian writers and singers, as *favelas* became the site of popular culture as symbolized in, for instance, samba's schools and carnival.

Therefore, the process of industrialization of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires that picked up since the 1930s slowly altered the spatial and social geography of both cities. In the 1940s, this new urban residents, composed mostly of poor rural migrants who joined the lower ranks of the working class, became suddenly visible as a result of the policies of the welfares state. They managed to access to housing and urban spaces that were previously reserved for middle and upper classes. But while the general public and certain sectors of the press and the Church reacted with fear and anxiety, social scholars began to ask about the nature of this social change. To these scholars, *developmentalism* provided a sense of compromise and a language to explore the scientific clues to inform policies to help in the modernization of their countries.

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[45] Dulce Chaves Pandolfi and Mário Grynszpan, *A favela fala: depoimentos ao CPDOC* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2003), 11. "O primeiro é estar ganhando visibilidade crescente, atraindo atenções, ocupando de forma constante espaços significativos na mídia, constituindo-se em tema recorrente de debates. O segundo é que basta a sua simples menção para que se produza, de modo automático, um efeito de reconhecimento e de assentimento. Isso significa não apenas que o termo se tornou de uso corrente, mas também que os seus sentidos passam a ser partilhados e generalizados. Todos concordam a respeito do que é uma favela, todos são capazes de visualizar e de identificar claramente uma favela."

Slums and Development in Transnational Networks of Social Sciences

As we have see, the history of housing as a "problem" was certainly not new in Latin America by the mid twentieth century and they were actually part of the debate about the progress of the nations. Poor urban spaces were scrutinized since the late nineteenth century through a moral and sanitary lens, legitimizing police intervention, hygienic campaigns, the criminalization and pathologization of poverty and, eventually, the bulldozing of tenements and squatter areas. By the 1940s, at the juncture of populist politics, industrialization, and urban expansion, political and social elites framed their concern about the social and moral (including sexual) living conditions of the popular classes as part of the question about the productivity of the nation. State professionals, business and industrialists' organizations, and welfare administrations conceived of the urban household as a civilizing and disciplinizing space in the remaking of the urban working class. Industrialists in Brazil promoted vocational training programs, literacy campaigns, and social activities in working class neighborhoods to "modernize" the worker beyond the limits of the workplace. Colombian textile entrepreneurs attempted to fashion the female workers with social and educational programs in consonance with the bourgeois moral code of sexual behavior in the 1940s and 1950s. Popular-front leaders in Chile reproduced a gendered perception of men as hardworking laborers and women as housekeepers and family caregivers as a way to contribute to the health of the popular classes, to raise their standards of living, and to promote national economic development.[46]

[46] Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, *Dulcinea in the Factory: Myths, Morals, Men, and Women in Colombia's Industrial Experiment, 1905-1960* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Karin Rosemblatt, *Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Mary Kay Vaughan, "Modernizing Patriarchy: State Policies, Rural Households, and

The housing "problem" gained a new transnational attention in the aftermath of World War II. The emergence of a global awareness about the development and "progress" of humanity brought together international organizations, philanthropic agencies, technical experts, policymakers, and social scientists to solve the problems associated with poverty and inequality in the Third World. Nations and peoples became aware of their shared interests and objectives and of the potentialities of combining and joining collective efforts and resources through transnational cooperation.[47] They shared a universalizing understanding of the world and contributed in the production of a knowledge that minimized unbridgeable difference in favor of comparability, standardization, and global applicability. The UN and the OAS built much of the organizational infrastructure to deal with all these different aspects of poverty, whether from a technical perspective or promoting research. In Latin America, this new transnational moment prompted Pan-American exchanges, materialized in an increasing and overlapping number of "contact zones" that covered most of the aspects of social life. Housing, in this backdrop, became scrutinized under a more technical gaze that ultimately decomposed the problem in a myriad of specific issues. If experts and policymakers in the field of urban planning insisted that their actions be taken in the broad names of development and modernization, they nonetheless developed an understanding of the housing problem that was piecemeal and fractured.[48] [Chapter 2]

Women in Mexico, 1930-1940," in *Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America*, ed. Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molineux, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Barbara Weinstein, *For Social Peace in Brazil*.

[47] Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

[48] Licia do Prado Valladares and Magda Prates Coelho, "La investigación urbana en América Latina: tendencias actuales y recomendaciones," *Cadernos IPPUR* X, no. 1 (1996): 103-141; Arturo Almandoz, "From urban to regional planning in Latin America, 1920-50," *Planning Perspectives* 25, no. 1 (January

In the postwar geography of power, *development* became a universal language that framed the understanding of how to alleviate poverty and impulse underdeveloped nations into a path of economic growth and social change. As Frederick Cooper and Randal Packard have argued, it "appealed as much to leaders of 'underdeveloped' societies as to the people of developed countries, and it gave citizens in both categories a share in the intellectual universe and in the moral community that grew up around the world-wide development initiative of the post-World War II era."[49] The development discourse thus allowed for a universalistic operation that equated Latin America with Africa or Asia. Latin America became part of the underdeveloped world.[50] This universalizing understanding of the world civilizations was part of the aftermath of the world and the awareness among social scientists about the horrific consequences of racist thinking. Rather than races, scholars and international organizations became concerned about the "evolution" of humanity, understood now as one human race. Underplaying difference in favor of common features, scientific knowledge emphasized comparison, standardization, and global applicability.[51] Particular explanations about the functioning of individual societies in circumscribed historical contexts were now assumed to have a

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2010): 87-95; Adrián Gorelik, "A produção da 'cidade latino-americana,'" *Tempo Social* (São Paulo), vol. 17, 1 (2005).

[49] Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 1-22.

[50] Carlos Altamirano, "Desarrollo y Desarrollistas." *Prismas*, no. 2 (1998): 75–91, esp. 81-82.We agree with Kathryn Sikkink's criticism of the post structural antidevelopmentalist perspective in that developmentalism was not a hegemonic colonizing operation of the industrialized west to guarantee domination over the Third World. As Sikkink has argued, "To frame the ideas of Latin American intellectuals like Raul Prebisch and other developmentalist thinkers mainly as means to effect Western domination over Third World countries is to debase the validity of many Latin American contributions to the global developmental debate. But even more serious, this view misrepresents the chronology and genealogy of intellectual currents and the nature of linkages and conflicts between external and internal factors," Kathryn Sikkink, *Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 15.

[51] Karin Rosemblatt, *Race, Poverty, and Science in Mexico and the United States, 1930-1979*, unpublished manuscript.

general and global validity for the rest of the world. U.S. functionalism and modernization theory, in the aftermath of the war, became highly influential as international organizations and philanthropic agencies promoted research in the whole globe, validating many of those assumptions.

Since the 1950s, Latin American social scientists turned their attention to explain the social and political problems of the era of mass society. These were the years of the scientific renovation of the social sciences in the region that proposed to learn about societies through careful empirical observation as a departure to the traditional philosophical/speculative approach of the past.[52] Scholars focused on the study of such topics as social mobility, the transformation of the social structure and the system of stratification, the consequences of massive migration, urbanization, and marginalization, and political participation. The urban space became one of the privileged loci of inquiry as it condensed most of the issues at stake in the modernization of the region. Certainly, this does not mean that the "urban" dominated the social sciences research agenda as rural issues were still very important, especially in a context when agrarian reform was becoming a hot topic for scholars, policymakers, and radical politics. Yet, even anthropology, a science related in Latin America to the study of peasant, indigenous communities, was very much influenced by questions about the question about the disruptive effects of modernization and the urban, modern way of life. In the city, but

[52] On the previous character of sociological work in, for instance, Argentina, and the "tradición ensayística" see Sylvia Saítta, "Modos de pensar lo social. Ensayos y sociedad en la Argentina (1930-1965)," in *Intelectuales y expertos: La constitución del conocimiento social en la Argentina*, ed. Federico Neiburg and Mariano Plotkin (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 2004), 107-146.

especially in working class neighborhoods –and even more particularly in the slums- sociologists sought to understand the presence of that dual society.[53]

In those years, scholars like Germani, L.A. Costa Pinto, Jose Medina Echavarría, Pablo González Casanovas, and Albert Hirschman, among others, pushed for the construction of an inter-American community of scholars based on research collaboration and exchange programs. International organizations and philanthropic agencies sponsored these research projects in the region and supported the creation of intellectual hubs for Latin American scholars in the late 1950s and 1960s, including the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO; Latin American School of Social Sciences) in Santiago, Chile (1957) and the Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales (CLAPCS; Latin American Center for Social Science Research; 1958) in Rio de Janeiro.[54] In those years, UNESCO, the OAS, and CLAPCS supported the Four City Study, a joint research project on social mobility and stratification in Santiago, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo, which included Germani.[55]

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[53] Besides the already cited, see also Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, "Secretos de la idiosincracia. Urbanización y cambio cultural en México, 1950s-1970s," in Carlos Lira y Ariel Rodríguez Kuri, eds., *Ciudades Mexicanas del siglo XX. Siete estudios históricos*, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana y El Colegio de México, 2009.)

[54] UNESCO, for instance, sponsored the study on race relations that included the study of Brazil in the 1950s; Marcos Chor Maio, *A história do projeto UNESCO: estudos raciais e ciência sociais no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1997); Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997), 51-58. For a history of FLACSO and CLAPCS, see Sergio Miceli, ed., *História das ciências sociais no Brasil. Vol 2.* (São Paulo: Ed. Sumaré, 1995)*;* Manuel Antonio Garreton, "Social sciences in Latin America: a comparative perspective, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay," *Social Science Information* 44, no. 2 (2005): 557-593; Andre Gunder Frank, "The Underdevelopment of Development," in *The Underdevelopment of Development: Essays in Honor of Andre Gunder Frank,* ed. Sing Chew and Robert A. Denemark (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996); Alejandro Blanco, *Razón y modernidad: Gino Germani y la sociología en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2006), 193-202.

[55] Blanco, 201; Ana Germani, *Antifascism and Sociology: Gino Germani, 1911-1979* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008), *95.* In the following years, *Germani* received additional funds from the Fulbright and the Rockefeller Foundation for a historical and sociological study on the impact of massive migration in the River Plate in the late nineteenth century; Gino Germani, "El Departamento y la Escuela de Sociología de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires: Informe del Director," mimeo, September 1961, folder 83, box 10, series 301R, RG 1.2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC).

In July 1959, UNESCO, the UN Bureau of Social Affairs, and ECLA organized the seminar on urbanization problems in Latin America, held in Santiago, Chile. The meeting was part of a series of regional symposia that UNESCO had been organizing on the impact of urbanization in the "underdeveloped" world that included Africa (1954) and Asia and the Far East (1956).[56] As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the conference's objectives to produce research and knowledge on the urban situation to be used in the formulation of public policy as well as to promote the internationalization of social sciences, the development of research centers, and the establishment of standards of comparability for the region, which speaks about the relationship between the urban and the transnationalization of social sciences. Among the participants were key sociologists of the Americas who presented their research conducted in slums of Latin America: Germani in the *villa miseria* of Isla Maciel, José Matos Mar in *barriadas* of Lima, Andrew Pearse in *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, and Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes in São Paulo's working class neighborhoods. They identified a series of pressing issues in Latin American urbanization that included massive rural-to-urban migration; housing shortages, especially for the lower income groups; the presence of "traditional" co-existing with "industrial" patterns of behavior; the character of the integration, acculturation, and assimilation of the individual to modern urban living; social disorganization, delinquency, crime, mental illness, and alcoholism; low productivity; problems of health, nutrition, literacy, lack of labor skills; political immaturity and

[56] UNESCO, *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa, South of the Sahara*, (London: UNESCO, 1956); Philip Hauser, *Urbanization in Asia and the Far East* (Calcutta: UNESCO, 1957); Philip Hauser, *Urbanization in Latin America* (Paris: UNESCO, 1961). For complementary analysis of this meeting, see Richard M. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 4 (July 1962): 473-493; Adrián Gorelik, "La aldea en la ciudad: ecos urbanos de un debate antropológico," *Revista del Museo de Antropología* 1, no. 1 (2008): 73-96.

apathy; and the role of the family and the community as a pivotal unit of socialization. The meeting became a point of encounter of different circuits and networks of knowledge that had began to emerge in the 1950s. In all these venues, the 1959 seminar became an exceptional event for the assemblage of personalities and ideas as well as a point in the larger spectrum of activities, exchanges, and figures that came to redefine the urban –and within it the housing- "problem."

The conference's initial document, which set the tone for rest of the encounter, put the city (the town) at the center of modern life, and defined it as a positive social force "whose influence is capable of affecting human ways in the most widely various ways." The idea of the city as a "generator of change," a space of creation, change, and innovation posited an urban biased that relegated the "rural" to a static, traditional past. It also offered an alternative interpretation of the city as a space of pathology. The city was thus the *locus* where "the psycho-social aspect of urban culture manifests itself in a new type of personality, that is, in a class of human beings with special attitude towards the world and his relations with the rest of mankind."[57] The arrival of countrymen into the city had created the coexistence of a dual society. Or, as Matos Mar put it more concretely in his research on the *barriadas* of Lima, "The migrants who come to settle at Lima, preferably in the *barriadas,* bring with them their traditional way of life and have to face an urban existence that proceeds at a different pace. The contrast between two ways of life leads to serious conflicts which are reflected in mental, social and economic maladjustment that militates against satisfactory integration." In a dichotomous view, scholars found on the one side, "the receptive attitude to foreigners, the emotional detachment and the capacity for abstract thought which are typical of the town-dweller;"

[57] Hauser, *Urbanization in Latin America,* 25.

on the other side "the xenophobia, the strong emotional ties and the directly concrete habits of thought which are characteristic of the countryman, and which make it difficult for him to adapt himself quickly to the stereotyped and impersonal relationship of the big city."[58] As a result, the urban personality became associated with change and innovation, key conditions for development, while the rural one represented, by definition, the opposite.

In this rationale, the widespread emergence of slums and squatter settlements represented a rural "enclave" in the city, an obstacle to the chances of development and modernization. For Hauser slums were "perhaps the most serious problem of urban areas" as "they dramatize the acute character of the housing problem in Latin American cities and reveal some of the worst physical and social consequences of poverty and the low level of living."[59] For Andrew Pearse, the *favela* house was "indeed a house of the rustic type, being nothing more nor less than the intrusion, into the interstices of an urban system of life, of rural standards of housing…"[60] By portraying the precarious slum houses as reproductions of the rural home into an urban setting, these scholars interpreted the external environment (and its deficiencies), influencing the internal qualities and life-styles of the poor. In this sense, a modern home located in an urbanized neighborhood could impact positively in the life of the poor resident.

Slums, therefore, became the *loci* of tradition, rural ways of life, and personal and collective disorganization that limited the full release of social, cultural, and productive forces for the full development of Latin American nations. As Frank Bonilla put it in

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[58] José Matos Mar, "Migration and Urbanization: The 'Barriadas' of Lima: An Example of Integration into Urban Life," in *Urbanization in Latin America*, 174-175.
[59] Ibid., 56.
[60] Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro," in *Urbanization in Latin America*, 195.

1961 studying Rio's *favelas*, they where "the rural slum within the city."[61] Or as Adrián Gorelik pointed out more recently, they represented the "village" (*aldea*) in the city. It is in this way that we argue that the housing "problem" was central to the problem of urbanization, prompting social scientists to study these places.[62] In so doing, these scholars located difference within the limits of the nation and the city instead of focusing on the relationship between the underdeveloped Third World (the periphery) and the First World (the center). As Karin Rosemblatt, points out, this is part of the discussions among anthropologists in the 1950s about the notion of internal colonialism.[63]

The concerns and assumptions of functionalism and modernization theory framed the general spirit of the conference in Chile although, as we will see, the papers presented began to question the general validity of its basic principles. In the 1950s, U.S. sociologists began to test their understanding of the urbanization process by transcending their national border.[64] Modernization theory provided a particular interpretation of the world whose generalizations served the U.S. to self-identify as the ultimate form of modernity and democracy, promoting a foreign policy and international research agenda that reified these assumptions.65 In the minds of modernization theorists, the fairly linear path to modernity was a transition from "traditionalism" and "backwardness" to

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[61] Frank Bonilla, *Rio's Favelas: The Rural Slum Within the City* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1961).
[62] Adrián Gorelik, "La aldea en la ciudad"
[63] Karin Rosemblatt, "The Crisis of Anthropology in the 1950s," forthcoming article.
[64] Diane Davis, "Cities in Global Context: A Brief Intellectual History," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 1 (March 2005): 92-109.
[65] Dorothy Ross, "Changing Contours of the Social Science Disciplines," in Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds., *The Cambridge History of Science, Vol. 7: The Modern Social Sciences* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 229-234. On the relationship between modernization theory and U.S. foreign policy, see Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2000); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, 2003); David Engerman, *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).

modernity and democracy which followed the normative model of Western, industrial nations. Industrialization, secularization, specialization, social differentiation, and achievement, were the central features that defined an ideal modern society. To unleash the economic, technological, material, and natural forces necessary to the advancement of capitalism in the underdeveloped world was not just a matter of foreign economic and technical assistance but also of the promotion of a whole set of values, behaviors, and attitudes compatible with modern industrial and (urban) life. Urbanization, industrialization, and modernization, in this model, became almost interchangeable terms.

Bert Hoselitz, a modernization theorist and a specialist on cultural and technological conditions for industrial development in underdeveloped nations, asked in an articled titled "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries" (1953), "To what extent is the growth of an urban culture in underdeveloped countries a vehicle for changing the values and beliefs of the society so as to make it more inclined to accept economic growth?"[66] From Weber to Talcott Parsons and W.W. Rostow, Hoselitz associated each economic stage with a particular social and cultural structure and defined a research agenda to study "the mechanisms by which the social structure of an underdeveloped country becomes altered and takes on the features which characterize economically advanced countries."[67] For modernization theorists like Hoselitz or Everett Hagan, among others, Latin American cities lacked the socio-cultural conditions that had made possible the modernizing potential of European and American

[66] Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries," *The Journal of Political Economy* 61, no. 3 (June 1953): 196. This article was reproduced later in Bert Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Illinois: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). Hoselitz was the first director of the Center on Economic Growth and Cultural Change at the University of Chicago in 1952. His work focused on the relationship between economic growth, industrialization, social change, and technological innovation.
[67] Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth*, 29.

urban centers in the past. There, according to Hoselitz, rural migrants "soon found new homes and loyalties in the city," while "their modern counterparts in underdeveloped countries continue 'belonging' to their places of origin. The city remains strange to them and forces to seek out as associated persons from their own kinship group or region. Patterns of co-operation, authority and responsibility are fashioned upon rural models rather than upon those of the Western City."[68] It was in the expansion of European and US cities that entrepreneurial middle classes assumed the risks of industrial innovation and technological investment contributing to the formation and expansion of capitalism, a feature that, according to this perspective, was lacking in Latin America.

For modernization theorists, then, cities occupied a central place as they represented "the main force and the chief locus for the introduction of new ideas and new ways of doing things," and where "adaptation to new ways, new technologies, new consumption and production patterns, and new social institutions is achieved."[69] Likewise, the author argued that "commerce, financial institutions, industrial establishments, governmental bureaucracies, and advanced educational and intellectual training facilities all require an urban climate to develop and flourish."[70] By exploring moral and social psychological aspects it was possible to understand the kind of "adaptations" to modern values and habits that could lead to the development of a modern society and "the degree to which the changed cultures of the urban centers affects the surrounding 'sea' of traditional folk-like ways of life."[71] Therefore, these scholars

[68] Bert F. Hoselitz, "The City, The Factory, and Economic Growth," *The American Economic Review* 45, no. 2 (May 1955): 176.
[69] Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities," 197.
[70] Ibid, 203.
[71] Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities," 197.

placed a strong emphasis on culture and behavior and localized in the cities the values associated with industrialism, democracy, specialization, and political moderation.

Hoselitz was building upon previous studies on the differences in social structure and cultural relations in different types of societies as explored in the dichotomies between tradition-oriented patterns of social actions and those of purposive rationality (Max Weber), the contrast between "community" and "society" (Ferdinad Toennies), and the folk-urban continuum (Robert Redfield).[72] Since the 1920s, the Chicago School of Sociology had been bridging the concern about the impact of modernity and capitalism of the German and French intellectuals to the analysis of the constitution of a complex urban society like Chicago.[73] It was Louis Wirth who synthesized the assumptions of the Chicago School in his classic work "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (1938) where he distinguished between the concepts of "urbanization" and "urbanism." The first term referred to the increasing proportion of the world's population residing in cities and the physical expansion of such agglomerations, stressing urban ecology variables. *Urbanism* was a "way of life," defined as "a set of attitudes and ideas, and a constellation of personalities engaging in typical forms of collective behavior and subject to characteristic mechanisms of social control."[74] The characteristics of urban life were isolation, functional specialization, secularization, mobility, competition, instability, and insecurity. Family and kinship ties vanished in cities making human relations impersonal, superficial, transitory, segmental, and utilitarian. If not contained by social organizations

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[72] Bert Hoselitz, "Main Concepts in the Analysis of the Social Implication of Technical Change," in *Industrialization and Society*, ed. by Bert F Hoselitz and Wilbert Ellis Moore (Paris: UNESCO, 1963), 11-31.

[73] Robert Park, one of the main theorists of the Chicago School, had studied in Germany with Simmel; Martin Bulmer, *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[74] Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology* 44, no. 1 (July 1938): 1-24.

or by welfare policies, urbanism could impact negatively in the individual personality and behavior, leading to situations of personal disorganization, mental breakdown, suicide, delinquency, crime, corruption, and disorder. Meanwhile, the rural (folk) way of life was defined in contrast to the urban way.

It was cultural anthropologist Robert Redfield who explored the folk life, studying the impact of modern life in Tepoztlán, a Mexican peasant village.[75] Redfield took from Park, his father-in-law and intellectual reference, the notion that cities exerted their modernizing influence into their hinterlands, asking about the forces that made for cultural stability and integration. From there, Redfield elaborated his theory of cultural change in a continuum from small rural villages to large cities: the folk-urban continuum. For Redfield, the cityward progression operated a gradual breakdown of traditional forms, for instance, of familial organization or kinship ties to forms of social relations similar to the ones described by Wirth. Characterizing the urban environment as a place of social anomy, Redfield's view of the city was negative.

By 1950, U.S. cultural anthropology began to turn their ethnographic work about the social integration of "non-Western" communities into urban environments. In his presidential address to the American Anthropological Association, titled "Urbanism, Urbanization, and Acculturation," Ralph Beals challenged his colleagues to follow sociologists in the study of the modification of human behavior, culture, assimilation or acculturation to urban life.[76] According to him, U.S. sociologists had paid more attention to urbanization (urban growth) than to urbanism (way of life), but the anthropologist was

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[75] On Redfield and the intellectual conversations between U.S. and Mexican anthropologists, see Karin Alejandra, *Race, Poverty, and Science in Mexico and the U.S., 1930-1970*, unpublished manuscript; Clifford Wilcox, *Robert Redfield and the Development of American Anthropology* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004); Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997), 40-58.
[76] Ralph L. Beals, "Urbanism, Urbanization and Acculturation," *American Anthropologist* 53, 1 (1951): 5.

better equipped to understand the urban "others." This urban "other" for Beals could be the Native American, African American, or poor whites that moved to the North American city as well as the rural peasants and the indigenous population living in Latin American urban centers. As he pointed out, "We believe there are common factors which link together the processes taking place among the peoples of Yucatán, or such Indian group as the Tarascans, the immigrant Mexicans in Southern California, the rural southern Negro or white moving into an urban setting, or the Iowa or Kansas farm family settling in the Middle Western Mecca." Urbanism was thus a universal experience.[77]

Anthropologist Oscar Lewis was working precisely in the direction that Beals had suggested. In 1952, he had published "Urbanization Without Breakdown: A Case Study" where he challenged Redfield's notion of the folk-urban continuum by exploring the changes in the habits, attitudes, and system of values of Tepoztecan individuals and families who moved from rural Mexico to the Federal City. Lewis worked with families of rural origin who settled in the *vecindades* of Mexico City (an equivalent of American tenements). It was precisely in these places where Lewis later localized in 1959 a distinct culture of the poor–the "culture of poverty," a notion that would become a subject of intellectual controversy in the 1960s.[78]

Lewis initially found that modern urban life did not bring "personal maladjustment, breakdown of family life, decline of religion, and increase of

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[77] As Karin Rosemblatt has pointed out, this apparent similarity allowed for the comparison between U.S. and Latin America in the transnational production of knowledge whose conclusions, nevertheless, confirmed national intellectual narratives which emphasized aspects of class in Mexico and of race in the United States; Karin Rosemblatt, "Other Americas: Transnationalism, Scholarship, and the Culture of Poverty in Mexico and the United States," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 89, no. 4 (November 2009): 603–641.

[78] Oscar Lewis, "La cultura de la vecindad en la Ciudad de México," *Ciencias Políticas y Sociales* (1959): 349-64 and Oscar Lewis, *Five Families: Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), cited in Karin Rosemblatt, "Other Americas;" see also Gorelik, "La aldea en la ciudad."

delinquency" as Wirth and Redfield had predicted.[79] On the contrary, Lewis saw little evidence of family disorganization in the city and proved that family ties and kinship rather than an element of tradition actually provided cohesiveness and stability in the city. This evidence contrasted with the harshness that Lewis noted for the U.S. farm families that had migrated to urban America. In so doing, Lewis was not only challenging the influential folk-urban continuum but was also alerting U.S. scholars about the risks of taking as universals generalizations that were too grounded in the U.S. experience. As Hauser noted the urbanization process for Lewis was not "a simple, unitary, universally similar process, but that it assumes different forms and meanings, depending upon the prevailing historic, economic, social, and cultural conditions."[80]

By the time Lewis was working in the discussion of the folk-urban continuum and some of the assumptions of the Chicago School, he was part of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee on Urbanization (1958-1965). This committee, directed by Hauser, gathered a multidisciplinary group of U.S. recognized experts charged with the task to review the assumptions and generalizations regarding urbanization and, especially, their applicability to "other cultures and areas" in order to formulate a research agenda for the future. Most of the committee members had also participated in a special issue on "World Urbanism," that Hauser had organized in 1955 for the American Journal of Sociology.[81] That issue recognized that the increasing

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[79] Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization without Breakdown: A Case Study," *The Scientific Monthly* 75, no.1 (1952): 31-41.

[80] Hauser citing Lewis during the discussion of the latter work at the Social Science Research Council Committee on Urbanization; Minutes March 28-29, 1960, p. 5, Collection SSRC, Accession 1, Series 1. Committee Projects, subseries 35, Committee on Urbanization, box 306, folder 1460, RAC.

[81] Participants included Hauser, Lewis, Leo Schnore, Eric Lampard, Gideon Sjoberg, Norton Ginsburg, Wallace Sayre, Raymond Vernor, Edgar M. Hoover, Nathan Keyfitz, among others. Hauser and Schnore edited the final works of the committee's members; Philip M. Hauser and Leo Francis Schnore, eds., *The Study of Urbanization* (New York: Wiley, 1965).

knowledge on urbanization of non-Western societies represented an effort to reconsider the past generalizations of American sociology. During the SSRC committee, Hauser and Lewis worked revising Redfield's model and shared a concern about going too far in generalizing it to the study of the urbanization process abroad. The debates around Redfield's folk-urban continuum and Lewis' criticism of it, as Gorelik has indicated, framed the discussions on the urbanization of Latin America in the period under consideration.[82] These debates and conversations, which circulated through transnational networks of scholarship, framed the general tone and the individual papers introduced at the ECLA meeting in Chile.

Most of the research presented at the conference agreed on underlying the structural socio-economic origins of poor housing conditions. For Matos Mar, "various factors, which are generally representative of defects in the economic and social structure of the nation as a whole, have given rise to colonies of dwellings that are known by different names but are, as a rule, fairly similar."[83] For Pearse, Rio's *favelas* were even economic responses to the impossibility of poor migrant families to afford to own or rent a house in a context of a growing gap between living and building costs, estate values, and poor wages. In that sense, the *favela* was functional, as it "performs an inevitable and essential function in the relation between the urban, industrial and rich sector, and the rural, agricultural and poor sectors, divided by a quite exceptional socio-economic lacuna."[84]

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[82] Gorelik, "La aldea en la ciudad"
[83] José Matos Mar, "Migration and Urbanization: The 'Barriadas' of Lima: An Example of Integration into Urban Life," in *Urbanization in Latin America*, 171.
[84] Pearse, 195.

This understanding was not totally new in the late 1950s, but it was indicative of the degree of consensus among scholars in explaining slums as a consequence of poverty. For instance, Raul Prebisch, ECLA's leading figure, explained the expansion of slums as the result of the unequal pattern of growth in the region, a characterization that would become increasingly generalized in the 1960s,

> An appreciable proportion of the increase in the active population is not properly absorbed in the production process: economic development passes it by. This is mainly true of the population that moves from the country areas to the towns… This must inevitably happen in the process of economic development, but what is not inevitable is the fate of such people. Far from achieving integration in city life, and sharing in better patterns of living, they put up their wretched shanty towns and eke out a hand to mouth existence in a whole wide range of ill-paid personal services, with periods of out-and-out unemployment. Thus, poverty, frustration and resentment surge in from the country to the towns where the symptoms of the concentration of income are already so conspicuous. This is clear proof of explosive social polarization of development, imputable to its dynamic weakness and distributional shortcomings.[85]

This framing of poverty and slums as the result of the contradictions of capitalist accumulation implied a departure in Latin American scholarship from explanations focused on internal "pathological" traits of the poor. In addition, this implied a difference with U.S. scholarship that would increasingly look at their own segregated urban spaces with racist underpinnings hidden in culturalist and behaviorist assessments of poor African American families.[86] Both explanations would nevertheless coexist but the fact that scholars began to paid attention to broader socio-structural conditions is indicative of the shift in the characterization of the housing problem in Latin America.

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[85] Raúl Prebisch, *Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America* (New York: United Nations, 1963), 25.

[86] Oscar Lewis also believed that the culture of poverty was a (valid) adaptation to capitalism.

At the conference, Germani presented provisional results on his research undertaken between July 1957 and February 1958 in Isla Maciel.[87] In the late 1950s, there were two differentiated zones at Maciel: the urbanized area populated by city-born families and migrants who had arrived by the late 1930s and early 1940s, who lived in modest houses of wood or corrugated iron (*conventillos*), and Villa Maciel, the slum, consisting of rudimentary huts in a squatter settlement with no urban services. Germani found out that most of the residents of the *villa* were recent migrants (no longer than fifteen years) of rural origins that came from the provinces of Argentine's littoral region. To assess patterns of social disorganization and degree of adaptation to the urban culture, Germani followed Redfield's indicators to compare migrants and city-born residents. The sociologist divided the population into five different groups according to average length and place of residence (the villa or the urbanized area) and date of migration to GBA. As Gorelik has pointed out, this analytical division allowed Germani to reproduce Redfield's stages of the folk-urban continuum in Maciel's social composition.[88] According to Germani, each of these areas showed differences in terms of ownership of the land, of the dwelling, the building material used, flooring, and the utilities provided –water, sewerage, electricity.

In his study, Germani's concluded that Maciel's slum residents were the less able to integrate into urban life, as suggested by the analysis of people's formal and informal participation in voluntary associations (social clubs, local communities, unions) and the

[87] Isla Maciel is not exactly an island. The area is right next to the Riachuelo, the brook that separates the city from the province of Buenos Aires to the south, and what was once a stream now diverted called Maciel. Gino Germani's work "Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization in a Working-Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in *Urbanization in Latin America*, 206-233. I analyze Villa Maciel in Leandro Benmergui, "The Transnationalization of the 'Housing Problem': Social Science and *Developmentalism* in Postwar Argentina," in Edward Murphy and Najib Hourani, eds., *Proprietary Matters: The Housing Question in High Modernist and Neoliberal Urbanism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming)
[88] Gorelik, "La aldea en la ciudad," 80

consumption of mass media (newspapers, magazines, and radio) "through which migrants may be brought into contact with different aspects of the life of the city and of society as a whole." The study concluded that the *villa* residents did not belong to local associations, and very few had connection with local clubs. Membership to trade unions and mutual societies, when happened, did not implied political compromise. In terms of social organization, Germani localized in the *villas* a "tendency towards the accumulation" of "demoralizing factors" that, for him, were not only the result of economic difficulties and primitive housing conditions but also "of the factors which arise from the inclination of individuals already on the fringe of normal behavior, or partly disintegrated, to gather there."[89] The mechanisms of social control were weak although Germani saw in the kinship group around the nuclear family a source of a limited but still vital stabilizing influence. The process of "cultural assimilation" thus had a simultaneous and "somewhat paradoxical" effect of "knitting some families together and disorganizing others," the same kind of tension that Lewis found in Mexico. Still, social disorganization and disintegration was more pronounced among the recent migrants who lived in the slum while older residents showed higher levels of assimilation and integration. Nevertheless, he found a more complex and ambiguous picture that the one suggested by Redfield. "The idea that families in rural and highly urbanized areas exhibit a greater degree of stability and attachment to the traditional family values," argued Germani, "clearly cannot be applied without reservation to these groups…It is therefore a rather complicated matter to determine the 'impact' of the city on groups of

[89] Germani, "Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization," 232.

persons whose cultural patterns would, if judged by urban standards, be regarded as symptoms of 'disorganization.'" [90]

The presence of familiar institutions or religious belief was, then, seen less as elements of disruption –or the continuation of tradition and rural habits- that could limit integration. They rather "functioned" as institutions that facilitated adaptation and provided stability. Matos Mar, for instance, argued that, "…when their structure is examined, the *barriadas* and the trade unions are likewise compensating factors which alleviate the social and economic problems of the inhabitants. However, it is always the family which provides the greatest source of security for the inhabitants of these areas. Even when very unsettled and living in overcrowding conditions, the family is always the mainstay of its members."

In this way, scholars like Germani or Matos Mar, arrived to similar conclusions of those of Lewis for the Mexican case in which families and kin groups proved "very little evidence of family disorganization in the city."[91] As Richard Morse pointed out few years later, "the point is not that rural or familial institutions are indefinitely preserved, or precisely duplicated, in the Latin American city. It is, rather, that the utilization and adaptation of such forms are a necessary alternative in the near-absence of mechanisms for the rapid assimilation of migrants into the urban milieu."[92] As Gorelik argues, Germani and the rest of the participants in the Santiago seminar shared the intention to demonstrate that this population, rather than marginal and pathological, was becoming

[90] Germani, 215.
[91] Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without Breakdown," 41.
[92] Richard M. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 4 (July 1962): 488.

integrated, with different degrees of difficulties, into the urban culture and its modern values.[93]

In contextualizing the origins of slums as the result of structural economic forces and showing that modern urban life in Latin America actually implied the adaptation of "traditional" institutions such as religious beliefs and kinship links, these scholars allowed for the questioning of the ethnocentric attitude behind the universalizing aspirations of the functionalist paradigm of modernization theory and opened the possibility to think of Latin America as a place for alternative modernities.[94]

Slums and the Politics of Populism in the Dual City

Slums also represented for those scholars the opportunity to understand the political process in Latin America and the support that popular sectors gave to populism, questions that were directly related with the formation of stables democracies and a more responsible citizenship. As we have mentioned, for modernization theorists at the height of the Cold War, the question about the modernization of underdeveloped societies was not only related to the expansion of capitalism. It was also a way to promote political participation and modern citizenship, understood as the exercise of political responsibility with moderation. Democracy and economic development were considered part of the same process.[95] It is in this sense that more modernity would ward off any totalitarian threat.

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[93] Marginality studies in the late 1960s returned to an understanding that stressed marginalization and isolation.

[94] I borrow the term from Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., *Alternative Modernities* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).

[95] That was, for instance, the position of political scientists associated with modernization theory like Gabriel Almond and Lucie Pye. Nils Gilman, Latham; Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional

Germani and Pearse were writing in contexts where the communist threat in Brazil and Argentina was not yet a source of real anxiety. It was rather the populist past and the authoritarian experiences what worried these scholars the most. Among Germani's central preoccupations was the massive support that the popular classes had given to Perón, a leader that Germani saw as very close to the ideal-type of a charismatic authoritarian leader. As a social scientist advocated to the study of social life, an Italian citizen who had to emigrate from Mussolini's regime, and as a humanist worried with the horrors of Fascism and Nazism, the sociologist needed to explain what he saw as the exceptionality of Argentine society. Different from Italy, where the middle classes backed Mussolini, in Argentina the working classes supported massively Perón. The striking thing for Germani is that this occurred in a country whose social structure and economy was among the most advanced in the region. For Germani, this was the result of the particular character of the industrialization and urbanization process and the social structure between mid-1930s and mid-1940s.[96]

The emergence of the Argentine modern national state in the late nineteenth century contributed to the economic modernization of the country and the transformation of the social structure in a process that was controlled by traditional "oligarchies" of Buenos Aires who monopolized the political power. In this perspective, the city's social

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Approach to Comparative Politics," in *The Politics of the Developing Areas***,** ed. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

[96] Gino Germani, "The Transition to a Mass Democracy in Argentina," translated and abridge from "El proceso de transición a una democracia de masa en la Argentina," *Política* (Buenos Aires) XVI (1961): 10-27. The SSRC and the Ford Foundation funded these works on social structure and on immigration in the late nineteenth century. The key question was about the modernization of society and the emergence of the mass society [Spanish: sociedad de masas]. It is very interesting that these works were conducted in the 1960s. This explanation, which was for many years the classic interpretation of the emergence of Peronism, was one of the most largely debated topic in Argentine contemporary history. In this section, I focus exclusively in Germani's social and political characterization of Argentine society at the same time he was studying the villas of Isla Maciel.

dynamism contrasted with the lack of it countryside. The implicit assumption was that the countryside did not develop a modern middle class of consumers that could contribute to a stable process of democratization, as allegedly was the case in the United States. In addition, this economically modern but politically conservative elites that rule Argentina from 1880 and 1916, and the frustrated attempts of democratic governments between 1916 and 1930 to incorporate popular classes to the political game, led to frustration and provide a fertile ground for the emergence of authoritarian governments in the 1930s. Thus, Germani, as many others, saw a disequilibrium between a developed littoral (leaded by Buenos Aires) and an underdeveloped interior, whose "consequences…were evident by the middle of the century."[97]

The new wave of industrialization and the agricultural crisis of the 1930s triggered the massive rural migration to the cities. Germani characterized this process as "An exodus en masse, by which vast layers of people from the underdeveloped zones—masses until that moment completely outside the bounds of the political life of the country- were established in the large cities and particularly in Buenos Aires."[98] For Germani, the inability of Argentine political system to incorporate and give expression to the material needs and the sentiments of the popular masses left them in a "state of 'availability'" (disponibilidad), "making them an element inclined to be exploited through whatever happenstance might offer them some form of participation."[99] The emergence of the Peronism in 1946, born within a nationalist sector of the military that took power with a coup in 1943, capitalized those "available masses" by appealing to their needs. The cultural and behavioral attitudes of these masses of recent migrants, for

[97] Ibid., 461
[98] Ibid., 468
[99] Ibid.

Germani, responded to the ideal-types prescribed by Weber or Redfield: emotion, religiosity and magical thinking, family and clan loyalties. In this interpretation, these masses had been already exposed in the countryside to the authority and charisma of the *caudillo* since the independence. As these masses arrived to the city, the incomplete transition and acculturation to urban life made them more receptive to the kind of political mobilization that Perón represented.

By the time Germani was reaching these conclusions and conducting his research at Maciel, in the beginning of Frondizi's *desarrollista* administration, he expressed that feeling of living at a historical crossroad when he claimed that "the incorporation of all social strata into national political life within a democracy functioning in an effective manner and based on the respect of political and social rights summarizes in itself the history of the present and of the immediate future in Argentina."[100] It is in that sense, that we can understand the contrast that Germani identified between the family "atmosphere" of Isla Maciel's urbanized area, where there was a "greater degree of friendliness" and more "co-operative and democratic behavior," and the "authoritarian" atmosphere present in the *villa*, despite the element of cohesiveness of the kin group. In identifying that "democratic behavior" in the working class area, Germani did not demonize the working class –as other liberal sectors were doing- and, on the contrary, saw a potential basis for a democratic maturity.

As it happened in Argentina, social scientists also went to the *favelas* to explore the relationship between *populist* politics and *clientelistic* practices through which Vargas

[100] Ibid., 470.

secured popular support.[101] In his research, Andrew Pearse identified in the *favelado* an attitude of indifference towards his surroundings or anything beyond the limits of the kin group. Despite this attitude, however, the sociologist saw how the *favelado* negotiated certain immediate needs and material improvements with the local boss. It is precisely that relationship between the poor urban dweller and the local boss that synthesized, for the British scholar, the basis of populist politics in Rio de Janeiro and the reproduction, among popular classes, of the notion that the government was a protector. For Pearse, the *favelado* had socialized first in the countryside were he had established relationships of subordination and dependency with his *patrão* (the landowner), "whose land they had cultivated and to whom they had looked for a day's work for wages, a house or the right to build a house…"[102] In coming to the city, the *favelado* brought with him his understanding of the nature of social relationships and the "inevitability of the boss." Still, populist practices represented, for Pearse, an instrumental function as he saw it as an agent of "cultural assimilation" and dominant characteristics of Brazilian urban culture.

The exchange of benefits for votes and personal loyalties was a mechanism that reproduced itself in every level from the local neighborhood or *favela,* the municipality, the state, to the national level. In this way populist leaders guaranteed his flows of votes while cultivating loyalty through personalism and charisma. For Pearse, the condition of possibility for such relationship, thus, came from the attitude of the rural migrant that arrived to the city predisposed to reproduce a subordinated relationship in his new urban

[101] On the subject of populism and the social sciences in Brazil, see Angela de Castro Gomes, "O populismo e as ciências sociais no Brasil: notas sobre a trajetória de um conceito," *Tempo* (Rio de Janeiro), vol. 1, no. 2 (December 1996): 31-58.
[102] Pearse, *Urbanization in Latin America,* 200.

environment. Populism, therefore, although impacted negatively in the quality of democracy and citizenship provided, according to Pearse, an element of assimilation as "owing to his background and the socio-economic situation which he confronts in the city, the in-migrant is easily assimilated into those aspects of city culture…" In this sense, poor people's religiosity and even their fascination for popular games such as the *jogo do bicho* reflected "his powerlessness greatly to improve or even secure his lot by his own and his family's endeavors and his habitual hope for the intervention and protection of a good *patrão*, a political leader or a strong saint."[103]

To similar conclusions, although framed from a different perspective, arrived sociologist José Arthur Rios and his research team in what became the first and, until then, most exhaustive social analysis of Rio's slums. In *Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca* (Human Aspects of the Carioca Favela; 1960), Rios argued that clientelism was possible because the worker failed "to find in the urban structure the powerful organizations of professional and social solidarity which constitute the bulwark of urban life in the highly industrialized countries" and, therefore, he "seeks to rebuild his political behavior following the guidelines of agrarian patriarchalism. The local ward boss is utilized by his higher-ups in the same way the agrarian 'clan' leader once utilized the *compadre*, the authority figure of the extended-family relation."[104]

Germani and Pearse's approaches to the study of populist politics are but two examples of the ways in which slums became this particular place where to look for traits

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[103] Pearse, *Urbanization in Latin America*, 204-205. On the history of Jogo de Bicho and its relationship with popular culture and local power, see Amy Chazkel, *Laws of Chance: Brazil's Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011)

[104] José Arthur Rios, "El pueblo y el politico," *Política* 6 (Feb 1960): 34-35, cited in Richard Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 4 (July 1962): 488. See also, Carlos Alberto Medina, *A favela e o demagogo*, 97-98.

of tradition in a context where the forces of modernization were creating a new type of personality. Yet, as the next section will show, the work of Rios and his research team demonstrates that the new interest on *villas* and *favelas* was not the exclusive patrimony of modernization theory in the America. Transnationalism implied all kind circuits of knowledge. In the case of Brazil, the arrival of Father Lebret's social Catholicism contributed and deeply influenced the study of *favelas.*

Économie et Humanism, Social Catholicism, and the study of favelas in Brazil

In 1960, sociologist José Arthur Rios undertook the direction of the study of Rio's *favelas* organized by the center for social research that French Dominican social reformer, Father Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-1966) opened in São Paulo. Lebret had founded "Économie et Humanism" in France in 1941 to study human and social realities and to "put back the economy at the service of man" challenging the social doctrine of the Catholic Church.[105] Together with French economist François Perroux, a fervent opponent of the financial and economic policies of the industrial West to the Third World, they embraced a new approach to poor nations influenced by Marxism. In France, the movement developed a social research office (SAGMA – Société d'Analyse Graphique et Mécanographique des Agglomérations) and participated in the French Sixth Republic through an agreement with the Ministry of Reconstruction to develop urban

[105] The presence and influence of *Économie and Humanism* has been recently revisited. This section builds upon the insights of Licia do Prado Valladares, *La favela d'un siècle à l'autre: mythe d'origine, discours scientifiques et représentations virtuelles* (Paris: Editions MSH, 2006) and *A invenção da favela: do mito de origem a favela.com* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2005); Celso M. Lamparelli, "Louis Joseph Lebret e a Pesquisa Urbano-Regional no Brasil: Crônicas Tardias ou História Prematura," *Revista Espaço e Debate* 37 (1994): 90-99; Maria Cristina de Silva Leme, "The Économie et Humanisme Movement: The Politicization of Urban Planning in Brazil after the Second World War," presented at the 14th International Planning History Society Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, July 12-14, 2010.

policy informed by the careful study of the country's housing conditions.[106] Lebret's interest in the Third World and Latin America in particular came, according to Leme, to the difficulties the movement found in the Catholic Church because of the intellectual proximity with Marxism. It was through his contact to the Brazilian social situation and the Third World, that Lebret became interested in the notion of underdevelopment, incorporating it into the movement's general understanding of processes of urban spatial and social structuration.

Father Lebret's relationship with Brazil began in São Paulo where he organized in 1947 a socioeconomic research laboratory, SAGMACS (Sociedade de Análises Gráficas e Mecanográficas Aplicadas aos Complexos Sociais), devoted to the study of social issues.[107] Those were years of scientific renovation in São Paulo, especially in the social sciences. The arrival of U.S. sociologist Donald Pierson and his role in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology in Universidad de São Paulo meant the incorporation of the methodological and theoretical understandings of the School of Chicago, from where Pierson was coming. But the French influence was also significant with the presence of Roger Bastide and Claude Levi Strauss as it was the impulse that UNESCO gave to social research on the topic of race relations.[108]

Lebret's involvement in Rio de Janeiro began during Lebret's second trip to Brazil in 1952 where he coordinated a social research project about living conditions in thirty-four Brazilian cities commissioned by Josué de Castro in the Comissão de Bem

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[106] I borrow this analysis from Maria Cristina da Silva Leme.
[107] Louis-Joseph Lebret, "Sondagem preliminar a um estudo sobre a habitação em São Paulo," *Revista do Arquivo Municipal* (São Paulo: Departamento de Cultura, 1951).
[108] Licia do Prado Valladares, *A Escola de Chicago: impacto de uma tradição no Brasil e na França* (Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 2005) and *A invenção da Favela.* In 1953, sociologist Luiz de Aguiar Costa Pinto published one of the first studies on race and ethnicity in Rio's favelas; see *O negro no Rio de Janeiro: relações de raças numa sociedade em mudança* (São Paulo: Companhia Ed. Nacional, 1953).

Estar Social (Social Welfare Commission).[109] In Rio, he got in contact with Dom Helder Camêra, a *carioca* priest who had been working with and was socially committed to the situation of the poor. He actually developed the Cruzada São Sebastião, an early housing development undertaken by the Church for the residents of Praia do Pinto, the *favela* located next to the Lagoa Rodrigo Freitas in the coveted neighborhood of Leblon [See Chapter 3]. Camêra had expressed to Lebret the importance of conducting a comprehensive and serious social study of Rio's *favelas*, a scientific analysis based on social surveys whose results would, in addition, provide evidence to support claims about state actions in this area. In 1958, *O Estado de São Paulo,* whose director Julio Mesquita was an opponent of President Kubitscheck, asked Father Lebret to organize the a SEGMACS local office in Rio and coordinate the study of Rio's slums.

Rios was the coordinator that Lebret choose for this study. The sociologist, who had also participated in inter-American sociological encounters in the past decade, gathered a multidisiciplinary team of twenty scholars from sociology, economy, anthropology, and geography, among other disciplines. After three years of fieldwork and analysis of previous data, SEGMACS published their report *Aspectos Humanos da Favela Carioca,* in *O Estado* in 1960. It became the first most systematic attempt to study the human and social universe of the *favela* with a methodology that combined scientific quantitative and qualitative analysis and whose results made a huge impact in the community of scholars and experts in the following decades. The work –as Parisse, Valla, and Valladares have analyzed- was a careful empirical work of Rio's *favelas* taken

[109] Da Silva Leme, "The Économie et Humanisme Movement," 3

collectively and individually.[110] The study singled out structural factors that explained the emergence of the *favelas*, the situation of the *favelados* in relation to the job market, access to health, degree of literacy, and relationship with political forces. In every case, the research avoided easy generalizations. The analysis of individual cases allowed the general public and experts to understand that *favela* was a too overarching and oversimplifying term to describe a much more complex situation, composed of a whole universe of different particular situations and contexts. What *favelas* had in common were their degree of illegality, inequality, poverty, social and spatial segregation, and a subordinated relationship with urban politics based on an unequal relation of power. Besides those very general aspects, each *favela* represented a whole world in itself and its solution required a careful assessment of individual cases.

The results of the research, according to Valladares and Leme, shaped the research agenda, the debates, and policy on low-income housing in Rio's favelas for the next decade.[111] Likewise, it also contributed in setting the tone for a more humanistic approach to *favelas* among social scientists in the 1960s, one that tried to understand *favelas* from the *favelado* perspective. Rios would apply his broad knowledge about *favelas* and his humanist approach when Governor Lacerda appointed him, in 1960, Secretary of Social Services, the state organism in charge of coordinating actions towards *favelas.* As Chapter 3 will show, during his short tenure (1960-62), Rios adopted a policy that encouraged the organization of *favelas* associations to promote aided self-help and community development projects (*operação mutirão*) to encourage *favelado* involvement

[110] On the methodological contributions of Lebret and the Économie et Humanism's movement, see Maria Cristina da Silva Leme, "The Économie et Humanisme Movement."
[111] In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the publication of Aspectos Humanos, the Laboratório de Etnografia Metropolitana of the IFCS-UFRJ organized a symposium where the most important Brazilian urban scholars remembered the history and the influence of SEGMACS' research.

in solving the slums more urgent problems. This policy, however, proved to be too much for the political and urban plans of governor Lacerda who, in 1962, adopted a more aggressive policy of slum relocation and construction of new public housing developments. In the history of low-income housing in the 1960s, the positive appraisal of *favelas* that figures like Rios helped to develop became the basis for the organization of *favelados'* resistance to eradications and the claim for slum rehabilitation policies.[112]

As a result, the transnational construction of the housing problem was built in the encounter of different circuits of ideas and experiences that circulated not only within the Americas but, as the example of Father Lebret in Brazil shows, also from Europe through its contact with the "underdeveloped" –and decolonizing- world. The US and modernization theory were certainly very influential as the latter provided the ideological rationale to the country's hegemonic position in the postwar order. In addition, modernization theory also informed research around the world through the work of international and philanthropic organizations, such as the UN.

Yet, as the papers presented at the ECLA meeting and SEGMACS research show, these different approaches shared, explicitly or implicitly, the representation of slums as almost rural enclaves in the city, as spaces of marginality where traits of tradition and countryside behavior coexisted with an urban way of life. At the same time, however, the ethnographies and surveys undertaken by Latin American scholarship began to show that the universalistic and generalizing pretensions of modernization theory were not empirically observable in Latin American cases or, at least, they presented many exceptions to the rule. As Gorelik has argued, these scholars begun to realize that

[112] As we will see in Chapter 5, the demand for slum rehabilitation was part of a broader transnational trend built upon the notion that, rather than problems, slums were actually poor people's long-term solution for shelter.

development and economic growth, by themselves, did not necessarily lead to the integration of these "marginal" populations. As a result, scholars began to think that explanations and solutions had to come from the "periphery" rather than from abroad.[113]

Coda: The Housing Problem in the 1960s Between Modernization and Dependency

The optimistic expectations about the reformists and integrative possibilities of economic growth associated with *developmentalism* began to fade away in the 1960s as modernization arrived with higher levels of inequality, fostering an era of political and economic instability. Socially, the cost of such pattern of growth, which favored upper-middle and upper classes and a smaller part of skilled labor showed that development did not go hand-in-hand with better standards of living and social integration. Slums continued to grow steadily in rapid proportions, evidencing structural economic limitations.

With this evidence in hand, and with an increasing disavowal of US geopolitical and intellectual hegemony, the consolidation of research centers created in the late 1950s as well as the emergence of new and influential schools of urban studies in the 1960s, provided the intellectual grounds for new circuits of knowledge that challenged the universalistic pretensions of U.S. theories. Taken together, these intellectual trends sought to counterbalance, from different theoretical foundations, the notion that low-income populations and the recent rural migrants living in Latin American slums were marginal. In so doing, they begun to praise the experience of slums residents and the way

[113] On a similar argumentation for the case of Mexican anthropology, see Karin Rosemblatt, "The Crisis of Anthropology in the 1950s," forthcoming article.

they organized their urban environment. Many would gradually see them as the inspiration for radical politics.

Gorelik has identified two kinds of reactions to the characterization of poor urban sectors as marginals, the *radical monism* and the *exasperated dualism.* In the first case, scholars simply denied the negative categorization of poor residents as marginal and their built environments as places for the self-reproduction of misery. US anthropologists like Anthony Leeds, William Mangin, Alejandro Portes, or Janice Perlman, to name a few, showed that poor urban residents rather than marginal were actually integrated in the social and economic structure of the city: they lived, produced and consumed the city. Urban social reconstruction was possible as slum residents actually formed their own associations. Regional and kinship ties were the basis for mutual-aid associations and solidarity rather than elements of disorganization and disintegration. As Morse pointed out, the works of scholars like Lewis, Mangin, and Butterworth "warns us not to dismiss regional origin and culture as a potential binding force for the fortuitous communities of the city." Leeds, a pioneer anthropologist working in Rio's *favelas* and an influential figure in the expansion of *favela* studies in the following decades, was a fervent opponent to Oscar Lewis' "culture of poverty" approach.[114] From a heterodox Marxist approach to the study of *favelas* of Rio and the *barriadas* of Lima (where he worked closely with Matos Mar) Leeds considered Lewis' notion a misleading portrayal of *favelados* and,

[114] As Licia do Prado Valladares has pointed out, Lewis had a direct influence in the development of *favela* studies in Brazil in the 1960s by forming and encouraging new students and scholars to explore this problems. He actually organized spaces of discussions that students remember as formative. Licia Valladares, Janice Perlman, or architect Carlos Nelson dos Santos were regulars in his workshops. These were also the years when Peace Corp volunteers got involved in activities in the *favelas.* Licia Valladares, *A invenção da favela*, particularly chapter 2.

more generally, disenfranchised minorities that ultimately blamed them for their own situation.[115]

By the same token, Mangin believed that slums were actually the solution, rather than a problem.[116] His work was part of a broader collective effort to probe that, in the long-term, poor people actually improved their housing conditions and their surroundings by investing with capital and labor in the improvement of their dwellings. Architect John Turner, who worked with Mangin and Matos Mar in Perú, also appraised positively the experience of squatters with their built environment and called for the support to aided self-help construction and slum rehabilitation programs.[117] As Chapter 3 and 5 will show, the problems associated with the displacement of eradicated slums dwellers in new popular housing project by the late 1960s gave place to a movement that pushed for the rehabilitation of *favelas*. Such approach was possible thanks to the reversal of fatalistic assumptions shared among modernization theorists that projected the slums and slum houses' physical realities as the materialization of poor people's lifestyles. The detractors to this vision shared, however, the same intellectual operation –the projection of people's character from their homes and built environment- but turned it into positive evidence.

On the other hand, the emergence of dependency theory was part of what Gorelik defines as the *exasperated dualism. Dependentists* reinforced the notion of the existence of a dual society in Latin America as the result of neo-colonial center-periphery relations. While modernization theorists believed that poor people's low living standards were a consequence of the nations' low productivity, the problem in the late 1960s was that

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[115] See, for instance, the articles edited in Eleanor Burke Leacock, ed,. *The Culture of Poverty* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971) that includes Anthony Leeds criticism of Lewis.
[116] William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review* 2, no. 3 (1967): 65-98.
[117] John Turner, *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process*. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

more productivity did not produce more equality. The pattern of capitalist accumulation, *dependentistas* would say, precisely perpetuated social inequality. As the spatial reproduction of social relations, the structuration of he city and thus the presence of slums were, therefore, the direct result of neocolonialism.

Many dependentist urban scholars, as Gorelik has pointed out, while keeping the traditional difference between the rural and the urban –and the rural in the urban- actually reversed the negative stereotyping of rural migrants portraying them as potential elements that could subvert the cultural and political dominant order of the city.[118] In the 1970s, scholars like Manuel Castells began to praise new grassroots movements, such as neighborhood associations, to advance social transformation, especially in countries were military regimes repressed class-based organizations. The political agency and transformative capacity of the urban resident –precisely as an urban resident rather than as a worker- could offered a resistance that maybe did not articulate an alternative to capitalism but that in any case channeled a more offensive stance against the prevailing order.[119] In the context of the political radicalization of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, urban landscapes of poverty became one of the central spaces that radical movements choose to organize a new social order.

As this chapter tried to show, slums -and within them slum houses- were central part of the "urban problem" in the historical conjuncture of modernization theory and *developmentalism.* It was precisely in the burgeoning slums of Latin American largest urban centers where older and newer working classes and popular sectors found shelter. It was there were sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists run to find the

[118] Gorelik, "La aldea," 87.
[119] Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach,* translated by Alan Sheridan (London: E. Arnold, 1977).

interpretative keys that might help to understand social change in Latin America in order to orient the transition to modernization. It is here, I argue, where lies the central relationship between housing and the city in this crucial, “urgent” moment where the hopes of modernization were still intact.

CHAPTER 2

THINKING AND PLANNING ON HOUSING: THE TRANSNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSING "PROBLEM"

Introduction

In 1942, Francis Violich, an American architect and city planner teaching at University of California, Berkeley, began a ten-month traveling surveying low-income housing and urban planning in major Latin American cities. That research became the basis for his book *Cities of Latin America: Planning and Housing in the South* (1944), a book motivated by Violich's desire of bringing "a general picture of urban planning and housing practice in Latin America, in the interest of promoting closer professional relations with the technicians of those countries."[1] *Cities of Latin America* came to be one of the first systematic attempts of a US scholar to reach out to Latin America and introduce the North American audience into the reality of cities and urban life south to his country.[2] The book offered a succinct analysis of the critical housing situation, an examination of governmental policies, and a survey on the state of affairs in the field of urban planning. With optimism about the role that housing might play in the modernization of Latin American societies in the areas of economy, health, education,

[1] Francis Violich, *Cities of Latin America: Housing and Planning to the South* (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1944), 222.
[2] Arturo Almandoz, "Planning Latin America's Capital Cities, 1850-1950" (London: Routledge, 2002); "From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin America, 1920-50," *Planning Perspectives* 25, no 1 (January 2010): 87-95.

and culture, Violich called for a new era of housing and urban policy based on Pan-American cooperation and the production and circulation of knowledge. His trip evidenced the interest that Latin American cities drew in the final years of President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy among U.S. urban experts and architects. Latin American cities had something to offer to the American public and for Violich it was the opportunity to self-reflect about US urban practices where private speculation, rather than public interest, determined urban land uses.

US-based architects also "discovered" Latin American cities and their architecture in the 1940s. For instance, Philip L. Goodwin (1888-1958), the Modernist architect of the New York Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), travelled to Brazil also in 1942 to learn more about Brazilian Modernist architecture. Goodwin was inspired by the success of the Brazilian pavilion at the New York World's Fair in 1939 and, as the Chairman of both the Committee on Foreign Relations of the American Institute of Architects and the MOMA's Architecture Committee, he organized the exhibition *Brazil Builds* in 1943. The retrospective featured, for the first time, the architecture of a Latin American country in the United States.[3] In a similar vein, Richard Neutra, another Modernist architect, began his work for the Puerto Rican government in 1943-1944. This experience triggered the architect's involvement in the region as a planning expert and consultant in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. During the war, the US Department of State sent Neutra to Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil to deliver talks and

[3] Brazil tropical modernism was the indigenous interpretation of the postulates of the International Congress of Modernist Architecture (CIAM). Among its major figures were Lucio Costa, Oscar Niemeyer, and Affonso Reidy. See Philip Lippincott Goodwin, *Brazil Builds; Architecture New and Old, 1652-1942* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1943), 1. On the debates about the Brazilian Pavilion for the New York World Fair and the role of Modernism in Brazilian "cultural wars," see Daryle Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 201-227.

conferences on architecture. His work, *Architecture of Social Concern in Regions of Mild Climate,* published in Brazil in 1948 in Portuguese and English, documented his participation in low-cost construction and local architectural practices in Puerto Rico.[4] For Goodwin or Neutra, Latin American architecture represented the possibility to consider the relationship between modernist architecture and the significance of climate in temperate zones. More important, it also meant the opportunity to build a truly American architectural tradition –the international style, undermining European preeminence.

This increasing interest of US urban planner and architects on Latin American cities and their attention to urban and rural issues, where low-income housing played a central role, was indicative of a new era of increasing inter-American exchanges in these fields that grew steadily in the following decades. As Violich noted after coming back from his long trip,

> I became aware of how much we take for granted in our cities and all that they contain ... Our isolationist thinking even led us to take for granted our security in North America and to build a mental Maginot line around ourselves … We now realize how we had ignored the rest of the world, particularly those whom we had most in common -the other republics of the New World.[5]

In the same way sociologists and urban scholars of the Americas found in the Latin American landscapes of urban poverty the locus for the interpretative keys to understand the paramount transformation of their societies, as Chapter 1 pointed out, housing for the poor also became the subject of transnational thinking and policy. This

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[4] José Tavares Correia de Lira, "From Mild Climates' Architecture to 'Third World Planning': Richard Neutra in Latin America" (paper presented at the 14th International Planning History Society Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, July 12, 2010).

[5] Violich, *Cities of Latin America,* 1*;* Violich became a leading figure in furthering the knowledge on urban issues in the region, assisting in the institutionalization and development of research centers, divulging specialized curricula and literature, as a teacher, a lecturer, and as a consultant.

chapter explores the transnational construction of the housing "problem" in the postwar period from the perspective of individual and institutional actors that had a decisive influence in defining the terms and policies towards low-income housing. Understanding planning as a spatial practice rather than abstract thinking applied to the formulation of urban policy, the chapter understands that urban planners and housing specialists did not only reflect about their cities and their dwelling units, but were actually producing cities. As David Perry has argued, building upon the insights of Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault, "to think of planning spatially is to think of it not as the conceptualization of relations within the boundaries of abstract space but to see it as both the critical interrogation and affirmative intervention of such abstraction, as the 'production of space'. For Lefebvre, modern urban life occurred in a planned society and in the spatial dimension of the city are embedded power relations that manifest in both material and immaterial ways as space is a social production. Thinking spatially, argues Perry, means "seeing the various politics and technologies of planning –its various discourses- in their contextual place(s) in society. They become examples of particular relations of power that constitute the conditions of freedom and dominance in the socially produced urban space."[6] I explore why landscapes of urban poverty and, within them, substandard housing, became such an object of thinking and action in discourse and practice after the end of the Second World War to the extent that housing came to be addressed in a hemispheric and even global level in an unprecedented way.

Housing and urbanism were certainly transnational issues before the war; in that sense our period does not represent a sharp departure with the past. Yet, despite

[6] David C. Perry, "Making Space: Planning as a Mode of Though," in *Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory*, ed. Helen Liggett and David C. Perry (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1995), 213.

continuities, there were particular configurations that made the postwar moment a significantly different era in the field of housing and urban planning. Within the optimistic predictions about a new era of prosperity through the application of the adequate governmental and technical measures, the modernization and *developmentalist* paradigm sought to respond to the existence of spaces of urban poverty and inequality. These attempts at modernizing and domesticizing those spaces differed from previous experiences. Poverty came to be explained less in pathological terms and more as the result of the structural character of capitalist expansion in the region. In addition, a technical imagination embodied in new institutional and administrative arrangements came to assist a welfare state that assumed an active role in planning and organizing economic and social life. Finally, postwar hopes and fears, sparked by cold-war anxieties in the region, created a new inter-American context in which dollars and technical aid arrived massively to build not only the physical infrastructure of development but also to cope with social reforms seen as urgent. U.S. funds arrived to Latin America in the context of the cold war driven Alliance for Progress, allowing the first massive and large-scale urban renewal and low-income housing projects, as well as community development programs based on the notion of aided-self help.

This chapter, thus, explores the way in which the housing "problem" came to be addressed in a scientific-technical era built through transnational networks of expertise, in a particular juncture marked by *developmentalism*, modernization, and Pan-American collaboration. The chapter starts with a historical review of the way in which the "housing problem" came to be define since the own birth of the nations in the late nineteenth century, the housing policies undertaken in the first half of the twentieth

century, and the historical account of the character of the professionalization and institutionalization of the fields of urban planning and architecture in relation to housing. That revision allows for an understanding of the continuities but also the differences with the specific period under consideration. Attention is also put into the particular architectural and urban planning languages available before the arrival of US urban and regional planning by the 1940s. In this case, the aim is at showing that many Latin American countries had a tradition of thinking –and building- popular housing according to the ideas of the Modernist movement that came from Europe in the late 1920s and were rapidly adapted to local conditions. The narration moves then to the characterization of the postwar period, exploring the constitutions of certain spaces in which scholars and experts of the Americas thought of housing and urban issues in a more technical way. I suggest some of the many possible intellectual and institutional paths as representative of spaces and intersections –the "contact zones"- in which people and ideas on urban planning and low-income housing circulated in Latin America. The map of networks and institutions is, nevertheless, incomplete as such a task is beyond the possibilities of this dissertation. Actually, every one of these actors deserves their own monographic work. Building upon the contribution that recent Latin American urban historiography has done to uncover these spaces of knowledge, I suggest an overarching framework that will be changed and definitively corrected by future analysis. The last section moves the analysis to the emergence of the Alliance for Progress and the mechanisms implemented to assist in the construction of low-income housing in the region during the 1960s. Such analysis provides the historical and analytical framework for the second part of the dissertation that analyzes the concrete experience of US and

Inter-American assistance in particular low-income housing projects in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.

The Housing "Problem": A Historical Review

The concern about spaces of urban poverty began with the nation-state consolidation during the late nineteenth-century, when the ruling elites and social engineers reacted to explosions of disease and social unrest that, according to them, threatened the very own health of the nation. Capitalist expansion in the turn-of-the-twentieth-century changed the social and physical colonial aspect of the region's largest cities, as new contingents of migrants as well as freed slaves in countries like Brazil joined the urban labor force. In a society in rapid transformation, the housing problem came to be part of the "social question" – a term that the ruling classes coined referring to the working class struggles against exploitative working and rent conditions.[7] Ruling elites saw with alarm the popular outburst during the "Vaccine Revolt" in Rio de Janeiro in 1904 and the tenants' strike in Buenos Aires in 1907. The economically liberal but politically conservative governments in Argentina and Brazil treated poor dwellings as places of social disorder, disease, and moral corruption. Police repression first, and social engineering later became the first state attempts at disciplining urban space. Sanitary and hygienic campaigns and urban reforms –*á la Haussmann*- included the

[7] Jeffrey D Needell, "The 'Revolta contra Vacina' of 1904: The Revolt Against 'Modernization' in 'Belle-Epoque' Rio de Janeiro," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 67, no. 2 (1987): 233-269; Nicolau Sevcenko, *A revolta da vacina: mentes insanas em corpos rebeldes* (São Paulo: Editora Scipione, 1993); José Murilho de Carvalho, *Os Bestializados: Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987); Juan Suriano, *La huelga de inquilinos de 1907* (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1987).

razing of large areas, tenements, and the opening and beautification of streets and parks during the belle époque.[8]

In the following decades, housing of "social interest" remained limited to a handful of projects undertaken by sectors of the civic sphere, i.e. the Catholic Church or the Socialist Party in Argentina, which competed for the organization of the working class.[9] The first state attempts in the area of housing for the working class appeared timidly but more clearly during the 1930s. Chile, for instance, became a leading country in the area of town planning and popular housing in Latin America, with the creation of the Popular Housing Fund (Caja de la Habitación Popular) as well as with Karl Brunner's urban and housing plans of 1936 for Santiago.[10] In other cities, European urban planners invited by national governments also recognized the problem of ill-housing conditions for poor populations although that awareness did not translate in policy. Between 1928 and 1930, French Alfred Agache elaborated a master plan for Rio de Janeiro where he

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[8] See, among others, Arturo Almandoz, *Planning Latin America's Capital Cities.* For Argentina, see the classics José Luis Romero and Luis Alberto Romero, eds., *Buenos Aires, historia de cuatro siglos* (Buenos Aires: Abril, 1983); James Scobie, *Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb, 1870-1910* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); and the recent Adrián Gorelik, *La grilla y el parque: espacio público y cultura urbana en Buenos Aires, 1887-1936* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1998); on Brazil see, Jaime Larry Benchimol, *Pereira Passos: um Haussmann tropical: a renovação urbana da cidade do Rio de Janeiro no início do século XX* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento Geral de Documentação e Informação Cultural, 1992); Mauricio de Almeida Abreu, *Evolução urbana do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: IPLANRIO, 1987); Lilian Fessler Vaz, *Modernidade e moradia: habitação coletiva no Rio de Janeiro séculos XIX e XX* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002); and Sidney Chalhoub, *Trabalho, lar e botequim: o cotidiano dos trabalhadores no Rio de Janeiro da Belle Époque* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986); Amy Chazkel, *Laws of Chance: Brazil's Clandestine Lottery and the Making of Urban Public Life* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

[9] The first Argentine democratically elected government passed The Low-Cost Housing Law 9677 (Ley de Casas Baratas) which created the Low-Cost Housing National Commission; see Oscar Yujnovsky, "Políticas de vivienda en la ciudad de Buenos Aires (1880-1914)," *Desarrollo Económico* 14, no. 54 (1974): 327-372, and the articles in Diego Armus, *Mundo urbano y cultura popular*, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1990).

[10] See Luis Valenzuela, "Mass Housing and Urbanization: On the Road to Modernization in Santiago, Chile, 1930–60," *Planning Perspectives* 23, no. 3 (2008): 263; Arturo Almandoz, "From Urban to Regional Planning;" and Arturo Almandoz, "Urban Planning and Historiography in Latin America," *Progress in Planning* 65, no. 2 (2006): 81-123. Karl Brunner was an Austrian urban planner that worked for the Chilean and Colombian government.

recognized the presence of *favelas* with horror and proposed as a solution their plain elimination.[11]

The presence of these European figures in the field of *urbanism* was an indicator of both the professionalization and institutionalization of the disciplinary field in the region since the 1920s, and the strong influence of Europe (and the almost inexistent dialogues with US ideas in the first half of the century).[12] French architects and urban planners like Joseph Bouvard, Jean-Claude Nicolas Forestier, and Alfred Agache in Buenos Aires, Havana, or Rio de Janeiro show the degree of influence of European modern urbanism and the high level of excellence attained during the first half of the century. When Violich travelled to Latin America he was impressed by the fine degree of professionalization and the achievements in these fields in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Brazil, which he recognized as heavily European centered.

Since the 1930s, and particularly in the 1940s and 1950s, central states started a more active stance toward urban space and working-class housing, as Latin American social structure began to change as a consequence of state-led industrialization and rural-to-urban migration. In terms of urban planning and architecture, one of the languages

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[11] With the arrival of Getúlio Vargas to power, the Agache's Plan fell into disgrace but partial aspects of it were later implemented; see Maria Cristina da Silva Leme, ed., *Urbanismo no Brasil: 1895-1965* (São Paulo: FUPAM, 1999); Margareth da Silva Pereira, "Pensando a metrópole moderna: os planos de Agache e Le Corbusier para o Rio de Janeiro," in *Cidade, Povo e Nação,* ed. Luiz César de Queiroz Ribeiro and Robert Pechman (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1996), 363-375, and David Underwood, "Alfred Agache, French Sociology, and Modern Urbanism in France and Brazil,*" Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* (1991): 130-166.

[12] As Almandoz has explained, the term urbanism in Spanish and Portuguese differs from the British town planning or American urban planning. "… In British and North American contexts town planning stressed systemic, procedural and/or political values, relying for purpose on the social sciences and its technical apparatus, rather than design." For Almandoz, it was the US influence in urban planning that transformed urbanist into a planner; see Arturo Almandoz, "Urban Planning and Historiography in Latin America;" Michael Hebbert, "Town Planning Versus Urbanism," in *Dialogues in Urban and Regional Planning*, Thomas Harper, Anthony Gar-On Yeh, and Heloisa Costa, eds. (London: Routledge, 2008), 150-170; Alicia Novick, "El urbanismo en las historias de la ciudad," Registros (Mar del Plata), vol. 1, no.1 (November 2003): 5-26.

that seemed to fit perfectly well with state modernizing efforts was the one of the Modernist movement of the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). Since the arrival of Le Corbusier to South America in 1929, the preoccupations of Modernism for a functional architecture suitable for modern living, the debates and proposals for mass production of working class housing, and the uses of technological advancements for that purpose became part of the conversations among many Latin American architects. An architecture that epitomized the ideology of the big central state –be it a democracy or a dictatorship- sparked the state construction of an important number of public buildings and social housing projects. International and local architects were called upon by states to carry on master plans, urban renewal, and housing programs. As the literature has indicated, the works of Hannes Meyer in Mexico, building upon the previous efforts of Juan O'Gorman, Juan Legarreta, and Villagrán García; Richard Neutra, Walter Gropius, Joseph Albers, and Jose Luis Sert in Cuba; Sert, Robert Moses, Francis Violich, and Maurice Rotival in Venezuela, among others, indicates the degree of influence of Modernism in public construction and the progressive changes in the urban planning practice.[13] The influence of Modernism did not imply plain imposition but rather the adaptation of the principles of functional rationalism to those vernacular languages already available in countries like Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil. The outcome was an original architecture that followed the principles of Modernism adapted to past architectural and building traditions with an eye on local

[13] Arturo Almandoz, "From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin America, 1920-50;" Valerie Fraser, *Building the New World: Studies in the Modern Architecture of Latin America, 1930-1960* (London; New York: Verso, 2000), 1-22 and 145-245; Adrián Gorelik, *Das vanguardas a Brasília : cultura urbana e arquitetura na América Latina* (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2005); Lauro Cavalcanti, "Architecture, Urbanism, and The Good Neighbor Policy: Brazil and the United States;" in Carlos Brillembourg, ed., *Latin American Architecture, 1929-1960: Contemporary Reflections* (New York: Monacelli Press, 2004), 50-59; Jorge Francisco Liernur, *Trazas de futuro: episodios de la cultura arquitectónica de la modernidad en América Latina* (Santa Fe: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 2008).

conditions, including climate. It was precisely that originality embodied in Brazilian Tropical Modernism what caught the attention of Philip Goodwin in the 1940s.

In Brazil and Argentina, the pro-labor governments of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1954) and Juan D. Perón in (1946-1955) rose to power changing drastically the conception of the central state government. They assumed an aggressive agenda of social inclusion and welfare policies that combined state incentives, certain benefits to the popular classes, and incentives to business. The construction of "social housing" for working-class families, and even the sanctioning of housing as a social right -the "right to a home"- in the Argentine Constitutional Amendment of 1949, showed the alliance between the central state, the urban working class, and the national industrial bourgeoisie.[14] At the juncture of populist politics, welfare state, and industrialization, both Brazil and Argentina became directly involved in the construction of low-income housing, and indirectly, by passing rent control laws and establishing a policy of cheap mortgages and loans subsidized by central (federal) banks.

In terms of the housing construction, Modernism became the architectural language of the Vargas' Estado Novo, embodied in public buildings like the Ministry of Education and Health and working-class buildings built with pension funds (Institutos de Aposentaduria; IAPS).[15] Affordable, modernist apartments were expected to be the home of the *estadonovista* worker for which the state might provide for it. Yet, despite the fame of Brazilian modernist architecture, low-income housing complexes built between 1930

[14] Anahi Ballent, *Las huellas de la politica: vivienda, ciudad, Peronismo en Buenos Aires, 1943–1955* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2005); Rosa Aboy, *Viviendas para el pueblo: espacio urbano y sociabilidad en el barrio Los Perales, 1946-1955* (Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005).

[15] Among them, the housing complexes for working class families and state employees that such as Pedregulhos (Architect Affonso Reidy), Realengo (Carlos Frederico Ferreira), or Penha (Roberto Brothers).

and 1960 were extremely diverse typologically and included modernist pavillions, multifamily buildings, and single-family residences. As Nabil Bonduki and Flavia Brito de Nascimento have pointed out, CIAM ideals, garden-cities, and American town planning coexisted in Brazil as architects tried different solutions. [16] In Argentina, the presence of Modernism was less univocal and it actually became one of the many languages that the Peronist state adopted for its first large-scale housing projects, and it was confined to a group of architects associated with Le Corbusier in the crafting of a master plan for Buenos Aires who were also working for the Municipality of Buenos Aires.[17] They strongly supported a modernist solution to working class housing backing the construction of apartment buildings arranged in the typical modernist pavillions but they had to compete with other conservative, catholic groups within the Peronist state that pushed for less radical solutions and were fervent defenders of single-family dettached homes.[18] But regardless the point of which adminsitration made of Modernism its representative public housing style, a discussion that is very important when thinking on the relationship between certain aesthetic decisions (culture) and politics, for the purpose of this chapter it is important to point out the presence of architectural and urban planning languages before the increasing influence of the United States in these areas at the end of the war, as it is better explained later.

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[16] See, for instance, Flávia Brito de Nascimento, "Entre a estética e o hábito: o Departamento de Habitação Popular (Rio de Janeiro, 1946-1960)" (MA. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2004); Nabil Bonduki, *Origens da habitação social no Brasil: arquitetura moderna, lei do inquilinato e difusão da casa própria* (São Paulo SP: Estação Liberdade ;FAPESP, 1998).

[17] Anahí Ballent, 213-243; Jorge Francisco Liernur, *La red austral: obras y proyectos de Le Corbusier y sus discípulos en la Argentina (1924-1965)* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2008)

[18] Ballent; Rosa Aboy, *Viviendas para el pueblo;* Horacio Gaggero and Alicia Garro, *Del trabajo a la casa: la política de vivienda del gobierno peronista 1946-1955* (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 1996); Mark Healy, *The ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

The efforts of the Vargas and Perón's administrations to provide for working-class housing and to recognize housing as a social right meant a radical difference with past attempts. Yet, these interventions remained low quantitatively, as the number of built units fell well short of the level of demand, which kept growing as a result of upward mobility and arrival of new migrants. In addition, these administrations favored the formal, unionized working-class and leaving those workers employed in the informal market and recent migrants who were not able to find any better housing option. In any case, these housing policies of welfare states in Argentina and Brazil began to officially recognize spaces of urban poverty inequality while increasingly explaining them as the result of social problems, although the new language did not end with previous depictions that stressed helplessness, immorality, criminality, pathology and disease.

This increasing involvement of the state in the area of low-income housing required the mobilization of an important group of experts and professionals. During the second half of the 1940s and in the 1950s, as Arturo Almandoz or Alicia Novick pointed out, there was a disciplinary shift toward a more technical and pragmatic conception of urban planning; a move that turned the *urbanista* into an urban planner (planificador), an expert ready to use his expertise to contribute in the crafting of plans to serve the modernizing purposes of the nations committed to their development. This shift was directly related to the ascending influence of the Anglo conception of town planning, which in the US became the official credo of New Deal's comprehensive urban and regional planning, as it will come clear in the next section.

Therefore, the history of housing as a problem for political and social elites as well as experts, and technical cadres dates back from the period of capitalist expansion of

the recent formed nation-states in Latin America. For decades, the spaces of urban poverty inhabited by the working class were scrutinized through a moral and sanitary lens, legitimizing police intervention, hygienic campaigns, the criminalization and pathologization of poverty, and eventually the bulldozing of tenements and squatter areas. As we move to the late 1930s and 1940s, depending on the country, it is possible to see that while the "pathological" gaze did not disappear there was a growing awareness and social concern for the domestic conditions of working-class families at the juncture of populist politics, industrialization, and urban expansion. The concern about the social and moral (including sexual) conditions of the popular classes became part of the concern, as we will see, about the productivity of the nation. In this context, social reformism in the area of housing became increasingly the *métier* of architects urban planners, and experts who began to find an institutional place and public recognition in many countries of the region.

This concern, however, was not confined to national boundaries; on the contrary, it was also part of a process that was occurring in other nations of the America. Popular housing, therefore, became part of the agenda of the first regional and inter-American meetings, in what can be considered the first moment of the transnationalization of the "housing problem." As Table 1 shows, the convergence of experts and professionals associations begun since the 1920s. The Pan-American Congresses of Architects gathered national associations of architects since 1920, passing resolutions that acknowledged the importance of affordable urban and rural housing and called for the application of technical innovations to their solutions.[19] Buenos Aires hosted the First

[19] The Pan American Congress of Architects, for instance, met eight times between 1920 and 1950 in Montevideo (1920), Santiago (1923), Buenos Aires (1927), Rio (1930), Montevideo (1940), Lima (1947)

International Congress of Urbanism (Congreso de Urbanismo) in 1935, and the first conference especially on the issue of popular housing in the First Pan-American Congress on Popular Housing in 1939. The Sixteenth International Congress on Housing and Town Planning took place for the first time in Latin America in 1938, in Mexico City.[20] Many other meetings that thematized housing met before the postwar period, including the Eleventh Pan American Sanitary Conference (Rio, 1942); the congresses of the Inter-American Municipal Organization (Havana, 1938 and Santiago, 1941) that recommended public policies in the area of housing, planning administration, and zoning legislation.

As Table 1 shows, before 1950 there were only few congresses that addressed housing and urban planning in specific terms although it was clear that it was a matter of concern for architects, planners, and public health specialist. These inter-American meetings, however, occurred at an irregular frequency. Taken together, these encounters helped to develop collective points of view, to define a working agenda, and to call for the creation of national housing agencies. The First Pan-American Congress on Popular Housing, the only one until the reorganization of the Pan American system in 1948, put the housing "problem" in the forefront. This congress indicated the urgent need for the identification and quantification of the aspects involved in housing, as the lack of reliable data was the general condition in almost every country. Likewise, it stressed the need for research in the areas of architectural design; experimentation on building systems to cheapen costs, including standardization, rationalization, prefabrication; the use of regional native construction materials; and the development of national building

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and La Habana (1950). In the latter meeting, national representations agreed to institutionalize the Pan American Federation of Association of Architects; Ramón Gutiérrez, Jorge Tartarini, and Rubens Stagno, *Congresos Panamericanos de Arquitectos, 1920-2000* (Buenos Aires: CEDODAL FPPA, 2007).

[20] Francis Violich, *Low-cost Housing in Latin America* (Washington: Pan American Union, 1949), 14-17; Arturo Almandoz "From Urban to Regional Planning in Latin America."

industries. Finally, the participants agreed on the need to create a permanent inter-American housing body entrusted with the task of articulating housing centers, training experts, researching construction methods, and disseminating knowledge on urban planning and housing.[21] Significantly, this first congress on housing did not come up with an official definition of "popular housing," leaving such thing to each individual country. The fact that these meetings did not produce concrete solutions at the inter-American scale indicated the lack of integration among Latin American nations and the absence of a permanent inter-American body in charge of centralizing and producing information and organizing exchanges. Nevertheless, the meetings innovated in the fact that they call for more state intervention and anticipated the increasing specialization and atomization of the approaches to housing and urban issues.

As a result, the transnationalization of the housing problem was not an invention of the postwar period, as there were already previous attempts at establishing more formal contacts and exchanges. Yet, these meetings were more sporadic, held at an irregular frequency, and did not have the capacity to enforce their recommendations within the agenda of the Pan-American Union. As the next section will show, these conditions changed significantly in the postwar period, contributing in a new moment in the transnational formation of the housing "problem."

[21] Pan American Union, Division of Labor and Social Affairs, *Resultados del Primer Congreso Panamericano de la Vivienda Popular, Buenos Aires, 1939* (Washington, DC: Pan American Union, 1950); Diego Eugenio Lecuona, "Conceptos políticos y sociales sobre el problema de la vivienda en Argentina a mediados del siglo XX," *Boletín del Instituto de la Vivienda* (Santiago) 16, no. 42 (2001): 7-59. On the typological debates during the first Pan-American Congress on Popular Housing see Rosa Aboy, *Viviendas,* 37-42.

The Transnationalization of the Housing Problem in the Scientific-Technical Era

To address the challenges of the postwar era in a context of growing urban poverty and poor housing conditions, nations, experts, and technicians of the world became aware of their shared interests and objectives -that transcended national boundaries- and of the potentialities of combining and joining collective efforts and resources through transnational cooperation.[22] Inter-American conferences, intergovernmental organizations, and the "encounters" of scholars, professionals, specialists, and policymakers grew steadily in number and were sustained over those years. Malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, ill-housing conditions, and widespread poverty in rural and urban areas of the now self-called "underdeveloped" world generated programs of socioeconomic rehabilitation in India, Africa, Asia, and also in Latin America.

As the postwar order brought a global awareness about the progress of humanity, also policymakers, urban experts, and international organizations contributed in the creation of a universalizing understanding of the world and the production the technology of knowledge that minimized difference in favor of comparability, standardization, and global applicability. With the sponsor of intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American States (OAS), these actors began to analyze the causes and impact of the uneven urbanization process in the world, especially in the "third world." As it was also the case with social scientists, as we have seen in Chapter 1, urban experts came to share a new conviction about the role of technological innovation, applied scientific research, and comprehensive planning to assist in the development and betterment of poor countries. The ever-growing presence of meetings,

[22] Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

symposiums, and forums as well as the creation of international housing and urban agencies, professional societies, and the impressive circulation of experts and technicians, demonstrated the emergence of transnational spaces where ideas were articulated, exchanged, and often reformulated. In these "contact zones," housing came to be scrutinized under a technical gaze that ultimately decomposed the problem in a myriad of specific issues, each one addressed almost exclusively by the expert.

If experts and policymakers insisted that their actions could be taken in the name of development and modernization, they nonetheless developed an understanding of the housing problem that was piecemeal and fractured. All the involved aspects of housing received specific attention and debates sparked on such issues as, the social impact of rapid urbanization, housing construction, financing, and urban and regional planning, among others. A sense of urgency permeated discourses and practices, as action was vital to accelerate Latin American path toward modern ways of life. The role of urban experts, in their capacity to assist in the regulation of urban space, was critical; as Violich envisioned, the expert was responsible "to improve the cities of the hemisphere with the use of modern technology, science, and the application of rational democratic planning."

With the establishment of the UN and the reorganization of the OAS at the end of World War II, the housing became part of the institutional agenda of both organizations from the outset.[23] The UN General Assembly in 1946, called for an ongoing international exchange of technical experience and expertise on housing, under the supervision of the

[23] This chapter focuses exclusively on those institutions within the UN and the OAS that paid particular attention to the technical aspects of housing, leaving aside other organizations, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and UNESCO summarized in David Owen, "The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance: A Multilateral Approach," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 323, (1959): 25-32.

UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). By 1949, the Social Department of the UN Secretariat began the publication of *Housing and Country Planning,* which circulated the result UN-sponsored studies and related material on the field of housing.[24] While the General Assembly denied the formation of a long-term program of housing assistance that ECOSOC had prepared in 1950, it nevertheless approved the creation of the Housing, Building, and Planning Program. Its first director, Ernest Weissmann, a Yugoslav architect and a member of the CIAM with strong connections with housing and urban experts in the world, initiated a program of foreign missions of experts to assess housing conditions in decolonizing countries while also assisting them in the creation of national planning agencies, public administrative bodies, and research centers.[25] Many of the experts that Weissmann hired were well-known housing reformers –especially from the United States- including Catherine Brauer, Charles Abrams, and Jacob L. Crane or Otto Konigsberg.[26] The UN housing branch promoted studies on urban land problems and policies; community services and facilities in large-scale projects; tropical housing and construction techniques; stabilized soil construction; financing; planning of education; cooperation among countries; regional planning and cooperative housing. Still, as Abrams recalled in his work *The Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World* (1964), housing received less institutional attention and resources during the 1950s

[24] The UN renamed the journal twice, *Housing and Community Development* in 1959 and *Housing, Building, and Planning* in 1963.
[25] On Weissmann, Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), and Muzaffar, M. Ijlal, "The Periphery Within: Modern architecture and the Making of the Third World" (Ph.D. diss, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007).
[26] Charles Abrams was a recognized housing reformer in the United States working, for instance, for the New York City Housing Authority. During the 1950s, Abrams served as a UN consultant in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. On Abrams, see A. Scott Henderson, *Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

in comparison to other areas like health, education, and economic reconstruction.[27] Actually, it was not until a decade later, in the early 1960s, that the UN Secretariat approved the formalization of the Center for Housing, Building, and Planning, launching a significant program of international cooperation on low-cost housing based on notions of aided self-help and mutual aid. In any case, the role of the UN in Latin America was less decisive in comparison to other regions and its influence came mediated through collaborative work with the OAS.

The 1950s were the years of the formation of a Pan-American understanding of the urban and housing "problem" that sparked an agenda of technical expertise and practice. The OAS, the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center, and the Inter-American Society of Planners were among the most important actors in the constitution of hemispheric spaces of production and circulation of knowledge on housing. US notions on urban and regional planning (with stress on regional decentralization), self-help and community development programs, and the inclusion of housing planning as part of broader centralized comprehensive national planning spread through these spaces and circuits.[28] As we have seen in the previous section, housing and urbanism were already transnational issues; they certainly were to a degree heretofore inexperienced. The novelty of this period laid in the significant impulse, attention and invested resources that the issue received at a Pan-American level in a context of optimism about the possibility to solve spatial inequalities through state planning, applied science and technology, contributing to the development and modernization of the region. The next

[27] Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in An Urbanizing World* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964).
[28] Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*, 3rd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 142-187.

pages analyzed the formation of some representative spaces and how ideas and personalities circulated among them.

The reorganization of the Pan American system in the Chapter of Bogota (1948) that created the OAS, sought to strengthen hemispheric integration in a context of postwar diplomacy, the ascendant hegemonic attitudes of the United States, and the expectations about the social and economic progress of the region.[29] For the US, the OAS became the place to impose its geopolitical interests through diplomacy, science, and technology. For Latin American nations it meant a place to play the opportunities made available by the US and to push for their own individual and regional agenda. Low-income housing, received new impetus and a higher status within the OAS social and technical agenda since the mid-1940s, and especially in the 1950s with the establishment and consolidation of the Inter-American Housing and Planning Center (CINVA) between 1951 and 1972. For the next two decades the OAS and CINVA called for, and assisted in most of the areas related to housing. Effort had to be made in the production and circulation of standardized, comparable data and statistics on population and housing organized in censuses, compilation of planning legislation and building codes, assessment of construction techniques and materials, and calculations on labor costs; exchange of experts and housing authorities; consultancies and missions to assist in the formation of national administrative and technical bodies; and research.[30] The OAS

[29] To avoid confusion, the Pan American Union was part of the inter-American System and in 1948 it became the General Secretariat of the OAS; G. Pope Atkins, *Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System* (Westport: Greenwood, 1997).

[30] Of course, the quantity and quality of statistical data varied from country to country. Yet, organizations like the OAS and the UN pushed for the generalization of new methodologies and data recollection techniques. The creation of the Inter-American Statistical Institute in 1940 was an indication of the need for such knowledge. The First Inter-American Congress on Demography (Mexico, 1943), recommended standard criteria for the surveys to be conducted in the 1950 census. In Brazil and Argentina, these were also the years of the first scientific censuses on *favelas* and *villas miserias* that scrutinized a problem with

also became a centerpiece in the introduction of US ideas of comprehensive urban and regional planning as well as aided self-help and community development projects in Latin America.

After the recommendations of the Pan-American Union's (PAU) Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, held in Chapultepec in 1945, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) became involved in low-income housing through the Division of Housing and Planning. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs (c. 1951) absorbed the functions of the former Housing Section of the Division of Labor and Social Affairs (c. 1949) providing a more overarching institutional and material support. Anatole Solow (1913-1978), an architect originally from Swiss with strong contacts in the US and in the UN, became the chief of the housing section. In 1949, Solow edited a volume that Violich had prepared on the housing situation in Latin America, based on his own data and in the previous work of Robert C. Jones.[31] *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America* updated Violich's previous *Cities of Latin America* and became the first institutional recollection of data on housing needs, slums, urban legislation, and residential programs in single nations. Jones noted in the preface of the book, "adequate low-cost housing," he observed, "is undoubtedly one of the most critical needs in all countries. Reading the literature of the period of exploration and expansion in America, one is force to admit that the housing problem is not a new one. Yet, today, at the close of the first half of the twentieth century, the American republics face the gravest

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empirical evidence. The OAS published the first systematic tabulation of data on housing in 1962; Instituto Interamericano de Estadística, *La situación de la vivienda en America: Análisis estadístico censal de los resultados obtenidos bajo el Programa del Censo de las Américas de 1950 COTA 1950* (Washington, D.C.: Unión Panamericana, 1962).

[31] According to Robert C. Jones, his work *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America* (1943) gave birth to an information and consultation service on housing and urban development in the PAU; Robert C. Jones, (Washington, DC., Pan American Union, 1943) and "Bienestar social en las Américas," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 13, no. 2 (May - Aug., 1951): 240.

housing crisis in their history."[32] Solow defined the housing crisis as a problem of development and living standards in the region, which required the concerted actions of municipal, state, and national agencies in charge of broad social, economic, and technical programs. Thus, the solution was not limited to the construction of new dwellings or the rehabilitation of obsolete stock but rather the general improvement of the economic and social situation. For Violich, such a solution was an fundamental part of citizenship and the construction of a stable democracy; as he argued, "man's concept of democracy, feeling of class equality, basic sense of security and resultant spirit of cooperation cannot be expected to flourish in the midst of squalor and a degrading environment."[33]

The next decisive step in the Pan-Americanization of the housing agenda was the organization of the Ad-Hoc Committee for the Study of the Low Cost Housing Problem, called upon the IA-ECOSOC in 1953.[34] This meeting of experts in Washington aimed at providing a careful picture of the housing situation in Latin America, a balance of what had been accomplished in terms of actions, policies, and research. The resolutions of the committee, presented in its final report "The Problem of Housing of Social Interest in Latin America," were later sanctioned in the Tenth Pan-American Meeting in Caracas in 1954 and defined the housing agenda for the next years. The committee defined the "housing problem" as the twofold result of, on the one hand, "the scarcity of hygienic and comfortable dwellings" because of population increase and low productivity, and, on the other hand, the "present discrepancy between the low purchasing power of the family

[32] Robert C. Jones, preface to Francis Violich, *Low-Cost Housing in Latin America* (Washington, DC., Pan American Union, 1949), 1.
[33] Ibid, 4.
[34] Most member states sent their official representatives, in most cases officials of national housing authorities, and included Albert M. Cole and Jacob L. Crane (US), Rafael Picó (Puerto Rico), Ernest Weissmann (UN), and Anatole Solow, among others.

income and the high cost of housing production." Thus, social and sanitary aspects of housing were now less understood as the outcome of misery, pathology, disease, and crime and more the result of economic structural forces and social change. While the moral and hygienic condemnation still pervaded as a residual element in the cultural formation of the 1950s, the dominant characterization emphasized productivity, costs, production, and homeownership. Solutions to a social problem came to be increasingly addressed in economic and financial terms.

In a context of limited resources, the housing problem came, therefore, mostly defined as one of development.[35] It was, then, pressing to channel domestic savings toward housing through the creation of a credit and mortgage market in savings and loans institutions, to strength the building industry, to introduce pre-fabrication techniques, and to encourage self-help projects; all measures aimed at lowering construction costs and providing homeownership. For the committee, the State had a central role in providing the legal and institutional support to stimulate the private initiative, and defining the relationship of housing within an integrated national economic plan. In practice, the recommendations of the committee benefited lower middle classes, the only ones in the capacity to access and to pay for mortgages. For the lowest sectors, urban and regional planning might contribute in the decentralization of economic activities and limit the overwhelming population growth in largest cities. Self-aided housing and community development programs, mostly in rural areas, and state direct construction of low-income housing was also recommended.

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[35] Housing of "social interest" came to be defined as "that which is built, within the basic standards of habitability, at a minimum cost, with the intention of putting it within reach of low-income families;" Inter-American Economic and Social Council, *Problems of housing of social interest: rev. ed. of the report prep. by the Ad Hoc Committee for the Study of the Low-Cost Housing Problem* (Washington DC: Pan American Union, 1954), 72.

The debates about the relationship between housing, economic growth, and the productivity of the nation –housing as a tool of economic development– permeated most of the conversations, particularly in the U.S. around the years in which low-income housing was a hot topic with the passage of the 1949 and 1954 Housing Act.[36] Precisely in 1954, few months before the Ad Hoc committee, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology organized a conference on "Housing and Economic Development."[37] Two confronting positions emerged clearly around the productivity issue during the meeting: on the one side, a group of economic and financial experts and, on the other side, a group of housing reformers. In the first group were figures like Max Millikan, Leo Grebler, and Paul Samuelson, who were also part of the think tanks of modernization theory and foreign policy.[38] For them, the problem was that housing in the underdeveloped world was an expensive investment that competed with other, more productive ventures, such as basic infrastructure (i.e., dams, highways, power). Any housing policy, this group argued, had to be part of carefully crafted national economic development plans. They would define, for instance, whether it was more economically rational to use public funds for housing or to develop other economic regions slowing down massive migration to largest cities. In all cases, the point was that the priority was economic growth, and then the rest. For Leo Grebler, by then the associate director and research professor at

[36] Godwin Arku and Richard Harris, "Housing as a Tool of Economic Development since 1929," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (December 2005): 895-915; on the housing acts in the United States and the housing projects in New York City Samuel Zipp, *Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York* (New York: University Press, 2010); see also Arnold Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Alexander von Hoffman, "Housing and Planning: A Century of Social Reform and Local Power," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 75, no. 2 (March 2009): 231-244.

[37] Kelly Burnham, ed., *Housing and Economic Development* (Cambridge: School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955).

[38] Max Millikan, Director of the MIT's Center for International Studies (CIS), Leo Grebler from the Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies of Columbia University, and Paul A. Samuelson, Professor of Economics at MIT.

Columbia University's Institute for Urban Land Use and Housing Studies and the author of *Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate* (1956),

> It is low productivity that prevents underdeveloped countries from realizing their potentialities in production and living standards. An increase in their productive efficiency is, in fact, a necessary pre-condition for an improvement in living standards. The emphasis on productivity has been questioned on the ground that development programs should advance people's welfare rather than productivity, but I believe the dichotomy between productivity and welfare is a false one. The only road to greater material welfare is through greater economic productivity.[39]

For Max Millikan, who had served as the CIA director from 1951-52, this economic problem was more related to US geopolitical interests in the region. The director of the MIT's Center for International Studies (CIS) put it bluntly, "Insofar as the objective of economic development as seen from the United States' point of view is a political objective," and "insofar as we are trying to help achieve a standard of living sufficient to prevent large scale political instability in these underdeveloped areas, we are interested in putting our investment in things that will pay off as soon as possible." For Millikan food, in this context, would "pay-off" more than housing.[40]

On the other side, the "housing reformers" adopted a more humanistic perspective.[41] Anatole Solow chose the Latin American experience to answer the most "efficiency" positions, "Does higher productivity in itself mean improvement in living standards?" he asked. "Have the tin mines of Bolivia brought more wealth to the Indian mine worker? Or has the United Fruit Company's activity in Guatemala automatically improved living conditions in the shocking slums of Puerto Barrio's dock workers?" The

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[39] Leo Grebler, "Possibilities of International Financing of Housing," in *Housing and Economic Development,* 30.
[40] Max Millikan, "The Economist's View of the Role of Housing," in *Housing and Economic,* 24-25.
[41] Other "housing reformers" present at the conference were Charles Abrams, Catherine Bauer, Ernest Weismann, Lloyd Rodwin, Jacob Crane, Robert Alexander, and José Luis Sert.

fact that Solow, whose position put him right in between US and Latin American interests, used two cases (Bolivia and Guatemala) that fitted somewhat well with other experiences of colonialism referred in the conference (i.e. the role of Great Britain in India or Burma), reveals the contradictions that experts like Solow experienced and brings an element of nuance to the analysis of the role of experts and technocrats. His position was also representative of the reformist social characterization of the relationship between housing and productivity; "the goal of a decent life," Solow argued, "is easily visualized in the form of a decent house, and consequently housing improvement becomes a powerful motive towards productivity."[42] A healthy and modern home located in neighborhoods furnished with collective facilities might bring a healthy worker, socialized within the values and behaviors of the modern world. This in turn, would contribute to decrease, for instance, absenteeism increasing the worker's productivity. As I have mentioned in the previous section, this reformist position on housing and its relationship with productivity was already present in Latin America since the late 1930s and shows, both the continuities in the reformist thinking and the points of convergence between Latin American and US counterparts. Actually, many national delegations took this position in inter-American meetings showing evidencing the endorsement of political and economic elites in individual countries. For instance, the Argentine delegation at the Ad Hoc Committee took a nationalistic stand to confront the general gloomy depiction of the housing crisis in the final document by stressing Perón's socially-driven housing policies: "According to the concept of social justice –which is the national doctrine of the Argentine people," the Argentine delegation argued, "housing

[42] Anatole Solow, "The Importance of Housing and Planning in Latin America," in *Housing and Economic Development,* 55.

performs a highly social function with respect to the happiness of a people and the greatness of a country, insofar as it contributes to the dignity of mankind and the preservation of the physical and moral health of the population." In a similar vain, argued Colombian representatives, "housing suitable to the needs of the family is the keystone of a just and ordered society composed of families who are capable of respecting the divine and secular laws and of constantly seeking their own improvement through education, hygiene, and work."[43]

The delegations agreed that inter-American cooperation was most useful and practical if it was directed toward training, research, and exchange of scientific information. For that reason, the Ad Hoc committee called for the organization of inter-American and regional technical meetings to increase the exchange of technical advances and the results of research and experiments and for the establishment of personal contacts to guide the work of technical institutions and the formulation of housing programs. The First Inter-American Technical Meeting on Housing and Urban Planning was held in Bogotá in 1956 and two years later the second meeting in Humpaní, Peru.[44] At the same time, the building industry also held their first inter-American meetings.[45] The OAS also began to organized regional meetings, as it was the case in Central America and Panama. These meetings focused on technical aspects of housing, financial issues, construction techniques, and urban and regional planning, demonstrating the degree of specialization that the housing and urban question was reaching by the end of the decade.

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[43] Ibid, 192-197.
[44] Pan American Union, *Informe de la Secretaría del Consejo Inteamericano Económico y Social sobre la Primera Reunión Técnica Interamericana en Vivienda y Planeamiento* (Washington DC: Union Panamericana, 1958); and Pan American Union, *Segunda Reunión Técnica Interamericana en Vivienda y Planeamiento* (Washington DC: Union Panamericana, 1959).
[45] The First Inter-American Congress of the Building Industry, (Caracas, 1958); the Inter-American Committee on Building (Chile, 1959); the Second Inter-American Congress on the Building Industry (Mexico, 1960)

At times, these encounters helped to new networks. That was the case, for instance, of the Inter-American Society of Planners (Sociedad Interamericana de Planificadores; SIAP), which was created during the First Inter-American Meeting in Bogotá, and became one of the most active networks, contributing to the development of urban research in Latin America. Its history is also important because, together with CINVA, it was one of the central institutions that helped in the introduction of U.S. ideas on urban and regional planning.[46] SIAP's, first president was Rafael Picó, a Puerto Rican geographer, whose experience in the United States and as director of the island's planning board got him acquainted with US notions of urban and regional planning, which he advocated later in Latin America. Puerto Rico, in this way, became one of the bridges between the US and Latin America on these matters.

The relationship between the US and Puerto Rico dated back from the times of President Roosevelt's New Deal Planning, as Peter Hall described the introduction of state-led integrated regional planning as one of the responses to the Great Depression.[47] There were a number of New Deal projects that later influenced Pan-American approaches to urban housing. This included the organization of the Tennessee Valley Administration, which commissioned a vast comprehensive regional plan to overcome poverty in the Appalachian region; the construction of new suburban satellite cities -the Greenbelts- for white middle classes; and the planning for the industrialization and

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[46] Luis Eduardo Camacho, "Sociedad Interamericana de Planificación, SIAP 50 años Vida institucional y programática," *Revista Bitácora Urbano Territorial* 1 (2007): 268-284 and Jorge Rivera "Les Axes de la Question Urbaine et Régionale dans les Congrès de la Société Interaméricaine de Planification (SIAP), 1956-1988," (paper presented at the IX International Conference on Urban History, August 27-30, Lyon, France); Licia do Prado Valladares and Magda Prates Coelho, "La investigación urbana en América Latina: tendencias actuales y recomendaciones," *Cadernos IPPUR* X, no. 1 (1996): 111.

[47] Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*, 3rd Ed (Malden: Blackwell, 2002), 169-178.

economic development of Puerto Rico in the 1940s.[48] The launching of Operation Bootstraps in Puerto Rico, a program for the rapid development and industrialization of the island based on federal and local tax exemptions, crafted by New Dealers together with governor Luis Muñoz Marín (1949-1965) was central. Rexford Tugwell, one of the chief intellectual contributors of the New Deal and the mastermind in the construction of the Greenbelts in the US, was the person that Roosevelt chose to govern Puerto Rico. He supported Muñoz Marín plans for the transformation of the country through an integral program of industrialization, and urban and regional development, based on the US experience. Aided self-help techniques and community development programs became available tools used in the area of housing.[49] Rafael Picó occupied a central place as the director of Puerto Rico's Planning Board during Operation Bootstrap and in the following decades he took this knowledge towards similar experiences in Latin America. Furthermore, Puerto Rico's urban development and its housing programs became the showcase for the rest of Latin America, especially during the years of the Alliance for Progress. Not in vain, President Kennedy appointed Teodoro Moscoso, the architect of Operation Bootstrap, as the first coordinator of the Alliance. During his short tenure, Moscoso held up Puerto Rico as the example that Latin America should follow.

The Centro Interamericano de la Vivienda (CINVA; Inter-American Housing and Planning Center), one of the most important housing agencies in the western hemisphere dedicated to urban and regional planning, low-income housing, community development,

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[48] On the history of Tugwell and the construction of Greenbelt, Maryland, see Cathy Knepper, *Greenbelt, Maryland: A Living Legacy of the New Deal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

[49] In the long-term, however, the causes that explained Puerto Rico's spectacular growth in the short term became also the reasons that explain its later stagnation and decline; see Alex W. Maldonado, *Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap* (University Press of Florida, 1997). For a history of public housing in Puerto Rico, see Zaire Dinzey-Flores, "Temporary Housing, Permanent Communities," *Journal of Urban History* 33:3 (2007): 467-492.

and self-help programs. In 1951, the OAS and the Colombian government agreed on the organization of the Center, a long-standing aspiration of Latin American countries since the First Pan-American Congress on Low-Cost Housing.[50] Its main functions were professional education and training, research, scientific exchange, and consultation services on technical, economic, social, and administrative aspects of low-cost rural and urban housing, with stress on multidisciplinary work. Research, for instance, included such topics as, construction techniques and experimentation with local building traditions and materials; planning and design of minimum dwellings in tropical areas; housing management, administration and financing, among many others. The exchange program allowed Latin American architects, planners, engineers, housing administrator, economists, and social workers to travel to Bogotá and take courses taught at the Center by Latin American scholars and US. Its publications circulated widely and became available in almost every national urban planning and housing agency of the region.

As was the case during SIAP's early years, CINVA was a model of Pan-American cooperation and planning and served as a bridge with US notions on planning. Not casually, many of the figures behind the formation of SIAP were either members or were strongly connected to CINVA: Picó, Solow, Venezuelan engineer and politician Luis Lander (formed in urban and regional planning at Harvard University), and Colombian Gabriel Andrade, and Peruvian Luis Dorich, among others. The US influence can also be seen in in the personalities of US origin who directed, taught, and worked as consultants for the Center. It's first director was Architect Leonard Currie, who had previously

[50] Inter-American Housing Center, *Prospectus 1956* (Washington, D.C.: Pan-American Union, 1956); Luis Fernando Acebedo Restrepo, "El CINVA y su entorno espacial y politico," *Mimesis* (Bauru), vol. 24, no.1 (2003), 74; Jorge Alberto Rivera Paez, "El CINVA modelo de cooperación internacional" (MA thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2002); Martha Liliana Peña Rodriguez, "El Programa CINVA y la acción communal," *Revista Bitácora Urbano Territorial* 12: 185-192.

worked in Central America where he joined a Carnegie Institute's archaeological expedition to Copan, Honduras and assisted Pan-Am Airways and the U.S. Government in the construction of airport facilities in Guatemala and Nicaragua in the early 1940s. Other directors included Eric Carlson and Walter Harris. The latter, a Professor in City Planning at Yale University and a consultant and researcher all over the region– negotiated agreements between Yale, CINVA, and several member-states.[51] During his tenure, Eric Carlson, who later replaced Weismann at the UN, strengthened the consulting role of the Center.

The example of the agreement between CINVA and the Venezuelan government for an assessment of large-scale housing program in Caracas provides details to see the degree of interconnections and overlapping among institutions and personalities. In 1959, Carlson organized an interdisciplinary team of experts and professionals following a request of the Venezuelan government requested by Luis Lander. That group included important sociologists, urban planners, social workers, that became very influential in the following years; among them Lloyd Rodwin, who had co-founded that same year the MIT-Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies; Josefina Albano, a Brazilian social worker with experience in slum population; José Matos Mar, the Peruvian sociologist who presented his work on Lima's *barriadas* in the 1959 UNESCO meeting in Santiago.[52] Rodwin and the MIT-Harvard Joint Center later signed a contract with the Venezuelan government for the integrated planning and design of all phases of city and regional

[51] Harris, for instance, organized a graduate master program in Peru, in 1961, as part of the agreement between Yale and the Institute for Urban Planning, at the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería; "Yale University Cooperates in Inter-American Housing and Planning Programs," *Vivienda + Planeamiento. Suplemento Informativo CINVA*, May 1961, 1.
[52] Eric Carlson, "Evaluation of Housing Projects and Programmes: A Case Report from Venezuela," *The Town Planning Review* 31, no. 3 (October, 1960): 187-209.

development of a new, modernist city, Ciudad Guayana (founded in 1961), at the confluence of the Orinoco and Careen Rivers in southeastern Venezuela.[53] Lander, on his side, strengthened its relations with Peru, especially through architect Eduardo Neira –whom he made consultant in Caracas in 1960, and Luis Fernando Belaunde and Dorich of SIAP. Lander was also strongly connected with Chile where he supported the appointment of Jorge Ahumada in the direction of the Centro de Estudios Urbanos para el Desarrollo (CENDES) of the University of Venezuela. Ahumada, an economist connected to Raúl Prebisch of ECLA.[54]

CINVA also embodied notions of aided-self help and community development programs in a similar way the UN was doing in Africa and Asia. Jacob L. Crane from the HHFA lobbied Weissmann at the UN and also Solow at the OAS and CINVA. Crane had helped, as the Assistant Director of the US Public Housing administration, in launching a housing program with the Housing Authority of Ponce, Puerto Rico. A close relationship with Picó and Solow put him in a strategic position of influence to the point that CINVA incorporated the topics of community development and self-help in the course programming by 1961 and carried these sorts of experiences in rural areas of Colombia, Ecuador, or Guatemala, and Central America.[55] In 1953, CINVA published

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[53] The Venezuelan state, together with Puerto Rico and Chile, were the first countries that got involved in the field of low-income housing already since the 1930s. Venezuela also received international missions leaded by prestigious architects and urban planners that included Maurice Rotival, Francis Violich, and John Friedmann. Adrián Gorelik, "A produção da 'cidade latino-americana,'" *Tempo Social* (São Paulo) 17, no. 1 (2005), Juan José Martín Frechilla, "Construcción urbana, profesiones e inmigración en el origen de los estudios de urbanismo en Venezuela: 1870-1957," *Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos* 11, no. 3 (1996): 507. On Chile, Edward Murphy, "A Home of One's Own: Finding a Place in the Fractured Landscapes of Urban Chile" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2006); Luis Valenzuela, "Mass Housing and Urbanization"

[54] Jorge Rivera, 9; Gorelik, "A produção;" Gregorio Darwich, *Pensamientos plurales: orígenes de los estudios del desarrollo en Venezuela* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 2005).

[55] Richard Harris, "The Silence of the Experts: 'Aided Self-Help Housing', 1939-1954," *Habitat International* 22, no. 2 (June 1998): 165-189.

studies on self-help and mutual aid systems based on Puerto Rican experiences and also translated the *Self-Help Manual* in 1961.[56]

These examples of "contact zones" and intersections show the extent to which the 1950s were years of the formation of spaces of expertise at a hemispheric scale on the issues of housing and urbanization. Many of the personalities that appeared in one country advising a planning agency or crafting urban renewal plans, reappeared later, or even at the same time, in some other country helping in the institutionalization of a governmental agency, lecturing, or advising for an intergovernmental organism. In so doing, they contributed in the transnational formation of a Pan-American understanding of the urban and housing problem.

Building [in] the Alliance for Progress

In the 1960s, fears of social revolutions and the spread of Communism, fueled by the decolonization struggles in the Third World, opened a scenario in which US dollars and foreign technical assistance in the field of housing arrived massively to the region at an unprecedented rate. Housing policy became an important aspect of inter-American relations and foreign aid, of lesser proportions quantitatively in comparison to other areas but definitively important in the modernizing project for Latin America. In the previous decade, conservative economic advisers of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had convinced both presidents that Latin American modernization could and should rely on the private efforts of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. In those years, the region did not pose a sense of geopolitical threat for US military advisors. US aid in the field of

[56] Luis Rivera Santos, *Manual para la organizacion de proyectos piloto de ayuda propia y ayuda mutua en Vivienda* (Bogota: CINVA, 1953); on the training courses, *Suplemento Informativo CINVA*, June 1962, 1.

housing during the 1950s, therefore, had consisted in few interventions, mainly technical advice for specific projects and loans for self-help programs in Santiago and Lima.

It was Milton Eisenhower who recognized the urgent need to promote social reforms when he became aware of the strong Anti-American general feeling and social turmoil during a visit to the region in the late 1950s. The president's brother used the specific example of housing and its potential positive impact in the heart and minds of Latin Americans, "A man who has a decent house has something worth conserving, he is apt to be more moderate in his pursuit of other goals, more likely to favor democratic change rather than violent upheaval."[57] Social reform, homeownership, and democracy became, according to Eisenhower, pillars for a new social order in a cold war context.

But in Latin America, the lack of long-term, low-interest credit was the major problem to mobilize savings and stimulate private capital in low-cost housing. Foreign credit, therefore, was seen as the only solution. President Eisenhower began to review foreign aid policies, and timidly took the first steps to promote development plans through the creation of the Development Loan Fund (DLF), which years later became one a key tool of foreign aid. The creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 1959 was also a decisive step in the agenda of hemispheric cooperation and the fulfillment of a long-standing demand of Latin American countries. The US agreed to provide funds to the IDB for the constitution of the Social Progress Trust Fund (SPTF) to finance national projects with a proved social impact. To receive assistance for social-development programs in the area of housing, Milton Eisenhower wanted to condition

[57] Cited in Thomas Zoumaras, "Containing Castro: Promoting Homeownership in Peru, 1956-61," in *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 2, (Spring 1986).

recipient countries to create of national agencies similar to the U.S. Federal Housing Authority but the Cuban Revolution speeded up the plans for economic assistance.[58]

In March 1961, President Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress in a meeting with Latin American diplomats at the White House. He defined the program as

> A vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and school (…) a continent rich in resources and in the spiritual and cultural achievements of its people [where] millions of men and women suffer the daily degradations of hunger and poverty [and] lack decent shelter or protection from disease.[59]

In August 1961, Latin American nations gathered at the OAS IA-ECOSOC conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay –urged by the US to enforce the isolation of the Cuban revolutionary government- signed the Alliance for Progress. The passing of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act reorganized the foreign assistance program absorbing the federal structure in charge of foreign aid created during the Truman and Eisenhower's administrations, especially the International Cooperation Administration and the DLF.[60] The Act created also the U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID). The central notions behind the US foreign aid policy were "planning" and "self-help." "Assistance from the United States," said the Foreign Assistance Act, "shall be used in support of, rather than substitution for, the self-help efforts that are essential to successful

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[58] See Milton Eisenhower, "United States-Latin American Relations, 1953-1958," Department of State *Bulletin* 40 (January 1959): 89-105.

[59] John F. Kennedy, "Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics," March 13th, 1961 in *The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV*, No. 1136 (April 3, 1961), `471-474. On the Alliance for Progress see, for instance, Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970); Mark T. Gilderhus, "U.S.-Latin American Relations since World War II", in Michael J. Hogan, ed., *America in the World. The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (New York: The Cambridge University Press, 1995); Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and Jeffrey Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America*, (New York: Routledge, 2007).

[60] Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter*, 99.

development programs and shall be concentrated in those countries that take positive steps to help themselves."[61] For the US, self-help meant that Latin American countries would have to commit to a series of reforms and efforts to fulfill the requirements to receiver assistance, instead of expecting a similar treatment as Europe did during the Marshall Plan. In theory, this implied US support only to those countries that would organize national development programs after the assessment of each country's performance. In practice, however, as Jeffrey Taffet has argued, the Alliance served the US as an instrument of foreign policy, as the most favored countries were those that represented a potential Communist threat: Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Dominican Republic. As Juan de Onís pointed out, there was an "almost mystical belief in the power of planning to solve Latin America's problem, reform its social structures, and stimulate is economic growth." This technical imagination defined the policies that affected low-income housing in the region.

Surely, these notions of self-help and planning reproduced gendered depictions. As the feminist critique of modernization and dependency theory has pointed out, "First World" diplomacy engendered social constructions of gender and racial differences in which ideals of "progress," "modernity," "forward looking," "change," and "rationality," and the reduction of human relationships to a series of impersonal market relations were built in opposition to feminized notions of "traditional," "backward," "household economy" identified with the "underdeveloped world."[62] Thus, lending countries self-identified as providers and agents of change, introducers of technology and reason.

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[61] The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public law 87–195 [S.1983], 75 Stat. 424, approved September 4, 1961, Sec. 2151–1.

[62] See, for instance, Catherine V. Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory* (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995).

Through self-help, Latin American societies might learn to assume the responsibilities associated with a matured, modern, developed nation rather than being mere passive recipients of state welfare. Responsibility, maturity, and agency, were all male attributes associated with modernization and development. Thus, the role of the US was not only economically motivated but morally correct, a work of "missionaries". As Teodoro Moscoso, Director of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, put it, "we must convince these [Latin American] peoples that through the Alliance they can really reach progress and happiness (…) We must evangelize them! (…) you must remember, this job is not just the administration of billions of dollars. It is a job of evangelizing."[63]

Assistance for housing during the Alliance came from different sources and in every case the ultimate explanation was economic: the rapid and impressive growth of slum and squatter settlements was the result of people's inability to pay for conventional housing. Any solution required state action to stabilize the different components of the housing market, including the constructive and financial aspects of low-income housing. As we have argued before, the formation of capital in Latin America was too slow to channel resources to housing. Large-scale construction of affordable housing, because of its own nature, was an expensive investment with very low return, competing with other strategic areas of investment. In addition, the expensive projects that had been already built by the public initiative served a small percentage of the needed population. The private sector was not interested in undertaking risks with low return without getting

[63] Tad Szulc, 'Selling a Revolution to Latin America', *New York Times*, 17 December 1961, 10. It is this sense of crusade that permeated not only the AFP but also the activities of the Peace Corps, created also in 1961 and formed by an "army" of young and enthusiasts American that traveled to different regions of the Third World, including the slums of Latin America.

juicy contracts and opportunities from the state.[64] Recurrent inflation and lack of confidence on the national financial institutions also contributed to the poor performance in the creation of domestic savings for housing purposes.

This economic understanding of the problem was assumed that most of working-class families were in conditions to pay for their homes and if they did not was because the lack of access to cheap credit. As a report about housing conditions in Latin American of the Inter-American Program of the Civil Engineering Department at the MIT, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation and USAID, pointed out in 1964, "no matter how much production costs could be reduced, there is no doubt that the low-income groups would find it almost impossible to achieve ownership of an adequate house without long-term financing."[65] The overgrowing presence of new settlements and slums showed that most families were in any capacity to pay monthly installments at any level and that in many cases homeownership was not even a top priority. As a result, this assumption discriminated between those urban poor sectors who were actually in conditions to pay for their own home and those who were not. Most of the policies of the Alliance aimed at the former group and left the latter with more precarious options, as we will see in the following chapters. Therefore, housing policies also contributed in the formation of new landscapes of urban poverty.

Cold war considerations were certainly behind this technical/financial approach. In 1962, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Housing recognized that housing was central to "the stability of the underdeveloped free nations of the world," as "social and political

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[64] The construction sector in Argentina, for instance, blamed Perón's rent control policies as the main reason for their lack of investment.

[65] Marcia N. Koth, Julio A. Silva, and Albert G.H. Dietz, *Housing in Latin America* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 55.

unrest and communism are natural consequences of such conditions. The actions of these large masses of underprivileged and ill-housed people can wipe out all the gains from economic assistance in these countries."[66] The following year, the same committee affirmed in a document titled *Study of International Housing,* that "aid to housing for people in less developed countries is an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy."[67] In the Cold War context, U.S. presence in the area of housing was central as "the deplorable living conditions of the masses of people in friendly developing countries area at the root of the political and social unrest in these countries."[68] In the same line argued a USAID report in 1962, this time emphasizing the social and political impact of homeownership,

> Arrangements which encourage homeownership (e.g., savings and loan institutions, self-help programs, cooperatives, etc.) may stimulate investment that may not otherwise take place (…) poor housing may be a significant factor in matters of health, family, stability, moral values, and political unrest. This is particular true in some urban slum areas where general economic and political discontent may be exacerbated by extremely low housing standards. Urgent social and political factors such as these should be considered … in determining the priority which housing activities should be given.[69]

Homeownership, therefore, was central to the modernizing project as the formalization and regularization of the urban poor would bring him into the responsibilities of the market economy and citizenship, deterring them from radical politics. As Chapter 3 shows, USAID assistance in Rio de Janeiro was directly related to this Cold-War rationale, as it was also the case in Chile during Frei's administration in

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[66] United States Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency, *Report on International Housing Programs; Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Banking and Currency. 87th Congress* (Washington, DC: 1963), 1.
[67] United States Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency, *Study of International Housing; Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Banking and Currency. 88th Congress,* (Washington, DC, 1963), viii.
[68] Ibid.
[69] United States. Department of State, Agency for International Development, *Report on Housing and Urban Development*, December 31, 1962.

Chile or Colombia with Lleras Camargo. Ultimately, housing and the landscapes of urban poverty were also spaces of cold-war politics.

The main sources of foreign aid to Latin America housing were the OAS, the UN, ECLA, the U.S. government, the IDB, and private corporations -most of them from the US.[70] (Table 2) The role of the OAS, the UN, or ECLA, as we have seen, was mostly through training, teaching, consultations, and assistance in the craft of development plans. After the launching of the Alliance, the OAS sought to speed up the assessment of the housing crisis, the evaluation of available resources, the definition of fundamental goals, and formulation of realistic and workable programs. To do so, PAU subdivided the Department of Economic and Social Affairs in two: Economic Affairs and Social Affairs. This latter, directed by Angel Palerm, was the one that, as Chapter 1 mentioned, undertook the Four Cities study, that included Gino Germani and Anthony Leeds.[71] Palerm organized in 1961, the OAS Advisory Committee on Housing in Latin America, held in Bogota, urged by the Alliance to come up with a research guide for a survey of housing in Latin America.[72] Single countries were encouraged to adapt such Guide and define national goals and specific action programs. The organization of another meeting in a series of similar encounters speaks about intricacies and difficulties to define a common research agenda and objectives at a Latin American scale. At the same time, it

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[70] For the following survey of international agencies involved in the field of housing I follow mainly Marcia N. Koth, Julio A. Silva, and Albert G.H. Dietz, *Housing in Latin America*; Sean Elliott, *Financing Latin American Housing: Domestic Savings Mobilization and U.S. Assistance Policy* (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968); and United States Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, *Study of International Housing*.

[71] Angel Palerm, an important Marxist anthropologist with a recognized trajectory in the in Mexico in the field of rural anthropology, was appointed Director of the latter Department. CINVA was placed under the Direction of Social Affairs.

[72] The members of the Advisory Committee were Charles Abrams, Jacob Crane, Vernon Esteves, Roberto Pineda, Felix Sánchez, Walter H. Scott, and Rodrigo Varas. Organization of American States, *Proceedings of the Meeting of an OAS Advisory Committee on Housing in Latin America; Bogotá, Colombia, September 4-9, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1962), 5 and 27.

also shows how the initial impetus of the Alliance brought a sense of urgency to the come up with policy recommendations that would address and correct spatial inequalities.

Financially, the IDB and USAID were the main lenders to housing projects in the region. In the first case, the bank used its SPTF to finance large-scale works with a stated social impact. The first allocation of funds to the IDB' SPTF came from the U.S. in the amount of $500 million after the signature of the Act of Bogotá in September, 1960, "to meet the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the Americas for a better life." As rural and urban housing was a quick social investment with visible impact and in the capacity to boost employment, the US announced investments nearing $100 million already during the meeting at Punta del Este.[73] The IDB was the administrative agency in the implementation of three different types of help: self-help housing; aid to savings and loan associations; and loans to public housing authorities. The IDB also allocated funds for the modernization and update of basic infrastructure in rural and urban areas; in Rio de Janeiro, for instance, the Bank supported the extension of the water supply and sewerage systems, part of a broader program of urban renewal in the first half of the 1960s. By the same token, the IDB was the central lending organization in countries considered to have a relatively developed economy and did note fit entirely to the programs addressed by USAID, as Chapter 4 will show for the case of Buenos Aires. Felipe Herrera, president of the IDB, explained the logic of the lending mechanism that also embodied the notion of self-help present in the Alliance rationale,

> … the bank does not pretend to act as a welfare institution offering a total solution to this (housing) problem. The Social Progress Trust Fund gives the Latin American countries their first opportunity to obtain international financing as a supplement to their public and domestic resources for their housing policies.

[73] U.S. Plan for Latin Housing Aid Is Reported Near $100,000,000," *The New York Times*, 7 August 1961, 3.

> This is why we see our role as one of cooperating to establishing and strengthening savings and loan institutions, or encouraging self-help construction, a valuable practice which is rapidly gaining momentum.[74]

The Bank provided long-term credits at moderate interest rates and with a long amortization period set between 20 and 30 years. According to Stanley Baruch, chief of the IDB housing division, this meant an improvement from past lending practices in the region that offered five-year loans at a fifteen percent of interest a year.[75] Between 1961 and 1965, the IDB made housing loans to fourteen countries, allotting more than forty percent of the SPTF. The IDB required Latin American nations to present detailed loan proposals for their low-income housing projects, previously endorsed by the national planning agency –an institutional requirement of the Alliance. The plans had to mobilize domestic savings, mainly through the establishment of loan and savings institutions; provide minimal internal amenities for low-income families; be consistent with the priority of objectives of the country in the field of social development. Self-help components, defined in this case as a "maximum element of contribution by the borrower either as a direct part of the project or as a part of a national program of which the project is a component," were key in order to be selected.[76] In addition, the IDB demanded careful studies supporting countries loan proposals and required administrative reforms, legal sanctioning, and institutional developments (i.e. national or municipal housing agencies) that would support the legal and technical requirements for large-scale construction. Regulation of land use, finance, rational of urban growth, and security of

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[74] Felipe Herrera, *The Inter-American Development Bank-Instrument for Latin American Development*, Washington, DC: IDB-Division of Information, 1962, pp. 160-171.
[75] "US Spurs Latin Americans to Mobilize Savings to Finance Homes," *The New York Times,* 28 July 1963, 87.
[76] Koth, Silva, and Dietz, *Housing in Latin America*, 75.

tenure were prerequisites in order to receive funds. The US-based Foundation for Cooperative Housing (FCH) worked for the IDB providing consulting services and assessing the feasibility of housing proposals, as it was the case in Buenos Aires with the evaluation of slums located in the site for the proposed urbanization of Parque Almirante Brown.[77] In most cases, the IDB funded housing programs that aimed only at homeownership as the loans were considered "seed capital" whose returns from the selling of the built units had to be reinvested in the construction of more dwellings. Meticulous accounting procedures, aimed at making the Bank successful in controlling the uses of funds to their original purpose.

USAID was the other main actor in the provision of money and technical aid. Its creation in 1961 made available, for the first time, DLF funds for housing purposes. Program and project loans as well as technical assistance to aided self-help and community development projects, the latter mainly in rural areas and urban slums, were the normal forms of aid. From these, project loans became the most generalized form of assistance, designed to fund single specific efforts, such as the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, housing, water pants, and sewage facilities.[78] Program loans, of larger proportions, were only disbursed to Chile, Brazil, Colombia, and Dominican Republic. The financial operatory was set in stages so that loans could be pay out according to partial assessments achievements, as Chapter 3 analyses with the example of Rio. As Juan de Onís pointed out, and our study on the housing projects built in Rio confirms, the handclasp symbol of the Alliance was visible in almost every construction site funded by

[77] L. Albert Wilson, *Voice of the Villas: Socio-Economic Analysis of the Residents of the Villas in Parque Almirante Brown, Buenos Aires, Argentina,* (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for Co-operative Housing Inc., 1965).
[78] Taffet, *Foreign Aid,* 72-79.

the US agency. US official delegations and visitors were also taken to these places as showcases of successful involvement in the area of housing.[79]

USAID also administered funds in local currency provided by Public Law 480 (PL-480) Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act of 1954 and the Cooley Amendment of July 1957. The PL-480, which President Kennedy renamed "Food for Peace," established a mechanism that allowed friendly developing countries to sell internally surplus bulk food commodities purchased from the US. The income generated in local currency was then invested in certain social programs in predetermined agreements between the US government and the recipient country. The concessional terms were more favorable as it provided long-term credit, with no minimum repayment for ten years, and a grace period for repayment of up to five year at low interests. The Cooley Amendment of 1957, established that a maximum of 25% of the currencies received from PL 480 agreements were to be made available to U.S. business firms for business development and trade expansion and for assistance in increasing the consumption of and markets for U.S. agricultural products. PL-480 and Cooley funds were granted to low-cost housing projects in Lima, built by a Kansas-based construction firm owned by Willard Garvey of World Homes – a construction firm that, together with the Rockefeller's construction company, were deeply involved in construction in Latin America.[80] The construction of Vila Aliança, Vila Kennedy, Vila Esperança, the first section of Cidade de Deus and other smaller interventions, part of the Guanabara Housing, were actually possible thanks to PL-480.

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[79] Juan de Onís, 259.

[80] In Peru, the Eximbank and ICA provided the loan to Hogares Peruanos, the Peruvian firm owned by Garvey; Elliot, 173-174.

Bureaucratic and organizational problems within USAID created internal problems, upsetting members of the Senate who requested clarification on the uses of taxpayers' money. According to Charles Abrams, actually the role of USAID and IDB was not always clear bringing confusion, overlapping, and a waist of resources.[81] This led to the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1962, which expanded the funds for the USAID Housing Guaranty Program. This program sought to channel US private resources, rather than public funds, guaranteeing investments in housing as a supplement to IDB funds. The US Congress, thus, rapidly shift the Alliance as an instrument to favor private business by forcing Latin American countries to guarantee US investments against inflation and economic and social instability.

To achieve the general goals of the Alliance, USAID established agreements with US federal agencies, labor organization, and private corporations. For instance, the Rockefeller family owned the International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC), which invested in different economic activities in the developing world. Its housing division, the IBEC Housing Corporation, participated in the world housing construction market, developing a standardized mass construction system tested in the United States and the Middle East and implemented in Puerto Rico, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.[82] Rodman C. Rockefeller, son of Nelson and vice president of the company, claimed the US government to press Latin American countries to stabilize their economies, regarding

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[81] Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter,* especially chapter 16 "The Role of Aid Programs," 242-266.

[82] "Project Booming in Latin America," *The New York Times,* 29 October 1961, R1; on the history of IBEC, see Wayne Broehl, *The International Basic Economy Corporation: United States Business Performance Abroad.* (Washington D.C.: National Planning Association, 1968); Kenneth Durr, *A Company with a Mission: Rodman Rockefeller and the International Basic Economy Corporation, 1947-1985* (Rockville Md.: Montrose Press, 2006). For a recent case study in urban planning, see Maria da Silva Leme, "Transforming the Modern Latin American City: Robert Moses and the International Basic Economic Corporation," *Planning Perspectives* 25, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 515-528.

high inflation, and to pass laws guarantying private financing of housing construction.[83] Richard Foley, a former administrator of the HHFA and then a consultant for IBEC Housing Division, defined clearly the role of USAID in assisting US companies to invest in the region,

> Since it is universally true in the Latin American countries that there is no existing source from which house purchasers can borrow such a percentage of the cost of houses, some existing agency of the United States Government should stand ready to lend funds to existing organizations in the several countries for the purpose of buying mortgages at approved projects. The U.S. agency might be A.I.D. The organizations in the Latin American countries could be existing mortgages banks, governmental housing agencies or private banks or savings and loan associations.[84]

Provision of "seed capital" to capitalize intermediate credit institutions as well as local currency loans to cover local costs of housing construction were central aspects of USAID policy. Attempts at constituting savings and loans institutions and cooperatives to channel individual savings, rather than public funds, were a constant over the 1960s. For such projects, USAID established agreements with the HHFA for consultation, technical assistance, recruitment, and program training services. For instance, HHFA had coordinated by 1963 savings and loan programs in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.[85] Likewise, agreements with the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) coordinated financial support for US friendly labor unions in Latin America, which had created cooperatives for their small-scale housing programs.

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[83] "Spurs Are Sought in Latin Housing," *The New York Times,* 21 October 1962, p. 157; Rodman Rockefeller, for instance, participated in the hearings before the US Senate Subcommittee on Banking and Currency.

[84] IBEC Series J, IHD (IBEC Housing Division), Consultants, Richard Foley, Oct. 1958-Dec. 1961, IBEC SA, IHD (IBEC Housing Division), Argentina, Tab, Service Copy REEL 123, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC)

[85] Statement of Stanley Baruch, chief of Housing, Inter-American Development Bank before the Subcommittee on Banking and Currency. United States Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency, *Study of International Housing.*

AIFLD was the joint project between the AFL-CIO, the US State Department, and US corporations, created as a cold war organization to coopt friendly" labor leaders in the US that, in turn, were expected to organize anti-leftist unions in their respective countries.[86] On March 1964, a technical team of AIFLD experts arrived to Argentina to investigate the architectural and development plans, labor and material costs for several low-cost housing projects agreed with four unions: FOECYT (Postal and Telegraph Workers' Federation), Luz y Fuerza (electricity), Railroad, and Municipal Workers. The financing for the ten million dollars for these projects were provided by a loan from the AFL-CIO, guaranteed by AID. The plan contemplated the construction of two thousand homes, of three different types (single family units; three and four floor walks-ups ten to sixteen floor apartment buildings) erected on seventeen sites, twelve in Buenos Aires and five in neighboring cities.[87] William C. Doherty, director of AIFLD's Social Projects Department and later general director, visited several housing programs in Latin America, including Vila Kennedy in August 1965. AIFLD also participated in self-help housing projects in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Dominican Republic and São Paulo, Brazil.[88] Although the impact of AIFLD assistance in housing was of small in terms of total built units, its involvement attests to the geopolitical implication of the

[86] Ronald Radosh has argued that the AFL-CIO used foreign policy to support anti-Communist unionism and has suggested that AIFLD was connected with the Department of State and the CIA. AIFLD trained Brazilian labor leaders that had an important role in the military coup in 1964 as it was also the case in the organization of labor strikes against socialist Chile's president Allende before the 1973 military coup. See Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969).
[87] American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), Board of Directors meeting, 24 March 1964, Record Group 18, International Affairs Department, International Labor Organizations Activities, 1946-1985, Series 5, International Labor Institutes, The George Meany Memorial Archives; Argentina, Secretaria de Estado de Vivienda, *Acción en vivenda, 1968-1969* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Bienestar Social, 1969), 24; see also Pablo Pozzi, "El sindicalismo norteamericano en América Latina y en la Argentina: El AIFLD entre 1961 y 1976," *Herramienta* (Buenos Aires), 10 (1999): 163-184.
[88] Airgram to AID A-173, "Goal and Activity Progress Report (Control Number U-310)," from Rio de Janeiro, 10 August 1964, Brazil Subj/Proj 56-73; ACC # 75-0162, box 25, folder 2, Project 512-11-830-264.1; National Housing Bank; Low Cost Housing – Guanabara FY 66-67, Record Group 286, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, (NARA)

Alliance in Latin America and the extent in which housing was part of cold war strategies.

Generally speaking, USAID and IDB principal attention to financing of S&L institutions or cooperatives and the promotion of US corporations aimed at lower middle-classes. The urban and rural poor received support but comparatively of a smaller scale, although not necessarily less important. In the cases of slums and squatter settlements these organizations supported in the beginning large-scale housing projects and then moved the focus to self-help and community development programs. In 1964, Charles Abrams criticized USAID and IDB for creating their universalizing approaches to situations of single characteristics, "eagerness to produce quick results," argued the progressive housing reformer, "has tempted AID and IDB to propose universal remedies at the central source of policy and then press for the application on a continental or worldwide basis." For him, cooperative housing, assistance to labor unions, and the capitalization of S&L associations was good for some countries but not for all and in each case it was central to identify the particular series of causes that determined the problem.[89] Therefore, local economic and political considerations shaped the particular responses and outcomes, as the analysis of the role of USAID in Rio and the IDB in Buenos Aires will show.

Conclusions

In April 3, 1962, Teodoro Moscoso addressed a crowded audience of US and Latin American technical and political elites, gathered at the Housing Symposium

[89] Abrams, 251.

organized by the Chase Manhattan Bank.[90] In front of ministers of economy, housing specialists, financers, and Nelson Rockefellers, Moscoso's discourse recounted his personal experience in the field of housing in Puerto Rico and how that experience took him to the team of experts that directed the modernization of the island. That experience, initiated during the New Deal and the Good Neighbor Policy, was for Moscoso a showcase of what had to be done in the rest of Latin America with the Alliance for Progress. The alliance, thus, was a sort of expansion of past policies undertaken in Puerto Rico that, according to him, probed the success of a country committed to help itself. And, as he began his speech, the US was ready to help those who were "ready to help themselves."[91]

As a way of balance of the first year of the program, Moscoso highlighted the positive role of the US in sharing its techniques, which had led to extensive programs and had generated interest in aided self-help, as both "a means of inculcating social values and as a method of decreasing construction costs." In addition, governments of the region created or reoriented housing agencies; indigenous materials were tested and evaluated while planning and construction efficiency were enhanced. Moscoso, however, was less generous when referring to what the US had learned from Latin America, "in the process, we have learned a great deal about social structures and dynamics, housing needs, and savings potentials," – a stingy assessment that evidenced the US self-

[90] Teodoro Moscoso, Speech at the Latin American Housing Symposium, Chase Manhattan Bank, 3 April 1962, Teodoro Moscoso Personal Papers, Series 6, Speech Files, 1956-64, Box 10, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library (NLJFK).

[91] It was in the field of housing that I first became associated with the economic and social development in Puerto Rico. It has been on of my primary interests ever since. I think the concept and methods evolved in Puerto Rico –the experience we gained there- are relevant to the housing problems in Latin America. Indeed this experience was used as a point of departure for housing programs involving U.S. funds and technical aid in Central and South America years before the Alliance for Progress came into existence," 3.

representation in its unequal of relationship with Latin America. By the 1960s, though, the U.S. policymakers reached the conclusion that they had learn enough to know that,

> The basic housing need in Latin America is financing, which means long-term mortgage credit at reasonable rates of interest, plus low down-payments. That must now be the major thrust of our aid. The need exists and the ability to pay for housing exists, once mortgage money is available. We must increase our efforts to stimulate local savings for housing, and this means inducing the peoples of Latin America to establish home savings institutions which can channel the accumulated capital of many small savers into long-term mortgage credit.

This assessment became the cornerstone of the Alliance's policies that over the years emphasized a paradigm of efficiency whose concrete results benefitted less poor urban and rural sectors and more middle classes, US construction companies, and investors.

As this chapter has shown, much of these actions in the area of urban planning and housing were not the outcome of just one year of Alliance policies but the result of years of inter-American exchanges and cooperation since the mid 1940s. During those years, the influence of the United States in the field of urban planning and low-income housing was significant yet not total. Nationalism and anti-Americanism feelings, the relative strength of some Latin American countries in the region, the presence of local architectural and urban planning traditions and languages, the growing shift of ECLA ideas toward dependency theory, and the own national and local political, economic, and social circumstances in a historical juncture of rapid transformation and instability. Some countries were more dependent on US assistance than others and most of them tried to take advantage of the opportunities opened by the Alliance and take the most from the US to advance their own agenda. But as the next chapters will show, the presence of USAID personnel or IDB missions did actually exercised power and conditioned the

progress of urban and housing programs. The US also made available a set of repertories of urban planning and housing techniques –either construction or financing- that many Latin American countries received and adapted totally or partially according to their own understandings. US attempts at assisting in the regulation of urban spatial inequalities were therefore mediated and conditioned by local and national contexts and varied from context to context. And, in some cases, USAID actually reversed its own policies as they learned from the their own experiences, as it was the case in Rio de Janeiro.

As chapter 1 has shown, as we move into the 1960s, Latin American urban experts became less optimistic about the forecasts of earlier modernization theory. The growing ascendance of dependency theory, the influence of ECLA in the consolidation of research centers in Latin America, and the ever-increasing presence of slums in Latin American cities turned less on urban and regional planning and more on what came to be seen as the origin of all inequalities of the region –the dependent relationship and the "neocolonial" link with advanced nations. During that decade, Latin America witnessed an increasing expansion of the field of urban studies in which the influence of ECLA structural thinking was critical. As Licia Valladares and Magda Prates Coelho have pointed out, new research centers on urban issues evidenced the growing interest of Latin American scholarship and policymaking to influence the social and economic development of the region and the need to formulate a native conceptualization with a stronger focus on social structure and less on the cultural or behaviorist explanations.[92]

[92] The list of this urban studies center is vast but its enumeration will help to show the extent in which the 1960s became an important ground in the emergence of a native reaction to modernization theory. Among the most representatives were, Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales (CEUR; Argentina); the Centro Interdisciplinatrio de Desarrollo Urbano (CIDU) and the Centro de Desarrollo Social de América Latina (DESAL) in Chile; the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) y Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo (DESCO) in Peru; the Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo of the Universidad Central de Venezuela (CENDES) in Venezuela; the Centro de Estudios Económicos y Demográficos of the Colegio de

For instance, the question about rural urban migration evolved from the formulation of the dualist theories on marginality and the uses of Oscar Lewis's "culture of poverty" to the debunking anthropological works of Anthony Leeds, William Mangin, or Janice Perlman, as we have seen in Chapter 1.[93] SIAP, for instance, reoriented its initial position on urban-regional planning backed by Picó and Lander to an emphasis on economic and social planning aiming at the transformation of the structural causes of inequality. This latter position gained predominance when Argentine urban planner Jorge Enrique Hardoy became SIAP director.

Also in the field of architecture, as Chapter 5 analyzes in more detail, the 1960s represented a re interpretation of the notion of aided self-help, especially through the work of John Turner in Peru and the "freedom to build" movement. As anthropological and sociological work in Latin America began to see slums not as problems but rather as solutions, also architects came to appraise dwellers control of the housing process. As the work of Mangin, Leeds, or Matos Mar had been showing, and as Turner had also noted in his observations of Lima's slums over a long period of time, poor urban residents actually invested time and capital in the improvement of their homes and their built environment through time. This led to the defense of poor urban residents' efforts, underlying their agency as well as the validation of their own understanding of what good

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México and the Instituto de Geografía of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; CINVA and the División de Estudios sobre la Población de la Asociación Colombiabn de Escuelas Médicas en Colombia; and the Centro Brasileiro de Análisis y Planejamento (CEBRAP) and the Instituto Universitario de Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ) together with the older Instituto Brasileño de Administração Municipal (IBAM); see Licia Valladares and Magda Prates Coelho, "La investigación urbana en América Latina," 116-121.

[93] Anthony Leeds, *Cities, Classes, and the Social Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review* 2, no. 3 (1967): 65-98; Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976)

housing instead of, at least theoretically, the imposition of the urban planner.[94] In the years that followed, Turner ideas became actually the official methodological and technical approach of the World Bank in the area of housing.

Also in the field of architecture, other transnational flows arrived to Latin America and not necessarily from the United States. In many countries, we have seen, local appropriations of the language of the modernist movement had paid specific attention to the subject of working-class housing.[95] By the 1960s, modernism had given place to other languages and experiences in the field of housing. As chapter 4 will show for the case of Buenos Aires, the architectural ideas of the Team X -the architectural movement that split from CIAM last congress-, the influence of pop, and also the structural turn in architecture, influenced the design of large-scale slab apartments built thanks to the financial support of the IDB.

As a result, in the 1950s, the increasing ascendancy of the US in the field of urban planning and housing met previous experiences and languages. The transnationalization of the housing "problem," therefore, contemplated many possible intersections and influences, whose particular materializations depended upon single local configurations. The second part of the dissertation explores historical cases in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires in which such contact occurred in specific housing programs.

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[94] Charles Abrams, *Man's Shelter;* John Turner, *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process* (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Peter Ward, ed., *Self-Help Housing: A Critique* (Bronx: H.W. Wilson, 1982); Richard Harris, "The Silence of the Experts: 'Aided Self-Help Housing', 1939-1954," *Habitat International* 22, no. 2 (June 1998): 165-189.

[95] I analyze, the project of modernist architect Wladimiro Acosta in a working class neighborhood in Greater Buenos Aires in 1960; see Leandro Benmergui, "The Transnationalization of the 'Housing Problem': Social Sciences and Developmentalism in Postwar Argentina," in *Infrastructures of Home and City: Dilemmas of Urban Housing from High Modernism to Neoliberalism*, ed. by Edward Murphy and Najib Hourani (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), forthcoming.

Table 3 - Sources of International Assistance[1]

Organization of American States	CINVA	Regular Graduate Courses	
	PIAPUR	Extension Courses	
United Nations	Housing, Building, and Planning Branch	Consultation	
		Exchange of Experts	
	ECLA/CEPAL	Studies, Reports, Advisory Committees	
		Assistance in Development Plans	
United States Government	AID	HHFA	Technical Assistance
		FCH	Housing Loans
		AIFLD	Risk Guarantees
			Savings and Loan Associations
			Inter-American Development Bank
Inter-American Development Bank			
Private Investemnt	Several companies		
	IBEC	Construction - Financial Assistance	
	Cooley Loans		

[1] Sources Marcia N. Koth, Julio A. Silva, and Albert G.H. Dietz, Housing in Latin America, Housing in Latin America (Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), 57-94 and Sean Elliott, Financing Latin American Housing: Domestic Savings Mobilization and U.S. Assistance Policy (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1968); and United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency, Study of International Housing; Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Banking and Currency. 88th Congress, April 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1963, 1963.

CHAPTER 3

SLUM ERADICATION AND LOW-INCOME HOUSING IN THE MARVELOUS CITY

Introduction

On Friday August 17, 1962, the governor of the State of Guanabara Carlos Lacerda escorted Teodoro Moscoso, the U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and Lincoln Gordon, the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, to visit the progress in the construction of Vila Aliança, a housing development under construction in suburban Rio de Janeiro.[1] The occasion was the first anniversary of the signing of the Alliance for Progress charter and Moscoso's official mission to Brazil. Vila Aliança was part of a key spatial restructuring launched by the local government of the State of Guanabara, working in concert with bilateral and multilateral development agencies based in the United States.[2] [Figure 1-2] These efforts included the construction of a total of almost fifteen thousand housing units distributed in Vila Aliança (2187 units), Vila Kennedy -formerly named Vila Progresso- (5069 units), Vila Esperança (464 units), and Cidade de Deus (originally 6658). These units were built to house some of the poor urban dwellers living in the shantytowns, known as *favelas*, that accounted for almost one fifth of Rio's total population.

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[1]Teodoro Moscoso (1910-1992) was both the U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress and the Assistant Administrator for Latin America of the U.S. Agency for International Development between 1962 and 1964.

[2] Juan Onís, "Brazilians Wary on Aid Benefits," *The New York Times*, 19 August 1962, 31.

The official delegation led by Lacerda first visited the Favela de Bom Jesús, a shantytown located in Botafogo, a middle-class neighborhood in South Rio, where 465 families were to be relocated in V. Aliança. Speaking in front of the hovel that housed a school, governor Lacerda introduced the distinguished visitors as "friends of Brazil" who were leaders of a program "to help those who help themselves." Then, the delegation left to the site of V. Aliança, but the people assembled around the school stayed and "expressed only objections and doubts" about the governor's slum clearance and relocation program, according to the *New York Times'* reporter Juan de Onís. The events of that morning in Bom Jesús illustrated the dissonance between the harsh reality of the *favelado* population and the official rhetoric which recurrently used the "self-help" trope to praise the commitment of the Alliance for Progress to assist poor Brazilians. When later that day, reporters asked Moscoso about the complaints of the Bom Jesús' residents, he minimized them saying that he had encountered the same anxieties during his experience in Ponce Housing Authority and Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap.[3] As Moscoso put it, "they had been overcome in Puerto Rico and would be overcome here with hard work and political leadership."[4] This connection that Moscoso made between State interventions into the spatial, social, and political configurations of Rio's *favela*s and previous experiences in this area in Latin America indicates that urban renewal and low-income housing programs in Rio were not just local, short-term attempts to respond

[3] Moscoso knew about planning for housing and industrial development. In the early 1940s, he became the executive director of the Puerto Rican Housing Authority. Between 1942 and 1950 he was the president of the Puerto Rican Industrial Development Company (FOMENTO) under the administration of Governor Muñoz Marin. Operation Bootstraps was the name of the industrial program launched in 1947 in Puerto Rico, marking the beginning of industrial planning based on external capital investment and tax exemption. Within a decade Puerto Rico underwent rapid industrialization and strong economic growth. In the long-term, however, the rapid modernization of the island showed its negative social effects. See, Alex W. Maldonado, *Teodoro Moscoso and Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997).

[4] Juan Onís, ibid.

to particular situations but rather part of a transnational process. They were part of international conversations and programs that stressed the role of housing and the environment in modernizing the poor urban resident in a context of economic development and rapid social transformation.

By the same token, the presence of the U.S. delegation in Bom Jesús and V. Aliança accompanying a local governor instead of national authorities contradicted the principles of the Alliance for Progress that mandated to only fund projects sponsored by national governments. This suggests that housing for the poor (as part of a broader investment in social reform) was part of the U.S. geopolitical interests in Brazil. In the political conjuncture of Brazil in 1962, U.S. assistance to right-of-center and pro-U.S. governor Lacerda was a way to counteract the leftist national administration of Brazilian president João Goulart, who U.S. Cold Warriors held in high suspicion.[5] The *favela* of Bom Jesús was no stranger to this explosive political scenario, not at least under American eyes. Onís pointed out that "outside agitators" linked with Leonel Brizola, the governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, were influencing the residents. Brizola was a left wing influential politician and Goulart's brother-in-law. According to Onís, Brizola, was "an outspoken enemy of the Alliance for Progress," whose political influence among Rio's *favelas* residents was strong enough to parlay into election to the federal legislature in the upcoming congressional elections scheduled for October 1962.[6]

Housing, therefore, was not only a matter of physical and social development. Foreign assistance in the area of social welfare and the provision of modern shelter for a

[5] Carlos Fico, *O grande irmão: da Operação Brother Sam aos anos de chumbo: o governo dos Estados Unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008); James N. Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
[6] Juan Onís, ibid.

mass of poor people living in harsh housing conditions were part of the agenda to build the foundations for social peace. In the minds of U.S. authorities and the ideologues of the Alliance for Progress at the height of the Cold War, new domestic residential life and homeownership could contribute to the integration of marginal people into society, mass consumption, and moderate politics and, in so doing, contributing to the formation of citizens.

What follows is an analysis of the Guanabara Housing Program, the first large-scale construction of low-income housing in Brazil to benefit from technical and economic aid from the United States. The literature on Rio's urban spatial reconfiguration under Lacerda has emphasized the governor's presidential aspirations, his technocratic administrative style, the influence of real estate interests to raze *favelas*, especially those located in increasingly expensive neighborhoods, and the lobby of the construction industry eager to take advantage of a massive public works program. In these accounts the U.S. presence is always taken for granted as either part of the governor's pro-U.S. ideology or the destabilizing efforts of the U.S. government against president Goulart. This chapter is the first historical account of the actual construction of three *vilas* —Aliança, Kennedy, Esperança- and the origins of Cidade de Deus. The chapter will demonstrate how, at the junction of transnational development policy, the radicalization of national politics, and local urban crisis, urban and housing plans aimed at coping with the needs for housing and modern environment ended up organizing spatial segregation and difference.

A History of Housing Policy in Rio de Janeiro

Government actions toward squatter settlements and *favelas* dated back to the nineteenth century as a reaction to the overcrowding of tenements and boarding houses and the occupation of the hillsides [*morros*] of central Rio.[7] During the late Brazilian Empire and the Old Republic, the housing question referred particularly to the presence of *cortiços, casas de cõmodo, republicas* in the city center. Equivalent to the American tenement, *cortiços* were the unsanitary option for shelter for free workers and self-employed urban slaves (*escravos de ganho*) that made a living in Rio's downtown streets and port.[8] The demolition of Cabeça de Porco in 1893, one of the biggest *cortiços*, during the municipal administration of Barata Ribeiro initiated a new era of social control through hygienist housing and eugenic social reforms.[9] Displaced from *cortiços* and urged by their needs for shelter, poor people began to build their shacks in the *morros*

[7] The history of housing policy and the history of *favelas*, two different subject, has been largely explored; see Licia Valladares and Ademir Figueiredo, "Housing in Brazil: An Introduction to Recent Literature," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 2, no. 2 (1983): 69-91 and Licia Valladares, Lidia Medeiros, and Filipina Chinelli, *Pensando as favelas do Rio de Janeiro, 1906-2000: uma bibliografia analítica* (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumará/URBANDATA, 2003). In this latter work, the authors have counted more than six hundred works on *favelas.* See also, Licia do Prado Valladares, *A invencão da favela. Do mito de origem a favela.com* (Rio de Janeiro, 2005); Alba Zaluar and Marcos Alvito, *Um século de favela* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1998); Lilian Fessler Vaz, *Modernidade e moradia: habitação coletiva no Rio de Janeiro séculos XIX e XX* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002); Brodwyn Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Nabil Bonduki, *Origens da habitação social no Brasil: arquitetura moderna, lei do inquilinato e difusão da casa própria* (São Paulo: FAPESP, 1998); Anthony Leeds and Elizabeth Leeds, *A sociologia do Brasil urbano* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1978); Victor V. Valla, *Educação e favela: politicas para as favelas do Rio de Janeiro, 1940-1985.* (Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 1986).

[8] Mary C. Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808-1850* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Sidney Chalhoub, *Cidade febril: cortiços e epidemias na corte imperial* (Companhia das Letras, 1996); João José Reis, "'The Revolution of the Ganhadores: Urban Labour, Ethnicity and the African Strike of 1857 in Bahia, Brazil," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 29, no. 02 (1997): 355-393); Patricia Acerbi, "Slave Legacies, Ambivalent Modernity: Street Commerce and the Transition to Free Labor in Rio de Janeiro, 1850-1925" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, College Park, 2010).

[9] Mauricio de Almeida Abreu, "Da habitação ao habitat: a questão da habitação popular no Rio de Janeiro e sua evolução," in *Revista do Rio de Janeiro* (Niteroi) 1, no. 2 (1986): 47-58; Sidney Chalhoub, *Trabalho, lar e botequim: O cotidiano dos trabalhadores no Rio de Janeiro da Belle Époque* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986).

that surrounded the city.[10] Other groups to turn to the hillsides included impoverished veterans returning from the Canudos War, who camped on the Morro da Favela, later named Morro da Providência, in 1897. Scholars have argued that the origins of the term *favela* comes from the name of that hill, which quickly became the universal name to describe informal settlements in Brazil, and specially in Rio de Janeiro.[11]

Local governments, journalists, social reformers, and hygienists in Rio treated nascent clusters of tenements and shantytowns as sites of disease and moral decay. The extensive urban reforms of mayor Francisco Pereira Passos (1902-1906) –"Brazil's Hausmann"- modernized the old colonial city to the standards of a modern capital and directed sanitary campaigns crafted by hygienists and sanitarists like Oswaldo Cruz.[12] Poor urban residents revolted against state disciplinizing attempts, as it happened with the vaccination campaigns in the Revolt of the Vaccine in 1904. By the turn of the century, the modernization of Rio's society and economy, growing social tensions, the political instability of the recently created Republic, and the infrastructural modernization and beautification of Rio de Janeiro, defined an aggressive official approach to the housing problem that combined repressive actions and an agenda of social engineering based on positivism and eugenics.

As the Republic matured, Rio's urbanized housing stock rapidly expanded from the central core surrounding the port and adjacent beaches as well as the Santo Antonio and Castelo Hills to spread towards the suburbs. This spread incorporated new areas into

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[10] Most of the hills close to Rio's downtown were razed during the first half of the 20th century.
[11] Sônia Zylberberg, *Morro da Providência: memórias da favela* (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura Secretaria Municipal de Cultura Turismo e Esportes, 1992); Valladares, *A invenção da favela*,..
[12] Jaime Larry Benchimol, *Pereira Passos: Um Haussmann Tropical: A renovação urbana da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro no início do século XX* (Rio de Janeiro: Prefeitura do Rio de Janeiro, 1990); Jeffrey D Needell, *A Tropical Belle Epoque: Elite Culture and Society in Turn-of-the-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

the city, including the burgeoning employment centers and transportation networks, ultimately consolidating the expanded urban network. Expansion, however, followed geographical factors that determined the settlement of *favelas*. Rio's topography includes numerous crests, hills, a large natural bay filled with small islands, freshwater rivers, saltwater lakes and mashes, a lagoon, and oceanfront.[13] The large Tijuca Massif, occupying ninety-five square kilometers and containing hundreds of smaller hills and forests, bisects the city. To the south of the massif lies Copacabana, Ipanema, Leblon and further south Barra da Tijuca. To the north lies Vila Isabel, Tijuca, Mangueira, and further north Bonsucesso, Ramos, Penha, Duque de Caxias, and the Baixada Fluminense. As population and transportation needs grew, the topography of the city became a serious obstacle for the urban development of the city. Public works to open new ways for commuting and basic infrastructure as the expansion of the water and the sewage system were urgent. Prior to the expansion of the urban streetcar system, and later roadways and tunnels suitable for private cars and municipal bus lines, these two zones were largely isolated. The growing middle classes settled in Rio's southern zone while the north saw the establishment of industries and factories along with new residencies. Meanwhile, informal housing settlements dotted around the city and its suburbs, on the sides of Rio's hills, in marshy areas skirting the Bay of Guanabara, and surrounding the city. Working families who could not access the formal housing market settled in the *favelas* seeking proximity to their working places: construction or domestic work in Rio's neighborhoods to the south or the industries to the north.

[13] Lise Fernanda Sedrez, ''The Bay of All Beauties': State and Environment in Guanabara Bay, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1875-1975'" (Ph.D. diss. Stanford University, 2005).

Urban planners had been considered spaces of urban poverty as a horrifying presence already since the Pereira Passos reform. But it was the French urbanist Alfred Agache, linked with the city beautiful movement, who actually condemned their presence in his Master Plan for Rio de Janeiro, commissioned by major Antonio Prado Júnior in 1927. The presence of *favela*s for in Agache's plan was not only a hygienic problem but also an aesthetic one. The solution was simple: they had to be demolished.[14] And although the Agache Plan was never implemented (the Vargas administration shelved the project when it comes to power) its "hierarchical and functionalist" understanding of poor people's place in urban society reappeared later, especially in the public works and building plans.[15]

In the following years, political elites assumed a newer, more expansive and conciliated politics of the *favela* and the *favelado*. In the late 1930s and 1940s public authorities first began to recognize *favelas* in official documents, beginning with the first Building Code of 1937. In those years, the city population grew as a result of the state-induced industrialization, improved rates of infant mortality and life expectancy. So too did the authorities' concerns for housing the urban poor. The municipal authorities began to work in conjunction with the Vargas's federal government adopting a more vigorous but fragmented approach towards *favelas*, empowered by the political and social mobilization of the urban working class the Estado Novo.[16] Mayor Pedro Ernesto (1931-

[14] Alfred Agache**,** Cidade do Rio de Janeiro: extens*ão* - remodela*ção* – embellezamento**,** cited in Abreu, *Evolução urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, 91; Valladares, *A invenção da favela*, 45-48. On Agache, see also David Underwood, "Alfred Agache, French Sociology, and Modern Urbanism in France and Brazil," *The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 50, no. 2 (1991): 130-166; `

[15] Brodwyn Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights*, 44.

[16] For a detailed study of Rio's politics see Marly Silva da Motta, *Rio de Janeiro: de cidade-capital a estado da Guanabara* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2001), 53-64. Carlos Eduardo Sarmento, "A arquitetura do impossível: a estruturação do Partido Autonomista do Distrito Federal e o debate

34 and 1935-36) reached out to *favelas* to build political clienteles by incorporating local electoral bosses and leaders –*figurões* and *chefes*- into state politics and by financing, for instance, e*scolas de samba* (samba's schools). As Marly Silva da Motta pointed out, these actions signaled a shifting understanding of poverty and *favela* as political and administrative problems that had to be put under state control. [17]

Mayor Henrique Dodsworth (1937-45) increased the state interventionist approach to areas of social concern, including housing. The Secretary General of Public Health commissioned Dr. Vítor Tavares de Moura -a recognized *sanitarista* who had served as head of the municipal Department for Social Assistance- the organization of a study of the *favela* problem, which he presented in 1940. This study suggested the construction of temporal housing complexes for poor families denominated *Proletarian Parks*. Between 1941 and 1943, Rio's municipality built *Parques Proletarios No.1 Gávea*, *No.2 Cajú and No .3 Pinto*, providing housing and a whole set of disciplinary measures to "reeducate" and bring into "organized life" the seven to eight thousand *favela* residents eradicated from the slums of the homonymous neighborhoods.[18] Each Parque had social centers and health posts, recreational spaces, daycare, and a police station. Residents had

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autonomista nos anos 1930," in *Rio de Janeiro: uma cidade na história*, ed. Marieta de Moraes Ferreira (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2000).

[17] Valladares, *A invenção da favela*, 49-63; see also Lucien *Favelas do Rio de Janeiro: Evolução e sentido* (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), 23-39

[18] *Favelas* Largo da Memória, Praia do Pinto, and Cajú were considered *favela*s planas (flat), as they were located in flat surfaces rather than in the hillsides. On the Parques Proletários, see Lucién Parisse, *Favelas do Rio de Janeiro*, 59-90; Ney dos Santos Oliveira, "Parque Proletário da Gávea – Uma experiência de habitação popular" (MA diss., Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1981); Victor V. Valla, *Educação e favela*, 4; Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978), 23; Jacqueline de Cassia Pinheiro Lima, "A pobreza como um problema social: as ações de Vítor Tavares de Moura e Agamenon Magalhães nas favelas do Rio e nos mocambos do Recife durante o Estado Novo, 1937-1945" (Ph.D. diss., Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 2006).

to submit to a series of stipulated regulations about entry and exit times. They were required to carrying identification. Residents also had to sit through lessons on morale.[19]

Consequently, there was a growing understanding of the *favela* as a social problem that required control and administration through a moral and disciplining official approach, congruent with the paternalistic character of Vargas's and Dodsworth's populist federal and local administrations.[20] Diverse social and political actors including also the Catholic Church would also share this moralizing and assistencialist approach. Not surprisingly this particular characterization of the *favela* and urban poverty required, rather than mere police and medical action, a careful and more comprehensive assessment of the situation, as the study undertaken by Dr. Tavares de Moura *Favelas do Distrito Federal* (1943) seemed to prove.[21] By the same token, the institutionalization of Social Work as a discipline for young women was part of this process. Field research work on favelas became a requirement to graduate as a Social Worker at the Social Institute of the General Secretary of Health and Welfare [Instituto Social of the Secretaria Geral de Saúde e Assistência].[22] Actually, many of these works together with Dr.

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[19] Yet, rather than temporary the *parques proletários* became permanent until they were bulldozed in the early 1970s. Already in 1950, the census of *favelas* described the proletarian park in Gávea as a *favela,* indicating that soon after its construction housing conditions worsened.

[20] Valladares, 62.

[21] In addition to the works of Valladares, Valla, and Leeds, see also Lídia Alice Medeiros, "Atendimento à pobreza no Rio de Janeiro durante a Era Vargas - do Albergue da Boa Vontade aos Parques Proletários Provisórios: a atuação do Dr. Victor Tavares de Moura, 1935-1945" (MA. Diss. Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro, 2002).

[22] The Instituto Social later became part of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica (PUC) School of Social Work. The students –usually female- had to write a monograph based on their field research in a *favela*. See, For a description of the eradicated *favela*s see Maria Hortência do Nascimento e Silva, "Impressões de uma assistente sobre o trabalho na *favela*" (MA. Diss., Instituto Social, Secretaria Geral de Saúde e Assistência, 1943). In the 1950s and 1960s, the *Parques Proletários* became objects of study in the research of the candidates; see for instance, Isaura Lembrugel Portugal, "Favela, Problema Administrativo" (1956); Laura Bogado Torres, "Parque Proletário Provisório No. 1," (1958); Maria Célia Guimarães da Cunha, "Repercussão do problema da habitação proletária na estabilidade familiar," (1959); Maria Stella Bezerra Pacheco, "Uma experiência de desenvolvimento e organização de comunidade no Parque Proletário Provisório No. 3," (1962). See also Valladares, *A invenção,* 55-63; Valla, *Educação e favela,* 59.

Moura's study, the first scientific analysis of *favelas.* This was the case of Maria Hortência do Nascimento e Silva's *Impressions of a Social Worker on the Work in the Alums* [Impressões de uma assistente sobre o trabalho na favela]. These works preceded the more systematic studies, especially the *favela* census that began to appear since the late 1940s.

Federal policies also had an impact in the area of housing. The expansion of the functions of the Retirement and Pension Institutes (Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensões; IAPSs) included the construction of housing for their members.[23] At the local level, the creation of the Public Housing Foundation (Fundação da Casa Popular) in 1946 and the Municipal Department of Public Housing of the Federal District (Departamento de Habitação Popular da Prefeitura do Distrito Federal). In most of the cases, Vargas housing initiatives for the working class reproduced the hygienic concerns exposed in the Agache Plan.[24] In addition, housing policy aimed at the formal segments of the working class but left aside the increasing numbers of informal or nonunionized workers who kept populating the *favelas*.[25]

Meanwhile, population growth accelerated. The construction of the Rio-Bahia Highway in the 1940s contributed to the densification of Rio's industrial northern suburban zone. The railroad service expansion –Leopoldina, Rio D'Ouro, and Linha Auxiliar- and the inauguration of Avenida Brasil that quickly became the busiest

[23] The Vargas administration reorganized the retirement and pension funds in 1933 to incorporate broader sectors of organized labor. Between 1933 and 1945 naval, commercial, bank, and industrial workers as well as state employees gained membership to these Institutes.
[24] Marcelo Burgos, "Dos parques proletários ao Favela-Bairro: as políticas públicas nas *favela*s do Rio de Janeiro," in *Um século de favela*, ed. Alva Zaluar and Marcos Alvito (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2003), 27.
[25] Barbara Weinstein, *For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). See also Angela Maria de Castro Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo* (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988); Dulce Pandolfi, *Repensando o Estado Novo* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 1999).

thoroughfare in Rio, contributed to the settlement of industries in the Zona Norte According to Mauricio Abreu, new *favelas* sprung up in these areas, as labor followed employment opportunities. Ironically, many industries took advantage of the already available cheap labor, leaving the residents of the new *favelas* to continue to live precarious lives.[26]

According to the 1948 census –the first census on *favelas*- almost 139,000 people lived in 105 *favela*s of which 44% were located in the suburbs, 24% in the South Zone; 22% in Centro-Tijuca. In terms of their place of origin, the census reported that 52% of *favelados* had come from the neighboring states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Espírito Santo, and that only thirteen percent of them chose to live in a *favela*.[27] The huge majority reportedly lived close to their workplace.[28] In terms of occupation, 30% of the counted population worked in the secondary sector, 20% in construction, and 20% as domestic workers –mostly in construction and domestic service concentrated in southern Rio.[29]

In this context of urban expansion, industrialization, and continuing growth of urban spaces of poverty, actors of the civil and political sphere such as the Catholic Church and the Brazilian Communist Party competed for leadership and ideological organization in *favela*s since the 1940s. With a strong moralist imprint, conservative sectors of the Catholic Church organized the Fundação Leão XIII (FLXIII) in 1947 – in reference to the Pope that authored the encyclical *Rerum Novarum,* "to provide moral,

[26] Abreu, *Evolução urbana do Rio de Janeiro,* 103.
[27] Taken from Lucien Parisse, *Favelas do Rio de Janeiro*, 97-112.
[28] Most of the people living in *favela*s worked closed to their homes, especially in Centro, 77% and Zona Sul, 79% while 58% for zona norte and suburbs.
[29] For a detailed analysis of the 1948 census see Lucien Parisse, ibid.

material, and religious assistance to the inhabitants of the hills of the Federal District."[30] From 1947 and 1954, the FLXIII had a strong presence in eight of the largest *favela*s and assisted thirty-four other slums by providing water and sewage services, light, and social assistance. Several scholars agreed on defining the creation of the FLXIII as a joint effort of the Church and the State to exert ideological control over the *favela*s through the Christianization of the residents and their vertical and coopted organization. This was a reaction to the potential threat posed by the Communist Party after the successful election for the city's Chamber of Councils in the 1945. Conservatives argued in those years, "we must climb the hill before the Communist come down."[31]

By the mid 1950s, social reformist sectors of the Church, later associated with the Second Vatican Council, launched the *Cruzada São Sebastião,* a housing project built in the coveted neighborhood of Leblon for the families living in the *favela* Praia do Pinto.[32] Under the leadership of D. Helder Câmara –a cleric whose commitments to social justice for *favelados* later earning him the title "Bishop of the Slums"— the *Cruzada* organized the construction of a housing complex of ten pavilions (945 units) equipped with social facilities, including a health post, daycare center, running water, and sewage.[33] This experience differed from the *Parques* in that the *Cruzada* offered permanent rather than temporary housing and sought to minimize the social and economic impact of spatial

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[30] Fundação Leão XII, *Morros e favelas. Como trabalha a Fundação Leão XIII. Notas e relatório de 1947 a 1954* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Naval, 1955). Representative of this sector of the Church was Rio's Archdiocese leaded by D. Jaime de Barros Câmara.

[31] "É necessário subir o morro ante que os comunistas desçam," in relatório SEGMACS, cited in Valla *Educação e favela*, 43. On the competition between the Church and the Communist Party, see Nísia Verônica Trindade Lima, "O movimento de favelados do Rio de Janeiro: políticas do estado e lutas sociais (1954-1973)" (MA. Diss., Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ, 1989); Kenneth P. Servin, "Dom Hélder Câmera: The Father of the Church of the Poor" (Wilmington: SR Books, 2004), 249-266.

[32] That *favela*, located in Leblon, at the margins of the Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon, had already been the object of relocation in the 1940s with the Parques Proletários and one of the favorite targets of the press.

[33] Dom Hélder Câmara was a respected Brazilian bishop associated later with the Liberation Theology. By 1955 he was the head of the Brazil's National Conference of Bishops.

dislocation by keeping a proximity to the *favela's* location. In other words, this program represented an attempt to promote the social integration of the *favela* resident into his/her neighborhood and the involvement of the residents through community organizations.[34] As a result, the *Cruzada* recognized the *favela* inhabitants as true residents of the city and as social, cultural, political and economic actors instead of criminals or marginals.

The municipal administration of Francisco Negrão de Lima (1956-57), chosen by president Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61) shared this recognition of the *favela* as a legitimate social and political actor. Sociologist José Arthur Rios, a respected voice on the *favela* problem, became the head of the Special Office for the Recovery of Slums and Anti-Hygienic Housing (Serviço Especial de Recuperação de Favelas e Habitações Anti-Higiênicas; SERFHA). The creation of SERPHA in 1956 sought to reorganize the many overlapping institutions that were in charge of substandard housing in the city.[35] Rios knew the situation of Rio's slums from first hand. He directed the first systematic study of *favelas* as director of SEGMACS, the study organized by Father Lebret that we have analyzed in Chapter 1.[36] The report looked into the social conditions that explained the existence of *favelas* as a consequence of the structural economic conditions. This characterization became official policy with the appointment of Rios as director of SERFHA. For the sociologist and policymaker, the only solution to the *favela* problem was to work together with the *favelados,* promoting the residents direct involvement in defining and solving their most urgent problems. The role of the government was to encourage *favela*'s organization in cooperatives or neighborhood associations as a way to

[34] On the role of community development programs, see Chapter 1.
[35] These included, the Departamento de Higiene, the Fundação da Casa Popular, a Polícia de Vigilância, the Departamento Sanitário and the FLXIII.
[36] On the history of SEGMACS and the role of José Arthur Rios, see Chapter 1.

promote the initiative and self-interest of the *moradores* (residents), a perspective very much in tune wit the notion of self-help that institutions like the United Nations and the OAS were promoting around the Third World. In Rio this approach carried the name of *Operação Mutirão.*[37]

The government recognized all forms of people's improvements into their built environment as an investment of time and capital. SERPHA's role was promoting the organization of neighborhoods associations and working cooperatives, the production and provision of building materials, and the establishment of training schools for unskilled workers.[38] The neighborhood associations were, in turn, required to hold regular meetings, to prioritize urgent needs, and stay in touch with authorities to coordinate technical aspects of self-help projects, which could include the installation of power lines, water, sewage, stairs, paving roads, and garbage collection. In the first years, however, SERFHA's field of action was limited because of financial constrains but aimed at establishing links with those favelas that were not under the influence of the FLXIII.

In 1960, Carlos Lacerda became the governor of the State of Guanabara and appointed José Arthur Rios as director of the Secretary of Social Services, from which the sociologist promote self-help and community development projects. In May 1962, however, Carlos Lacerda dismissed Rios, named Sandra Cavalcanti instead, and began a more repressive action toward *favelas*. In the next years, *favela* leaders praised Rios for having treated them with "dignity" and his ability to solve and cope with their problems with a realistic approach. In the two years that Rios worked for Lacerda, their working

[37] This approach predated the better-known emphasis on self-help construction developed by architect John Turner, especially in his experience in Peru slums in the 1960s.
[38] Anthony Leeds and Elizabeth Leeds, *A sociologia do Brasil urbano* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1978), 212.

relation was tense, as their personal correspondence show.[39] But rather than personal animosity, it was Lacerda's aspirations to be a presidential candidate in a political context defined by the fears of the spread of communism what made his urban policy in Rio a key aspect of his administration.

Rio de Janeiro at the Local, National, and Transnational Conjuncture

By 1960, the housing stock of Rio de Janeiro could hardly mirror that city deeply embedded in Rio's popular culture as the Marvelous City (Cidade Maravilhosa). Postwar economic fluctuation and political instability had hampered effective urban planning, exacerbating a difficult situation in which the demands of a growing population overwhelmed not merely the state's capacity to house the poor but the entire city's capacity to provide such basic services as clean water, trash removal, sewage treatment, health and education, and traffic engineering to all city residents, regardless of income. Rio de Janeiro was Brazil's most demographically concentrated area with a total population of 3,306,163 inhabitants in a territory of 1,356 square kilometers and a resulting density of 2824 square kilometers. The *favela* population grew almost threefold between 1950 and 1970. By 1960, almost ten percent of the total population lived in substandard housing.[40]

Economically speaking, the onset of heavy industrialization in and around the city of São Paulo imposed a serious restriction on Rio's own industrial development, whose participation in the national industrial production declined from 15.16% to 9.66%

[39] Arquivo Claudio Lacerda, Universidade de Brasília.
[40] Rio's urban population almost doubled between 1950 and 1970, reaching highest historical rates. *Favelado* population was 169,000 in 1950; 335,000 in 1960; and 554,000 in 1970. See Lucien Parisse, *Favelas do Rio de Janeiro*) 145.

between 1950 and 1960. Rio remained competitive in the production of consumer basics, textiles, and food as well as financial services, whereas heavy industrialization concentrated in the industrial parks of São Paulo and the centers of raw-material extraction in Minas and elsewhere.[41] While still the country's second industrial city, Rio's productivity could not absorb the growing number of available workers who moved to the service and informal sector, such as street vendors and maids, and also swelled the ranks of the unemployed.[42] While not all these workers lived in *favelas,* these sites of urban poverty were actually composed of working-class families.

In addition to the problems caused by economic decline, demographic strain, and deficient urban infrastructure, Rio de Janeiro lost its administrative and political supremacy when Brasília was officially inaugurated as the new nation's capital in April 1960. Rio had been the seat of the Portuguese viceroyalty after 1763, seat of the Portuguese empire between 1808 and 1821, and capital of an independent Brazil after 1822. The city's fortunes were deeply tied to governing the empire, and remained so after 1889, even as successive constitution of the republic provided for the construction of a new capital.[43] When President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61) took office in 1956 he committed his administration to the building of a new capital city for Brazil. Kubitschek framed his government as a new era of development and modernization and wanted

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[41] Mauro Osorio, *Rio nacional, Rio local: mitos e visões da crise carioca e fluminense* (Rio de Janeiro: SENAC, 2005), 132.

[42] Although population growth in São Paulo was more significant in relative terms, Rio de Janeiro had a more significant growth in the number of *favela*s. Irregular urban dwellers of São Paulo –a 1.1% of the total population- were less significant in nominal terms compared to Rio until the 1970s. Suzana Pasternak Taschner. "Favelas e cortiços: vinte anos de pesquisa urbana no Brasil," *Cadernos IPPUR* (Rio de Janeiro), vol 10, no.2 (1996): 89-115; Eva Alterman Blay, *Luta pelo espaço: textos de sociologia urbana* (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1978), *Eu não tenho onde morar: vilas operárias na cidade de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Nobel, 1985).

[43] Article 3 of the Federal Constitution of 1891established the construction of a new federal district.

Brasília to epitomize that ideal building it *ex-nihilo* in the country's Central Plateau and in a strict modernist urban conception.[44]

Rio had been, until then, Brazil's showcase nationally and internationally. Its beauty had caught the attention of the world since the 1930s.[45] As the country's capital city, Rio was the ground for political competition at both the local and the federal level, which fostered active political participation that differed in character from the experience of other states.[46] What happened at the local level could have national implications. The city was thus a laboratory for political projects with national projection. This characterization of Rio's politics challenged the traditional vision that argued that the city's political elites never formed cohesive political parties capable of influencing national politics, as it was the case in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, or Rio Grande do Sul, due to Rio's subordination to federal politics.[47]

For a city whose "capitality" (capitalidade) was key to the Carioca identity, the transference of the federal administration to Brasília threatened Rio's traditional place as the core of national politics and put it in the awkward position of having to define its own administrative status.[48] As Silva pointed out, the future of Rio was important giving its

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[44] James Holston, *The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasília* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
[45] Bryan McCann, *Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, "Cultura urbana do Rio de Janeiro," in *Rio de Janeiro: uma cidade na história*, ed. Marieta Ferreira (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2000), 139-149; Lúcia Lippi Oliveira, "Memórias do Rio de Janeiro," in *Cidade: história e desafios* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2002), 156-175; Paulo Knauss and Ana Mauad, eds., *Cidade vaidosa: imagens urbanas do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Sette Letras, 1999).
[46] See, among others, Américo Freire, *Uma capital para a República: poder federal e forças políticas locais no Rio de Janeiro na virada para o século XX* (Rio de Janeiro: Revan, 2000); Ângela Castro Gomes, *A invenção do trabalhismo* (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988); Marly Silva da Motta, *Rio de Janeiro: de cidade-capital a estado da Guanabara* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2001).
[47] On this perspective, for instance, José Murilo de Carvalho, *Os bestializados: o Rio de Janeiro e a República que não foi* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1987).
[48] Marly Silva da Motta, *Rio de Janeiro: de cidade-capital a estado da Guanabara* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2001), passim.

quality as a "sounding board" for national issues and it had a large political electorate, mainly urban and literate. Three options for Rio's future came up as clear in the debates of the late 1950s, one of each favoring different political configurations. The city of Rio could be a federal territory, an autonomous state, or a municipality of the existing state of Rio de Janeiro. Each option had its limitations: the first option was ambiguous and sought to freeze the potential disruptive politics of Rio at the federal level. In the second case, the debate was whether Rio would be one among other states or become a city-state. The third option held the potential to dilute the significance of Rio city in the larger politics of Rio state.[49] Finally, the Law 3752, known as San Tiago Dantas Law, created the Estado da Guanabara –the second option- on April 12, 1960. From 1960 to 1975, the city of Rio de Janeiro became the State of Guanabara, an autonomous city-state with a similar character as that of the rest of the Brazilian states. Greater Rio, including the Baixada Fluminense, were annexed onto to the neighboring state of Rio de Janeiro. The arrangement as maintained until 1975, when Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro state were fused into an enlarged state of Rio de Janeiro whose capital was seated in the former federal capital.

After the transfer of the capital to Brasilia, the citizens of the State of Guanabara –former Rio- were allowed to elect for the first time their own governor and federal representatives, which added a complex element in the balance of power between national and local governments.[50] When the right-of-center journalist Carlos Lacerda

[49] The city of Rio de Janeiro and the State of Rio de Janeiro were in the past two different administrative entities. Nowadays, the city of Rio is the capital of the homonymous state. On the debates about the satus of Rio, see Marly Silva da Motta's "'Que será de Rio?' Refletindo sobre a identidade politica da cidade do Rio de Janeiro," *Tempo* (Rio de Janeiro) 2, no. 4 (1997): 146-174

[50] The San Tiago Dantas law stipulated the creation of the State of Guanabara in April 20, 1960 and call for elections to the new governor for October 3, 1960. President Juscelino Kubitschek appointed José Sette

became the first governor of the State of Guanabara on December 12, 1960, he framed his administration as a rupture with past practices associated with populism, personalism, corruption, and lack of administrative perspective, on the one hand, and as a deliverer of urban reform, on the other. Lacerda's renowned role in the opposition to the Vargas regime, his political confrontation with Kubitschek, and his well-known sympathies to the U.S. made him a model Cold-War politician for the fledgling Kennedy administration.

From the beginning, Lacerda adopted a new model of political and administrative style that emphasized "modern," "efficient," and technocratic management to achieve a more dynamic and executive bureaucratic apparatus designed to accomplish his ambitious program of urban renewal. His authoritative political style was also congruent with the appointment of technocrat cadres to key areas of the public administration.[51] By blaming the bureaucracy and its politicization, he sought to create the image of a diligent executive in charge of a troupe of rational technicians with the knowledge and expertise to solve Rio's urgent problems. To do so, Lacerda decentralized local administration to guarantee organizational autonomy in the decision-making process and created autarchic agencies charged with urban renewal. He did so by dividing the city into Administrative

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Câmara as interim governor for the period between the transference of the capital and the inauguration of the new governor, which was on December 12, 1960.

[51] On Lacerda, see Bryan McCann, "Carlos Lacerda: The Rise and Fall of a Middle-Class Populist in 1950s Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 83, no. 4 (2003): John W. F. Dulles, Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader (Austin, 1991); 661-696; Carlos Lacerda, *Depoimento* (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1977); Marina Gusmão de Mendonça, *O demolidor de presidentes: a trajetória política de Carlos Lacerda, 1930-1968* (São Paulo: Códex, 2002). In the last ten years, Lacerda has been the object of revisionist analysis that praises Lacerda as the epitome of good and orderly public administration his focus on efficiency, with an authoritative style, and the appointment of technocratic personnel. See, the special issue of *Veja* "Saudades do Rio," *Veja*, 20 April 2005, 86-10 and Maurício Dominguez Perez, *Lacerda na Guanabara: a reconstrução do Rio de Janeiro nos anos 1960* (Rio de Janeiro: Odisséia, 2007).

Regions instead of traditional municipal wards, which guaranteed him control over his appointed administrators rather than have to deal directly with elected local leaders.

During his term, Lacerda targeted the areas of education, water supply and sewage services, transportation, housing, and the construction of roadways, tunnels and overpasses as key areas of his administration.[52] Large-scale projects like the Guandú water system, the construction of the tunnel Santa Bárbara, the beginnings of the Rebouças tunnel, the reclamation through landfill and development of the Aterro de Flamengo, the construction of freeways and overpasses, and the erection of a large number of schools were among the most celebrated public works undertaken during his tenure. These works were possible thanks to the restructuring of the administrative body, which involved the creation of new secretaries and autarchic joint state-private companies.[53] This set of major public works with a definitive presence in the city coincided with the celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of Rio's founding, certainly promoting Lacerda's image as a deliverer.

Lacerda was well aware of the character of Rio as a laboratory for national politics, especially within the unstable democracy of Brazil in the first half of the 1960s. In January 1961, Kubitschek handed the presidency to political opponent Jânio Quadros, a politician from the center-to-right União Democrática Nacional (UDN/National Democratic Union) who resigned eight months later in a failed political maneuver to

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[52] Recently, scholars have revisited the history of Rio de Janeiro in the 1960 and 1970s from a historical perspective. See, among others, Marly Silva da Motta, *Rio de Janeiro: de cidade-capital a Estado da Guanabara*; Angela Moulin S. Penalva Santos, *Economia, espaço e sociedade no Rio de Janeiro (*Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2003); Mauro Osorio, *Rio nacional, Rio local*; Maurício Dominguez Perez, *Lacerda na Guanabara;* Mark Kehren, "Tunnel Vision: Urban Renewal in Rio de Janeiro, 1960-1975" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Maryland, 2006).

[53] Other agencies created in the previous administration remained in functions. This was the case of the Urbanization and Sanitation Authority of Rio de Janeiro (SURSAN), a well-respected organism of technical cadres, that was a central agency in the engineering of the restructuration of urban space; on the work of SURSAN in Rio's urban renewal, see Mark Kehren, *Tunnel Vision.*

discipline Congress and the opposition. Vice-President Jõao Goulart, a *varguista* from the pro-Vargas Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Workers Party; PTB) in coalition with the Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party; PSD) became president of Brazil in September 1961after sorting out a preventive coup orchestrated by an alliance of militaries and oppositional politicians, including Lacerda.[54] Between 1961 and 1964, Goulart's administration was marked by the political strife over his leftist and pro-labor position in a Cold-War context where the specters of the Cuban Revolution tainted everyday politics. In 1964, a military coup backed by the United States overthrew Goulart and imposed a harsh military dictatorship (1964-1985).

Lacerda nourished the anxieties about the communist threat and elaborated his presidential ambitions for the upcoming national election set for 1965. A successful government in Guanabara meant a launching platform for his presidential candidacy. During his appointment, the governor worked hard to keep the centrality of Rio de Janeiro within national politics. When Leonel Brizola (1922-2004) won the elections as Guanabara representative to Congress in 1962 for the PTB ticket, Lacerda publicized it as an attack to the city. For Lacerda, Brizola was the embodiment of Vargas's populism and clientelism. While governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1959-63) Brizola's leftist nationalism took him to the nationalization of the ITT Telephone Company, action that infuriated the US. Brizola and ex-president Kubitschek loomed as Lacerda's political competitors for the presidential run. Yet, in order to become a national leader, the governor had to earn the national presidency of the UDN. Rio, therefore, was critical to Lacerda's aspirations.

[54] The electoral law in Brazil allowed voting for Vice-President separately from the President's ticket. João Goulart was the candidate of the PTB-PSD coalition. The UDN was its strongest political opposition.

The governor's inflammatory reactions and the agitation of the fear of communism was not mere political artillery, it was also the result of the turbulent political times and the social ferment. Poor urban residents accompanied this general mood dissatisfied by economic instability, inflation, production decline, increasing housing shortages, lack of substantive changes in the housing market, and as a reaction to repressive eradications. Political awareness led to the articulation of *favelas'* organizations that by 1963 crystallized in the creation of the Guanabara Federation of Favelas Associations (Federação das Associações de Favelas da Guanabara; FAFEG) in 1963.[55]

The local government was conscious of the potential threat that people's unease represented. In order to reduce the real possibilities of food riots as a consequence of inflation and supply shortages, Lacerda launched a plan for the construction of five markets with U.S. funds in strategic areas of the suburbs. The official rationale read,

> The sense of justice and solidarity of governments and elites to the lower classes has been further pressured by the collective consciousness of the masses, which are beginning to agitate, fermented by the eternal profiteers of times of crisis, the propagandists of the far left. The communist agitators, before the dramatic supply crisis situation (…), foster intense propaganda and, finding favorable climate of righteous anguish and despair, lead the masses to demonstrations disrespectful of the authorities and the subversion of order, endangering our own democratic institutions that support our social system.[56]

Lacerda's urban and housing policies were thus part of a delicate political game whose pieces moved back and forth between the local and the national level. Yet, as the example of the U.S. assistance to build supermarkets show, this political conjuncture also

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[55] Nísia Verônica Trindade de Lima, "O movimento de favelados do Rio de Janeiro;" Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, "A política na *favela*," *Cadernos Brasileiros* (Rio de Janeiro) 9, no. 3: 35-47; Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, *Movimentos urbanos no Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1981).
[56] Secretaria Geral de Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio, *Plano para construção de 5 mercados*, mimeo, folder 15 "512-11-150-130 Guanabara Markets," March 1962, box 42, RG 286, NACP

involved the U.S., whose presence became fundamental not only in diplomatic and undercover military ways but also in key aspects of social life.

Lacerda's credentials as a politician hostile to the heterodoxy of populism and the orthodoxy of the left embodied in the figures of Vargas or Kubitscheck, yet still committed to certain aspects of social reform, placed him in good stead with the Kennedy Administration. In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. saw Lacerda as a guarantor of order in comparison to what was seen as the radical politics of Goulart (characterized by the Department of State in a secret memo as "childish and erratic") or Brizola.[57] In a telegram to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann, ambassador Lincoln Gordon described the governor of Guanabara as, "one anti-commie. One of ablest in country. Brilliant. Was newspaper publisher. Good administrator. Would make good President—under attack for being pro-American." The potential political liabilities of the close ties between the governor and the U.S. prompted Gordon to advise Lacerda to maintain some distance "so obvious a public relationship as to make him appear a favorite son of U.S.."[58]

In March 1962, Lacerda traveled to New York and Washington to negotiate with the IDB and USAID different funds for urban renewal programs.[59] Before meeting with President Kennedy on March 26, Lacerda handed a note to Kennedy's staff referring to

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[57] Aluísio Alves, governor of Rio Grande do Norte, was also one of the other main politician that the U.S. preferred as a presidential candidate at that time.

[58] Telegram 1773 from Rio de Janeiro, February 24, 1964, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 BRAZ, RG 59, NACP; and Ruth Leacock, *Requiem for Revolution* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990), 31. On the involvement of the US in Brazil's politics and its support to the miliary coup, see Carlos Fico, *O grande irmão;* John D.W. Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991); James N. Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

[59] These conversations centered on funding for the sewer and Guandu water system, negotiated directly with IDB's president, Felipe Herrera, and a U.S.$ 5million loan for an international airport hotel, fishing, cold storage, and a U.S.$ 10 million loan for low-income housing.

the housing crisis and the opportunity it represented, as according to him, building housing stock would be a huge boom for labor. In that note Lacerda wrote, "my state is, and could be even more so, the showcase for democratic progress in Brazil. It is the main center of the Communist effort. Powder may lie in the Northeast of Brazil but the wick is in Rio."[60] In this way, Guanabara's governor presented himself as a reliable executive, an astute anti-communist, and accomplished leader who could lead Brazil into a course of development coincidental to U.S. interests and values. And housing was one of these areas that Lacerda's invoked to prove his abilities.

In cultivating the relationship with the White House, Lacerda established a preferential relationship that ultimately allowed the arrival of U.S. loans and technical assistance directly from USAID to Guanabara –bypassing the control of the federal administration. In so doing, Lacerda limited negotiations with the Brazilian federal government –of which he was a strong opponent- and capitalized on the image of an efficient executive administrator. In lending to a governor, USAID waived the requirement of considering only proposals submitted by national governments that fulfill the requirement of being part of an integral development plan. This was actually the argument that USAID used to deny aid to governors or municipal authorities in Latin America, as private conversations between U.S. Ambassadors and Brazilian and Argentinean local authorities had proven. The Guanabara Housing Program should be precisely understood within this interrelation of local, national, and international politics

[60] Carlos Lacerda, letter to John F. Kennedy, Washington, D.C., March 26, 1962, cited by John D.W. Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda, Brazilian Crusader*, 88-9. In the 1960s, the Brazilian Northeast, a large region that occupies 18.26 per cent of the country, suffered from economic stagnation and severe draughts. The region became the focus of radical leftist guerrilla.

The Guanabara Housing Program

In 1962, the government of Guanabara turned to a more systematic approach to the *favela* problem launching a program of slum clearance, partial *favela* urbanization, and the construction of publicly financed low-income housing complexes [*núcleos habitacionais*] to house displaced *favelados*. With the dismissal of José Arthur Rios from the Secretary of Social Service the government put previous official action toward *favela* amelioration through self-help and community development projects in a secondary place. *Mutirão* projects did not necessarily cease to exist. These programs actually embedded the principles of self-improvement promoted by the Alliance for Progress and were always good hooks in the negotiations with lending agencies.[61] The government considered, however, that most of the people living in *favelas* were actually in financial conditions to formalize their situation by buying their own housing if given the possibility to buy it in the long term with reasonable financing.

The causes of Lacerda's change in housing policy were multiple. On the one side, there was a generalized perception among middle and upper class *cariocas* that *favelas* were sites of marginality and urban squalor, an obstacle to large-scale real-estate interests, and an uncomfortable presence in Rio's cityscape. The identification of poor living conditions with marginality and criminality, rather than as the outcome of more structural economic factors, created the idea that relocating *favelados* in new housing complexes might formalize the situation of thousands of poor families. This opinion was in tune with that of the government and international organisms. In addition, the general public and the government saw *favelas* as obstacles to the development of the city,

[61] During his visit to the White House in March 1962, Lacerda mentioned Kennedy the accomplishments in self-help works conducted in the Favela do Vintém, "where we installed water and sewer with the voluntary participation of those who live there," cited in Dulles, *Carlos Lacerda*, 90.

especially for those slums located in growing areas such as the coveted upper-middle to upper-class neighborhoods of Ipanema and Leblon as well as places of value for tourism such as the morro do Pasmado, with a scenic view to the Guanabara Bay. Liberating those lands from the presence of slums was part of Lacerda's spatial reorganization and modernization of Rio.

Lacerda resorted to the Alliance for Progress for economic and technical assistance to launch his housing program giving the scarcity of domestic savings, growing inflation, and the multiplicity of large-scale projects that the government was undertaking. Conversations with foreign organizations had already begun in May 1961 when Guanabara authorities applied to the IDB for a line of credit for the total amount of ten million dollars from the Social Progress Trust Fund.[62] Philip Glaessner, the IDB representative in 1961, established the guiding principles for the feasibility of the housing program, which emphasized the construction of the maximum number of housing units in the allotted amounts as a way to maximize the impact of the program.[63] In terms of planning, this program implied thorough rationalization of housing construction, from the conception to the execution. This principle present from the beginning of the conversations determined the spatial design of the homes and the neighborhoods through the serialization of housing layouts and the construction of *minimum housing* limited to the amount of Cr$200,000 per unit. The *embryo-house*, the construction of a "core" from where the homeowner could expand as their own wish following a pre-established layout, was the key notion behind the conception of the housing complexes. These improvements

[62] The mechanisms of foreign assistance for housing are explained in Chapter 2.
[63] Glaessner, was at that time assistant director for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Bank. A Jewish émigré, he was a member of "The Ritchie Boys" during World War II, the U.S. special military intelligence unit trained in methods of psychological warfare. He later worked for the World Bank.

would include the expansion of square footage and new construction materials would promote consumption. In this way, "development" and "growth," part of the developmentalist *ethos* of the era would be spatial as well as moral. Despite several negotiations, including the visit to Rio of a joint IDB-USAID technical mission leaded by Stanley Baruch to analyze the project, IDB withdrew from the project to prioritize financing the expansion of the water supply infrastructure.[64]

Assistance came mainly from USAID. Between 1962 and 1966, the agency provided four different loans from Public Law of the Wheat Fund (PL 480) and program loan counterpart *Cruzeiros* (the local currency) for almost the equivalent of U.S. dollar $4,500,000 (approximately 6.75 billion *Cruzeiros*).[65] These funds were for costs associated with the construction of a handful of housing complexes in Rio's periphery: Vila Aliança in Bangú (2,183 units), Vila Kennedy in Senador Camará (originally named Vila Progresso; 5,069 units), Vila Esperança (464 units) in Vigário Geral, and Cidade de Deus in Jacarepaguá (6,658 units).[66] In the first two cases, the original names –Alliance and Progress- paid tribute to the program of inter-American cooperation. After the assassination of the president of the United States, the government renamed Vila Progresso as Vila Kennedy. [Figure 3-10]

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[64] Carlos Lacerda to Felipe Herrera, IDB President, n.d. (c. July 1962); Carlos Lacerda to Leonard Saccio, Minister-Deputy IDB, 12 July 1962 in Estado de Guanabara, *Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitação de interesse social* (Guanabara: COHAB), July 1962, Entry 400, Brazil subj/proj 56-73; ACC # 75-0162, Box 25, RG 286, NACP. Stanley Baruch was the IDB housing chief. During his term the Bank provided Latin American countries with seed capital loans from the Social Progress Trust Fund for low-income housing. He also encouraged the organization of savings and loan institutions; see "U.S. Spurs Latin Americans to Mobilize Savings to Finance Homes," *The New York Times*, 28 July 1963, 87.

[65] For the explanation of Public Law 480, see chapter 2.

[66] It is difficult to establish the exact number of housing units for Cidade de Deus giving the constant alteration of the original plan. The number chosen here reflects USAID estimates for the total number of built units agreed with the organism, independently of those erected by the local administrations.

According to the loan proposal that the Guanabara government submitted to U.S. authorities, almost a third of Rio's population of 3.5 million were living in substandard housing. The housing shortage was estimated in 200,000 units with an increase of the housing deficit estimated at 11,500 units annually. The private construction and financial market did not attend this segment of the population because of the small revenue expected, especially in a moment of good profits with the construction of middle and upper classes residences, especially in the beach neighborhoods of Zona Sul, the close-in neighborhoods of the Zona Norte.[67] But the government estimated that most of the people living in *favela*s were actually financially able to buy their own house in monthly installments by allotting, according to official estimations, between fifteen to eighteen (but no to exceed twenty-five) percent of their minimum wage. Rafael de Almeida Magalhães, Guanabara vice-governor, argued that that figure was close to the amount people paid to the *birosqueiro*, in charge of informal renting in the *favela*, for a shack in the hill.[68] With these numbers in mind, the government initiated a housing program which residential units would be sold in monthly installments over a period of ten years.

In this backdrop, the state assumed with urgency the direct construction of the new neighborhoods, the financing of the whole operation, and the relocation of the people of the *favela*. State action had to be fast but Guanabara's domestic resources for housing were insufficient as the government was undertaking so many expensive and large-scale public. As the loan proposal indicated, "It is precisely in the first years of operation of the scheme, when the state still cannot count on substantial re-flow of funds

[67] Estado da Guanabara, "Plano de Recuperação de *favela*s e de habitações de interesse social," 3.
[68] Rafael de Almeida Magalhães, *O problema das favelas cariocas e sua solução* (Rio de Janeiro: Universidade do Estado da Guanabara, 1964), 13. Estado de Guanabara, *Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitação de interesse social* (Guanabara: COHAB), July 1962. *Birosqueiro* refers here to the to the person in charge of the informal rental market in the *favelas.*

received in the past that we are expecting the credit assistance from the Alliance for Progress." Paraphrasing W.W. Rostow, the document indicated that, "foreign aid will aim to accelerate the take off of the housing program."[69] U.S. assistance was thus central to launch the housing program in a time of dwelling shortages and electoral anxieties.[70]

On the U.S. side, official experts regarded the program as promising. Upon its completion, there were going to be 8,747 new dwelling-units, with a total capacity for 47,800 residents. These estimates included provisions for water, gas, and electricity hook-ups as well as access to healthcare, educational, commercial, and community facilities. The works were expected to provide 3,000 new jobs. Equally important, USAID considered the housing program as a pilot project that could set national guidelines for a national housing plan. The U.S. agency also saw its role as contributing to the development of self-sustaining state institutions, a guiding principle of the Alliance for Progress. U.S. funds, released upon the achievement of set program goals, were considered "seed capital" whose returns had to be re-invested in the construction and finance of more residencies. The U.S. agreed to fund eleven percent of the total investment and the State of Guanabara the rest. According to Rafael de Almeida the deal with USAID established a repayment period of forty years with an interest rate of 2.75% with a seven-year initial grace period at the beginning of the program. The State agreed to allocate all the returns and inputs from down payments, mortgage repayments, and other

[69] Ibid, 11.
[70] Almeida also pointed out the difficulty and bureaucracy to obtain funds from the national government that, in addition, had to satisfy the demands of the reminding states; Ibid, 23-27

benefits to this end.[71] This was exactly the kind of operations that international lending organizations promoted along the region in the 1960s.

The constitution of the state of Guanabara, made official in December 1962, reorganized the administrative body. Article 66, in particular, created COHAB (Companhia de Habitação Popular), the State Popular Housing Company.[72] COHAB was a joint venture between private and state capital (the State of Guanabara subscribed 51% of the stocks), which gave the company an autarchic status and relative autonomy from the state.[73] The state established the mandatory investment of the three per cent of the state tax revenue to finance its share of COHAB.[74] The agency's main functions were the study of the problem of popular housing, planning and execution of housing complexes, building of temporary housing for relocated residents, and *favela* urbanization. Since the beginning it was clearly stated that it was the state's mission to establish a plan for slum clearance.[75] The vice-governor emphasized Lacerda's interest in making the company "a real estate company," invested with the flexibility to operate in the low-income construction market.[76]

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[71] "USAID—Assisted Guanabra Housing Program," folder 2 Project 512-11-830-264.1; National Housing Bank; Low Cost Housing–Guanabara FY 66-67, entry 400 Brazil Subj/Proj 56 73; ACC # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

[72] State Law 263, 24 December 1962, The State General Assembly formalized COHAB on March 13, 1963. According to Leeds the creation of COHAB was the local response to the creation of the Housing Federal Council (Conselho Federal da Habitação; created on June 25, 1962); Leeds (1971), 25.

[73] "Audit Report in the Utilization of Public Law 480, Title I, Local Currency Sales Proceeds under Grant Project Number 512-11-803-107 (Formerly 512-H-83-AA), Guanabara Housing, June 12, 1962 through February 29, 1964," 4, entry 400 Brazil Subj/Proj 56 73; ACC # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

[74] The military dictatorship that came to power in 1964 created the National Housing Bank that year, which later contributed in the financing of the housing program.

[75] COHAB, *Relatório Geral, 1963-1965,* 1; "Somente neste Governo houve a preocupação de erradicação e, para tanto, juntaram-se todos os resultados experiências de ordem social e econômica que foram devidamente estudados dando origem a diretrizes adoradas pela companhia, postas em pratica e de resultados positivos."

[76] "Postulamos então a criação da 'Companhia de Habitação Popular', que, operando como empresa imobiliária, teria condições de flexibilidade muito maiores para atuar no campo de construções de casas populares; porque, ainda que recuperada a iniciativa privada para o campo da habitação, a casa para o *favela*do, de baixo padrão de pagamento seria, evidentemente, a última faixa que a iniciativa privada

Lacerda and his vice-governor considered the *favela* problem more in economic than in social terms. Its solution was to formalize the poor urban resident by making them homeowners. The rule of thumb was that a family income had to be equal 25% of the minimum salary, i.e., a family of four had to earn at least one minimum salary, a family of five at least one-and-a-quarter minimum salaries. The housing program envisioned that at the end of a ten-year period the new homeowner would have paid for urbanization, construction, and financial costs. In a context of galloping inflation, the government stipulated periodical readjustments to avoid speculation or the decrease in the loans' value. No down payment was required. Proprietorship, therefore, was the key to the government initiative for most of the *favela* population –at least to those that the government identified as able to afford their own houses. As Lacerda put it bluntly years later, "we are not going to give anything for free except for the miserable, the indigent. The poor can always pay something, within reach of their poverty ... these slum-dwellers may have lost hope… but they can be sure they haven't lost their shame not wanting to give up the freedom and honor."[77]

This selection based on income created a spatial segregation, as people with the ability to pay would live in privately owned houses built by the state and served with urban and social services. Those families that could not meet those standards, however, were relocated in temporary housing, denominated triage areas, that lacked most of the fundamental social infrastructure. Interestingly enough, the term *triage* [that comes from *trier*, "separate out] has an origin in the military system of assessing the wounded on the

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cobriria, e pareceu-nos que a ação do Estado devia se fazer intense e necessariamente nesse setor, porque não havia outra alternativa na linha de solução," Rafael de Almeida Magalhães, *O problema das favelas cariocas e sua solução,* 12.

[77] Lacerda, *Poder das ideias.*

battlefield. This temporary housing in many cases later became permanent, new *favela*s plagued with negative stereotypes and vulnerable to violence and crime.[78]

In June 1962, USAID provided the first one billion cruzeiro loan (about US$1.6 million) for the construction of V. Aliança and V. Esperança, the urbanization of a *favela* in Vila de Penha, and the construction of a large hospital in Madureira.[79] The State of Guanabara, represented by the Fundação Leão XIII (FLXIII), the Special Commission for Agricultural Commodities Agreements (CEAPA) and the U.S. Government, represented by USAID/Brazil, signed the first agreement on June 12, 1962, approved by the Brazilian Government Coordinator for Point IV.[80] USAID assumed co-responsibility for continued analysis of the economic capability of the slum occupants, and their ability to repay loans. The FLXIII was responsible for initial suitability and feasibility studies, evaluation of social and physical needs of the soon to be eradicated families. The agency was the main authority in organizing and executing the project but, as an organism involved in social assistance activities, it was not organizationally or functionally capable of administering the new program. When the state legislature formalized COHAB in March 1963, the housing company took over the responsibilities and duties of the FLXIII. The latter remained engaged in social work activities in slums.[81]

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[78] Nova Holanda, for instance, one of the triage zones built by the housing agency became decades later part of the Complexo da Maré, a group of *favela*s known for the its violence and drug trafficking.

[79] "Project Agreement Between the Agency of International Development An Agency of the Government of the United States of America and State of Guanbara, Fundação Leão XIII, The Brazilian Government and Representative for Point IV and CEAPA of the Government of Brazil, Agencies," and Agency for International Development, United States A.I.D. Mission to Brazil, "Audit Report in the Utilization of Public Law 480, Title I, Local Currency Sales Proceeds under Grant Project Number 512-11-803-107 (Formerly 512-H-83-AA), Guanabara Housing, June 12, 1962 through February 29, 1964," 18 June 1964, project 512-11-830-264.1, National Housing Bank, Low Cost Housing – Guanabara FY 64, folder 4, entry 400, Brazil Subj/proj 56 73, ACC # 75-0162, Box 25, RG 286, NACP.

[80] "Brazil Install Alliance Panel," *The New York Times*, 14 June 1962, 30.

[81] A revision of the project agreement on June 29, 1963 recognized COHAB authority. At the same time all references to CEAPA were changed to Coordinating Commission for the Alliance for Progress (Comissão Coordenadora da Aliança para o Progresso – COCAP. Administratively, COHAB was under the Secretary

The original agreement, for which the first loan was given, comprised five sub-projects being the construction of new housing complexes for the relocation of qualified residents from the eradicated slums.[82] The other sub-projects included the urbanization of the *favela* Vila da Penha, partial improvements to a number of *favela*s spread over Rio, including community development and self-help programs, and the construction of the Madureira Health Center, located in a highly populated area district. The housing program differentiated between *favela*s that were suitable for urbanization, either total or partial, and those that had to be eradicated. The official rationale argued issues of health and safety in most cases as *favela*s were presented as unhealthy given their lack of piped water and sewerage, garbage collection. In many cases, their locations were far from hospitals and health centers. Other settlements were situated in dangerous zones, either in hillsides that could collapse with heavy rains and landslides or built on stilts on the water over the Guanabara bay. Some other *favela*s, however, were in valuable lands either sorrounding the Rodrigo de Freitas Lagoon, close to the coveted neighborhoods of Leblon and Ipanema, or the Morro do Pasmado, where a *favela* occupied a site with a view of the Guanabara Bay. In these latter cases, the local authorities argued that the

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of Social Services and its organizational structure included technical, administrative, financial departments, and an office of social welfare (or social service). The Technical Department (Diretoria Técnica) responsible for urbanization and construction activities, including the study and crafting of the projects and the execution, supervision, and oversight of works. It also experimented with construction methods and materials to rationalize and economize the building process. The Social Services Department was responsible for gathering census information on *favela*s, assessing poor people's social and economic conditions, and establishing which housing solution would fit the families' needs. During the eradication process, personnel of this department assisted the families in getting relocated, helped in the organization of community authorities, social activities, and provided assistance in the area of hygiene and sanitation.

[82] For these two sub-projects, USAID allocated Cr$458 million out of its total contribution of Cr$1,000,000,000 divided in a) the construction of 2,250 housing units (Cr$254.3 million), b) urbanization of land (Cr$105.7 million), and c) a Loan fund (Cr$ 98 million) which was going to be used to finance home buying. The State of Guanabara provided the funds for the construction of community facilities, including schools, markets, police and medical facilities.

privatization of such spaces would provide the government with funds to expand the construction of affordable housing.

The urbanization of *favela*s usually begun with aerial-photographic and topographic surveys; a socio-economic study of the residents and their built infrastructure. Then came the sanitation works, landfills and, eventually, zoning and land use specifications. Works usually included the construction of pedestrian and, when geography allowed, vehicular aceess; basic urban infrastructure, including water, sanitary and storm sewerage, electricity, and garbage collection. If considered necessary, communal facilities were also provided, including schools, markets, health and police posts, churches, recreational areas, or bus stops. The improvement of individual dwellings consisted on some –or all- of the following steps: basic sanitary inftrastructure (kitchen, toilet, shower), floors and ceiling, and the building of additional rooms. The construction of new housing units in urbanized *favela*s involved a number of options where the degree of involvement between the state and the occupand varied. For instance, the State could assume the total or partial construction of the unit. In the latter case, the dweller was responsible for its completion. For the option of self-construction, the government promised to supply materials, technical assistance, or long-term financing. In most of the cases, the program emphasized the importance of the "integration" of the *favela* into self-help and community development activities, including the organization and participation in neighborhhood associations. In this sense, the Operação Mutirão approach that J.A. Rios had inaugurated continued in fifty-two *favela*s had by 1962 [83]

[83] The list of *favela*s that undertook self-help programs were: Cantagalo Sul, Pavão – Pavãozinho, Santa Marta Sul, João Goulart (Sul), Liberdade, Paula Ramos, Bispo 117, Matinha, Môrro da Corêa\, Morro São Joao (Meier), Barro Vermelho (Lins de Vasconselos), Jacarezinho, Cachoeira Grande (Boca do Mato), Fernão Cardim (Meier), Catumbí (Catumbí), Nova Holanda (Ramos), Dendê (Ilha do Governador), Praia

In the case of the Favela da Vila Penha, more than 40,000 people lived in the 4,000 dwellings that covered the hill. This working class neigborhood of northern Rio did not occupy lands of significant value for the city, as it was the case with other *favelas*, so urbanization was economically more rational than eradication. Works were, in general, of the same kind of those described above and some families who lived in areas affected by the reforms were offered a place in the *vilas*. In a visit to the site in September 1964, Bill Williams, a top USAID/Housing and Urban Development Office (HUDO) expert, commented the positive impact of the works. For the U.S. official, the Vila da Penha "has the appearance of a stable, working-class community, in sharp contrast to other *favela* areas that have gone unattended."[84] Urbanization *per se,* for Williams as for urban planners, policymakers, and urban experts in those years was synonym of stability.

The construction of the Madureira Health Center (Centro Médico Sanitário Alberto Borgerth), which began on April 5, 1963, responded to a pressing need to provide health services to the almost 80,000 people living in a densely-populated area that included twenty-one *favelas*. The incidence of communicable diseases, such as typhoid and tuberculosis, was high, and the rate of infant mortality distressing. The construction of the hospital is a good example of the degree of involvement of U.S. officials in the projects in which the funds and name of the Alliance was at stake. Internal

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do Pinto (Cordovil), Morro da Matriz (Enjenho Novo), Parque São Sebastião (Cajú), Vila da Penha (Penha), Baixa do Sapateiro (Bomsucesso); Maré (Bomsucesso); João Candido (Penha), São Carlos (Estácio), Borel (Tijuca), Salgueiro (Tijuca), Guararapes (Santa Tereza), Jardim Zoologico (Vila Isabel), Vila Croácia (Senador Camará); Morro dos Telegrafos (São Cristovão), Vila Nova (Osvaldo Ctruz), Barreira do Vasco (São Cristovão), Vila Sáo Jorge (Cosmos), Nova Brasília (Bomsucesso); Estado da Gunabara, *Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social...*

[84] On the technical inspection of the urbanization process, see the Memorandum Charles E. Shirley to Helio Vanzolini, 4 February 1964, "Project No. 512-11-830-1320 Vila da Penha and Madureira Health Center Work Progress Report," Folder 7: SOC 4 GUANABARA LOW-COST HOUSING Plans of Madureira Health Center; October, 1964, entry 400, Brazil Subj/proj 56 73, ACC # 75-0162, Box 42; RG 286; "Urbanização da Vila da Penha," *O Globo*, 16 October 1964, 11.

memos and conversations between COHAB and USAID authorities show concern even for minor details. The COHAB architects, for instance, requested authorization to USAID experts in order to modify the original project to build a dining room instead of a laundry in the second floor. USAID, however, denied the change arguing that a sanitary and controlled laundry was more important.[85] In the end, the construction of the hospital received good reviews from USAID inspectors, who praised the quality of the building.[86]

Undoubtedly, the construction of the *Vilas*- was the most important aspect of COHAB's housing plan in terms of scale and resources employed. It involved a number of operations including buying the terrains, levelling and urbanization works, building the dwellings and communal facilities, implementing the eradication and relocation process, and supervising the new neighborhoods. COHAB's looked for areas of considerable size to build several thousand units, easily accessible by paved highway or rail service, and with the capacity to offer sufficient job opportunities.[87] Rio's periphery to the Western and North, where large, inexpensive tracts of land were available became the choice. Railroads such as the Estrada de Ferro da Central do Brasil and higways like the Brazil Ave served those areas, expecially the Western zone.

This choice complemented Lacerda's plans to bolster Rio's battered economy. The Guanabara State created the Company for the Progress of Guanabara (Companhia de

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[85] James W. Howe, Vice-Director USAID/Brazil to Milton de Oliveira Ferreira, Director COHAB, 21 November 1963 and ss; entry 400, Brazil Subj/proj 56 73, ACC # 75-0162, Box 47, RG 286, NACP

[86] Charles E. Shirley to Helio Vanzolini, 4 February 1964, "Project No. 512-11-830-1320 Vila da Penha and Madureira Health Center Work Progress Report," entry 400, Brazil Subj/proj 56 73, ACC # 75-0162, entry 400, Brazil Subj/proj 56 73, ACC # 75-0162, Box 47, RG 286, NACP

[86] Charles E. Shirley to Helio Vanzolini, 4 February 1964, "Project No. 512-11-830-1320 Vila da Penha

[87] COHAB potential construction sites were close to Estação de Santíssimo; Meier (Sítio dos Pretos Fôrros); Loteamento Estrada do Guafá; Santa Cruz, Paciência, Campo Grande, Realengo, Senadro Camarâ, most of them close to railway stations. In addition, there were public lands available in Jacarepaguá in a large area of 3 million sq.mt between Neimayer Ave. and the Baixadad de Jacarepagúa –what became the site of Cidade de Deus; Estado de Guanabara, *Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitação de interesse social* (Guanabara: COHAB), July 1962, p. 23/24 Entry 400, Brazil subj/proj 56-73; ACC # 75-0162, Box 25, RG 286, NACP.

Progresso da Guanabara; COPEG) to promote the formation of an industrial pole via state tax exemptions and subventions as a way to counter São Paulo's competence. Lacerda organized COPEG following the example of the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, created during Operation Bootstrap under Moscoso's direction. In Rio, COPEG had been in courting foreign lenders to fianance the establishment of a steel company, COSIGUA, in the Santa Cruz district.[88] Vila Kennedy, and to a lesser extent Vila Aliança, built in the proximities of that industrial pole, were to provide an already settled and disciplined labor force.[89] There is another element that might have influenced the location. USAID rules prevented real-estate speculation, leading to the selection of less-valuable land at a further remove from the city center. The head of the USAID/HUDO referred to this reason when he had to respond, years later, to internal investigations sparked by criticism of the poor conditions at V. Kennedy. While it is difficult to assess the influence of USAID in determining the location of the *Vilas* it nevertheless indicates the type of negotiations and considerations behind its decision.

Construction in V. Aliança began in 1962 in an area of 43.1 hectares (106.5 acres) in Bangú Administrative Region, close to the railway station of the same name.[90] As the first of the residential developments, V. Aliança had an experimental character in terms of urban and housing design. The site was divided in three different sections (*glebas*) and constructions developed in stages. Work included the leveling of the terrain, urbanization,

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[88] COPEG had bought the area that pertained to *Cristo Redentor's Shelter* where COHAB built Vila Kennedy. Documentation on property transactions is located at the Centro de Pesquisa e Documentacão de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC) Clemente Mariani's Collection CMa ae COPEG 1960.12.29. In 1971, the Gerdau Group, owners of Siderúrgica Riograndense and Siderúrgica Açonorte, begins the construction of COISGUA with a loan from the World Bank.

[89] Lacerda blamed his successor Negrão de Lima for having cutting off the industrial program.

[90] The origins of Bangú went back to the creation of a major textile company in Brazil, Fábrica de Tecidos Bangú in 1893; Márcio Piñon de Oliveira, "Quando a fábrica cria o bairro: estratégias do capital industrial e produção do espaço metropolitano no Rio de Janeiro," *Scripta Nova. Revista electrónica de geografía y ciencias sociales* 10, no. 218 (2006): 51

and the installation of basic urban infrastructure (water, sewage, and electricity).[91] Between 1962 and March 1963, the FLXIII built 400 units [see Appendix 1] in the first section and had initiated works for 1,357 units and infrastructure in the second. When COHAB was formalized took over the project it built 430 more units in the third section. By that time, families had been already relocated to the neighborhood, although the health and police posts, the community center, and the main square equipped with recreational facilities and playgrounds were yet to be built. By the end of 1965, families displaced during the eradication of the *favelas* Pasmado, Brás de Pina, Bom Jesús, and Getúlio Vargas occupied most of these houses (See Table 1).

The construction of V. Kennedy begun in December 1962, in Senador Camará, also in the Bangú Regional Administration. Originally named Vila Progresso (Progress), it was renamed after Kennedy's assassination. USAID officials touted this action in internal reports, praising the "people of Rio and the State of Guanabara, [who] out of deep love and respect for a man they cherished as a personal friend, spontaneously renamed the project Vila Kennedy and erected at its entrance a miniature model of the U.S. Statue of Liberty." COHAB indeed placed an original of Bartholdi's sketch of the Statue in Plaza Miami, Vila Kennedy's main square.[92] The new residents came mainly from two large *favela*s, Esqueleto (800 families; 4,400 inhabitants), and Pasmado (911 families; 4828 inhabitants) and from others of smaller size, including Maria Angú, Macedo Sobrinho, Marquês de São Vicente, Ladeira dos Funcionários, and Av. 24 de Maio. [See Table 1]

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[91] The total construction area of the 2,187 houses was of 47,472 m2 (510,984 sq.ft); COHAB *Relatorio*, 4.
[92] For the history of the origins of the Statue of Liberty and contemporary popular appropriations of that space see Cecília Azevedo, "Essa pobre menina moça: a estátua da Liberdade da Vila Kennedy," in *Cidade vaidosa…,*. 93-116.

Construction works also occurred in stages in three different sections. The first one included 1,870 houses for 8,085 people in an area of 337,557 square meters (3,633,433.31 sq.ft) the second section consisted of 1,934 units for 9,630 people, with construction beginning in January 1964. Work in the third section was possible thanks to the second release of funds, whose agreement had been signed on October 16, 1964.[93] Finally, a third USAID release on April 30, 1965, complemented this time with federal funds, allowed for further extension at V. Kennedy and the beginning of Cidade de Deus.[94] Between May 1965 and December 1966, with Lacerda already gone, USAID contributed to the construction of 2,620 new units for 13,672 people while state and national funds allowed 513 additional units for 1,488 people, all located in the second and third section.

The third sector incorporated a number of community facilities important for the everyday life that the previous two sections lacked. These were, the V.K. Social Educational and Sport Center (CESE) and two cooperatives, COPARO (Clothing Factory Coop; Cooperativa de Fábrica de Roupas) and COARTE (Crafts Coop; Cooperativo de Artesanato).[95] CESE included a club house, a much-needed primary school with playground, an administrative office, a health post, a police sub-station, a community

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[93] Sandra Cavalcanti, who in 1964 left the Secretary of Social Services to become the first president of the recently created National Housing Bank. Although the BNH existed only in paper and did not have funds it did not financially participate in that phase of the Guanabara housing program. Still, Cavalcanti was instrumental in arranging the release; "Marcado para a semana que vem o início da construção de casas na segunda gleba da Vile Kennedy," *O'Globo,* 24 October 1964, 7.

[94] The State and the BNH loan-request of January 28, 1965, authorized by COCAP, was signed on April 30, 1965 between the USAID Deputy Director and the Brazilian Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination. It released NCr$4 million (4 billion old *cruzeiros*), equivalent to us$ 2,150,537, from june 23, 1964 program loan counterpart funds, Layton F, MacNichol to Bill J. Williams, 11 December 1968, project 512-11-830-264-1, national housing bank, low cost housing – Guanabara, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP. [103_2647]

[95] Bill J. Williams to Layton P. Mac Nichol, Chief USAID/HUDO, Memorandum "History of USAID-Assisted Guanabara Low-Cost Housing and Slum Clearance Program," 11 December 1968; project 512-11-830-264-1, national housing bank, low cost housing – Guanabara, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP. [103_2646]

center, a family education center, a large public park, and a soccer field. COARTE and COPARO were consumer/worker (mixed) cooperatives. They produced souvenirs and uniforms for the employees of the Secretary of Social Services. COPARO also worked as a vocational training center in textile and garment industry for unskilled female residents.

These small cooperatives had been the creation of ATOPI, the Plan of Technical and Socio-Economic Assistance to Workers and Small Industries (Ajuda Técnico e Econômico Social ao Operário e Pequena Indústria) –an entity established by the Lacerda Administration designed to deliver training programs for workers and to stimulate small industry.[96] The creation of ATOPI –of which COHAB took over by the end of 1964— responded to the limited job opportunities for the new residents. USAID provided technical assistance to ATOPI in organizing and establishing the by-laws and formal applications for the cooperatives. USAID, through ATOPI, also assisted in the creation of the bakeries –and the bread- of V. Aliança and V. Kennedy supplying the ovens and the flour from the Food for Peace program.[97] The bakery "Illinois" read at the entrance "COHAB/USAID agreement." As the *vilas* became the object of criticism and the name and prestige of the Alliance for Progress was at stake, the U.S. authorities became more involved in projects like ATOPI and the bakeries. [Figures 11-12]

V. Esperança was the third and smallest complex. Different from the previous two experiences, V. Esperança was not considered a neighborhood unit in itself but rather a smaller development attached to neighboring Vigário Geral. Construction begun almost

[96] Lacerda created ATOPI in March 1964 and was constituted by representatives of the Secretary of Economy, Secretary of Social Services, FLXII, and the Banco de Guanabara. In December of that year this executive group was extinguished transferring the responsibilities to COHAB; *Relatório Geral*, 18-21.
[97] A report from USAID actually commented that the daily production of the bakeries averaged approximately 8,000 units of bread per day for the 5,000 families that were living in both Vilas; Memorandum "P.L. 480 Title II Section II 202 Program – Reporting," from Ambassador Tuthill to AID/W, 18 April 1967, Box 25, RG 286, NACP 103_1318]

simultaneously with V. Kennedy in lands donated by the *Cruzada São Sebastião*.[98] Its design did not include community facilities or the expansion of urban services and, as a result, the 464 units were connected to the infrastructure of Vigário Geral, taxing the infrastructure of the existing neighborhood.

Cidade de Deus, the last of the neighborhoods conceived in the Guanabara Housing Program, was planned on a state-owned site in the Administrative Region of Jacarepaguá. Cidade de Deus was not part of the original plan crafted in 1962. Works on the site began in November 1964, but USAID became involved in it after the approval of the third loan on April 1965.[99] By that time, the military dictatorship has been in power and created the National Housing Bank (BNH), contributing funds for these projects. The agreement for the third loan stipulated that half of the total investment had to come from the federak government, 33% from the State, and 17% from USAID.

The the original plan envisisoned 16,000 housing units. For this reason the construction of Cidade de Deus involved a larger constructive and organizational effort.[100] Community facilities, for instance, were to include an adminsitrative center, a field office, a medical post, a police sub-station, two primary schools, a kindergarten for 200 children, a day nursery for 60 infants, a social center with library, two large public parks, five playgrounds, four sports fields, a large movie theatre, a multi-unit commercial center, a bakery, a self-service supermarket, and almost two hundred commercial-

[98] COHAB, *Relatório Geral,* 13

[99] Stuart H. Van Dyke, Director USAID/Brazil to Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Minister of Planning and Economic Cooordination, 30 April 1965. project 512-11-830-264-1, national housing bank, low cost housing – Guanabara, "Disaster Relief Program".entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

[100] Works included six miles of paved or stabilized streets, four miles of concrete or compacted walkways, ten miles of electric wiring, electric distribution sub-stations, telephones, two and a half miles of water lines and an equal amount for sewers, a sewage pump station, nine miles of drainage culverts, a large concrete bridge, and four small concrete bridges across a concrete-walled drainage canal.

residential shops. These original plans for Cidade de Deus changed drastically in January 1966 and then again in February 1967 as a consequence of the dramatic natural disasters. Heavy storms flooded the city causing landslides and the partial collapse of many hillsides, including the Morro da Providência in downtown. The bad weather paralized city services. More than 2,000 slum occupants perished, and another 20,000 people were left without shelter or belongings. USAID diverted counterpart funds originally meant for housing construction to the "disaster relief program" in the amount of NCr$3 million. The Negrão de Lima administration, that followed Lacerda's, used those funds to repare the damage in Cidade de Deus and building emergency housing for 1,300 families.

The chaotic situation and the degree of emergency created a situation where the government located more than two hundred families in a place that was still under construction, in unfinished houses that lacked connection to the public water and sewage system, in vacants buildings and tents.[101] A cruel irony, premature occupancy reproduced the living conditions of the *favela*, worsened by the sudden displacement and consequential rupture of social, familiar, and economic links. This sad story partially explains the origins of the infamous history of Cidade de Deus.[102]

[101] "Flagelados saem para novas casas," *Correio da Manhá*, 5 May 1967; see also the folder Disaster Relief Program, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

[102] Emergency relief actions taken in Cidade de Deus following January, 1966 included economic rehabilitation and construction works, including urbanization, drainage, pavement of streets, repair of access roads, procurement of transportation equipment and vehicles, and emergency housing of 1300 families. No specific goals were set." As an emergency release, the government was exempted of matching funds. Memo, "Disaster Relief – Guanabara", 30 October1967, folder 19, Project 512-11-830-264.1; National Housing Bank; Guanabara – Disaster FY 68-69, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

The Embryo-model and the spatial design

The idea behind the physical design of the complexes, except for the case of V. Esperança, was the neighborhood unit. The construction of integrated communities served with communal facilities emphasized an ideal of community life and civil life. Early advocates of this concet, like urban planners Clarence Perry, saw the community center as a way to promote public life, providing meeting places for discussion and community activities.[103] The strict separation between pedestrian and vehicular traffic sought to create a friendly, organized space complemented by open plazas and recreational areas. Neighborhood units were also seen as the best way to design, build, and manage communities in an economical way. For COHAB's architects and experts, the neighborhood unit represented a way to formalize and integrate the illegal resident into the community through homeownership and the provision of an urban environment furnished with all the elements of modern infrastructure and life. Neighborhood units also allowed for spatial descentralization, which in Lacerda's urban plans implied descongesting *favelas* and fixing the original population in the *vilas* of the periphery.

The layouts of V. Aliança, V. Kennedy (except for Section 3), and V.Esperança, showed a spatial design that emphasized long street corridors ["grande rua corredor"] in which long rows of single-family houses displayed in a flat areas created a serialized, sanitized residential space. This aspect reinforced a sense of closure, monotony, and

[103] The concept of the neighborhood unit became influential in urban planning thinking thanks to the work of Clarence Perry in the United States and Europe during the postwar reconstruction, as seen in Sir Leslie Patrick Abercrombie's *The County of London Plan* (1943) and the *Greater London Plan*
On the historical development of this notion, see Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007) and Larry Lloyd Lawhon, "The Neighborhood Unit: Physical Design or Physical Determinism?" *Journal of Planning History* 8, no. 2 (May 2009): 111-132. Early examples of the idea of the neighborhood unit in the U.S. the Greenbelts built during the Roosevelt's New Deal.

repetition (as contemporary pictures, layouts, and blueprints show) that differed from the more spontaneous and disorderly arrangement of the *favela.* Built in suburban and for the most part rural areas, the *vilas* also contrasted greatly with their surroundings. COHAB architects recognized this fact and came up with a different pattern of design. The introduction of the "quadra-padrão," the repetition of the same block pattern, which was first implemented in V. Kennedy's third section and later in Cidade de Deus [Figure 14] offered a more varied landscape through the construction of pedestrian walkways separated from vehicular traffic, introduction of green areas inside the blocks, assorted distribution of lots, introduction of color, and better road distribution.

The Guanabara Housing Program offered the same series of housing designs for all the complexes. Even before the selection of the neighborhoods' locations, the government had conceived the dwelling types following the suggestions about costs and size that campe up during the conversations with the IDB, first, and then with USAID experts.[104] The notion of social housing attached to this developments thus represented the experts' *a prioristic* understanding of what shelter for low-income populations should be rather the outcome of a careful study about the social and living necesities of the *favela* residents who were to be eradicated. That low-income housing had to be cheap in costs and cover minimum livable spatial requirements was already part of the debate among modernist architects since the late 1920s and by the 1960s was already part of the common sense among experts. In the case of the *vilas*, this *rationalizing* perspective was, from the get-go, part of the conversations between the local authorities and the international lending organisms. This, however, did not imply an inflexible position especially when the architects had to deal with the reality of the ground and the users'

[104] *Plano de Recuperação de Favelas* (1962).

real housing needs rather than with the comfort of the blueprint. As an experimental program, COHAB architects tried several types until reaching a convenient design.

The central piece of the architectural program was the "embryo-type" scheme, a house built from a core of clay bricks and cement blocks of 3.5 by five meters, a room, kitchen, and bathroom, with a simple finishing.[105] The embryo-type rested on the premise that a family, with little additional work, might move into the house immediately and expand the house subsequently as time and funds allowed.[106] [See Figure 15] COHAB developed different typologies of embryo-houses, including the two-room embryo that could expand horizontally; the duplex (vertical expansion); the row houses [*casas geminadas*]; and the front an rear house.

The blueprints of individual houses came already with a planned layout for the expansion. The basic assumption behind this plan was that as a resident-driven process, it created an opportunity to unleash individual and collective potentials and to empower low-income families through self-help programs. It also envisioned a future consumer of building materials. One of the advantages of this design was that it could be mass-produced on-site at a considerable savings and it did not necessarilly involve extensive or complex supervision. In terms of operations, it basically required the piece of land and the basic utilities, after which the cores could be built on one mass step. In other words, while the physical program of the complexes was somewhat schematic in nature, the embryo-model allowed for certain flexibility whose ultimately responsibility was the owner's. In this sense, the Guanabara housing program was not a rigid final product but a

[105] For instance, the type A house included a room, kitchen, and bathroom in a area of 16 sq.mt; type B: idem plus living-room in 25 sq.mt.

[106] In the floor plan the first stage consisted in the construction of the first room of 2.90 x 3 meters; additions would follow a room of 2.35 x 3 meters and then a third room of the same size. *Plano de recuperação de favelas*, p. 22, and subsequent pages.

flexible one that had room for improvement. The program and the embryo-type solution responded to the notion of self-help that the United Nations, the OAS, and USAID promoted in their low-income housing programs in the "Third World."

COHAB architects proved different typological solutions from one neighborhood to the next, and within sections of the same project which confirms the experimental nature of the whole Guanabara Housing Project. Annex 1 shows the evolution of typologies in each neighborhood. In V. Aliança's first section (the first of all), COHAB begun building mostly Type A houses but they stop using it in later sections and developments. The spatial arrangements of these small units did not meet the architects' and the new residents' expectations because it led to overcrowding and confusing layout. The predominant designs in the four *vilas* were type-F (2353 units) and type-G (1634 units), the result of the experimentation process.[107] These two models were especially convenient for displaced families of up to five and nine members, respectively, which was more representative of the size of the families in the *favelas.* Other built designs included duplex units, also called "embryo of vertical development" (embrião de desenvolvimento vertical), to increase density in a given space, as it was the case in V. Kennedy. Finally, commercial residences sought to provide a formal space to those commercial activities that in the *favelas* remained within informal circuits (the *birosque*).

Cidade de Deus, conceived at a later stage, sought to capitalize the lessons learned previously during the construction of the *vilas.*[108] At the beginning of the project experts pointed out that they had conceived the new neighborhhod integrally in advance. According to the planners, this would led them to take full advantage of available lands

[107] COHAB en números e imagens
[108] "Iniciado em Jacarepaguá novo núcleo habitacional," *O'Globo,* 3 November 1964, 16.

and to better accommodate the different needs of the diverse population that it was intended to serve. Cidade de Deus, for instance, incorporated the block-pattern, as it was the case with V. Kennedy's third section. In addition, the complex combined single-family residencies (3,865 units); 1,600 apartments, and 1,193 temporary units allowing for a more textured physical and social landscape.[109]

In more general terms, COHAB designs meant a rupture with the past experience of low-income housing built by the Department of Popular Housing of the Federal District (Departamento de Habitação Popular do Distrito Federal). Under the architectural direction of the modernist Affonso Eduardo Reidy (1909-1964), a disciple of Le Corbusier and part of the brilliant generation of Brazilian architects that included Lúcio Costa and Oscar Niemayer, the Department of Popular Housing built several working-class projects in international style.[110] In his projects, Reidy applied the principles of modernist architecture of the CIAM, including as the radical simplification of form, the adoption of industrialized mass-production techniques, and the use of glass, steel, and concrete as materials of preference. The Pedregulhos Complex (328 units), completed in 1951 to house government employes of the then federal city, revealed the concern for formal solutions to the the control of light, ventilation, circulation and functional spatial rationalization.[111] This complex was part of other materpieces of Brazilian modernism,

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[109] Licia do Prado Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978), 24.

[110] Carmen Portinho, Reidy long-life parter directed the Department o Popular Housing of the Federal Distrcit. See, Nabil Bonduki, *Origens da habitação social no Brasil: arquitetura moderna, lei do inquilinato e difusão da casa própria* (São Paulo:FAPESP, 1998); Carmen Portinho and Nabil Bonduki, *Affonso Eduardo Reidy*, (Editions Blau, 2000). On modernism and the national cultural renewal during the Vargas Era, see Daryle Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil: the First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 13-89.

[111] The Pedregulho Complex also followed the principle of the neighborhood unit, and included a residential block and common service areas: daycare, primary school, laundry, a market, a health center, recreational facilities, and a commercial center. The key feature of this residential complex is the large

including the headquarters of the Ministery of Education and Health, and many of the working-class housing complexes for built durign the Vargas era through the IAPs in addition to Pedregulhos, Realengo (concluded in 1943; Carlos Frederico Ferreira), or Penha (Roberto Brothers), among others. In this way, modernism was the architectural style associated with Vargas and the Estado Novo, and the symbolism around the creation of the *estadonovista* worker. Affordable housing had to be transformative of the worker's status, and it had to be financed and produced by the state.[112]

Why, then, the rupture with this style for which Brazilian architecture was praised worldwide? One possibility is that Lacerda wanted to differentiate Rio de Janeiro from Brasília -the modernists' crown jewel- conceived and planned as a symbol of Brasil's modernity and development by Kubitschek, the governor's political rival. Lacerda actually had a long history as an oponent of Brasília and he might not wanted to use an architectural language that he associated with the populism and clientelism, which he so profoundly opposed. On the contrary, single-family homes reminded more the suburban house of the white, middle class family. Both architectural aestetics had also ideological and political connotations. During the debates of the first Pan-American Congress on Popular Housing (Buenos Aires, 1939), technical groups associated with the Catholic Church defended the single-family home as the most suitable environment for family life. They opposed what thet considered *socialistic* consequences of modernists apartment buildings that encouraged socialization of residents. We can speculate that Lacerda and even Sandra Cavalcanti's links with conservative sectors and the Church could have

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building, at the top of a hillside with a view of the Bay of Guanabara, built on stilts, with a serpentine plan, that follows the natural contours of the site.

[112] See, for instance, Flávia Nascimento, "Entre a estética e o hábito: o Departamento de Habitação Popular (Rio de Janeiro, 1946-1960)" (MA. diss., Universidade de São Paulo, 2004).

influenced the idea of a neighborhood built of detached homes where families could share the amenities of family life. As Chapter 5 will show, COHAB's *vilas* certainly reflected a consertvative stance toward public housing.

In any case, and despite the fame of Brazilian modernist architecture, low-income housing complexes built between 1930 and 1964 in Brazil were extremely diverse typologically, including modernist pavillions and multifamily buildings as well as single-family residences. As Nabil Bonduki and Flavia Brito de Nascimento point out, CIAM ideals, garden-cities, and American town planning coexisted in Brazil as architects tried different solutions.[113] In this sense, the aesthetic language of the *vilas* was already available to be used in oposition to the highly symbolical modernist style. Finally, it is also true that the modernist movement, despite having built Brasília, its hegemony was certainly disputed in the 1960s criticized by groups like the TEAM X or the Situationists. In Rio, this criticism had also reached to complexes like Pedregulhos.[114] Another demonstration that Lacerda was not interested in modernist architecture was his hiring of Constantin Dioxiadis, the famous Greek urban planner, to develop a new master plan for the city.[115]

The Department of Public Housing dissapeard with the creation of COHAB, which finished some of the projects that had begun during the previous adminsitration. A report from COHAB pointed out that modernist housing complexes like the Marquês de São Vicente in Gávea –planned by Reiddy and similar in conception to Pedregulhos-

[113] Flavia Brito de Nascimento, "Conjuntos residenciais modernos: valor e preservação."
[114] Beatriz Jaguaribe, *Fins de século: cidade e cultura no Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1998); Beatriz Jaguaribe, "Modernist Ruins: National Narratives and Architectural Forms," in *Alternative modernities*, ed. Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 327-348.
[115] On Dioxiadis in Brazil see Vera Rezende, "Planos e regulação urbanística: a dimensão narrativa das intervenções na cidade do Rio de Janeiro," in *Cidade: história e desafios*, edited by Lúcia Lippi Oliveira (Rio de Janeiro: FGV Editora, 2002), 256-281 and Mark Kehren, *Tunnel Vision.*

were a legacy of the past and its housing concepts had been overtaken.[116] Lacerda modified the original program of the São Vicente Complex and eliminated a series of buildings that had never been built and whose land was later given to the Catholic University. Reiddy, who at that moment was directing the construction of the complex quit his job and retired from the public activity. According to Carmen Portinho, the modernist architect was committed to a social agenda of public housing that differed, according to her, from the governor's vision.[117] Reiddy died in 1964.

The eradication process

From 1962 to 1967, the Lacerda administration displaced 8,078 families, almost 42,000 *favela* residents from more than thirty two *favelas* –ranging from tiny settlements with few shacks to highly populated slums like Pasmado or Esqueleto. [See Table 1] The eradication process involved several steps before final relocation in the *vilas* or the *parques proletários* or "triage areas." In some cases the process was peaceful, but in others residents resisted the removal and the use of police coercion added more trauma to an already difficult process. The study of the eradication of Favela do Esqueleto, whose residents were relocated to V. Kennedy and the *parques proletarios*, provides a well documented case.

The Favela do Esqueleto, also known as Vila São Jorge, was located in Rio's Nothern Zone, right next to the Maracanã Stadium, on public federal lands.[118] The site

[116] COHAB em números e imagems. Among the modernist complexes finished by COHAB by 1967 were Conjunto Residencial Pio XII (Botafogo), Santo Amaro (Glória), and Márques de São Vicente (Gávea).
[117] Carmen Portinho, "Entrevista a Hugo Segawa," *Revista Projeto & Design*, nº 111 (1988): 115-120.
[118] Documentation on the eradication of Esqueleto is in the Arquivo Carlos Lacerda (ACL) at Universidade de Brasilia, Código: PO.04, série vida política, subsérie governador, Secretaria de Obras Públicas, Pasta

provided good access to workplaces as it was close to main avenues and right in front of the Mangueira train station.[119] The *favela* proximity to the world's largest sporting stadium, inaugurated in 1950 to host the World Cup, provided ready access to job opportunities on match days. Its origins of the *favela* dated back to the 1930s when Mayor Pedro Ernesto began the construction of a health clinic, which was never finished. According to COHAB's reports, the workers employed in the construction of both the hospital and the Maracanã Stadium (works began in 1948) occupied the site around the hospital's skeleton frame (*esqueleto* in Portuguese), which gave the name to the *favela.* New contingent arrived to Esqueleto when an ice-cream manufacturing plant (Kibon) settled in neighboring Mangueira displacing the residents living in that squatter settlement. By the time of Esqueleto's eradication, there were 15,635 people living in its 118,520 square meters, mostly in houses made of wood and stucco served with illegal connections to the water distribution system and electricity. Almost a third of the dwellings were made of masonry, a fact the government interpreted as evidence of the resident's purchasing power.

The government argued environmental and sanitary reasons for the relocation. In addition, the government has plans to build the "campus" of the Universidade do Estado da Guanabara (today's Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro) close to the Pedro Ernesto Hospital, which became the university's hospital facility.[120] Simbolically, COHAB's experts associated the *favela* with the populist and clientelistic practices of

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PO.03., Dossie Secretária de Obras Públicas, Remoção da Favela do Esqueleto, Relatório, 1964; and Código PO.03, série vida política, subsérie governador, box, Secretaría de Serviços Socias-COHAB, Programa de Remoção das Favelas.

[119] The streets that sorrounded Esqueleto were Av. Radial Oeste, Av. Turfe Clube, Rua Professor Eurico Rabelo and Rua São Francisco Xavier.

[120] Paradoxically, the building of the university carries the name of Negrão de Lima, Lacerda's successor and political adversary.

Varguismo, which might have, allegedly, overlook the occupation of the site and the use of construction materials from the stadium to build their shacks in exchange for votes. When accused of promoting real-estate interests in the eradication of *favelas* many years later, Lacerda used the argument that he had actually began the construction of a public university campus, which denied, to him, the economic argument. In any case, the construction of the university was part of the massive program of public works that fostered the building industry.

The eradication demanded a rationalized and well-planned procedure to coordinate the different areas involved, including social workers, engineers, architects, lawyers, workers and supervisors, among others. The process began with a socio-economic survey of the *favela* and a strict accounting of the residents of the favelas. Social workers from the FLXIII and COHAB visited the place and gathered information on the residents' socioeconomic status and living conditions, including family size, income, marital status as a well as a record of their surrounding amenities. The data gathered should contribute in the construction of the *vilas* by providing a description of the housing and living needs of the future residents. Social workers also explained the purpose of the program, provided details about life in the new housing complexes, and showed (for the most part a female audience) sketches of their new houses. In the previous eradications of Bom Jesús and Pasmado, the department of Social Services had taken women to visit the *vilas* during while they were being built. They did so as a way to make them convince their husbands. The assumption was that women, as housewives and mothers, were more inclined to move to a better place, while men were more resilient to abandon their proximity to their workplaces and spaces of sociability. [Figures 16-17]

Internal communications shows that the agency requesting their social worker prudence when dealing with the *favela* residents in an effort to minimize social tensions in an already stressful process. Social workers and supervisors had to respond to every question with delicacy and with "simple and clear" answers, evidencing the rather conflictive nature of the whole operation in a context of political dissatisfaction.

Then, COHAB engineers subdivided the *favela* into twelve areas in order to facilitate fieldwork and the removal process; avenues, creeks, and streets facilitated the demarcation of the subzone. This made the eradication faster and allowed COHAB to spend on average three days to move the people, bulldoze the shacks, and clean the area. An architect or an engineer served as a field coordinator supervising the removal and transportation of the residents, and the bulldozing of the area. His tasks usually involved the organization of the foremen and the gathering of the families to be removed following the lists that the FLXII crafted in advance. Then, the social workers assigned the families to the vans (kombies), checking that the residents were in possession of a moving card (cartão de mudança) with their name, date, and destination. This step was very important to avoid speculation and the selling of the moving card among *favelados.* Soon to be ex-residents were allowed to take those materials that might be of use in their new homes (i.e. tiles, framing timber, bricks, mosaics, floor boards, galvanized pipes, iron rods, and toilet frames). These materials were then loaded in company trucks and moved to either the *Vilas* or the *parques*. Informal transactions of any type between the residents and COHAB workers, e.g. trading construction materials or alcohol, were forbidden. [Figures 21-24] Then followed the bulldozing of the area and the leveling the terrain. By the end of the day, according to the plan, the families had eaten and slept in their new homes. At

the same time, that particular subsection of the *favela* was cleared of any reminiscence of the people who had lived there.

The selection of the resident's destination was the responsibility of the social worker and COHAB's administrators, who determined the household's income, composition, and occupations to establish the number of families in condition to pay (or not) for their new houses. Those families that were able to meet those standards were sent to the *Parques* or triage zone; a few families decided to move to their own piece of land that some *favelados* had in the periphery or for which had negotiated with COHAB; the poorest inhabitants of Esqueleto who were not in condition to pay for their home were sent to the Parques Nova Holanda, SERFHA, Manguinos, Cajú, and São José. But the vast majority of Esqueleto residents went to V. Kennedy. The destination of the inhabitants of Esqueleto subsection "G" helps to illustrate this point. From a total of 419 relocated families, 312 went to V. Kennedy, 21 to SERFHA, 19 to Nova Holanda, 19 to owned property located in the outskirts, and 13 to Cajú.[121]

As mentioned later, this selection created a spatial segregation, as COHAB's methodology to determine income and destination in effect skimmed poverty, assigning one area for those working families with a slightly higher income while allocating the poorest people to another area. In so doing, the spatial structuration of Rio's periphery – or at least of those areas and its surrounding's affected by COHAB's policy- followed a previous administrative structuration of social classes. In other words, the state created spatial difference through administrative criteria and, in so doing, helped reconstitute new landscapes

[121] PO.03, Dossié Secretaria de Obras Públicas, Remoção da Favela do Esqueleto, Projetos, Planilhas de Remoções, 1964; "Os moradores da Favela do Esqueleto irão para Vila Kennedy em Abril," *O'Globo*, 30 October 1964, 6; ACL.

The assignment of the units was by lottery. Still, personal favors and perhaps corruption also intervened in the allocation of families: evidence in Lacerda's archive suggests that the governor made personal requirements to accommodate individual requests. Luiz Carlos de Moraes Vital, the State Secretary of Social Services by 1965, for instance, diligently responded to the governor's request in written notes when a beneficiary was located in a house.[122] It is certainly difficult to establish the extent in number of these requests. But it is nevertheless indicative of how personalism and clientelistic practices were very much part of the resources at hand for his governor who liked to introduce himself as the epitome of technocracy and efficiency. Perhaps more interesting, though, is to recognize that many people actually requested the governor for homes in the *vilas.* In this way, the possibility to own a home, even in places isolated from the city's center, or even leaving the residence in a favela behind was certainly that many people wished to the extent of making personal requests to the governor.

Once arrived in V. Kennedy, the *moradores* had to sign the deed of purchase and sale commitment after a quick explanation of payment modalities and responsibility. In cases where signature was not possible, residents were asked to do so at the agency's local office; the notarization of the signature, however, was ratified five months later to establish the effective occupation of the dwelling unit. COHAB set this procedure to avoid informal commercial transferences from the original beneficiary to potential buyers. In later days, social workers oriented the new residents on how to expand their embryo unit, but for the most part this orientation was brief and incomplete because of lack of personnel. Unfortunately, the research does not allow us to know how the new

[122] Luiz Carlos de Moraes Vital's answers and some of Lacerda's memorandums are located in Pasta P.O.03, dossié Secretaria de Serviços Socias, Companhia de Habitação Popular, Programa de Remoção de Favelas, Correspondencias, 1963-65, ACL

residents reacted when they saw their houses. We know, though, that many families complained vehemently because they alleged COHAB had not fulfill original promises regarding, for instance, the number of rooms or the lack of detached homes. COHAB actually admitted having poorly planned the number of homes and recreational areas to reproduce the social and cultural life of the *favelas*, including the organization of social and sport clubs. They neither anticipated the needs of a population with diverse religious backgrounds.

Resisting eradication

Resistance to eradication begun early when the residents of Esqueleto heard about the official plans by late November 1964. The leader of the neighborhood association *Associação dos Amigos da Vila São Jorge* denied to the press the argument of the Secretary of Social Services that seventy percent of the families had agreed to move to V. Kennedy. The association took an undersigned petition to the *O Globo*'s newsroom calling, instead, for the urbanization of the *favela*.[123] Families argued that dislocation would alienate them from labor, social and cultural networks. Commuting distance was another concern. For families that struggled to make a minimum income and spent most of it in food and transportation, with little left for clothing and almost none for rent, an increase in commuting costs meant a huge burden.

Most important, the active resistance to eradication in the *favela*s Pasmado and Brás de Pina, another *favela* who called the attention of the press because of its organization and resistance, showed the degree of political organization reached by the

[123] "Os *favelados* do Esqueleto não querem transferência, mas um conjunto residencial lá mesmo," *O'Globo*, 24 November 1964.

favelado movement by the end of 1964.[124] The Federation of Favela Associations of the State of Guanabara (FAFEG) held the First Favelado Congress in October to oppose *favela* clearance. At the Congress, celebrated in Morro da Liberdade, representatives of almost a hundred *favelas* debated about their situation. The violent and traumatic eradication of Pasmado, the first large eradicated *favela* whose remains the government set on fire immediately to avoid re-occupation, triggered the alarms among poor residents and sympathetic sectors, including progressive Catholic groups, leftist organizations, and the Communist Party. Sandra Cavalcanti and Lacerda complained about the politicization of the favelas, the presence of political agitators, and legitimized the use of police violence as a way to guarantee eradications. The political climate in Brazil during the first months of the dictatorship was uncertain and anxiety about the *favela* problem grew. The concern was that the authoritarian regime would opt for massive repressive eradications.

The conclusions of the First Favelado Congress opposed any attempt at eradication, and proclaimed in favor of *favela* urbanization and rehabilitation, construction of schools, and creation of worker workshops to teach skills demanded by the market. In addition, FAFEG claimed the recognition of the figure of the "*favelado* citizen" (cidadão *favelado*) as a way to guarantee the *favelados* rights to the city as

[124] The literature on *favela*s political organizations is vast and it was produced during in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the neighborhood association emerged as new political actors with the potential to react to the social and economic policies of the Brazilian military dictatorship. See, among others, the work of Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos on the social movement in Bras de Pina, Morro Azul, and Catumbí, *Movimentos urbanos no Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1981). See also Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, "A política na favela," *Cadernos Brasileiros (Rio de Janeiro)* 9, no. 3 (n.d.): 35–47.

legitimate members of the Brazilian and *Carioca* society. In so doing, the residents sought to overcome the negative stereotypes associated with *favela*.[125]

Resistance in Brás de Pina was key. The favela had already suffered a previous eradication and in 1964, Lacerda sought to clear the whole area. The residents organized in three different neighborhood associations unified against eradication and were joined by a number of parish priests linked with the group Catholic Action. The governor went to the *favela* with his technicians and armed police to initiate the removal, but the organized *favelados* together with fifty priests waited for him. Cardinal Camêra, conservative and anti-communist, unsuccessfully tried to mediate. When Camêra decided to leave the scene, the governor, true to his political style, got involved in a personal verbal outburst against the priests that confronted him. Local and national press covering the event showed Lacerda as an angry politician yelling and threatening priests who were working with the poor, and turned the public opinion against the eradication of Brás de Pina.[126] At the end, some families gave up to the pressure of the governor and moved out, a decision amplified by the media. But for the most part, Brás de Pina remained untouched. The political experience and the defense of the *favela* rehabilitation was central few years later in the organization of the Community Development Company (CODESCO), the local agency that governor Negrão de Lima created for the urbanization of Rio's *favela*s, a move that of Lacerda's program.[127]

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[125] "O Congresso dos *favelados* aprovou ateprojeto sobre habitação e urbanização," *O'Globo,* 20 October 1964, 6; "Favelado encerrarão congresso com diversas reivindicações," *O'Globo,* 27 October 1964.
[126] Clippings in Arquivo Lacerda.
[127] Jorge Ferraz, the journalist who got all of a sudden involved in the struggles of *favelados* when he helped by chance a woman of Pasmado who was waiting in vain for an ambulance to take her to the local hospital Miguel Coutinho in 1963. He had served as the representative of Pasmado during the times of Jose Arthur Rios' appointment as Secretary of Social Services when the *favela* applied for community development projects. Sérgio Luis Abrahão, *Espaço público: do urbano ao político* (São Paulo: Annablume Editora, 2008).

And although the experience of Brás de Pina did not stop the eradication of other *favelas*, like Esqueleto, it emerged as a symbol of the struggle of poor Brazilian urban residents who claimed for better living and social condition as *favelados*. In the political conjuncture marked by the end of the Lacerda administration at the local level and the anxieties opened by the military coup at the federal, the debate between *favela* eradication and urbanization became political artillery.

The confrontation between the governor and Rio's poor residents was indicative of the climate of political radicalization that began to grow since the mid 1960s. Faith in the forces of development to promote an orderly path to social peace, as well as the constructive role of U.S. assistance to that process began to dim in Rio, in Brazil, and in the rest of Latin America. Slum residents became caught between the eradication or urban renewal policies. Authoritarian regimes empowered through military dictatorships undertook the eradication approach while democratic governments and progressive sectors defended an urbanization policy. As a result, the history of resistances to *favela* eradication and the support that leftist and progressive sectors gave to the rehabilitation program, as well as the authoritarian attempts to eradicate them, was also part of broader transnational trends marked by the increasing radicalization of the political conflict in Latin American societies. Spaces of urban poverty thus were also one of the where of the social and political conflict unfolded since the late 1960s. In the Brazilian case, neighborhoods associations and grassroot movements will emerged as important oppositional actors to the military dictatorship.

Coda

The cover page of the *Wall Street Journal* on Monday, March 20, 1967, told the U.S. public about the harsh conditions found in V. Kennedy. "This community of 30,000," wrote the reporter "is a place that U.S. foreign administrators would just as soon forget about." According to the correspondent, V. Kennedy was planned "as a showcase for the American effort to aid Brazil, a must stop on the tour of any visiting VIP," although he advised against taking President Johnson there in his visit to South America. Still, V. Kennedy was worthwhile to see for one particular reason: "what has gone wrong here tells a great deal about what can -and often does- go wrong in America's massive foreign aid program." In other words, "the basic lesson of Vila Kennedy" –the reporter pointed out- "seems to be that much more thoughtful planning often is required before taxpayers' dollars are shelled out for any new project."[128]

The actual construction and occupation of V. Kennedy failed to meet this lofty goal. As the new housing development emerged in a flat area in the Western Zone of the city, the planned industrial park in Santa Cruz failed to materialize. Transportation services to other parts of the city remained notoriously poor. In 1966, a USAID mission led by Bernard Wagner, David McVoy, and Gordon Edwards -the "Wagner report"- echoed these complaints, which were confirmed that same year in an ethnographic study that a young anthropologist, Lawrence Salmen, conducted in V. Kennedy for the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economy (IPEA).[129] Spatial isolation, ruptures of traditional economic, social, and cultural linkages were the problems that residents most

[128] "Foreign Aid Flop: 'Showcase' Community in Brazil Deteriorates Due to Poor Planning", *The Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 1967, p1.
[129] Bernard Wagner, David McVoy, and Gordon Edwards, *Programa para o desenvolvimento urbano e habitacional da Guanabara: Relatório e recomendações da equipe de Habitação e Desenvolvimento Urbano da A.I.D., 1º de julho de 1966* (mimeographed, 1966).

complained about.[130] Even Sandra Cavalcanti, Lacerda's secretary of social services, recognized privately shortcoming in the planning of V. Kennedy in a personal letter to the miliary president Castelo Branco when negotiating his incorporation to the federal government as president of the newly created National Housing Bank (BNH). "Mr. President," Cavalcanti pointed out in her letter, "there is no point in making large complexes where there is no water, electricity, sewer, police and transportation. At Vila Kennedy I had to provide the bus line."[131] For Cavalcanti, who took the local experience of COHAB to the federal level, the military government needed "to act vigorously with the masses" as the housing crisis was mounting social discontent.

To make things worst, the irregular occupation of vacant homes in the *vilas* and the high rate of financial delinquency compromised the revolving funds and failed to provide for reinvestment to build more units. Unpaved streets, irregularity of garbage collection, and insecurity were some of the main problems of the new neighborhoods. The Brazilian newspaper *Journal do Brasil*, illustrated the contrast between the original expectations of the plan and the reality of the ground in V. Kennedy, characterizing the neighborhood as "a new ghetto."[132] In 1969, the director of the BNH, Mario Trindade (1966-1971), pointed out that V. Kennedy was an example of what not to do urbanistically, as "it had been scheduled to be done in a broader context surrounded with small and medium industries. These industries have not been installed and there was no

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[130] Lawrence F. Salmen, "A Perspective on the Resettlement of Squatters in Brazil," *América Latina (Rio de Janeiro)* 12, no. 1 (January-March 1969): 73-95. I am very thankful to Mr. Salmen for sharing with me the memories of his time in Rio and in Vila Kennedy; interview conducted February 13, 2011.
[131] Sandra Cavalcanti to Castelo Branco, 18 April 1964, cited in Berenice Guimarães Vasconcelos de Souza, "O BNH e a política do governo" (Departamento de Ciência Política, Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1974), 157-159; Sérgio Azevedo and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, *Habitação e poder: da Fundação da Casa Popular ao Banco Nacional da Habitação* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), 57.
[132] "Vila Kennedy fracassa como experiência para acabar com as *favela*s," *Jornal do Brasil*, 7 July 1968, 19.

job market, getting those people in difficulty even to pay (…) These errors must all be taken into consideration to prevent to repeat them again."[133]

The disapproval of outcomes in V. Kennedy and V. Aliança, evidenced in the cover of the *WSJ*, was already mounting in the United States and in Brazil. USAID internal reports fed U.S. Senators complaints about the costs of foreign aid.[134] Those reports echoed Lacerda's accusation of negligence and abandonment of the *Vilas* of the Negrão de Lima administration. Negrão, in turn, capitalized on the bad reputation of V. Kennedy and V. Aliança to promote his own housing policy and did little to improve the situation of the thousands of inhabitants in the *vilas*.[135] During his administration, Negrão favored the urbanization option, creating CODESCO. This position had found increasing support not only among Brazilian social scientists and progressive urban planners and architects, but also among USAID members. The USAID Wegner report actually supported the rehabilitation option. But the military government reacted to Negrão's independence and his rehabilitation policies creating the Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Área Metropolitana do Grande Rio (CHISAM; Coordination Agency for Housing of Social Interest of the Greater Rio Metropolotian area) in charge of *favela* eradication.

But despite the criticism, some residents in V. Kennedy pointed out positive aspects of their new built environment to U.S. scholar Lawrence Salmen during his

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[133] Mário Trindade, *Habitação E Desenvolvimento* (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1971), 176.

[134] The article in the Wall Street Journal launched an internal investigation in USAID/Brazil. Among the most persistent complaints, American officials mentioned that despite repeated requests, the Negrão de Lima administration had failed, "or convincingly try to fulfill, its obligations." "Its stalling and sporadic activities certainly do not constitute genuine efforts for improvement," the report continued; Bill J. Williams, HUDO, to Ambassador Tuthill, responding to Ambassador request for information on Vila Kennedy, 3 May 1967, Project 512-11-830-264.1 National Housing Bank, Low Cost Housing-Guanabara FY67, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

[135] "700 famílias da Vila Kennedy têm ameaça de despejo," *O Dia*, 6 May 1968; "Vila Kennedy fracassa como experiência para acabar com as *favela*s," *Jornal do Brasil*, 7 July 1968, 19; "Cidade de Deus quase é *favela*," *Correio da Manhá*, 7 July 1968, 16; "Lacerda afirmou que Estado abandonou a Vila Kennedy," *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 July 1968, 7.

ethnographic work. Neighbors liked their houses, all built of solid material in solid grounds and served with water, sewage, and electricity, which they did not have before; security of tenure offered a good alternative to the fragile situation in the *favela*s. Furthermore, the residents of V. Kennedy expressed gratification for getting rid of the negative connotations of living in *favela*s and the fact that they could also become part – at least in their self-representations- of Rio's middle class.[136] Geographer Iná Elias de Castro, evaluated positively the experience of V. Kennedy and pointed out many of the arguments that some residents raised with Salmen. Castro's survey suggested that most of the relocated families in Vila Kennedy still lived there twenty years later. Three main reasons explained this for the geographer: the location far from the city's downtown – clearly one of the most criticized factors pointed out by the detractors of the housing developments- might have protected the residents from the rising prices of the housing market; the spatial characteristics of the housing units, which allowed for further expansion, and finally the triumph of the ideal of homeownership.[137]

As a pilot program, the experience of the Guanabara Housing Program served as a guide in the crafting of new national housing legislation, especially after the creation of the BNH in 1964, which brought in Sandra Cavalcanti as the first president. The literature on the origins of the BNH points out that the growing economic crisis, caused by inflation, speculation and the decline of the construction industry, led to a distress of the real estate sector between 1960 and 1964 causing a severe housing shortage.[138] In this

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[136] Salmen, 88-89; still the author found that most of the people were not happy with the eradication process and most of them had a difficult experience in their new neighborhoods.
[137] Iná Elias de Castro, "Conjunto habitacional: ampliando a controvérsia sobre a remoção de favelas," *Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais* (Rio de Janeiro), 26, no. 3 (1983): 213-231.
[138] This review is based on the synthesis by Licia Valladares and Ademir Figueiredo, "Housing in Brazil: An Introduction to Recent Literature," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 2, no. 2 (May 1, 1983), 75-76; see also Berenice Guimarães Vasconcelos de Souza, "O BNH e a política do governo" (Belo Horizonte:

sense, the federal state intervention in the low-income housing market was a way to reactivate the market and the construction sector.[139] But as *favelas* became increasingly seen as potential focus of social unrest, the BNH also served as an instrument of political and social control. In any case, the federal authorities fashioned the BNH according to the lessons learned from the Guanabara Housing Program and state COHAB agencies began to operate around the country.

By the late 1960s the local, national, and international situation had changed greatly. As we have mentioned, Brazil was under a harsh military dictatorship that suspended national elections wrecking Lacerda's presidential ambitions. The federal executive initiated a centralized housing policy and generalized the experience of the COHAB to most of the Brazilian, opening several COHAB agencies. The State of Guanabara finally lost the little of the relative political autonomy that had kept after the transference of the capital city and eliminated the political bargaining power of slums associations. The Alliance for Progress was, by then, winding down. Fiscally conservative house representatives and Senators strongly criticized the use of public funds for projects like the Guanabara Housing Program and took advantage of every trip and every negative article in the newspapers. In addition, the military dictatorship proved to the U.S. that their geopolitical interests in the region and the goals of the Alliance for

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Departamento de Ciência Política, Universidade de Minas Gerais, 1974); Gabriel Bolaffi, *A casa das ilusões perdidas : aspectos sócio-econômicos do Plano Nacional de Habitação* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1977); Sérgio Azevedo and Luis Aureliano Gama de Andrade, *Habitação e poder: da Fundação da Casa Popular ao Banco Nacional da Habitação* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982).

[139] With the creation of the BNH, the government created a system to cope with increasing inflation by indexing the housing loans. The bank became the financial agent that regulated the private market. In addition, between 1964, the bank created the Financial System for Housing (Sistema Financiero de Habitação), the Seniority Security Funds (FGTS) in 1966, and the Brazilian Savings and Loan System in 1967. The FGTS became one of the most controversial measures as it imposed a compulsory savings scheme for workers that finance the investment for housing of which they were not necessarily the main beneficiaries.

Progress (economic development and political stability) were better achieved by military regimes than by a highly polarized democratic process.

In May 1969, William A. Ellis, director of USAID/HUDO wrote a letter to Governor Negrão de Lima letting him know that his office considered the Project agreement for the Guanabara Housing Program terminated as the project was completed. Between June 1962, and January 1966, USAID made available NCr$8.45 million (8.45 billion old cruzeiros) and by mid-1969 more than 45,000 inhabitants were occupying 9,000 houses in V. Aliança, Esperanza, Kennedy, and Cidade de Deus. Considering that its assistance in the area of low-income housing had served its purpose and that the Guanabara projects were completed, USAID closed its Housing and Urban Development Office in June 30, 1969.[140] The urban residential dwelling in Rio at the end of the era of modernization nevertheless failed to be the rationalized, commoditized, and democratized space that early postwar planners had envisioned: wondrous apartment buildings and planned worker housing developments stood alongside new chaotic land invasions and squatter settlements.

[140] Williams Ellis, director of USAID/Brazil Housing and Urban Development Office, to Governor Francisco Negrão de Lima, 2 June 1969, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

Figure 1 - Teodoro Moscoso, Lincoln Gordon, and Carlos Lacerda visiting the progress of works at Vila Aliança; August 17, 1962; *Visão* (Rio de Janeiro), 31 August 1962

Figure 2 - Governor Lacerda and U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon signing the PL 480 agreement between the Guanabara State and USAID; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social (mimeo), July 1962.

Figure 3 - Location of the Vilas. From top to the bottom, Vila Kennedy, Vila Aliança, and Cidade de Deus.


Figure 4 - Vila Aliança - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 5 - Vila Aliança - Detail of the main square; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 6 - Vila Kennedy - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 7 - Vila Kennedy - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 8 - Vila Esperança - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.



Figure 9 - Cidade de Deus; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 10 - Cidade de Deus - General View; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 11 - Vila Kennedy - Panificio Illinois; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *Relatório*, (mimeo), c. 1967.

Figure 12 - Vila Kennedy - Cooperativa COFARO; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *Relatório*, (mimeo), c. 1967.

Figure 13 - Vila Kennedy – 1st Section (Gleba) is South to Brazil Ave, 2nd Section is north, and 3rd Section is right next to the 1st on the right. In this latter case, the long corridors are eliminated and COHAB experimented with the quadra-padrão; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *Relatório*, (mimeo), c. 1967.



Figure 14 - Quadra-padrão – example – This design sought to stimulate social life wihin the core of the block; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *Relatório*, (mimeo), c. 1967.



Figure 15 - Embryo House Type A and F. As an experimental project, COHAB modified the typologies according to the needs and evaluation conducted during the construction process; Companhia de Habitação Popular, *Relatório*, (mimeo), c. 1967.

Figure 16 - A Social Workers doing a house demonstration in Favela de Bom Jesús, eradicated to Vila Aliança; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social (mimeo), July 1962.



Figure 17 - House demonstration in Bom Jesús; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social (mimeo), July 1962.

CHAPTER 4

"TO ENTER INTO THE PRESENT:" HOUSING POLICY IN BUENOS AIRES IN THE 1960S

Introduction

During his official visit to Washington, DC, in December 1961, Argentine Minister of Economy Roberto T. Alemann (b.1922) met Teodoro Moscoso (1910-1992), the director of the Alliance for Progress to talk about plans for US assistance under the Alliance. Alemann was representing Arturo Frondizi (1908-1995) the first civilian president after the military coup that ousted President Perón in 1955. Frondizi's *desarrollista* administration (1958-1962) sought the rapid structural transformation of the country's economy through an agenda of industrial integration, self-sufficiency in basic and strategic inputs, and the modernization of the productive infrastructure. Access to foreign credit and the availability of international funds was key to the developmentalist program in a context marked by insufficient domestic savings, economic instability, and high inflation.

During the meeting, Alemann stressed that Argentina differed from most of other Latin American countries in that the country's problems were not of a social nature, as measured by social development indicators, but of credit. To underline how advanced Argentina was for the standards of the Alliance, Alemann commented on the progress his government had made in terms of institutional modernization and administrative reorganization, including the sanctioning of laws for the creation of a National Planning

Office in charge of national programming. Before this evidence, Moscoso conformity with the great amount of "self-help" that, according to him, had been already accomplished in Argentina, reaffirmed that the country was probably the republic of the hemisphere that had complied with the basic tenets of the Charter of Punta del Este. "Then," he added, "you are ready for the take-off according to the Rostow theory" in clear reference to the paradigmatic work of the modernization theory published a year earlier.[1]

The problem of housing in Argentina was an important part of the conversation on development, modernization, and US assistance between both officials. According to the minister, the country's most urgent social problem was with the middle and lower middle classes who, allegedly, suffered the most. For that the Argentine government was focusing on the institutionalization and capitalization of the mortgage market which would channel domestic resources into the production and consumption of housing, easing the dramatic shortages of dwellings. Alemann's official visit to the US was actually to speed up negotiations for two loan requests (one with the Inter-American Development Bank and another with the Development Loan Fund) intended for the creation and regulation of the housing financial market. Housing, therefore, was part of inter-American dialogues and of the political and social agenda of the Alliance for Progress during the 1960s.

In this chapter, I explore the modernization of the housing problem in Buenos Aires during the developmentalist era. I look particularly at the way in which foreign economic and technical assistance as well as aesthetic languages arrived in Buenos Aires

[1] Memorandum of Conversation, Roberto T. Alemann, Minister of Economy, Argentina with Ambassador Teodoro Moscoso, 8 December 1961entry 3167, Records relative to Argentina, box 2, 250/63/03/01, RG 59, National Archives at College Park.

in a historical moment marked by a major spatial restructuration of the city. As the administrations that followed the ouster of Perón addressed the problem of housing as a departure from Perón's social justice approach, they sought to organize the financial, institutional, and legal structure that would guarantee the functioning of the mortgage market andencourage domestic savings through the formation of a savings and loan system. Housing became the territory of economic and technical decisions that targeted mostly the middle and lower-middle classes. At the same time, local and international authorities and experts understood that a relatively smaller but socially and politically important social sector was not able to acquire housing through traditional market channels. To address that necessity, local governments proposed the construction of publically financed low-income housing complexes.

The chapter analyzes the formation of the mortgage market and the construction of low-income housing complexes in Buenos Aires during the 1960s. I am interested in exploring why and how real estate and finance capital–including USAID, AIFLD, US private corporations, and the IDB—arrived to Argentina and what the Alliance for Progress actions meant in Buenos Aires, especially in comparison to Rio de Janeiro. In particulary, I explore the construction of two housing complexes, Villa Lugano 1-2 (VL1-2) and Ciudad General Belgrano (CGB) that were built thanks to a loan from the IDB framed within the rationale of the Alliance or Progress. These housing complexes, I propose, can be understood as "contact zones" as the point of encounter between local, national, and international flows of power, capital, aesthetics, and expectations about the modernization of the working masses of Latin America. In this way, the chapter pays particular attention to the relationship between inter-American lending organization and

experts, US companies and authorities, and their Argentine counterparts. This approach, however, does not neglect other kind of transnational flows. As the history of the design of VL1-2 will show, the aesthetic language used in the project was in dialogue with contemporary debates within the modernist movement in the field of architecture in Europe. In this way, I seek to offer a more nuanced picture without denying the centrality of US-Latin American relations in these particular years.

Finally, in studying two housing complexes built in the southwest of Buenos Aires, I seek to shed light on an area that remained largely underexplored in the Argentine urban historiography. Most of the literature on Buenos Aires in the 1960s pays more attention to the modernization of city from the perspective of consumption, cultural renovation, and cospomolitanism. Yet, the southwest of Buenos Aires, originally a trash-filled swampland often flooded by the Matanza River, became one of the locations that concentrated slums within the city limits. Such lack of academic attention to the area is symptomatic of the more general lack of interest of the *porteño* population that usually imagines this area as the cradle of crime, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Many of the social problems that the poor residents of this area suffer nowadays have their roots in the historical moment under consideration in this chapter.

In the following pages, I will briefly describe the growth of Buenos Aires and the emergence of *villas miserias* since the late nineteenth century. That analysis will pay particular attention to the unprecedented state attention to housing during the peronista administration (1946-1955) and the significance of the social and political mobilization of the working class in Buenos Aires, that new urban "other." Then, I will focus on how the governments that followed Perón, broadly defined as *desarrollistas*, understood and

tried to solve the housing problem. I pay particular attention to the role of foreign organizations in defining the problem and their field of intervention in the area of housing according to US geopolitical and hegemonic interests. Next is the analysis of the formation of the savings and loan system and the involvement of the US labor movement (AFL-CIO) and US real estate and construction corporations in the field of housing in Argentina. Finally, I study the history of Villa Lugano I-II and Ciudad General Belgrano within the spatial restructuration of the Parque Almirante Brown. In this case, the of the architectural design of the projects will seek to offer a more nuance understanding of the transnational flows that converged in these housing complexes, as mentioned above.

Buenos Aires: Growth and Contrasts

By the mid 1950s, national authorities were alarmed with the deficit of housing stock for middle- and low-income classes, the number of families and individuals living in substandard dwellings (including overcrowded boarding houses, hotels, and slums), and the number of obsolete homes. The context was particularly alarming given the impressive growth and rapid social transformation of Buenos Aires. This scenario was certainly not new in Argentina. In the late nineteenth century, the Argentine export-driven economy and massive European immigration altered the social and physical composition of the city as population grew from 239,000 to 2,035,000 between 1869 and 1914.[2] When confronted by episodes including the outbreak of yellow fever in 1871, which decimated the city's population, and the tenants' strike in 1907, the city's ruling

[2] See the classics James Scobie, *Buenos Aires: Plaza to Suburb, 1870-1910* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), José Luis Romero and Luis Alberto Romero, *Buenos Aires, historia de cuatro siglos*, 2nd rev. ed. (Buenos Aires: Altamira, 2000); Adrián Gorelik, *La grilla y el parque: espacio público y cultura urbana en Buenos Aires, 1887-1936* (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1998).

elites and social engineers circumscribed the housing problem to issues of eugenics and social control. During the 1930s, protectionism and incipient state-led import-substitution industrialization prompted a new moment of expansion.[3] The city's population grew again from 3,457,000 in 1936; 4,724,000 in 1947; 6,739,000 in 1960; and 8,353,000 in 1970.[4] As table 1 shows, the population of the city of Buenos Aires reached its peak by 1947, while laterexpansion occurred mostly toward the suburbs, in the counties (partidos) of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), in a process that consolidated the metropolitan region.[5] Such an impressive increase was the result of a second wave of migrants, this time coming from the countryside instead of from overseas, especially Europe. These percentages are impressive but this considerable growth was moderate in comparison with the explosion of urbanization rates in other Latin American cities (e.g. México City and São Paulo) in this same time. The production of affordable housing, however, did not grow accordingly.

New neighborhoods and squatter settlements appeared in proximity to industrial jobs, while existing working-class areas kept growing as new contingents of workers arrived.[6] Two areas of the city concentrated most of the slums: Retiro, close to the port and one of the main train terminals, and the southwest area, including the area known as the Bañado de Flores that would become the Parque Almirante Brown.[7] In 1956, the

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[3] Charles Sargent, *The Spatial Evolution of Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1870-1930* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1974).
[4] Gino Germani, *Estructura social de la Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Raigal, 1955).
[5] Horacio A. Torres, "El mapa social de Buenos Aires en 1943, 1947 y 1960. Buenos Aires y los modelos urbanos," *Desarrollo Económico* 18, no. 70 (July 1978): 163-204; Zulma Recchini de Lattes, *La población de Buenos Aires componentes demográficos del crecimiento entre 1855 y 1960* (Buenos Aires: Editorial del Instituto Torcuato di Tella, 1971).
[6] Irregular settlements had already existed in Buenos Aires since the late nineteenth century but they were small in number and their existence was temporal.
[7] Lidia de la Torre, "La ciudad residual," in *Buenos Aires, historia de cuatro siglos,* ed. José Luis Romero and Luis Alberto Romero (Buenos Aires: Altamira, 2000), 287-298; Vicente de Pablo and Marta Ezcurra,

recently created National Housing Commission (Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda), undertook the first census of slums in the Federal Capital, which counted a total of 112,350 people living in *villas* (1.9 percent of the total population) of which 33,920 people lived in the *villas* of Federal Capital (1.1 percent).[8] These figures were relatively low compared with other cities like Rio de Janeiro but numbers doubled in the following decade. As a result, what many had initially regarded as temporary housing was becoming a permanent aspect of the city, at least until 1976 when the military dictatorship undertook a repressive approach that eliminated most of the slums in the Federal Capital.[9]

Table 4 - Population of Buenos Aires (Capital Federal, Greater Buenos Aires) (Source: Argentine national censuses)

	1869	1895	1914	1947	1960	1970	1980	1991
Federal Capital	187,346	663,854	1,576,597	2,982,580	2,966,634	2,972,453	2,922,829	2,955,002
Greater Buenos Aires	42,374	117,763	458,217	1,741,338	3,772,411	5,380,447	6,823,175	7,926,379
Metropolitan Area (FC+GBA)	229,720	781,617	2,034,814	4,723,918	6,739,045	8,352,900	9,746,004	10,881,381
Argentine Population	1,737,076	3,954,911	7,885,237	15,893,827	20,013,793	23,364,431	27,064,000	32,370,298
Metropolitan Area / Total (%)	13.2	19.8	25.8	29.7	33.7	35.8	36.0	33.6

* The administrative dimensions of Greater Buenos Aires changed over this period of time. This number reflects the figures of the censuses.

After decades in which housing was mostly the matter of private initiatives, President Perón made it part of his welfare state. After 1946 housing was defined, for the first time, as a problem of social justice. The right of every worker to a home became a social right in the Constitutional Amendment in 1949. The government intervened in this

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Investigación social en agrupaciones de villas miserias de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda, 1958).

[8] Oscar Yujnovsky, *Claves políticas del problema habitacional argentino: 1955-1981* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1984), 249.

[9] The p°pulation of the *villas* of Buenos Aires fell from almost 280,000 in 1978 to almost 19,000 few years later. The repressive eradication, dislocated those residents who re-settled in a vast majority in the slums and squatter settlements of Greater Buenos Aires. In the context of the return of the democratic regime in 1983 and the consequences of the economic recession during the 1980s and the desindustrialization of the neoliberal created a new context for the multiplication and densification of villas miserias in the city and its suburbs.

area in several directions. Direct actions included the construction of several housing complexes for unionized state employees and industrial workers. Indirect actions included the loosening of lending regulations and injections of public funds through the National Housing Bank (BHN), an unprecedented provision of funds for housing and for the regulation of the rent market through freezing rents and prohibiting evictions. Perón also sanctioned the Horizontal Property Law in 1949 that allowed the subdivision of property in apartment buildings**.**[10]

This more active role of the state in the area of affordable housing allowed many working-class families to achieve homeownership for the first time. Yet, as was the case in Brazil with Getúlio Vargas, Perón's housing policies aimed at unionized workers and state employees but left unattended a growing sector of informal workers. In many cases, the state responded to these sectors by providing temporary housing in available public lands, as happened in the first settlements of the Bañado de Flores (Barrio Lacarra). Difficulties and poor housing for many working families, even with a pro-labor government such as the Peronist one, became portrayed in literature, plastic arts, and films.[11] Indeed, the origin of the term "villa miseria" came from Bernardo Verbitsky's book *Villa Miseria también es América* (1957).[12]

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[10] Anahi Ballent, *Las huellas de la politica: vivienda, ciudad, Peronismo en Buenos Aires, 1943–1955* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2005); Oscar Yujnovsky, *Claves políticas del problema habitacional argentino*; Rosa Aboy, *Viviendas para el pueblo: espacio urbano y sociabilidad en el barrio Los Perales, 1946 1955* (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005) and "The Right to a Home," *Journal of Urban History* 33, no. 3 (2007): 493-518; Horacio Gaggero and Alicia Garro, *Del trabajo a la casa: la política de vivienda del gobierno peronista 1946-1955* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 1996); Mark Healey, *The Ruins of the New Argentina: Peronism and the Remaking of San Juan After the 1944 Earthquake* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

[11] On the representations of working class neighborhoods in cinema during the years of Perón, see Paula Halperin,"With an Awesome Realism that Beats the Best of the European Cinemas': the Making of Barrio Gris and the Reception of the Italian Neorealism in Argentina, 1947-1955," in *Global Neorealismo. The Transnational History of a Film Style*, edited by Robert Sklar and Saverio Giovacchini (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011). On the representation of villas and poverty and urban space more generally, see

Slums and urban spaces poverty were becoming more and more an uncomfortable presence for most of the governments, both civic and military, that governed Argentina in the decades to follow. The modernization of the industrial sector (predominantly oriented to conspicuous consumption) broadened the social distance between a new (middle) class of professionals and managers joined by a smaller but important qualified, skilled working class, on the one hand, and the traditional industrial working class whose participation in the distribution of wealth decline significantly. The latter could not afford homeownership and found in the *villas miserias*, informal settlements, and overcrowded hotels and boarding homes a solution to the problem of shelter.

The first official recognition came in 1955 when the government of the so-called Revolución Libertadora created the Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda (CNV), which commissioned social surveys of the city's slums for the preparation of both an emergency and a long-term housing plan that called for the eradication of the *villas.*[13] Despite the short existence of this organism–itself a good evidence of the inconsistency of official policies characteristic of the decade—it was nevertheless the first time that the state explicitly recognized the slums, produced data and guidelines, and recommended eradication.

Still, acknowledgment of slums was not a concession from the top. By the end of the 1950s, the *villa* population began to organize against the threat of eradication policies and to push their own social demands for certain improvements. The *Federación de*

Laura Podalsky, *Specular City: Transforming Culture, Consumption, and Space in Buenos Aires, 1955-1973* (Temple University Press, 2004).

[12] Certainly the term *villa* was popularly used to name illegal settlements but the very term *villa miseria* apparently comes from Verbitsky's book. Interestingly, the title of the fiction paraphrases the final line of Langston Hughes' poem "I too, sing, America." Horacio Verbitsky, personal interview, August 14, 2005.

[13] Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda (Argentina), *Informe de la Comisión Nacional de la Vivienda sobre su actuación y plan integral* (Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión, 1957).

Villas Miseria (c. 1958) became a political actor with bargaining power, particularly in those (democratic) administrations more open to dialogue with (non-Peronist) popular organizations, as with Arturo Umberto Illia (1964-1966).[14]

Housing Policy and Developmentalism during the Alliance for Progress

With the military coup that ousted Perón in 1955, state actions toward housing departed from the social justice approach. As the country had limited domestic resources, developmentalists and economic liberal elites in the late 1950s and early 1960s agreed that spending in social programs was unproductive. Developmentalists in particular wanted to concentrate the energies on the structural transformation of the economy through the development and verticalization of the industrial sector, which required extensive, thus expensive, investment in basic infrastructure.[15] Major debates concerned whether housing was to be a tool of economic development or not. Giving its specific nature, housing is an expensive commodity in comparison to other areas of social spending, although it can be a quick source of employment and economic stimulus.[16] While housing could help to ease social tensions by creating jobs and dwellings, most of

[14] Alicia Ziccardi, "Villas miseria y favelas: sobre las relaciones entre las instituciones del Estado y la organización social en las democracias de los años sesenta". *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 45, no. 1 (1983): 45-67.
[15] The government of the Revolución Libertadora commissioned Raul Prebisch a study of Argentina economy and a set of guidelines to promote economic recovery. The Prebisch Plan, as it was popularly known, recommended a program of industrialization, the stimulus of traditional agricultural exports to guarantee the arrival of dollars, the liberalization of monetary and trade controls, a drastic reduction of state spending and the promotion of foreign investment. Eduardo M Basualdo, *Estudios de historia económica argentina: desde mediados del siglo XX a la actualidad* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2010).
[16] Housing as a commodity is expensive. Its value is made up of the value of the land and urbanization, construction, financing, and maintenance costs. On the history of the debates about housing as a tool of economic development in the 1950s, see Richard Harris and Godwin Arku, "Housing and Economic Development: The Evolution of an Idea Since 1945," *Habitat International* 30, no. 4 (December 2006): 1007–1017 and Godwin Arku and Richard Harris, "Housing as a Tool of Economic Development Since 1929," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (December 2005): 895–915.

the governments from 1955 to 1973, with the exception of Illia's administration, considered public spending in housing a deviation from more productive forms of investment. These administrations considered that development policies and good planning would lead to more productivity and, therefore, to a growing national wealth. More productivity, ultimately, was expected to improve the living standards and the purchasing capacity of the general population solving most of the structural problems associated with underdevelopment.

As Alvaro Alsogaray—the economic liberal and US allied minister that Frondizi had to put in charge of the economy as part of the stabilization program negotiated with the International Monetary Found in 1959—put it, "the intention is to establish a regime that is accessible to all who are willing to save and make a sacrifice to procure their own home. Building neighborhoods or buildings made by the State, and the distribution of units at prices and terms away from economic reality, are procedures usually more associated with political and propagandistic ends than with a real governmental action to improve housing conditions."[17] Emphasizing sacrifice and discipline rather than waiting for the paternalitic state to provide for shelter, "It is necessary to understand that the State cannot and should not give away housing, neither establish a conduct that could mean, in many occasions, privileges to benefit those sectors that contribute the less to resolve their problem."[18]

[17] "Síntesis del discurso pronunciado por el Ministro de Economía Ing. Álvaro Alsogaray el lunes 5 de noviembre de 1962 a las 18 horas, en la sede del Banco Hipotecario Nacional, en oportunidad de aprobarse los primeros proyectos de construcción de viviendas dentro del Plan Federal de la Vivienda," material available in the library of the Ministery of Economy, Buenos Aires.

[18] "Informe de la Comisión Especial de Viviedna, de la Cámara de Diputados, sobre el proyecto de creación del Consejo Federal de la Vivienda," reproduced in *Temas de urbanismo y vivienda*, ed, by Ministerio de la Vivienda. España, serie II, no. 10/62 (55) (May 1962), underlined in the original. "Es necesario que se comprenda que el Estado no puede ni debe regular vivienda, ni establecer una conducta que signifique privilegios muchas veces, beneficiándose aquellos que menos contribuyen a resolver su problema."

Public housing policies in the 1960s thus followed two main courses according to the definition of the problem and the identification of the social sectors affected by it. First, as Alemann pointed out to Moscoso, there were the middle classes that had been suffering the most. The assumption was that most of the people in need of housing actually had the means to afford it, and if they did not do so was because of the lack of credit. As a result, state efforts focused in the creation of the administrative, institutional, and financial framework to channel domestic savings into the production and consumption of dwellings. The middle classes, those in a position to save for housing and access the financial market, became thus the main targets of the official policies.

On the other hand, the growing presence of slums and other substandard housing arrangements began to be explained as an undesirable consequence of Argentina's economic modernization.[19] In addition, working-class neighborhoods and slums could easily become a ground for social and political discontent, especially considering that the Peronist Party was banned and therefore the expression of the political identity of the working class officially denied.[20] Therefore, the state assumed, at least in theory, the need to provide some kind of solution to these families and built a limited number of low-income housing in several complexes.

The formation of the market conditions for housing for the middle and lower middle-classes and the construction of low-income housing for the most poor were partially possible, to a large extent, thanks to the availability of funds from the US States

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[19] This characterization of the housing problem for the urban poor was certainly not the only available. It added to other present discourses that condemned *villas* as spaces of moral decade and hygienic threat. Antiperonist sectors also blamed the origins of the *villas* to Perón's devious populist practices. In this version, Perón brought rural workers to strength his political base in Buenos Aires.

[20] On working-class identity and Peronism in these years, see Daniel James, *Resistance and Integration: Peronism and The Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), passim.

and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Alliance for Progress was the umbrella organization that channeled a series of old and new lending programs to Latin America. It also provided a common language and a relative sense of mission framed by cold war expectations, fears, and anxieties about the development of Latin American nations. The analysis of the US approach to Argentina during the Alliance will help to understand the context in which aid for housing was provided.

The role of the Alliance in Argentina differed from the experience in countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, or the Dominican Republic.[21] This was the result of the different geopolitical priorities in the region. In the early 1960s, Argentina was for the US an advanced country, located "'in-between' the fully industrialized countries and the third world of those less-developed countries which lack institutions and infrastructure as well as the human, financial and, in some cases, the natural resources for establishing a continued rate of growth and progress." Using as criteria indicators such as per capita income, access to formal education, urbanization, and industrialization Argentina was "already the most advanced nation in Latin America," which was largely in line with Argentines' national self-image. For Gino Germani, the dilemma of whether Argentina was a "modern, European, progressive country" or an "underdeveloped, dependent, almost colonial one," was a false dichotomy. According to him, the country showed a significant imbalance between indicators on development and on modernization. "Birth rate and life expectancy," noted Germani, "show levels close to those of developed countries. The same show demographic concentration, literacy, and the number of

[21] See Jeffrey Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007)

students in higher education. The two images could translate into this: we are a socially advanced country, but less developed economically."[22]

Differing from the Brazilian case, where US actors were more concerned with trade unionism and the leftist policies of President Goulart, USAID agents in Argentina were in fact analyzing in 1961 whether a continued presence in the country was justified. In a letter to US Ambassador to Argentina, Ruy Rubottom, a US State Department official responded to the confidential question whether it was recommendable to keep Argentina "economically dependent on the US." "This idea, is one of which I entertain because I have reservations, as you know, about the course which US-Argentine economic relations may take whenever our Argentine friends are less tied to us economically than their present situation requires. I hope that I am not being too hard on them, but I do think that we must maintain a realistic attitude toward a country as basically self-centered and tenacious in defense of its own interests above everything else as my long association with Argentina has convinced me the Argentines are."[23] In the early 1960s, the US was less concerned with the possibility of social unrest in Argentina and more with the degree of the country's autonomy and reliability for US interests in the Southern Cone.

It was perhaps Everett Hagen, Professor of Political Science and Economics at the MIT's Center for International Studies and himself a modernization theorist, who gave a

[22] Gino Germani, "Argentina: desarrollo económico y modernización," Doscientos Millones en el Desarrollo Económico y Social de Latinoamérica (revista de la Confederación General Económica), no. 2 (February 1963), 69-78.
[23] James O'Connor to Ambassador Roy Rubottom, February 24, 1961, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 2, RG 59, NACP.

crude perspective about Argentina.[24] Hagen, an expert on the relationship between social change, behavior and personality, traveled to Argentina in an official mission to assess its economic and political situation and the implications for US policy. In a confidential memo to Moscoso and W.W. Rostow presenting his study, the economist put it bluntly, "Argentina, I may borrow a phrase originally used in quite a different context, is sick, sick, sick." To Hagen, the country suffered from inadequate political leadership and a strong sense of proud, nationalism, and anti-Americanism that might lead any attempt to influence the country into failure. The "blindness of present leaders" on the top was the source of the public's general mistrust to their authorities, a symptom of social disintegration.[25] One of the examples Hagen used to support his argument was his brief experience in an unspecified shantytown on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. The economist commented that what impressed him the most "was not the low quality of the housing, bad though that was, but that with a few thousand dollars it would have been possible to grade the dirt streets to eliminate the year-round pools of water, to add to the 17 water taps in a village of 45,000, and to provide a sewer or two (the drainage canal being across the street at a lower level), and that no political leader had had the elementary cunning to appeal for votes in this inexpensive way."[26]

Hagen was skeptical about the possibility of influencing Argentine leaders. Hence, he suggested proceeding with a "policy of cool detachment, not one of hostility,"

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[24] On the MIT Center for International Studies and Hagen see Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 155-202.
[25] It was a problem of governmental attitudes and functioning that required the elimination of corruption, the spread of financial burden more equitably, and to "tackle the basic responsibilities of government soberly instead of talking about great development schemes; Memorandum from Everett E. Hagen to Teodoro Moscoso and W.W. Rostow, "Report on Selected Aspects of Economic and political conditions in Argentina, with Suggested Implications for United States Policy," June 25, 1962, p. 21, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 2, RG 59, NACP.
[26] We are not sure exactly how familiarized Hagen was about slums and local politics. It appears at least doubtful his impressions about the lack contact between local leaders and slums dwellers.

adopting a formally correct but less cordial stance toward present political and military leaders as a way to avoid giving the impression to the Argentine public that the US supported any particular government. Housing, in this scenario, was an area in which the US could assist.[27] Buildings new housing units and providing most needed collective facilities was a way to reduce social pressure. Hagen, therefore, recommended offering seed funds to unions, housing cooperatives, savings and loan associations, and some aid lo low-cost housing to be built by the state. Local authorities were expected to do "the inexpensive simple things so conspicuously necessary" such street improvement, water pipes, and sewers in present shantytowns.[28] For the MIT economist, actions in the field housing could contribute in creating an "appearance of social responsibility in many varied aspects of the functioning of government." He supported the idea of money being absorbed in housing construction projects, but here he recommended caution by making clear that the US share was going to be small in relation to total costs and contingent to the "satisfactory continuing execution of related measures and of the program itself by Argentine authorities."Hagen was certainly skeptical about the real impact of any housing program in the short term, but he recognized that some small contribution could pay back in the future,

> The space which I have devoted to aid to housing might make it seem that I regard this program as of especially great promise. **I do not.** If the basic causes of social discontent continue, social disruption would be little reduced even by a well-executed housing program-and the program might not get at because

[27] Ibid., 24. Other areas of investment were agriculture and the promotion of public administrative reform, including the development of planning and programming with emphasis on budgeting and the relations of basic government service to private economic activity,

[28] Ibid., 25 The government was also expected to provide land and prepare utilities for individual housing construction. He noted that these initial, basic reforms did not necessarily required eradication, at least in the first years. As a result of "provisions of improved utilities, and preparation of land farther away from town on which an individual may build if he wishes (and if he is financially able to, individually or under a union, cooperative, or savings and loan programs) should make an adequate reduction in the social pressure.

> Argentine authorities might not in fact execute their part of the program. However, I think that a program can be developed and a basket of aid offered such that the offer will rebound to the benefit of the United States, and will be accepted by some future more responsible government if not by the present one or its immediate successor. (my emphasis)

In a memorandum to Douglas Dillon, US secretary of Treasure, in September 1961, the ex- Minister of Economy Alvaro Alsogaray wrote a section titled "the housing problem" in which he defined it as a social as well as a political issue. The lack of homes was, according to the report, "really critical in relation to the standard of living the argentines are used to [and] constitutes a serious center of social tensions." But US authorities recognized that the situation could be relatively easy to solve if local authorities give it proper attention, as "at the same time it is the only center of this nature that exists. In the precise moment that this problem begins to be solved, all social tensions will disappear and this will contribute great to the political stability."[29] The report did not specify whether social discontent could arise from the middle or the lower classes, but in any case, frustration among middle classes could be a source of social apathy or hostility toward the government while working class dissatisfaction, in a context of institutionalized anti-Peronism, could become the breeding ground for social and political unrest.

Minister Alsogaray also made the connection between the housing issue, social discontent, and political turmoil in a conversation with US Ambassador that took place in June, 1960. "In spite of Argentina's noteworthy economic recovery," said Alsogaray, "the housing situation remains critical and is the most glaring example which

[29] Memorandum from Álvaro Alsogaray to C. Douglas Dillon, "Organization of Private Endeavor ro Cooperate in a New Time of Anticommunist Fight an to Promote Economic and Social Progress," September 1961, p. 3, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 3, RG 59, NACP.

Communists can use to bring home to the people their criticism of the free enterprise system pursued by the Argentine Government." To Alsogaray, a fierce anti-Communist, "the solution to the housing problem (…) would go a long way toward solving great social problems in which Communist propaganda is having growing success. Contrariwise, all of the basic industrial programs now progressing in Argentina would be fruitless unless the social problems arising from inadequate and unsatisfactory housing are eliminated."[30] It is hard to determine whether Alsogaray was really worried about the situation he described or he was playing the US authorities with Communist anxiety to commit them to release financial aid for housing. Yet, the minister's comments were not necessarily unfounded but overstated for effect. As we have mentioned, many slums residents began to organize politically and formed the Federación de Villas Miserias de Buenos Aires in 1958 to support the immediate demands of the *villero* population. At that time, the Federation had links with the Argentine Communist Party.

It is in this backdrop that the expansion of the domestic mortgage market became a priority for Argentine authorities with the support and requirements of the US. Key to that project was the laying of the financial, legal and administrative foundations for the formalization of a savings and loan system, which except for a brief experience was absent in the country.[31] By the early 1960 housing financial operations were for the most

[30] Memorandum of conversation between Álvaro Alsogaray and Raymond G. Leddy, Counselor of Embassy, June 20, 1961, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 3, RG 59, NACP.

[31] In Argentina, the first savings organizations dated back from 1935 and they operated in a framework of disorganization and legal and administrative confusion until 1949 when the Peronist government decreed the nationalization of the banking system. According to José Ramón Martin, the system suffered from adequate legislations, control, and technical guidance that led to appearance of several organizations that were not in a capacity to survive. The state did not guarantee the savings. Still, during those years, Martin accounted the system financed the construction of twenty thousand units. Martin was an expert in this field and the founder of ARCA, one of the first S&L institutions in 1935. In 1964, USAID invited him to study the US S&L system as part of the technical ccoperation program of the Alliance for Progress; see José Ramón Martin, *El Ahorro y Préstamo: Fuente Generadora De Viviendas* (Buenos Aires: Libreria Premier,

part channeled directly through the National Housing Bank (Banco Hipotecario Nacional; BHN).[32] But inflation and conservative public spending policies decreased the availability of funds. The basic rationale was that capital for housing had to come not from the state but from the effort of those who wanted to become homeowners. The savings and loan system, then, was to guarantee and regulate the capitalization of a mortgage market that would be invested in the construction of homes for the middle and lower-middle classes. In broad terms, this system organizes a series of associations and/or financial institutions that can receive savings deposits and give mortgage and other loans. The associations are often mutually held which means that depositors and borrowers are members with voting rights and with managerial decisions. Originally, the system sought to stimulate the formation of "intermediary institutions" such as mutual aid associations, cooperatives, unions, banks, or public organisms interested in building houses for their members.

In the context of modernization and developmentalism of Argentina, the formation of the savings and loan system had several symbolic implications. It represented a departure from the populist practices of the past and from the definition of housing as a social right to be regulated and "given" by the state. Housing was no longer a right but a consumer item that people had to earn with their sacrifice, effort, and responsibly in a free market capitalist system. The role of the state was to guarantee, in a context of high inflation and economic instability, the relative normal functioning of the

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1966), 83. "Lack of technical guidance of the control authorities and the absence of adequate legislation, led to the appearance of an excessive number of companies, in some cases lacking the most basic technical computing. I have a crisis of confidence," José Ramón Martin, 82.

[32] Most of the financing for housing was centralized through the National Housing Bank and the Dirección General de Préstamos Personales y con Garantía Real (DGPPGR). This latter instituion was the old Institute of Social Prevision, which work for the members of the previsional institutes during Peronism. For a detailed history of the institutions in change of financing, see Yujnovsky and Horacio Balliero.

housing market. This also implied a more classic liberal definition of citizenship, in which the individual was accountable for himself instead of the social justice conception in which the whole society was responsible for the general welfare. Savings, therefore, implied an economic behavior in which short-term sacrifice would redound to a personal improvement, homeownership in this case. This notion was certainly a counterpoint to what liberal sectors saw as the manipulation and creation of a mass of passive citizens who expected the state, or its leader, to fulfill their needs. In this sense, the modernization of the mortgage market was consistent with the expectations of modernization theorists (embedded in the Alliance for Progress) about the formation of a middle class of proprietors in a context of modern capitalism.

In practice, successive Argentine governments during the first half of the 1960s focused on the formation of what came to be the Caja Federal de Ahorro y Préstamos para la Vivienda ("la Caja"; a Central Housing Bank) in 1965. The first steps to its formation began in 1960, when the Frondizi Administration created the Federal Housing Fund and the Federal Housing Administration. The object was to regulate the mortgage market, capitalize a central fund, and providing state insurance to private savings –key to build confidence in an economy where inflation was higher that interest rates. Plans aimed at intermediary institutions, including unions, cooperatives, mutual aid associations, consortium of owners, banks with mortgage's sections, and public organizations. To obtain the loans, these intermediary actors had to present building plans together with the solicitation for financing to the housing administration. Negotiations

with USAID for a seed loan from the Development Loan Fund ($12.5 million dollars) and the IDB ($37.5 million dollars) began immediately.[33]

US authorities and experts in the field, including representatives of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA), were interested in promoting a system that was considered successful since the aftermath of the Great Depression. The depression had begun with the burst of a real estate bubble, which caused the collapse of the banking system and caused a spike in the number of foreclosures. The New Deal organized the savings and loan system under President Franklin D. Roosevelt with the sanction of the National Housing Act in 1934, creating the Federal Home Loan Bank, which guaranteed loans by authorized banks and agencies and regulated rates of interest and the terms of mortgages. The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) was actually the result of such restructuration and a model that US authorities sought to export abroad.

Following the reports and recommendations of their official missions to the country, the Kennedy administration was committed to the seed loans very early on in the conversations. Yet they did not become effective until 1964 with the sanctioning of Law-Decree 9004 (sanctioned in late 1963) that created the *Caja Federal para las Entidades de Ahorro y Préstamo de la Vivienda*, a mixed-economy society. The reasons for the delay in its implementation were multiple. Political and economic instability (three

[33] Negotiations for Alliance for Progress loans also included assistance in highways, power, and railway rehabilitation. Frondizi actually prioritized investment in productive areas of the economy rather is social programs. He actually criticized the Alliance for Progress for collaborating less in the modernization of infrastructure and industrialization and more in social programs. James O'Connor and Rubottom, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina actually complained about the *developmentlista's* disdain for social projects. In an internal memo, the Ambassador commented: "they [the Frondizi Administration] tend to down-grade social development (as compared with economic expansion) as somewhat bush-league, although the political benefits would appear to be more tangible and immediate (…) I wonder to what extent our clients know what they want or what is truly most important for them developmentally," James O'Connor to Ambassador Roy Rubottom, February 24, 1961, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 2, RG 59, NACP. On Frondizi's assessment of the Alliance, see Arturo Frondizi, *La Alianza para el Progreso* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, c.1964), Fondo CEN, Biblioteca Nacional, Argentina, Caja 691.

governments and a larger quantity of finance ministers succeeded in those years) was not the best context to have permanent legislations approved by the Argentine Congress. There were also discussions whether the Central Bank or the National Housing Bank were the most suitable monetary and credit control agent in Argentina.[34] By that time, US experts also realized that the implementation of a system inspired in the American experience was not going to work as "Argentina could not afford the kind of competition which prevailed between the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Reserve Board in the Unites States." In many occasions, the Argentine government also complained about what they considered burdensome demands.[35] A US report summarized the reasons of the delay "due to a misunderstanding regarding the disposition of Argentine officials to accept and institute a savings and loan system in Argentina, a concept which AID seeks to promote through the loan to the Central Housing Bank (…) Although the GOA [Government of Argentina] as in response to our prodding issued decree-laws laying a bare legal and organizational foundation for a savings and loan system, the loan will not be signed until the loan team presently in Buenos Aires is satisfied that the GOA has taken the steps to meet additional legal and organization requirements sufficient to permit signature."[36]

It was not until the Illia administration accepted the condition to organize a Central Housing Bank that US funds become available. That is why housing programs under the regulation of La Caja begun just in 1964 under the administration of President

[34] US experts realized that an exact copy of the American system was impossible.
[35] For instance, USAID requests for data and project information that imposed an extra burden of time in the operations. Memorandum of conversation, Roberto Alemann, Ministry of Economy, Mr. Henry A. Hoyt, Charge d'Affairs, ad interim, Harry Conover, Economic Counselor, on the matter of "Social Development Trust Agreement with Inter-American Development Bank," June 6, 1961, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 3, RG 59, NACP.
[36] Memorandum from Bruce M. Lancaster to Mr. Wellman, "Status of A.I.D. Development Loans to Argentina," May 17, 1963, entry 3167, Records related to Argentina, Box 7, RG 59, NACP.

Arturo Illia (1964-1966) who was also able to renegotiate the terms of the agreement and prolonged the deadlines to subscribe housing initiatives.[37] [Figure 1]

USAID's interest in the formation of a mortgage market in Argentina was consistent with the more conservative direction that the US government sought to give to the Alliance for Progress in terms of promoting the mobilization of private capital rather than taxpayers' money. Pressure to create a centralizing institutions such as La Caja and securing the compromise of the Argentine state to guarantee the investment was a way to stimulate US private investors into the area of housing. High inflation was certainly one of the main causes that deterred US developers and investors, who pushed the US government to pass a Housing Investment Guaranty program, as hearings before the US senate demonstrates.[38] Those hearings reflected the frustration of US developers such as the Rockefeller family and Williard Garvey of World Homes Co.[39]

Rodman Rockefeller, for instance, represented IBEC Housing Corporation, an affiliate of the Rockefeller-sponsored International Basic Economy Corporation (IBEC).[40] In Latin America, the company participated in the construction industry applying their own prefabrication method in Puerto Rico, Chile, and Peru, that they had

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[37] A Brazilian-based firm, owned by the Jordan group, subscribe to these funds for the construction of Barrio Kennedy, a small housing complex for lower middle-class company right next to the Velez Sarfield soccer Stadium in the neighborhood of Liners. I plan to explore this history of a Brazilian company with close links to Argentine government officials in an article.

[38] United States, *Study of International Housing: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, on a Compendium of Papers* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1963).

[39] Williard Garvey, followed the example of the Rockefeller a developed several projects in Latin America. His motto was "Every Man a Home Owner, Every Man a Capitalist;" Jean and Willard Garvey World Homes Archives, Special Collections and University Archives, Wichita State University.

[40] Kenneth Durr, *A Company with a Mission: Rodman Rockefeller and the International Basic Economy Corporation, 1947-1985* (Rockville: Montrose Press, 2006); Wayne G. Broehl, *The International Basic Economy Corporation* (Washington D.C.: National Planning Association, 1968); Maria Cristina da Silva Leme "Transforming the Modern Latin American City: Robert Moses and the International Basic Economic Corporation,"*Planning Perspectives* 25, no. 4 (2010): 515-528. Research at the Rockefeller Archive Center was possible thanks to a grant-in-aid the institution awarded me in 2008.

tested before in the United States and in some other areas of the world, including Lebanon, Iran, and Israel. In addition, the company and the Inter-American Housing Center (CINVA) established a contract for the manufacturing and commercialization of CINVA's brick machinery, the CINVA-RAM, which the Center had developed to cheapen material costs for aided self-help projects in rural areas. But as construction was certainly a complex endeavor, the company diversified its interests in housing by also paying attention to financial services. In a letter to Moscoso, Rodman Rockefeller explained the plans the company had in Chile, Peru, and Argentina after their experience building 9,000 units in Puerto Rico. Rockefeller explained that such a good opportunity for investment was a result of the rise in the income levels of the Puerto Rican middle and lower-middle classes and because of the availability of FHA mortgages insurance and savings and loans mortgages. "We are convinced that the first factor exist throughout most of South America," said Rockefeller, "We are equally convinced that it is essential that our Government and our private economy provide the means for the second to become effective throughout Latin America."

As we can see, the Alliance for Progress was an instrument for the profit of US companies in Latin America. The alliance between US foreign policies and the role of the private sector was seen as mutually beneficial for both. As Rockefeller pointed out, "We feel that we can offer to our government our capacity and experience in building in Latin America, so that I may become part of the National Effort towards our Alliance for Progress. Our government can be of immense assistance in furthering our efforts by making it possible for us to maintain our investments through the new all risk investment guarantee program, and in the case of Argentina, by augmenting the resources to

complete the work."[41] Interestingly enough, IBEC was considering its commercial involvement in a housing project in Buenos Aires in the early 1960s and wanted to speed up the creation of the Municipal Housing Fund being negotiated then by Alsogaray. Internal memos show the capacity of lobby that a company like the Rockefeller's had. Talking about the support the Argentine Central Bank could have in guaranteeing the investment, W.B. Dixon, an IBEC representative, said that negotiations had to be conducted directly with Julio González del Solar, vice president of the Central Bank, "who is known by and is friendly to IBEC." One of the questions that had to be asked to del Solar was "whether the Argentine government will guarantee to allow us to take it out [remittances] and what attitude would be taken regarding remittance of profits."[42]

The Alliance for Progress, therefore, represented an economic opportunity for profit to US developers while furthering geopolitical interests in the cold war era. Both objectives informed the interest of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), founded by the AFL-CIO in 1962, to act in the western hemisphere US labor movement, including the financing of housing in Latin America. The purpose of AIFLD, as stated by Berent Friele to Nelson A. Rockefeller, "is to assist democratic labor unions in the Western Hemisphere in their struggle to remain free and resist communist domination."[43] The institution represented an interesting effort in which labor and

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[41] Rodman Rockefeller, Vice-President IBEC Housing Division, to The Honorable Teodoro Moscoso, Asssitant Administration for AID for Latin America, International Cooperation Administration, 5 January 1962, Microfilm IBEC Housing Division, Rockefeller Archive Center.

[42] IBEC was going to participate in the construction of about 3,000 hosuing units in partnership with the American & Foreign Power Company, Inc., and with Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.; W.B. Dixon Stroud, "Housing – Argentina," memorandum to T.R. Ackerbloom and H.T. Newcomb, 30 November 1960. NAR, 4. Personal, III 4B, AIA IBEC, Box 33, folder 310, RAC.

[43] Briele was Nelson A. Rockefeller's special assistant for diplomatic relation when he was Governor of New York and a business associate of the Rockefeller family.
Berent Friele, "The American Institute for Free Labor Development," letter to Nelson A. Rockefeller, 31 May 1962, and Berent Friele, letter to Mr. J. Richardson Dilworth, 13 November 1962, Collection NAR,

government joined hands with business and industry not only to stem "the danger of Communist take-overs in Latin America" but also "to defend our free enterprise system."[44] In 1962, the US government granted $350,000 to AIFLD through USAID to fund its training program the Social Projects Department, created at the suggestion of the Labor Advisory Committee for the Alliance for Progress. AIFLD sought to support in Latin American "projects sponsored by the free labor movement, such as trade union educational centers, training schools for skilled mechanics, worker's housing cooperatives, credit unions and similar institutions that will give labor an opportunity to contribute effectively to the attainment o social economic goals of the Alliance."[45]

By the early 1960s, the AFL-CIO was studying the possibility of investing pensions funds in federally insured mortgages within the U.S. and abroad. By then, almost nine percent of its general pension fund was invested in mortgages from the FHA.[46] The idea was to advise affiliated units who intended to invest their pension funds in housing mortgages guaranteed by the US government. Therefore, AFL-CIO used its financial resources to capitalize housing as a way to diversify institutional investment.[47] In 1962, George Meany, the AFL-CIO director, charged William C. Doherty, director of AIFLD's Social Projects Department, to explore financing opportunities in the field of housing abroad. In 1963, AIFLD sent a team of experts to study and organize major housing cooperatives under trade union sponsorship in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador,

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RG 4, Series Projects, Sub-series Labor, Box 103, Folder 985. On AIFLD's history, Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969).

[44] Among its trustees were US corporations, including the mining company Anaconda, Pan American airways, General Motors, Otis elevator, among others.

[45] J. Peter Grace and George Meany letter to Dan S. Creel, Director of the Rockefeller Brother Fund, 18 April 1962, NAR, 4, Projects, Labor, Bopx 103, folder 985.

[46] AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO HIT Timeline, accessed April 13, 2012, http://timeline.aflcio-hit.com/content/2/en/1960s.html.

[47] In 1965, the AFL-CIO creates the Mortgage Investment Trust.

and Uruguay.[48] In April of that year, AIFLD presented a proposal to the IDB for a pilot housing cooperative in Argentina. The organism approved an "only loan earmarking trade union participation for Argentina," to supply six million US dollars in AFL-CIO affiliated union welfare funds, guaranteed by the AID Investment Guaranty Program, to be added to six million dollars from the IDB Social Progress Trust Funds. It was expected that local Argentine unions would match funds for the creation of a major pilot program.[49] Four unions applied for AIFLD financing: the Postal and Telegraph Workers' Federation (FOECyT); Light and Power (Luz y Fuerza), Railroad Workers (Unión Ferroviaria), and Municipal Workers (UOEM; Unión Obreros y Empleados Municipales). As in Argentina the working class supported Perón and held a strong anti-American feeling, AIFLD supported those unions that were disputing the leadership of the General Labor Confederation (Peronist).[50]

In actuality, the impact of AIFLD- backed financing of housing was more significant in symbolic terms than in the total amount of built units. The evidence is incomplete but estimates indicate that the total amount of houses erected was around

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[48] The team was comprised of William Doherty, and Derish Wolff, Financial Consultant, AIFLD; Peter Kimm, AIFLD Engineer, and Alexander Bookstaver, Director, Department of Investments, AFL-CIO. On the role of AFL-CIO and Romualdo Serafini in Argentina during the Perón administration see the history of Luis Gay in Juan Carlos Torre, *La vieja guardia sindical y Perón: sobre los orígenes del peronismo* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1990).

[49] Feasibility studies followed next. For operations in the Rio de la Plata region, AIFLD appointed Manuel Campa as Country Director Program and Eduardo Baraño as Staff Engineer. See the documentation located in 16/17 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), 1962-63, Series 5: International Labor Institutes, 1962-1980, RG18-010: International Affaire Department. Country Files, 1969-1981, George Meany Memorial Archive, National Labor College, MD (GMMA)

[50] An internal report noted in March 1964, noted that an FHA technical team was going to arrive in Buenos Aires by March 30 to analyze the architectural and development plans, labor and material costs of these low cost housing project; 16/18 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), 1964, Series 5: International Labor Institutes, 1962-1980, RG18-010: International Affaire Department. Country Files, 1969-1981, GMMA; Pablo Pozzi has explored partial aspects of AIFLD involvement in housing in Argentina and explain the funding of housing projects by American labor movement as a clear example of Cold War interventions, this time by coopting Argentine unions. Pablo Pozzi,"El sindicalismo norteamericano en América Latina y en la Argentina: El AIFLD entre 1961 y 1976," *Herramienta* (Buenos Aires), 10 (1999): 163-184.

2,000 units.[51] In making credit and housing more accessible to union members, AIFLD expected to boost the image and attraction of US-friendly unions while also providing an economic profit for AFL-CIO.[52] The relationship between housing and cold war, in this case, had a more clear expression. Furthermore, it is indicative of how the Alliance for Progress really encompassed a mosaic of financial sources and programs that included USAID, IDB, AIFLD, and US private developers.

Urban Renewal and Low-Income Housing in the second half of the 1960s

More significant was the assistance the IDB provided within the framework of the Alliance for Progress to the Municipality of Buenos Aires (MCBA) for the construction of three housing complexes at a total produced of 12,500 new housing units. This operation was part of a major urban expansion that the city of Buenos Aires underwent during the 1960s including the urbanization of an area equal to almost ten percent of the city's territorial jurisdiction.[53]

By the middle of the twentieth century, Buenos Aires was one of the largest cities in Latin America. Demographically, however, population growth in the city had reached a limit. Since the city grew to the suburbs of Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). The expansion of consumption for the middle classes associated with the modernization of the

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[51] Internal reports from 1964 mention plans to build a total of 2,000 units on seventeen sites, twelve in Buenos Aires, and five in neighboring cities. In 1969, the Argentine Secretary of Housing mentioned the agreement with the AFL-CIO was for a total of 21,500,000 dollars guaranteed by USAID. In addition, the report of the Argentine agency mentions that USAID offered additional guarantees in the amount of 10,300,000 dollars; Secretaria de Estado de vivienda, *Acción en vivienda, 1968-1969 (*Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Bienestar Social, 1969), 24 and 83-86; 16/18 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), 1964, RG18-010: International Affaire Department. Country Files, 1969-1981, GMMA.

[52] AIFLD invested in housing programs also in Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, República Dominicana, Colombia, Venezuela, Perú, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. The British Guayan was certainly another country that rapidly called the attention of George Meany and his troupe of anti-Communist experts.

[53] Adrián Gorelik, "Buenos Aires: el fin de la expansión," in *Buenos Aires: la formación del presente*, edited by Pedro Pírez (Quito: Organización Latinoamericana y del Caribe de Centros Históricos, 2009), 267-284.

industrial sector and the arrival of foreign capital in the 1960s left an imprint in the city. New international corporations transformed and internationalized the city's skyline with skyscrapers that loomed in the city's downtown. imposing a new, cosmopolitan presence. New commercial galleries offered trendy clothes and appliances for the modern man and woman. The massification of the cultural industry responded to a new era of mass society that was eager to consume the latest books, films, and music produced locally and internationally. In few blocks of Buenos Aires' downtown—the "Crazy Block" (la Manzana Loca)--contained the University of Buenos Aires, the Di Tella Institute (famous for its vanguardist art center), bookstores and cafés, concentrating the bohemia, the intellectual elite, and avant-garde artists and giving the city a stunning vibe of cosmopolitanism.[54] Buenos Aires was, as Laura Podalsky called it, the "specular city."[55]

But that same modernization of Buenos Aires had many contrasts. As early as 1948, several of the key urban issues had been identified in *El estudio para el Plan de Buenos Aires* (EPBA), a document drafted by a group of modernist architects who had been working with Le Corbusier. Problems identified in the EPBA included excessive concentration of commercial, residential, and industrial functions in the city's downtown, a lack of adequate zoning, the overwhelming demographic imbalance between an

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[54] Eduardo Elena, *Dignifying Argentina: Peronism, Citizenship, and Mass Consumption* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011); Andrea Giunta, *Avant-Garde, Internationalism, and Politics: Argentine Art in the Sixties* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Paula Halperin, "Modernization and Visual Economy: Film, Photojournalism, and the Public Sphere in Brazil and Argentina, 1955-1980" (Ph.D., University of Maryland, 2010); John King, *El Di Tella y El Desarrollo Cultural Argentino En La Década Del Sesenta* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones de Arte Gaglianone, 1985); Valeria Manzano, "The Blue Jean Generation: Youth, Gender, and Sexuality in Buenos Aires, 1958-1975," *Journal of Social History* 42, no. 3 (March 2009): 657–676; Rebecca Pite, "Entertaining Inequalities: Doña Petrona, Juanita Bordoy, and Domestic Work in mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 91, no. 1 (2011): 96–128.

[55] Laura Podalsky, *Specular City: Transforming Culture, Consumption, and Space in Buenos Aires, 1955-1973* (Temple University Press, 2004).

overpopulated North and an underdeveloped South, a deficient traffic circulation system, limited green and recreational areas, and a general housing shortage.[56]

Animated by the problems identified in the EPBA, Buenos Aires' Mayor Horacio Giralt, Frondizi's mayor, organized the *Organización del Plan Regulador para la Ciudad de Buenos Aires* (OPRBA) in 1958 to draft a master plan for the city. This Master Plan, approved in 1962 as the *Plan Director para Capital y lineamientos estructurales para el area metropolitana* (Master Plan for the Capital and Structural Guidelines for the Metropolitan Area), was inspired after London's postwar urban planning crafted by Sir Patrick Abercrombie and Great Britain "New Towns." In Argentina, the study offered an innovative understanding of the city as not an isolated jurisdictional unit but as part a more complex network within the whole metropolitan region, including the surrounding counties administratively under the jurisdiction of the Province of Buenos Aires. Urban planner Odilia Suárez, member of OPRBA, defined the Plan as perhaps "the first and more complete [analysis] ever conducted." The quality and skills of the body of technicians and professionals gathered at OPRBA was indicative of the degree of legitimacy that planning, science, and technical expertise had reached in the 1960s.[57] The plan innovated in redefining the urban space at three different levels: the city in itself, the metropolitan district (within a range of 30kms), and the regional area (within a range of

[56] Anahí Ballent describes the history of the EPBA as the 'brief era of urban planning from 1946 to 1949', Anahí Ballent, *Las huellas de la Política : vivienda, ciudad, peronismo en Buenos Aires, 1943-1955* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Prometeo, 2005), 213. On the Plan, see also Odilia Suárez, *Planes y Códigos para Buenos Aires 1925-1985* (Buenos Aires, 1986), 15. On the history and debates about modernist architecture in Argentina see Jorge Francisco Liernur, 'El discreto encanto de nuestra arquitectura, 1930/1960', *Summa Revista de Arquitectura* 223 (1986), 60-79 and Jorge Francisco Liernur, *La red Austral: obras y proyectos de Le Corbusier y sus discípulos en la Argentina, 1924-1965* (Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes;Prometeo 3010, 2008); Mark Healey, *The Ruins of the New Argentina*.

[57] OPBRA gathered a group of prominent experts in the area of urban planning and it was their expertise, knowledge, and respectability what gave the Plan Director its respectability and relative continuity, surviving the abrupt changes in municipal authorities as a result of the national political instability. Odilia Suárez, *Planes y Códigos.*

100km).[58] In addition, the plan sought to establish a series of hierarchies in the planning agenda that included long-term reforms as well as programs of immediate impact.

One of the most ambitious programs of the master plan was the incorporation and urbanization of a vast area of approximately 1434 hectares (3543 acres), equal to nine percent of the city's total surface, located in the southwestern corner of Buenos Aires, which was still a relatively underpopulated swampland. Known as the Bañado de Flores, the region was an inhospitable rural low-lying area prone to flooding by the waters of the Matanza River and its tributaries. The city's incinerator furnaces were also located there, as were the shacks of many working class families who worked either in nearby industries or, more probable, in the municipal trash dumps. This part of the city was a site of continued illegal settlement, together with the area around the train terminals in Retiro.

The contrast between the neglected south, especially the Bañado de Flores, and the overpopulated residential North was already indicated officially in the *Proyecto orgánico para la urbanización del Municipio* of the Municipality's *Comisión de Estética Edilicia*, between 1923-25.[59] That Plan, influenced by French architect Forestier and inspired by the City Beautiful movement, proposed the urbanization of the Bañado as a park and suggested the construction of housing for the working class, an industrial area, and recreational facilities, including a convention center. In 1936, Socialist representative Manuel González Maseda presented his project for the "Gran Parque Sud de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires." [Figure 2] In his project, which repeated many of the functional spatial

[58] While the Plan conceived the city within the metropolitan and regional area, the organization did not have any authority beyond the limits of the capital. The difficulty in articulating an organism that worked through the different involved authorities made most of the most required urban interventions unviable.
[59] The first legislation affecting the Bañado de Flores dated back from 1905 and 1907 when national laws authorized the municipality to negotiate a loan for the sanitation (saneamiento) and improvement of the Bajo Flores basin.

characteristics defined in the previous project, Maseda offered a description of the area. In contrast with the north, where "everything is beauty," in the south an "open field, ravines, swamps, and wasteland that appear there as a unique demonstration of the existence of the city, a category that despite appearances, is there. We have to transform this ugly, low-laying area plenty of nitrate, with low edification of poor value, into a large and beautiful park that could be, doubtless, the largest and most beautiful park in the city. An unforgivable mistake is to forget that the these lands constitute the largest tract of land, free of construction, that is left in Buenos Aires..."[60] Maseda'a project emphasized the construction of housing and an industrial area, in addition to a municipal convention center and, interestingly, an airport for the city. The project was never built but in the following years there were partial interventions that slowly sought to regulate the space, including the works to regulate the Matanza River (denominated Riachuelo) and the construction of key transportation arteries, projected in 1939 and inaugurated in 1942.

By the mid 1940s, the area of the Bajo Flores gained renovated interest.[61] According to Anahí Ballent, the Peronista government operated a symbolical re-orientation of Buenos Aires, one that looked to the countryside rather than to Río de la Plata. This represented the country-oriented operation as a reaction to the city that had

[60] "En el Sur, en cambio, todo es campo abierto, barrancas, pantanos y basura que aparece allí como demonstración única de la existencia de la ciudad, categoría que a pesar de las apariencias, corresponde a ese lugar. A ese Sur, feo, bajo y abundante en salitre, donde la edificación es poca y de reducido valor, hay que transformarlo en un grande y hermoso parque, que podría ser, sin lugar a dudas, el más grande y hermoso de la ciudad- Error grande e imperdonable sería olvidar que esos terrenos forman parte en conjunto la única gran extensión de tierra, libre de edificación, que queda en Buenso Aires, de 20.000 hectáreas de extensión.¨ Revista de Arquitectura, Marzo 1936, 127-132; and Manuel González Maseda, *El Gran Parque del Sur de la ciudad* (Buenos Aires, 1935).

[61] Between 1939 and 1942, began a planned filling program to cover the garbage that sought to eliminate sanitary problems.

grown looking at the river, abroad-oriented, that represented the liberal project of the Argentine oligarchy and liberal elites. Central to that operation was the construction of the International Airport Ministro Pistarini, recreational areas for the popular classes, and Ciudad Evita (a city garden planned community) located in Greater Buenos Aires to the west. A highway connected Buenos Aires with these two places. Cutting across that corridor was the area of the Bajo Flores. As Ballent pointed out, "the new way would pass through this almost empty area in terms of edification, structuring the new projects, and turning a rural landscape into a suburban one; in effect, the freeway was designed to go over a green space, among a group of low and scattered buildings…"[62]

An integral part of this program was the project for the construction of the "Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores," planned by modernist architects Ítala Fulva Villa and Horacio Nazar.[63] [Figure 3 to 5] The project recognized the lack of planning and regulation that led to the unbalanced growth of the city and sought to regulate, develop, and incorporate this neglected area to the benefit of the city, in general, and the working class, in particular. Following a strict modernist design and functional zoning, which separated residential, working, recreational, and commuting areas, the plan envisioned the urbanization of the area through the canalization of the Cildañez Creek and a series of

[62] Anahí Ballent, page. "(..) la nueva vía atravesaría esta zona prácticamente vacía en cuanto a edificación, estructurando los nuevos emprendimientos y convirtiendo un paisaje rural en suburbano; en efecto, la autopista estaba pensada como una cinta que recorrería un espacio verde, entre un conjunto de edificaciones bajas y dispersas (..)," Anahí Ballent, *Las huellas de la política, p.*

[63] Ibid; see also Graciela Silvestri, *El color del río: Historia cultural del paisaje del Riachuelo* (Bernal, 2003), 143-14; "Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), *Revista de Arquitectura* (Buenos Aires) no. 297, año XXX, (September 1945).

major works to control the floods of the Matanza River. It included the closing of the city's incinerator and the end of garbage dumping in the area. It also established the development of a convention center, a stadium, and a series of recreational areas for the city. Even though the project was never built, many of its features were present almost two decades later when the works for the urbanization of the Parque Almirante Brown began. Among those features was the rupture of the traditional grid, an artifact that, as Gorelik has pointed out, represented the republican ideas for the democratization of space and Argentine society since the late nineteenth century. The program for the Bañanado de Flores designed by modernist architects Villa and Nazar showed the extent in which the arrival of modernism as a tool of urbanism implied the end of that era of republicanism.

In the following years, federal and municipal authorities passed different laws and ordinances authorizing expropriations and purchasing of lands for the construction of low-income housing, ordering the drainage of the area, leveling of the terrain, opening and paving of roads, and the expansion of the city's sewage system and that cut across the Bañado. In 1957, a decree-law transferred the expropriated terrain to the Municipality of Buenos Aires. Landscaping work also included the planting of more than thirty thousand trees, increasing city's green spaces from 8 to 15 percent.[64]

It was also in the 1940s when the first illegal settlements appeared in the Bañado de Flores. In 1948, a presidential decree authorized the construction of sixty temporary

[64] Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, "Préstamo a la Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires," internal document to assess the Municipality of Buenos Aires loan application, p. 131, archive of the Inter-American Development Bank, branch Argentina (IDB); Horacio Baliero, *Desarrollo urbano y vivienda: introducción al estudio de la acción del estado* (Buenos Aires: Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda, 1983); Rogelio Eiriz Sequeiros, "Urbanización del Bañado de Flores en la ciudad de Buenos Aires," *Boletín de Obras Sanitarias de la Nación* 51, vol. 5 (September 1941): 243.

houses for displaced families affected by urban renewal works, particular the widening of a central artery (Belgrano Ave). New families arrived occupying the surrounding public spaces, building their homes of plywood and their roofs of tarred cardboard. This settlement was the origin of Barrio Lacarra or Villa de Emergencia #2, according to the official municipal denomination.[65] [Figure 6] That same year began the occupation of the Villa de Emergencia #20 with the original establishment of 120 homes that later grew thanks to new occupations and subdivisions. In those years, the Bañado de Flores also became a trash dump, attracting poor unskilled workers that made their living removing, selecting, and commercializing recovering elements from the trash. This activity is called *cirujeo* [trash grubbing] The 1942 project for the urbanization of the Bañado de Flores, mentioned above, described the difficult situation of the inhabitants of the area, "There, housing alternates with trash dumps, dropped by the Municipality in what has become the local industry. Among clouds of flies and breathing a miasma atmosphere, is growing a generation of young people of uncertain future and with a dismal present: 'the little grubber" (el pequeño *ciruja*). We understand that the authorities should not keep their eyes close towards such an unpleasant spectacle and should get involved but providing the opportunity to improve this sector of the population in human conditions."[66]

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[65] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Investigación Aerofotográfica-terrestre de villas de emergencia en la Capital Federal: Parque Almirante Brown, Villas De Emergencia Nos. 1,2,3,6,11,12,13a,13b,14,18,20.* Buenos Aires: CMV, 1971, 21; Oscar Yujnovsky, *Claves políticas del problema habitacional;* Victoria Mazzeo, *La población residente en villas en la ciudad de Buenos Aires: su magnitud, localización y características. Transformaciones en el periodo 1960-1991*. Serie Metodológica #8 (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires/ Dirección de Estadísticas y Censos, 1991).

[66] "Allí la vivienda alterna con el vaciadero de basuras y estas últimas arrojadas por la Municipalidad constituyen la industria local. Entre nubes de moscas y respirando una atmósfera de miasmas crece una juventud de porvenir incierto y con un triste presente: 'el pequeños ciruja'. Entendemos que no pueden las autoridades cerrar los ojos ante dicho espectáculo y deben intervenir proporcionando la oportunidad de realijar dicho sector de la población en condiciones humanas." Revista de Arquitectura; for another description, see Francis Korn, *Buenos Aires, mundos particulares, 1870-1895, 1914-1945* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2004), 179.

Landfilling and the levelling of the terrain allowed for the settlements of these workers, giving origin to the Villa de Emergencia #3 also called, by then, Villa Nuestra Señora de Fátima.

In 1955, the government of the Revolución Libertadora built Barrio Rivadavia, a neighborhood for low-income families which was one of several small housing complex the BHN built after the ouster of Perón.[67] At the same time many of the slums affected by periodical flooding were relocated in available lands between Barrio Rivadavia and the Perito Moreno Ave, which was the access to the city from the west. This is the origin of the slum complex Villa 1-11-14, integrated by the Villa #1 (Medio Caño), #11 (Bonorino), and #14 (Villa 9 de Julio).[68] Easier access to water taps and better accessibility increased the density of these slums and by 1957 gave also birth to the Villas 13a and 13b. There, the Frondizi administration provided pre-fabricated homes which were famous for their half-pipe shape. Mocking the poor quality of the homes, the residents called their villa "medio-caño". In 1955, the Villa #12 (Villa Piolín) followed the establishment of sheds built for the storage and classification of waste and rubbish. The precarious shacks built in its surroundings were mostly populated by Bolivian immigrants, and gave origin to the most emblematic neighborhood mostly composed of families from the neighboring country.[69]

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[67] Barrio Rivadavia soon became a slum and it was actually demolished on 1973.

[68] The villa 1-11-14 is also one of the largest villas in the city nowadays, which concentrates a vast population of neighboring countries and concentrates most of the xenophobic anxieties of the *porteño* population.

[69] The neighborhood is nowadays denominated Barrio General San Martín or popularly called barrio Charrúa and it is the core and the reference point of the Bolivian community in Buenos Aires. Eighty percent of its inhabitants are Bolivian and Bolivian descendents. In its origins, the precarious settlement parcial fires in 1950, 1965, and 1968. The church of the Nuestra Señora de Copacabana is located there. Observatorio de colectividades, accessed January 27, 2012,

Finally, in the northern extreme of the Bañado, next to the highway that connects the international airport with the city, were located villas #5, 6, and 18. Construction workers of the highway built villa #5 in a construction site where they used materials to assemble their shacks.[70] These slums are important to us, because the first housing complexes the MCBA built as part of the construction of PAB were in these locations. They were also the subjects of the Pilot Plan for the Eradication of Slums, launched during the Illia administration.

Centro Urbano Integrado Parque Almirante Brown

It was the Pilot Plan for the Parque Almirante Brown (PAB) of the Organización del Plan Regulador that established a program for the Bañado de Flores and the incorporation of that neglected part of the city into the urban fabric. The OPRBA focused on "the promotion of urban rehabilitation of those terrains in which present-day use is inadequate to the level of development reached by the city" and specified the urbanization of residential and recreational zones in the city's south.[71] The development of this area, which became known as Centro Urbano Integrado Parque Almirante Brown (PAB**)**, was the most important program of urban development in terms of dimensions, social implications, applied organizational and technical skills, and capital investment.[72]

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http://www.buenosaires.gob.ar/areas/secretaria_gral/colectividades/?secInterna=159&subSeccion=523&col=38 .

[70] The increasing activity that trash brought to the area and the arrival and the people that arrived to the place on the weekends to play soccer in the spontaneously built field contributed to the expansion of the site and the origin of villa #6 (Cildañez) and #18 predominantly occupied by Paraguayan immigrants. The growth of the Cildañez villa was so rapid that municipal ordinances during the Frondizi administration ordered the construction of a school. Yujnovsky, 121.

[71] Organización del Plan Regulador, *Descripción Sintética del Plan Regulador* (Buenos Aires; Municipalidad de Buenos Aires, 1968), 56.

[72] Besides the Parque Almirante Brown, the plan indicated the creation of residential areas in "Casa Amarilla" (23,5 ha; 23,500 inhabitants) and "Catalinas Sur" (8,5 ha; 8,900 inhabitants) in the neighborhood

Presidential Decree 8717 of 1962 authorized the definitive urbanization of the Parque, envisioning a large-scale, multiyear program of public works that included the cleaning up (saneamiento) of the area, the recovery of lands by leveling the terrains, drainage and wetlands, flood control measures (through the tubing of the Cildañez Creek and the construction of artificial lakes to regulate high water), creation of green areas, and the construction of recreational spaces. The plan conceived a careful zoning of the area, divided in housing and community facilities (348 ha), recreational and green spaces (769 ha), a small industrial park for light industries (43 ha), and roads (247 ha) [Figure 7-10]. Among the urban amenities prescribed in the plan for development and modernization were a zoological garden, an area set aside for sports (including tennis courts, soccer and softball fields, polo fields and riding areas), a cultural center, museums, a metropolitan theater, and a commercial and entertainment center.[73] There were also plans for the construction of a university campus.[74] Therefore, the urbanization of such a significant amount of land represented a major spatial restructuration of the city and significant opportunity to bring about solutions for most of the urban problems.

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of La Boca; the ex-Arsenal "Esteban de Luca" (20ha; 20,000 inhabitants); the ex-National Penitentiary (10ha; 17,200 inhabitants) in the neighborhood of Palermo; "Catalinas Norte" (offices, hotels, shopping areas, and parking lots) in Retiro; the terrains of the College of Agronomy-University of Buenos Aires (40,000 inhabitants); "Playa Caballito" (26ha) and the Parque Almirante Brown (1400 ha; 250,000 inhabitants); Plano Director del Plan Regulador, 3-4.

[73] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, "Parque Almirante Brown" (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1969).

[74] Never built, the university campus was for the Universidad Tecnológica Nacional. In another part of Buenos Aires, right next to Río de la Plata river, Universidad de Buenos Aires began the construction of Ciudad Universitaria. As it was the case with the campus of the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, in the Ilha do Fundão, built in the 1950s, the construction of campuses far from the city's center was a way for the governments to remove students from city centers.

Housing for low-income families was a central part of the pilot program.[75] These plans included housing for working families that could afford monthly installments. Two complexes were built by the MCBA right next to the highway (Dellepiane Ave) that linked the international airport. Most ambitious were the plans to build two separate neighborhood units for a total of 50,000 housing units to accommodate 250,000 people in Villa Lugano and Villa Soldatti.[76] [Figure 9] Conceived as pilot programs to be built in stages in a period of twelve years, these neighborhoods were to provide a major solution to the lack of housing for low-income sectors.[77] Villa Lugano, the plans indicated, might have six sections and Villa Soldati five. Conceived as neighborhood units, as it was the case with the *vilas* in Rio, the plan was to build self-contained integrated urban centers serviced with collective facilities including schools, health posts, day-care, schools, commercial center, playgrounds, a church, and public offices. Envisaging the progressive development of the neighborhood, the urbanization of the area also implied heavy investment in complex and basic infrastructure like running sewerage and water systems –including the channeling of the Cildañez Creek, connection to gas and electric power, and telephone services. [Figures 10]

When the mayor of Buenos Aires, Francisco Rabanal, turned to the IDB with a loan request in December 1965, the preparations for urbanization in PAB were proceeding at steady pace. Most of the grading, the storm drains, the lakes, and roads

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[75] In this sense, this urban program differed from the urbanization of Brasília, where Lucio Costa's Plano Piloto did not contemplate the provision of houses for the working classes who had built the city. In this way, the very poor in the Brazilian modernist iconic city were denied their place as residents.

[76] The two housing complexes built next to the highway were relatively smaller in total units and were not conceived as neighborhood units.

[77] Argentina, Loan Proposal and IDB analysis of the project. At the same time, the CMV was in charge of the construction of two other housing complexes, of smaller scale. The Pampa complex (368 units; 1.354 residents), in Bajo Belgrano, for the people affected by the expansion of Libertador Ave., and San Pedrito complex (576 units; 1,993 residents) in Bajo Flores, for the displaced people from the boarding houses and hotels located in those terrains demolished for the expansion of the Avenue 9 de Julio.

were well in advance. The incorporation and urbanization of the area demanded the federal and local government become involved with local planning through the creation and execution of urban renewal legislation and the institutionalization of the bureaucratic and technical apparatus in charge of urban reform. The MCBA assumed technical and financial control of the basic infrastructure and created two institutions in charge of coordinating the complex operation that included public national and municipal agencies, public utility companies, and a huge number of private contractors. These agencies were the Comité de Ejecución y Desarrollo para las Obras del Parque Almirante Brown (CEDOPAB) and the Municipal Housing Commission (CMV; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda). The latter was responsible for the execution of the housing program and became, in the following decades, a key institutional actor in the area of housing.

The MCBA executed and financed all the infrastructural works at Parque Almirante Brown and the construction of two housing complexes in Richhieri, right next to the highway to the International Airport. But to speed up the construction of more housing units, the MCBA requested a loan to the IDB's for the Social Progress Trust Fund for the construction of 6,440 units in apartment buildings in Villa Lugano, the eradication of four little Villas de Emergencia, as well as the construction of 3,024 single-family houses in Ciudad General Belgrano in Greater Buenos Aires, for the people to be cleared from the slums. For this latter development, the Municipality of Buenos Aires bought an area of 90 hectares (222 acres) in Greater Buenos Aires, six kilometers from PAB.[78] [figure 11]

[78] See Andrea Catenazzi y Teresa Boselli, "Los arquitectos proyectistas y las politicas oficiales de vivienda - Area Metropolitana de Buenos Aires,1963/1973," *Revista AREA* (Buenos Aires), 5 (1999): 35-53.

Housing of social interest and the promise of providing a new built environment for slum residents were central in the considerations of the IDB it fitted the social purposes of the international organization and the core principles of the Alliance for Progress. In his letter to Felipe Herrera, the IDB director, Major Rabanal closed his supporting statement for the loan proposal by framing the project within the spirit of the Alliance for Progress, "Once completed the works for the development program of the Parque Almirante Brown, they [the works] will become a living and dynamic example of the value of inter-American cooperation within the framework of the Alliance for Progress whose philosophy, briefly, does not purse another objective than the welfare of the people of America, through the constant improvement of their standards of life and their culture."[79]

In March 1965, the MCBA sent a letter of application to the IDB for funds to the urbanization of PAB and the eradication of nearby slums. Between July and August 1965, an IDB mission headed by Ecuadorian architect Sixto Durán Ballen visited Buenos Aires for the first time.[80] Between August and September of that same year, USAID had sent Albert L. Wilson, Director of Research and Development of the Foundation for Cooperative Housing's (FCH), to analyze the socio-economic situation of PAB's slum dwellers. In this case, USAID involvement was only in the form of technical assistance for feasibility studies. Wilson, sharing the optimistic expectations of the Alliance about

[79] Francisco Rabanal, letter to Felipe Herrera, 10 December 1965, in Municipalidad de Buenos Aires, *Centro Urbano Integrado Parque Almirante Brown: Solicitud del préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo* (Buenos Aires, MCBA, c.1966) "Completado pues el Programa de desarrollo de las obras del Parque Almirante Brown, éstas se constituirán en un ejemplo vivo y dinámico del valor de la cooperación interamericana dentro del marco de la Alianza para el Progreso cuya filosofía, en resumen, no persigue otro objetivo que el bienestar de los pueblos de América, a través del mejoramiento constante de sus niveles de vida y su cultura."

[80] Durán Ballén served as mayor of Quito (1970-1978) and then president of Ecuador (1992-1996). He was not the first architect president. Like Peruvian president Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-68), he used his formation as an architect and the emphasis on planning as a governing tool.

the role of technical assistance in contributing to local developmental efforts, expressed, "it is my deepest hope that this information and analysis may contribute to a fresh, positive and creative understanding between the people of Gran Buenos Aires and the residents of the Villas, resulting in a re-location and community development project which will be only the dawn of an era of accelerating social and economic progress and an exemplary model for the other cities of this hemisphere of ours."[81]

In December 1965, the MCBA with the support, of the national government through the Ministry of Economy and the Council for National Development (CONADE), requested the IDB for a loan on the total amount of $34 million dollars for a partial funding of housing of social interest in PAB. Argentine authorities estimated the total cost of the program in $163 million dollars of which the MCBA had already invested almost $45 million dollars. The plan calculated that the housing deficit by the end of 1965 was 1,350,000 housing units plus more than 500,000 obsolete dwellings (total of 1,860,000).[82] It also showed the significant decrease in public participation in the housing sector which fell from 48% in 1955 to 0.6% in 1962.[83] Albert L. Wilson, the USAID housing expert estimated the city's housing deficit of 600,000 homes and the number of slum dwellers in 150,000, one third living in PAB. In his study of the villas #5, 6, and 18, Wilson found out that most of the population was actually employed and

[81] L. Albert Wilson, letter to The Honorable Francisco Rabanal, Mayor, 15 December 1965; in L. Albert Wilson, *Voice of the Villas: Socio-Economic Analysis of the Residents of the Villas in Parque Almirante Brown, Buenos Aires, Argentina,* FCH, Company and Foundation for Cooperative Housing Inc., 1965. Data collection for this study were undertaken by the social workers of the CMV who were actually working in the slums #5, 6, and 18 as part of the Plan for the Eradication of Villas Miserias.
[82] Most of the data that supported the loan proposal made use of census information and the analysis the CONADE came up with for the National Development Plan (1965/69), which was the first comprehensive national and integral development plan in Argentina framed by CEPAL developmentalist ideas. Roque Carranza was the director of CONADE during the Illia administration and backed the MCBA's loan proposal.
[83] IDB loan evaluation 35-36.

had some sort of income. With a high level of employment, the US expert agreed with local authorities that more than four fifths of this population were capable of purchasing their homes if given access to properties and credit. The IDB also estimated that the program was going to provide a net return of 16,660,323 in thirty years in terms of repayment of loans. Allotted funds would thus become seed capital for a self-sufficient program that included the construction of the next stages in Lugano and Villa Soldati.

After careful consideration and revisions, the IDB agreed to fund the housing program but demanded a series of institutional developments as well as modifications to the design of the housing complexes. As in most of the projects or programs funded by international organisms, one of the preconditions for the disbursement of funds was the modernization and rationalization of state bureaucracy. This was part of the public administration ethos of the 1960s in which planning and technical expertise increasingly defined the language and the competence of the state in economic and social areas of interest. In Argentina, such faith in the role of applied science and technology to the planning of development was evident in the creation of several institutions and the strong support to the scientific renovation, particularly the Universidad de Buenos Aires.[84]

Among the institutional developments that IDB requested was the consolidation and strengthening of the CMV.[85] The IDB wanted a semi-autonomous housing agency with management capacity and operational efficiency to undertake the many complex

[84] Examples of the optimistic expectations about the role of science and technology as tools to apply in the development of the country are the creation of the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET; 1958), the National Agricultural Technology Institute (INTA; 1956); the National Industry Technological Institute (INTI; 1957) and the Council for National Development (CONADE), Argentine's national planning agency.

[85] The MCBA had created the housing agency in 1961 to administer the Municipal Housing Fund (Fondo Municipal de la Vivienda; FMV) established in that same moment. Yet, as it was the case with constitution of the S&L system, the CMV suffered different setbacks. It was not until 1965 that the CMV began to fully operate with a team of highly trained experts. Municipal ordinance 17823 (7/27/1961); Decree 8/21/1961 constitutes the FMV and the CMV.

responsibilities it had to assume.[86] The first mission that visited Argentina in March 1965, was impressed during the first mission to Argentina with the quality of the people working at the CMV, under the direction of architect Maximo Vázquez Llona.[87] They considered the personnel of high technical quality, devoted, and efficient but the agency they noted, needed more personnel and better salaries. As a result the CMV increased its staff and, giving its semi-autonomous status, increased salaries beyond the scale allowed for public municipal officials, bringing people from the private sector.[88] By 1969 the CMV had thirty-three architects, thirty engineers, five sociologists, five economists, five land surveyors, and seventy-six technicians.[89] According to architect Heriberto Allende, head of the CMV's Studies and Projects Divisions, the efficiency of the agency as well as the good relationship they had with the IDB guaranteed the continuity of the project and personnel despite the military coup that ousted President Illia. As chapter 5 will show, these conditions lasted until t the conclusion and inauguration of the first stage of VL1-2 in 1970. In the following years, the CMV got caught within the politization of public administration by the time Perón was preparing his return to national politics.

Heriberto Allende recalls the relationship with IDB being very cordial, supporting but at the same time very demanding. In the first two years, which were mostly the years of the design of the project and works of urbanization of the area, the IDB not only required the MCBA to secure support with the nation and the consolidation of the CMV,

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[86] Personal interview with architect Heriberto Allende, head of the CMV's Studies and Projects Divisions in charge of the design of VL1-2 and CGB, 5 August 2009. To reinforce the status of the CMV, a Committee composed of the Nation's President, the Minister of Public Works, and the Mayor among others supported the decisions of the CMV.

[87] Vázquez Llona became president of the BHN and Secretario de Estado de Vivienda y Urbanismo of the Minister of Social Welfare of the military dictatorship in 1976.

[88] Architects Jorge Silvetti and Jorge Lestard, who worked in the design of Villa Lugano, emphasized these points in individual interviews which might underline the moment of expansion the CMV received in the first years, thanks to the support of the IDB. Personal interview with architect Jorge Lestard, July 5, 2009.

[89] Heriberto Allende personal archive.

but it also influenced the guiding principles of the housing program. During the construction's stage (1968-1970), the IDB mission also visited the CMV's offices and the construction sites regularly, once or twice a year, the organism also assigned permanent supervisors and technical assistants in charge of studying and analyzing technical data, agreements among participant agencies, blueprints, specifications, procedures for public bids, adjudication of contracts, supervision of construction sites.[90] It is, then, time to see the design of the housing complexes.

The design of Villa Lugano and Ciudad General Belgrano

VL1-2 and CGB represented an incredible opportunity not only to build housing for low-income residents but, perhaps more important, it was also the challenge to build the city ["hacer ciudad"]. According to the original plan, VL1-2 was going to be the first stage of a longer plan to provide more than 50,000 housing units to 250,000 people in the span of 12 years. Villa Lugano (1-5) and Villa Soldatti (1-5) were going to be built in an area that few years prior had been a rural desolated swamp and a trash dump. That landscape was to receive urban services, including the expansion of the water and sewage system, electricity, gas, as well as the opening and pavement of the central traffic arteries (Roca Ave, Larrazabal, Cruz, Blanco Escalada). The project, in addition, meant a planned and audacious break with the city's traditional urban grid of Buenos Aires. If such grid represented, according to Adrián Gorelik, the republican reformism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, this new intervention offered a new and different

[90] William Bill Cooke, who later became President of Arizona Architects Association, and Peruvian Raul Cano settled in Argentina for about two to three years and were intimately involved in the project; Heriberto Allende, personal interview.

progressive pattern of city to the urban fabric. It is in this sense, that for the architects of the CMV, this was the opportunity to "hacer ciudad." [91]

The design of Villa Lugano was very innovative and visionary. The construction of Lugano's first stage consisted in high-density towers of apartment residences placed in two main strips of 14-story brutalist slab blocks made of reinforced concrete, located in two superblocks, forming a long street corridor. [Figures 12-18] It covered about sixty-seven hectares and included 6,440 apartments, and a commercial and civic center. The first phase, built between 1968 and 1970, consisted of sixty-eight towers with a total of 3,808 apartments (2,464 one-bedroom and 1,344 two-bedroom), fifteen daycares and 264 commercial stores. There are 56 apartments in each building. That first stage also included a community center, a social and sport club, a health and a policy post, a postal agency, magistrate's court (juzgado de paz), a bank, a Catholic church, four schools, and a kindergarten. The second stage included the construction of fourty-seven additional buildings (of similar characteristics as the first stage) with a total of 2,632 apartments. A landscaped green area surrounded the flats.[92]

The main feature of the project was that it established a strict differentiation between vehicular and pedestrian traffic, locating each on different levels to avoid "mutual interference." [Figures 15-17] Pedestrians shopping streets, for instance, were situated along an elevated sidewalk at the level of the first floor of the buildings and a system of bridges connected the towers, allowing for the creation of spaces of circulation

[91] Architects Heriberto Allende and Jorge Lestard both used this same term. Jorge Silvetti also recalled the opportunity that Villa Lugano represented. Personal interview, August 3, 2009.
[92] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown* (Buenos Aires: MCBA, circa 1969); Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Villa Lugano 1-2* (Buenos Aires: MCBA, c. 1969); "Conjunto Lugano I y II," *Revista Construcciones* (Buenos Aires), no 227 (January-February 1971): 361-366; "Lugano I-II," *Summa* (Buenos Aires), no 18 (September 1969): 53-58.

and sociability. This "obsession" with a dynamic use of space and communication among buildings was part of the recent trends in architecture, as we will see. The set of drawings and blueprints attached to the loan proposal imagined a warm spatial arrangement in which a white middle class socialized in the areas designed for that purpose, as Chapter 5 will show.[93]

The individual apartments were of a fine quality. The proportion of housing types was consistent with the distribution of families according to the 1960 census: 60% of one-bedroom apartments [dos dormitorios] (families of three to five members), 35% of two-bedroom (families of five to seven), and 5% of three bedroom (families of seven or more). In terms of the floor plan, the design represented a simple, rationalized solution to optimize the use of space. All the interiors in Lugano were tiled, kitchens had ovens and water heater (a difference with Ciudad General Belgrano were residents were expected to do the finishing). Telephone connections were set. In addition, each tower had a set of automated elevators and trash incinerators. Manuals for the users explained with the uses of these facilities. In every case, all homeowners were subject to Argentina's horizontal property regime (Law 13,152/1948) that states that each owner and proportionally co-owner are responsible for the whole building and collective facilities, as in a co-op.

The architectural design was innovative for Buenos Aires and incorporated the contemporary ideas and discussions of the Team X, a group of European architects that challenged the Modernist conception of the city. By the early 1950s, began a crisis within the modern movement that gave place to a moment of huge renovation in architecture. Informed by, but also as a reaction against the work of architects like Le

[93] Municipalidad de Buenos Aires, *Centro Urbano Integrado Parque Almirante Brown: solicitud del préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo* (Buenos Aires: MCBA, c.1966)

Corbusier and his Unité d'Habitation, the Team X criticized the modernist conception of the housing residence for not having considered the relationship between the housing complex and the city at a human scale. Modernism had built wonderful residential buildings and had liberated the land for social and public use. Yet the modernist pavilions became isolated pieces, displaced in a scale that was simply too excessive for a comfortable urban life. The Team X gathered in 1953 during the Ninth Congress of CIAM and formalized a schism within the Modernist Movement.[94] In January 1954, Peter Smithson, John Voelcker, Jacob Bakema, Also Van Eyck, George Candilis, and others that formed (the Doorn group), issued a collective "Statement on Habitat" that criticized the modernist movement affirming that "Urbanism considered and developed in the terms of the Chartre d'Athenes [the architectural modernist manifesto] tends to produce 'towns' in which vital human associations are inadequately expressed. To comprehend these human associations we must consider every community as a particular *total* complex."[95] The functional hierarchy of the Athens Charter, the Smithsons would say, had to be replaced with an architecture that could serve as an expression of community.

The argentine architects looked at the project that Alice and Peter Smithson submitted for the Golden Lane Housing competition in 1952, or the work of Georges Candilis, Alexis Josic, and Shadrach Woods in Toulouse Le Mirail, in France (1961-1971). The proposal was to build housing complexes, but instead of creating and isolated modernist pavilions, they wanted to connect them, articulate them, in a way that would facilitate pedestrian traffic and a more dynamic human use of the space. They

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[94] The name Team X was in opposition to the CIAM X (Tenth) meeting.

[95] "Doorn Manifesto", cited in Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928-1960* (Cambridge: Massachusetts, 2000), 239-249; on the history of the schism pages 238-259. Architects Jaap Bakema, Georges Candilis, Giancarlo De Carlo, Aldo van Eyck, Alison and Peter Smithson, and Shadrach Woods were the inner circle of Team X. 3

emphasized the relation among spaces and spatial uses, in opposition to the strict zoning of the modernist movement. Or, as architect Manfredo Tafuri put it, "Here the structure of the *Siedlungen* of Weimar Germany is vastly improved and made part of a theoretical continuum."[96] These were the "streets in the sky" the concept of the Smithsons came up with to connect buildings by broad aerial walkways, as they did years later in Robin Hood Gardens in Poplar, London. This strict separation between vehicular and terrestrial traffic had been also explored before in the work of Jo van den Broek and Jacob Bakema for the reconstruction of the main shopping street of Rotterdam, the Lijnbaan, destroyed during the war. Between 1949 and 1954, these architects built "an integrated complex of shops along two intersecting pedestrian thoroughfares and adjoined by ten-story slab like apartment houses facing compact green areas. A number of commercial buildings around the complex link it with the surrounding urban area."[97]

Although the design of VL1-2 was inspired in the discussions in Europe, the IDB also established certain guiding principles which affected important decisions regarding design, adding to the idea of Lugano as this space of encounter. Concern with the maximization of the social impact of the housing plan, the IDB demanded a very high density of 1,000 inhabitants per hectare for a total area of 50 ha that would serve to 50,000 residents.[98] The non-negotiable issue of density influenced the decision to build the tall slab towers. Any other spatial distribution would have been impossible (especially for single-family homes). It also affected the original plan to provide every apartment

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[96] Manfredo Tafuri and Francesco Dal Co, *Modern Architecture* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1979), 371 (originally published in Italy as *Architettura Contemporanea* in 1976).
[97] Tafuri, 369/. Other sources of inspiration were also the brutalist architecture of Kenzo Tange in Japan, and later on, the pop ideas of the avant-gard group of architects around the magazine Archigram in the 1960s. Personal interview with Jorge Lestard; personal interview with Jorge Silvestri; personal interview with Silvio Grichener.
[98] The population density in this area, by then, was very low, 75 to 100 inhabitants per Ha.

with a view to the surrounding green area. This would have impeded a more rationalized use of space. Likewise, the original project planned some variations in the total height of the towers, especially at both ends of the strips to give a more diverse and textured landscape or, better said, skyline. But the IDB also opposed this reform of the design as it would also impact negatively in density. In addition, aesthetic choices that could increase costs were also rejected. As a result, we can say that the Alliance for Progress did not impose any particular aesthetic language but rather enforced certain aspirations such as economy of space and resources in post of a larger number of built units.

Prefabrication is another element that can shed light about the intersections of transnational ideas and local conceptions. According to Heliberto Allende, international organisms involved in urban renewal or housing projects put pressure in local authorities to the importation of building materials as a stimulus to the lending country, especially the United States.[99] But most of the required materials, according to Allende, were locally produced. Still, IDB insisted in the use of prefabricated systems as a way to reduce costs and stimulate the participation of foreign firms. As the 1960s was a key decade in the production of low-income housing in the third world, rationalization, standardization, serialization of construction systems, and the mass production of building components became a key topic. International organisms like the UN, USAID, and IDB sought to advise planners, engineers, and architects from developing countries with methods to achieve systematic solutions to building requirements. Serialization and mass production,

[99] Allende pointed out that for many organisms, the level of importation was key when negotiating loans. Allende recalled a visit Robert McNamara to Villa Lugano in the late 1960s as Director of the World Bank in which Allende asked him if his organization would participate in the project. McNamara then asked him which percentage of the total costs represented purchases to the United States to which Allende answered back around five percent. Then McNamara, Allende recalls, told him, then we can think of giving a 5%.

the example in Europe and the US seemed to demonstrate, became a central paradigm to lower construction costs.

In 1967, the United Nations organized a meeting in Denmark for Latin American American experts, which included representatives from the OAS, IDB, and the UN, on capacitation in prefabrication methods. Heriberto Allende participated in that trip. After his return to Buenos Aires, and aware of IDB's insistence in pre-fabrication, Allende gathered his team to think the feasibility of using pre-fabrication techniques. After long conversations, the personnel agreed that as a public organism it was not recommendable to support just one construction system, a decision that would have affected negatively local contractors and companies building traditionally. In addition, as a pilot project, the CMV wanted to experiment with different construction systems.

Still, the design of Villa Lugano was modified in order to facilitate a mix-technique and allow for the inclusion of prefabrication, serialization, and mass production of certain elements. The use of repeated modules was central. The CMV came up with a design that reduced all the building components to a particular unit (3.15-meter unit). All the designs of the project had to be reducible to that unit (or be multiple of it). The windows, for instance, are perhaps the best example to illustrate this point. Considering the scale of the project, it was necessary to mass-produce offsite themore than 6,500 windows. The CMV used this opportunity to try different materials and solutions. The final result were fiber cement panels of 3.15 meters long with aluminum windows of 3.15m by 1.50m that were added to the buildings with cranes.[100]

[100] For the construction of Lugano, the public bid divided the construction to eight different companies that could build in any system always fulfilling the requirements of the program.

As a result, Villa Lugano became an experimental program and served local authorities to realize that Argentina was a country more suitable for the use of mixed construction systems rather than one, fully mechanized prefabricated system. Prefabrication appeared more reasonable in Europe or the US where labor costs were higher and weather conditions imposed limits in the seasonality of civil construction. In Argentina, prefabrication was not economically reasonable, which in other terms means that it was more profitable to hire poorly paid manual labor than investing in technology. As Guillermo Vitelli pointed out in the past, construction workers' salaries increased less than productivity, making construction companies to gain profit and keep a flexible structure more suitable for an unstable market.[101]

In the case of Ciudad General Belgrano, the scale of the project was significant although smaller in comparison to the VL1-2. The plan was simpler. [Figures 19-21] Localized in La Matanza district, Greater Buenos Aires, CMV planned the construction of a neighborhood unit of 3,024 single-family units, covering 90 hectares of the 400 the city owned in the province. This was an unusual operation as it was strange for the city to have territory in another jurisdiction. According to Allende, there were internal debates with the CMV team of sociologists and social workers leaded by sociologist Joaquín Fischerman about whether to build monoblocks or single-family homes. Fischerman was working at that time in Villa #5, 6, 6 bis, and 18, located in PAB, whose residents were going to be relocated mostly in CGB. Among the people who supported the detached home were many that argued that the as rural migrants, many of the future resident would prefer to have their backyard as they were more used to that habitat, a discourse that, we

[101] Guillermo Vitelli, "Cambio tecnológico, estructura de mercado y ocupación en la industria de la construcción argentina," *El Trimestre Económico* 45, no. 180 (4) (October 1978): 997–1031.

have seen in Chapter 1, repeated the general stereotypes about these urban residents. In this sense, VL1-2 was a more expensive project and, therefore, the people to be relocated there were of a higher income than the ones that were going to be settled in CGB. The units were kept to a simple design that maximized a rather small space. The finishing was also basic. Defined as a self-aided project, new residents were expected to assume active responsibilities for their place. As it was the case with VL1-2, the project also required the extension of the urban infrastructure and communal facilities characterstics of a self-contained integrated neighborhood unit, including schools, health posts, day-care centers, community centers, commercial center, playgrounds, churches, and public offices. The CMV's original plan also programmed a design that facilitated repetition and the serialization of the construction procedures in order to rationalize costs and time. The construction rhythm was fast at a pace of 200 homes per month.[102]

In terms of construction plans, the CMV envisioned the division of the area in nine sectors to split the work among nine construction companies.[103] The idea was to promote the participation of individual (local) small and medium companies. Nevertheless, the CMV granted the whole project to one large developer: the US-based FIELD Argentina SA. The study of this operation suggests some lines of analysis to explore the relationship between foreign assistance, cold war politics, authoritarianism, and corruption in a historical context in which the Alliance for Progress was coming to an end. By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that the purposes of the Alliance to contribute

[102] "Ciudad General Belgrano," *Revista Construcciones*, no 232 (November-December 1971): 630-638; Personal interview with architect Silvio Grichener, July 10, 2009.
[103] Field Argentina SACICy, Memoria técnica para licitación de viviendas (Silvio Grichener in collaboration with Francisco Sainz Trápaga), Silvio Grichener, personal archive.

to the development of Latin American democracies had turned into the support of military dictatorships, more efficient in containing social discontent.

In his classic work, Guillermo O'Donnell has pointed out that the period inaugurated with the coup of General Ongania in 1966 until the return of Perón in 1973 represented the emergence of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, an association between technocratic elites and the military governments to undertake the modernization process. In Argentina, it represented the most serious effort, until then, to break the hegemonic struggle among different alliances of classes and national projects. It was the government of the so-called Revolución Argentina that imposed the most systematic attempt to consolidate the position of the most advanced part of the traditional oligarchy, concentrated national industrial sectors, and foreign corporations. Building upon this model, Yujnovsky has shown that the construction sector also witnessed a moment of concentration leaded by the association among few international developers with the capital and technological capacity to work in large-scale project and local construction companies.[104] State-sponsored large-scale construction projects, which also included highways and dams (ie, Chocón-Cerros Colorados), offered these companies significant opportunities.[105]

FIELD Argentina, owned by a US developer Mr. Field, began to operate in Argentina in 1961, by the time when the USAID and Argentine authorities were in negotiations to stimulate the housing market and the construction sector. By the mid 1960s, the company's board was composed mostly of members linked with the armed forces, a characteristic of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state in Argentina. For instance,

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[104] Yujnovsky, 52.

[105] The three international companies that get involved in housing projects between 1966 and 1972 are Field Construcciones; Dragados y Construcciones SA (DYCASA) y Solel Boneh'**s.**

FIELD's Director in 1965 was Nicanor Costa Mendez, who resigned in 1966 to become Minister of Foreign Relations of the military dictatorship of Ongania (he hold that position again during the military dictatorship of 1976-1983 and was a central during the Malvinas War in 1982). Captain Guillermo Rawson replaced him as director then.

Envisioning the possibility to build CGB in its totality, FIELD authorities began conversations in 1968 with the representatives of the Rockefeller's IBEC Housing Company to sell them 51% of their shares. From August to December 1968, several communications with IBEC headquarters in New York and its representatives in Buenos Aires showed the degree of privilege access the company had among top-level officials at the CMV and the IDB's officials working in the project. In August of that year, Frederic W. Botts informed Rodman Rockefeller that architect Bill Cook, the consultant the IDB assigned for the MCBA-IDB program, had told him that he had supported in front of CMV authorities FIELD's offer.[106] Botts even gave Rodman Rockefeller details about the secret public bid, suggesting the possibility that he had accessed privilege information. A month later, Botts announced Rockefeller that he should not be worried about CMV's original plans to grant the work to nine different contractors, "Quite contrary to the worries expressed in your letter," wrote Botts, "contacts with BID/Municipality subsequent to release of pliegos [tender specifications?], clearly confirm their desire for one contractor performing the entire job. If you can believe them, they have expressed

[106] In a letter to Rodman Rockefeller, Frederick W. Botts a Field representative in Argentina mentioned the confidential conversations with the IDB architect working in Ciudad General Belgrano. Bill Cook, "the BID honcho for Ciudad Belgrano," provided the representative with details about the public bid. Frederick W. Botts to Rodman Rockefeller, August 30, 1968, Folder entitled IBECASA SA: Argentina – Planning – Expansion – FIELD Argentina, Reel 123 IHD (IBEC Housing Division), Consultants, Foley, R.M., Oct 1958-Dec 1961, IBEC SA (IBEC Hosuing Division), Argentina, International Basic Economy Corporation Archives, 1945-1977 (IBEC), RAC.

clear favoritism that this single contractor be Field Argentina. I will have a better picture upon my arrival in NY."[107]

From that moment on, IBEC focused on analyzing the building capacity of FIELD to analyze if the company was in condition to undertake the complex task. FIELD had previously built a housing program (1,000 units) in Rosario, Santa Fe, for which it had built a factory to produce bricks and many of the housing's component parts. In October, and after much analysis, IBEC's representatives requested the approval "for the acquisition of 51% of the common stock of Field Argentina and for granting a *peso* working capital loan to finance the construction of 3,000 homes in Buenos Aires" was. In the memo R.Rockefeller sent to IBEC's Executive Committee, he supported the acquisition affirming, "The City of Buenos Aires has now put for bids a large, potentially quite profitable project that Field Argentina proposed IBEC join them in doing. This is the opportunity we have waited for, and we wish to seize it."[108] IBEC expected to make a net profit of one million dollars in CGB.[109]

Showing close contact with municipal Authorities, FIELD representatives tell Rockefeller in November 19 that, "The 'jefe de la Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda' was quoted as saying to a mutual friend: 'Field Argentina se robó la licitación. Lo que debemos hacer ahora es adjudicar la obra y empezar la construcción lo más rápido

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[107] Botts to Rodman Rockefeller, September 18, 1968, Folder entitled IBECASA SA: Argentina – Planning – Expansion – FIELD Argentina, Reel 123, International Basic Economy Corporation Archives, 1945-1977 (IBEC), RAC.

[108] Rockefeller also commented FIELD's plan to build the Sheraton Hotel, the project to renew the area of Retiro, itself a symbol of imperialism that gained huge significance years later during with the political radicalization of peronism and the new left. Rodman Rockefeller to the Executive Committee, October 24, 1968, Folder entitled IBECASA SA: Argentina – Planning – Expansion – FIELD Argentina, Reel 123, International Basic Economy Corporation Archives, 1945-1977 (IBEC), RAC.

[109] Confidential memorandum, November 13, 1968, Folder entitled IBECASA SA: Argentina – Planning – Expansion – FIELD Argentina, Reel 123, International Basic Economy Corporation Archives, 1945-1977 (IBEC), RAC.

posible. [Field has stolen the bid. We now must be giving them the work and begin the construction as quickly as possible].” After months of negotiations, however, IBEC apparently declined to accept the FIELD offer in December 3, 1968.

Unfortunately, the evidence disappears here and it is impossible to know whether new conversations began at a later stage. Architect Silvio Grichener, who worked for FIELD in the revision of the CMV specifications for CGB and in the construction’s first stage, recalls a Rockefeller visiting FIELD’s headquarters in Buenos Aires but research does not allow confirmation of this fact. Yet, whether IBEC was involved or not in the project, the evidence shows the degree of connection between CMV top authorities, IDB personnel, and the representatives of US corporations.[110]

Conclusion

In the 1960s Buenos Aires witnessed a moment of expansion marked by huge contrasts. The character of the economic and social modernization during the developmentalist era contributed to the expansion of consumption and the cosmopolitanization of the city. The flipside of this process was the increasing levels of inequality and poverty that caused an increase in the number of slums and slum residents in the city and especially in the outskirts.

With the ouster of Perón, the state abandoned the social justice approach that had considered housing as a social right and organized the mechanisms that regulated and modernize the mortgage market. Homeownership had to be the result of the sacrifice and

[110] Grichener recalls how the company, analyzing the evidence that certain works prescribed in the CMV’s original plans were a waist of money and resources, the order was finally to build according to the general plan as that operation was profitable for FIELD and actually its construction allowed the financing of the whole operation. Sanez Trápaga was the engeneer in charge of the project.

effort of the individual who would save and contribute in the production of the housing market. State efforts in this regard focused in the organization of the financial market, with particular attention to the creation of the Savings and Loan System. This understanding of the housing problem and the solutions implemented targeted the middle and lower-middle classes who were in conditions to save. Yet, living conditions for the poor worsened and construction levels also decreased at serious rates in the second half of the 1950s until 1962. Slums became recognized as the outcome of the unequal character of the Argentine economy and its existence was perceived as a potential focus of social disintegration and political unrest. To this sector, the state promoted a more shy policy of housing construction.

The Alliance for Progress in Argentina made available funds to capitalize the mortgage market and to secure US private investment in the region. It also contributed in the construction of low-income housing. In so doing, the US sought to contribute in the expansion of homeownership and the formation of a middle class of proprietors, all features associated with the modernity. These measures were significant in the struggle to build stable democracies that would deter the threat of social unrest. Perhaps, more obvious, the intervention of AIFLD, a blunt cold war organization, represented the more direct relationship between housing, US foreign relations, and Cold War. More mundanely, the Alliance also represented new opportunities for business and profit for US capital and developers.

In Buenos Aires, the 1960s represented a new moment of urban expansion and the possibility to intervene in the spatial structuration of the city. The Oficina del Plan Regulador defined areas for urban renewal which included the eradication of slums and

the construction of much needed housing. The urbanization of the Bañado de Flores, involving the incorporation of almost ten percent of the city's total surface, created an opportunity to regulate and find solutions to many of the city's problem: it promised new green areas, a new demographic balance, and the provision of a whole set of urban facilities. It also meant the construction of housing for low-income sectors. For the architects gathered at the CMV, the plans for the Parque Almirante Brown was the opportunity to build city ("hacer ciudad"), not only housing. The architectural design of Villa Lugano 1-2, shows that the transnational flows were beyond the intense North-South exchanges in the Americas. The influence of the ideas of the Team X, conditioned by the demands of the IDB, and contextualized in the context of local technological and working conditionings showed the extent the housing program was also a "contact zone."

Yet, as Chapter 5 will show, the striking architecture of Villa Lugano 1-2 and the modest respectability of the single-family homes built in Ciudad General Belgrano failed to provide for a varied and textured landscape. The highly theorized and abstract conception of the city that followed the postulates of the TEAM X created its own ambiguities. The obsession to create the "street" by creating a pedestrian corridor among the building towers and connected bridges were too foreign for the kind of street life that residents were used to. The new urban pattern, which broke the traditional grid, was conceived in a progressive context but the arrival of the military dictatorship perverted those original intentions. The mechanisms of assignations of the new homes that sought to organize a transparent process were abandoned and units were now assigned to members of the armed forces and state employees. Homes were now given to members of the military and state employees. The urban infrastructure built to serve more than

250,000 residents became underutilized as the remaining complexes envisioned for Villa Lugano were never built, with the exception of a number of new towers built in the 1980s. In addition, the CMV also intervened and the staff multiplied as the state became a source of employment, losing much of its original character. The new housing units, as well as the CMV itself became later, in the early 1970s, the ground of radical politics. The distance between the optimistic hopes of the modernization of housing and the city and the results of the policies implemented are the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4 - ILLUSTRATIONS



Figure 18 - Analysis of the Argentina savings and loan proposal, memorandum from Alvaro Alsogaray, ex minister of Economy of Argentina, to Douglas Dillon, September 1961, entry 3167, records related to Argentina, box 3, RG 59, NACP



Figure 19 - Manuel González Maseda, El Gran Parque del Sur de la ciudad (Buenos Aires, [n.p], 1935), p.7

Figure 20 - Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores. Planning was part of the operation of extension to the West that included the construction of the Airport Ministro Pistarini; "Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), Revista de Arquitectura (Buenos Aires) no. 297, año XXX, (September 1945).



Figure 21 - "Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), Revista de Arquitectura (Buenos Aires) no. 297, año XXX, (September 1945).

Figure 22 - "Barrio Parque de los Trabajadores, Primer Premio del VI Salón Nacional de Arquitectura, Proyecto de los Arquitectos Itala Fulvia Villa y Horacio E. Nazar (h), Revista de Arquitectura (Buenos Aires) no. 297, año XXX, (September 1945).



Figure 23 - Maps of Slums in the city of Buenos Aires – Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, "Censo Villas de Emergencia," *Boletín de la Dirección de Estadística de la Municipalidad de Buenos Aires*, 1, no.3, 1963.

Figure 24 - Parque Almirante Brown - Pilot Plan; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II* (Buenso Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)

Figure 25 - Parque Almirante Brown – Aerial View and a *villa miseria* in the Bañado de Flores; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)

Figure 26 - The program envisioned the construction of two neighborhood units -Villa Lugano and VIlla Soldati- to house more than 250,000 families; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)

Figure 27 - The canalization of the Cildañez Creek; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1969)

Figure 28 - Villa Lugano and Ciudad General Belgrano – Location; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, *Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965)

Figure 29 - Villa Lugano 1-2; the area is already urbanized and the main corridor is already built; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Urbanización Lugano I-II* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, c.1969)

Figure 30 - Villa Lugano I and II, Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)



Figure 31 - Parque Almirante Brown – Aerial View and a *villa miseria* in the Bañado de Flores; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)

Figure 32 – Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development Bank; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965)



Figure 33 - Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development Bank; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965)

Figure 34 - Villa Lugano I and II, view from the main corridor; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)



Figure 35 – Building, floorplan; Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Parque Almirante Brown - Conjunto Urbano Lugano I-II* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; circa 1971)



Figure 36 - General Layout of Ciudad General Belgrano in Greater Buenos Aires. Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965)

Figure 37 - Aerial view and layout; Revista Construcciones (Buenos Aires) no. 232, November-December 1971, p. 631.



Figure 38 – Ciudad General Belgrano; Revista Construcciones (Buenos Aires) no. 232, November-December 1971, p. 632.

CHAPTER 5

MODERN HOUSEHOLDS: BETWEEN THE EXPERTS' EXPECTATIONS AND THE RESIDENTS' SPATIAL APPROPRIATIONS

Introduction

Carlos Lacerda used the publication of *Manual do Proprietário* (1965), a sort of users' manual, as the occasion to educate the new residents of Vila Kennedy, a publically-financed low-income housing complex built in the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro, about their new homes. "Fellow Homeowner," wrote the governor, "life has been made for everyone. It is for each family to HAVE A HOME, but it is not just that. It is also for every home to HAVE A FAMILY (…) It is my hope that the owner of this house, under the tutelage of God, remembers those who have not had that opportunity yet and also helps us to give it to everyone."[1] In the following pages, drawings and captions showed an immaculately dressed white woman cleaning the house, hanging out the laundry in the backyard, disposing the trash in a proper receptacle and in a timely manner and registering their children at the local school. In the minds of the people at COHAB, the resettled squatter who was to occupy Vila Kennedy required instruction of the proper and respectable use of their new environment. The images reproduced the core dualistic understanding of modernization theory that contrasted the domestic practices of a "traditional" peasantry, such as food cultivation and animal rearing in close proximity to the home, with the more modern, urban domestic practices suitable for the orderly conditions of the modern home. Taken together, the illustrations conveyed a white,

[1] Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Proprietário* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), 1; capitals in the original.

middle-class domestic imaginary that reinforced traditional and conservative gender and racial relations. They evidenced the expectations and desires of the technical, political, and social elites about the role of housing as a component of "social peace."[2] At the same time, these imagines reflected the fears and anxieties of these sectors in an era of political and social turmoil.

Five years later, in Buenos Aires, the Municipal Housing Commission (CMV) distributed *To Enter into the Present*, a user's guide for the low-income families relocated to Ciudad General Belgrano. In the guide's preface, a picture of a set of keys preceded the phrase: "These keys that we are giving you serve to enter into the present, this present in which every human being has the right, that of light, air, the comforts and simplicities of modern life, a home worthy of our time."[3] As in the Brazilian case, an optimistic and proscriptive discourse on homeownership, space, and domestic behavior defined modern urban life. The idea that the new, modern urban environment might "instill a sense and a need for change" among the former slum dwellers was widely shared among technical elites, policymakers, US representatives, foreign consultants, and social scientists.[4]

In 1967, however, the cover page of the *Wall Street Journal* denounced to the American public the dire situation of VK. The *WSJ* reporter described VK as "a place that U.S. foreign administrators would just as soon forget about." The irony was that VK had once been seen "as a showcase for the American effort to aid Brazil, a must-stop on the tour of any visiting VIP." In the article, the correspondent advised that US President

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[2] Barbara Weinstein, *For Social Peace in Brazil: Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-1964* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996)
[3] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Para entrar en el presente* (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, nod.)
[4] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Plan Piloto Erradicación de las Villas de Emergencia 5-6-18. Etapas previas, Plan de Prioridades de Obras para Villas de Emergencia; Plan de Congelamiento Poblacional* (Buenos Aires, 1966), ii and v.

Johnson not visit the community in a scheduled visit to South America. Yet, the reporter acknowledged that VK was worth seeing for one particular reason and that was that "what has gone wrong here tells a great deal about what can -and often does- go wrong in America's massive foreign aid program." In other words, "the basic lesson of Vila Kennedy seems to be that much more thoughtful planning often is required before taxpayers' dollars are shelled out for any new project." Both user's manuals and the article in the *WSJ* show both how high the hopes and optimism were in the beginning and also how deep the disappointment was just a few years after the completion of these housing developments.

In this chapter, I explore the state and technical imagination behind the design of our historical cases, how both residents and experts assessed these new environments, and what alternative ideas on housing for the poor emerged as a reaction to these large-scale slum eradication and relocation policies. As this dissertation intends to demonstrate, in the beginning of our periodization, the provision of housing for poor urban residents was seen as a way to integrate them into the formalities of capitalism and citizenship. Homeownership, self-help, and bourgeois (white, middle-class) domesticity were the keys in producing a new citizen, one whose supposedly traditional and emotional habits and behaviors would transform into the characteristics of urban life and political moderation.

In the following pages, I analyze the way in which those in a position of power to exert policy or knowledge represented the role of housing in modernizing the poor urban resident. Then, I explore the way in which the new residents appropriated their spaces and how experts and critics assessed the results. Here the evidence is incomplete and

fragmented but the analysis is important to show the distance between the imagined and the real city. Finally, I will briefly explore the alternative solutions that a group of progressive architects and social scientists in both Rio and Buenos Aires proposed to cope with the housing problem by the late 1960s and early 1970s. I pay attention to the experiences of the urbanization of the *favela* Brás de Pina by the Community Development Company (CODESCO) in Rio and the urbanization of Villa #7 into the Barrio Villa Justo Suárez in Buenos Aires. These experiences, I seek to show, were part of emerging transnational trends in the field of housing that argued in favor of thinking of housing from the perspective of the slum dweller rather than that of the policymaker or the expert.

Low-Income Housing as a Tool of Modernization

This dissertation has argued that governments and technical elites of the postwar Americas sought to modernize Latin American societies not just by deepening the mechanisms for capitalist accumulation but also by creating built environments designed to generate modern sociabilities and behaviors. In Chapter 1, I have suggested how slums of Latin American cities were at the core of the "urban problem" as defined in transnational circuits of scholarship and policymaking and how that was the result of the duality inherent to modernization theory. Within the antinomies of this theory, the city was a space of creation, change, innovation, rationality, secularism, and democracy. The model was the industrial European and American city that had given birth to an industrious class of entrepreneurs and middle classes. The city was fundamentally a

democratic space. On the contrary, the countryside was portrayed as rather static, associated with tradition, "magical" belief, kinship, emotion, and paternalism.

Slums, and their improvised homes, represented in this model, rural, pre-modern "enclaves" coexisting in an urban setting. In the city, they were the *loci* of tradition, rural ways of life, and personal disorganization that limited the full release of social, cultural, and productive forces necessary for the full development of Latin American nations. They were the "village" in the city.[5] As sociologist Andrew Pearse put it in his description of the *favela* do Esqueleto, the slum house was "indeed a house of the rustic type, being nothing more nor less than the intrusion, into the interstices of an urban system of life, of rural standards of housing."[6] Within this framework certain scholars, as well as state and technical elites, projected physical features into social attributes and life-styles. They assumed that the bad quality of the slums and the slums house was actually the manifestation of internal qualities.

In addition, slums and working class neighborhoods were important to these scholars and policymakers because in the political history of Latin America these had been the places from where the populist regimes of Vargas in Brazil or Perón in Argentina received most support. Clientelism and populism were practices that these scholars associated with a limited or incomplete democracy and with the residual presence of rural and traditional elements in a society in transformation. In this context, governments saw the provision of modern housing as an agent of transformation. Homeownership and modern housing were to remedy urban squalor, promote the

[5] I borrow this notion from Adrián Gorelik.
[6] Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro," in *Urbanization in Latin America*, ed. Philip Hauser (Paris: Unesco, 1961).

integration and assimilation of new urban residents, inculcate middle-class habits and mass consumption, and moderate political behavior.

The transformation of the squatter dweller into a homeowner, with domestic and collective responsibilities, was a key notion behind the construction of the housing complexes for both US and Latin American authorities. During a ceremony to mark the finalization of the funding agreement for the construction of the housing complexes in 1962, US Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon argued that, "the role of housing in a free nation is vital to the full development of its economy and society, and that a free people is better assured of stability and healthy growth by possessing at least a minimum standard of decency in housing." Referring to the commitment of Latin American nations to the construction of low-income housing during the Charter of Punta del Este in 1961, Gordon continued, "the essence of true friendship of the United States for the people of Brazil can only be realized by our financial assistance being used as an impetus to their own efforts to solve their problems." For US geopolitical interests in the cold war context, the formalization and expansion of the housing market, especially for the poor, and the dissemination of the very own ideology of homeownership meant a triumph of capitalism over the communist threat. In his analysis of the relationship between homeownership, capitalism, and anti-Communism in middle-class housing projects built in Peru in the late 1950s, Thomas Zoumaras cites a revealing exchange in 1959 between the US Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) and US private investors.[7] Arguing in favor of the importance of investing in housing in Latin America, CFEP representatives argued, "Private home ownership is basic capitalism. If the free enterprise capitalistic system is to

[7] The Council on Foreign Economic Policy was the agency created by president Eisenhower in 1954 to coordinate foreign economic policy.

be propagated and strengthened elsewhere in the world, there is no greater appeal to the hearts and minds of men than to espouse the cause of owning one's home." Proprietorship would be politically positive; it would generate a rejection of the Communist ideology and its concepts of state ownership and elimination of private property. "As a further bulwark against Communism, expanded private home ownership will help to build a substantial citizenry and more stable political climate."[8]

Squatters' illegal occupations of public and private lands challenged the very notion of private property, the fundament of capitalism, sanctioned in both Argentine and Brazilian constitutions.[9] As Brodwyn Fischer pointed out for the case of Rio, a "poverty of rights" was the condition of poor *cariocas* whose weak enfranchisement was the result of the practical ways in which the rule of law affected them. Ironically, slum residents were in many occasions successful in their disputes against private owners and managed to stay in those occupied lands as squatters although they never won land rights.[10] Through eradications and resettlement in different housing complexes or temporal dwellings according to income, the state incorporated those former squatters who could pay into the mechanisms of the capitalist free-market.[11]

In Guanabara, urban renewal, slum eradication, and relocations was part of the efforts to reorient Rio's economy post Brasília. The formalization of the squatter's situation through the provision of housing close to the development of an industrial area, to be built, was central to this project. In assessing Lacerda's plan for the development of

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[8] Thomas Zoumaras, "Containing Castro: Promoting Homeownership in Peru, 1956?61." *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 2 (1986): 161–181, citation is in page 176.
[9] Even the Constitutional Amendment of Vargas in Brazil (1937) and Perón in Argentina (1949), which emphasized the social character of property, sanctioned its inviolable character.
[10] Brodwyn Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
[11] Here it is important to recognize, as Bryan McCann does whether the slum residents actually –or better put, in every case- wanted to become recognize as with land rights.

an industrial area in Santa Cruz, US consultants from Howard Chase Associates argued that,

> Such industrial decentralization is worthy of maximum state inducements, not only from the more important human sense, but also in the substantial economic savings which will result from any reduction in the rate of congestion in the city's center. Decentralization builds up the suburban areas and increases all the property values providing a growing source of income for the government, with perhaps a lesser relative cost in meeting the demand for increased social services. Above all, it can be used to help reduce the growth rate of favelas, whose inhabitants are in those urban slums chiefly in order to be close to the concentration of job.[12]

Not surprisingly, the report recommended to "provide incentives for location of new industries in outlying fringe areas of the State and next to or in low-cost housing clusters in the industrial decentralization program."[13]

In addition, property rights were connected to the moral economy of the postwar era, especially in the cold war context. Notions of homeownership in a capitalist, free-market economy, stressed the idea of individual sacrifice, organization, responsibility, discipline, and planning. A modern capitalist society demanded of the individual legitimate payment for urban land and public services. The *Manual of the Homeowner* for the residents of VK highlighted the responsibility of the homeowner to legalize possession of his propriety: "This house is yours! Keep it, enlarge it, and decorate it. It's your duty," informed the manual. [Figure 1]. "After legalizing your commitment you made by signing the deed of purchase, pay your monthly fee on time. Remember, your punctuality is worth a home."[14] In the case of Ciudad General Belgrano in Buenos Aires, the first page of the user's manual, titled "To Enter into the Present," showed a set of

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[12] Howard Chase Associates. *Survey and a Program for the Further Industrial Development of Guanabara. Prepared for government of the State of Guanabara and U.S. Operations Mission to Brazil, Agency for International Development.* 1961, mimeo, p 14. ["Offer greater inducements or other terms of priority to firms which will decentralize into locations in or near existing labor supply concentrations. This may mean either within the residential suburbs or along the railroad lines but closer to the suburban populations].
[13] Ibid, 109-110.
[14] Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB. *Manual do Propirétario* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), 3-4.

keys that represented the possibility of entering into the (modern) present through the possession of the house.[15] [Figure 19] Buying a home either in Rio or Buenos Aires required from the individual the capacity to pay mortgage regularly and to allot sums of money that were previously spent on other, more immediate, needs.

The underlying assumption, here, was that the poor individual would develop an instrumental rationality, key in a modern society. Through sacrifice, self-determination, and prudent organization of the family's budget, the former squatters would follow a course of action to achieve their desired end. This *homo economicus,* forged in this case through the provision of affordable housing, was then an integrated citizen rather than an illegal, "marginal" squatter.

Individual responsibilities, in addition, were the basis for life in society. "IN UNITY THERE IS STRENGH!" said in capital letters the COHAB's manual, "Participate in meetings with your street's representative and work together with the neighborhood council." [Figure 11] This exercise of citizenship at the street and local level would contribute in creating community links; key to project success, "The Vila will be beautiful and pleasant if all the residents do their part" praised the manual in its final page [Figure 12].

The home was thus not just a material structure but also a whole transformative environment that might encourage a new predisposition for urban life. The set of keys (the symbol of homeownership) offered in the first page of the manual for the people of CGB represented a symbolic way to cross the threshold to modernity, leaving once and for all the traditional life localized in the slums. In the following pages, the manual

[15] "These keys that we are giving you serve to enter into the present, this present in which every human being has the right, that of light, air, the comforts and simplicities of modern life, a home worthy of our time."

established a counterpoint between Buenos Aires's past and present. The past was the Buenos Aires of the Gran Aldea [the Big Village], the city of the late colonial time.[16] Back then, the guide explained, urban life was not comfortable: there was not running water, "they did not have the ease of merely turning on a faucet to get out the fluids that now we give so little importance" and the children had to retrieve it by carrying containers on their shoulders. A housewife had to get up early in the morning, "to rub her eyes, and to wash her face with the little remainder of water of the day before [and] light the fire to prepare the breakfast for the man who had to go out to work." Now, however, Buenos Aires became a modern city, a metropolis that incorporated the comforts of modern life. In that present of the late 1960s,

> The new houses of General Belgrano are an expression of today's Buenos Aires, one of the most modern and beautiful cities in the world. These homes are, then, not only a great architectural work: they provide many families what is necessary for work and rest, and allow them to come into this present and start a new phase of their life.[17]

The juxtaposition of the past and the present was not just a contrast between two historical eras. On the contrary, the narrative referred to a different counterpoint, one that opposed traditional to modern societies, a cultural and social condition that could exist simultaneously in the same historical time. Figuratively, the attributes of everyday life in the Gran Aldea depicted in the text did not differ so much from the life of the poor people of Buenos Aires in the 1960s: illegal settlements lacking electric power, running water, or even water faucets.

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[16] Lucio Vicente Lopez, a member of the Buenos Aires traditional families of the nineteenth century, coined that name remembering the city of his childhood; Lucio Vicente López, *La Gran Aldea.* (Buenos Aires, 1884).

[17] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Para entrar en el presente* (Buenos Aires, nod.), 2-3.

This broadly shared image of the 'traditional' character of the inhabitants of the *villas* was well expressed in 1966 in the first sociological survey conducted in the slums of the Bañado de Flores. The "Pilot Plan for the Eradication of the Villas de Emergencia 5-6-18" pointed out the role of the government as an agent of change and social integration by providing community development plans as a "temporal and precarious solution to the deep needs of the inhabitants of the Villas de Emergencia, that facilitates the motivation of those communities to participate with their own efforts, providing the necessary labor, in the execution of the proposed works in this plan." The Pilot Plan, organized during the democratic administration of President Illia, stipulated certain basic improvements in the original *villas* to be executed by the residents in community development and self-help projects. These upgrades sought to provide an immediate solution to serious problems and to build bonds of solidarity. As the Plan argued, "**It is not about mitigating needs but about instilling a sense and a need for change** (…) trying to change the mental attitude of the inhabitant of the villas, whose characteristic is a tendency to static quietism, and transform that attitude into a dynamic process of order, organization, and development (…) **the Villa de Emergencia represents more a mental problem than a physical one.**" The same Pilot Plan explained "it is not acceptable that those who live in the Villa de Emergencia, with their minds in the Villas, then go and live in a definitive house without a total change in attitude and abilities."[18]

Educating the poor in community development and self-help projects was a way to transform habits associated with traditional sociability into productive modern living. As Chapter 1 pointed out, this notion of poverty as a "mental" problem did not refer to a

[18] Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, *Plan Piloto para erradicación de Villas de Emergencia 5-6-18*, (Buenos Aires, 1966), II. The emphasis is mine.

biological (physical) attribute but a behavioral, therefore cultural, aspect of poor squatters. This understanding may have been a perverse way of blaming the poor for their living conditions, but it also reflected the reformist thinking of many experts and scholars in Latin America that considered the provision of social welfare, vocational training, and a new built environment a central, but partial, remedy to social maladjustment and poverty.[19]

The notion of progress and modernization -that longstanding aspiration of Latin American social and state elites- attached to the housing projects reproduced a white bourgeois (middle-class) domestic order. The illustrations of the manuals depicted homes and family life that embedded gendered and racialized expectations and hopes, but also fears and anxieties in a society in rapid change. The series of drawings of the COHAB manual depicted one family –father, mother and a small child- performing different tasks within and outside the home. [Figure 1 to 12] The house resembled the postwar American suburban home, whose model was reproduced infinitely in movies and fanzines around the world. Accompanying illustrations clearly demarcated the gendered expectation of a male breadwinner and female housewife. Men were advised not to turn their house into a workplace as it probably was the case in many *favela's* houses, "This is no workplace! Use your home only as a residence. There are other appropriate places for work and commerce." [Figure 4]. Another picture showed a pair of newlyweds and also a

[19] Mary Kay Vaughan, "Modernizing Patriarchy: State Policies, Rural Households, and Women in Mexico, 1930-1940," in Hidden Histories of Gender and the State in Latin America, ed. by Elizabeth Dore and Maxine Molyneux (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 194–214. Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil; Ann Farnsworth-Alvear, *Dulcinea in the Factory: Myths, Morals, Men, and Women in Colombia's Industrial Experiment, 1905-1960* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Karin Rosemblatt, *Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Sueann Caulfield, *In Defense of Honor: Sexual Morality, Modernity, and Nation in Early-Twentieth Century Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000); Susan Besse, *Restructuring Patriarchy: The Modernization of Gender Inequality in Brazil, 1914-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

father at the foot of his daughter's bed; the captions read "Register all family events with social services: marriages, death, contagious diseases," and, "inform the social services of every birth." [Figure 9] This image certainly contrasted with the situation present in *favelas* where family relations differed from middle class standards measured by the significant number of consensual unions (as an alternative to legal marriage) and the relatively high rate of infants per household. Moreover, the insistence on keeping vital records with the local office of the Secretary of Social Service not only talks about the significant number of illegal births among poor but also, and more generally, about the weakness of the state in knowing and controlling *favelas*.

The women of the *vila* were always portrayed as the white mother and wife who performed domestic tasks inside the home. A picture of a neat white mother with a broom in one hand and a duster in the other accompanied the caption "keep your house and surroundings in order and clean." [Figure 3] The description for a picture of the mother brushing her daughter's hair mentioned, "Housewife, mother: Look for the Secretary of the Social Services' office to learn about the preparation of food and care for your children." [Figure 10] Women were responsible for getting their dogs vaccinated and were expected to keep their kids under control by preventing them from making noises and obeying the "law of silence." In terms of the house care, they were advised to hang their clothes only in the backyard -not outside-, to dispose the trash in trash bins, and to check the gas nozzles were closed and to avoid leaving gasoline or alcohol in her kids reach. [Figures 6-7] Of course, the modern housewife would enjoy doing these tasks with the help of modern appliances (the drawing showed a happy mother ironing while listening to radio in a room illuminated by electric light) although she was advised to use

them properly in order to save water, electricity or gas. Ironically, this ideal female resident of the *vila* looked more like the probable employer of the real residents, most of these women were thus not only mothers and housewives but also domestic workers, cooks, or seamstresses.

That the house would reinforce family and therefore social order was certainly not new in the 1960s. As we have seen in chapter 2, the home had been the target for state and industrialists modernization projects all around Latin America. In Brazil, as Barbara Weinstein has shown, the creation of the SENAI (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial/National Service for Industrial Training) and SESI (Serviço Social da Indústria/Industral Social Service) in the 1940s developed a whole program of worker training beyond the limits of the factory, including the domestic realm. In Argentina, the Peronist imaginary also reinforced traditional notions of family attached to the home at a time when women were also gaining more prominence in the labor market and in the public sphere.[20]

The strengthened of domesticity in Rio, as in Buenos Aires, in the 1960s should be understood within the broader cultural and political context marked by rapid social change and increasing political conflict at the height of the Cold War.[21] Guanabara was the sounding board of national politics in a moment when its own political and

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[20] Weinstein, *For Social Peace in Brazil;* Besse, *Restructuring Patriarchy;* Isabella Cosse, *Estigmas De Nacimiento Peronismo y Orden Familiar, 1946-1955* (Buenos Aires: Universidad San Andrés; Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006).

[21] Here, we agree with Seth Fine on his analysis of Cold War representations in Mexico. Seth Fein. "Myths of Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism in Golden Age Mexican Cinema." In *Fragments of a Golden Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940*, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Anne Rubenstein, and Eric Zolov, 159–198 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001): 159-198; See also Victoria Langland's analysis in his article on the sexualized female representations of youth in the late 1960s; Victoria Langland, "Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails: Reading Sex and Revolution in 1968 Brazil," in *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War,* edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 308–349

administrative status was being defined. Despite Lacerda's best efforts to dismantle the power of local political bosses through his administrative reforms, they managed to remain influential. In addition, Varguista Lionel Brizola, the governor's political adversary from the left, increased his political ascendancy among poor *cariocas.* They participated in food riots and popular turmoil throughout Rio's suburbs caused by shortages orchestrated by Brizola. On the other side, conservative forces reacted against President Goulart's Basic Reforms plan (Reformas de base) announced in March 1964 which US officials and Brazilian right wing and military sectors considered evidence of Jango's socialist tendencies. In March 1964, these conservative sectors took over the streets of Rio aligned behind middle and upper-class catholic women in what was denominated the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade* (Marches of the Family with God for Freedom).[22] These series of marches anticipated and prepared the ground for the military coup that ousted Goulart in April 1964.

Governor Lacerda actually praised the role of women in the coup against Goulart in a meeting of the Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (CAMDE), a group of conservative, catholic women. At the Cinema Pax, in Ipanema, Lacerda said, "the true owner of the Revolution is the Brazilian woman."[23] The conservative modernizing

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[22] Among the organizers were the União Cívica Femenina and the Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (CAMDE) sponsored by the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES), which represented Brazilian and multinational corporations and US interests. On sexualized female representations of youth in the late 1960s see Victoria Langland, "Birth Control Pills and Molotov Cocktails: Reading Sex and Revolution in 1968 Brazil," in *In from the Cold: Latin America's New Encounter with the Cold War*, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 308–349.

[23] "O Governador da Guanabara fala na CAMDE em Ipanema," *O Globo,* 14 October 1964. I am very grateful with Margaret Power who alerted me about this connection. See Margaret Power, "Transnational, Conservative, Catholic, and Anti-Communist: Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP)," in *New Perspectives on the Transnational Right,* ed. by Martin Durham and Margaret Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 85-106 and Margaret Power, "Transnational Connections Among Right-Wing Women: Brazil, Chile, and the United States," in *Women of the Right: Comparisons and Interplay Across Borders*, ed. Kathleen M. Blee and Sandra McGee Deutsch (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 21-35.

character of Lacerda's administration could also be seen in actions such as the replacement of Jose Arthur Rios by Sandra Cavalcanti, connected to Catholic conservative groups, as Secretary of Social Services. Favorable press like *O Globo* covered the life of former residents from *Favela do Pasmado* in Vila Kennedy. As prove of the rapid assimilation in the new environment, *O'Globo* commented on the election of the "Mother of the Year" in both VK and VA, in celebration of Mother's Day.[24]

Conservatism and traditionalism in Argentina was also strong already in the early 1960s and very much influenced state policies in a period of rapid modernization. Recent scholarship has challenged the traditional understanding of modernization of Buenos Aires society in the 1960s as a moment of liberalization of social norms about sexual relations and women's respectability. In the traditional version, this process was radically interrupted by the military dictatorship of the so-called *Revolución Argentina* that had imposed a conservative, authoritarian reaction to those social and cultural changes. But, as Valerio Manzano has pointed out, conservatism was already present in the early 1960s, as shown in morality campaigns.[25] As Isabella Cosse points out, the characteristic of the Argentine process was precisely the coexistence of conservative and modernizing forces: changes in customs (costumbres) and morals occurred in an authoritarian context. Traditionalists and conservative principles, however, had the power to influence state policies. The reinforcement of domestic imaginaries associated with new housing are

[24] "Audit Report in the Utilization of Public Law 480, Title I, Local Currency Sales Proceeds under Grant Project Number 512-11-803-107 (Formerly 512-H-83-AA), Guanabara Housing, June 12, 1962 through February 29, 1964," 10, entry 400 Brazil Subj/Proj 56 73; ACC # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP. The magazine Manchete in 1964 had a whole article on maternity and pregnancy following the lives of a upper, middle, and popular classes' women; *Manchete* (Rio de Janeiro), no .466, 25 March 1961.

[25] Valeria Manzano, "Sexualizing Youth: Morality Campaigns and Representations of Youth in Early 1960s Buenos Aires," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 14, no. 4 (2005): 433-461; Isabella Cosse, *Pareja, sexualidad y familia en los años sesenta: una revolución discreta en Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores Argentina, 2010).

consistent with the ambiguities of the modernization process in cities like Rio or Buenos Aires when the relaxation of certain cultural and social norms encountered strong reaction and opposition.

Such conservative vision of modernity also produced a racialized definition of modernity. The modernity imagined in the depictions of the housing projects was a white one. These representations definitely contrasted with the faces of those women that met the social workers of the Secretary of Social Services when the later showed *faveladas* a scale model of the Vilas' house. [Figures 13-5] Of course, there was not discrimination between whites and non-whites when assigning the housing units. Actually the *favelado* population in those years were only one-third were black (preto), one-half white, and the rest pardo. Even though the number of whites may be surprising, this does not equate racial balance. Racial inequality operated in other levels. Blacks constituted a third of *favela* residents and accounted for almost the entire black population of the city.[26] In the drawings of COHAB User's Manual, it is more than significant that the only representation of an Afro-Brazilian in COHAB is the picture that alerts the mother not to leave any incendiary artifact within the children's reach. In the picture, a black and a white kid are setting fire to a campfire inside the home and playing with what look like fireworks. [Figure 7]

Both representations, the white residents of the User' Manual and the *favela* female residents observing the demonstration of the Social Worker recalls Michael Mitchell's analysis regarding the conservative modernization of Brazilian race relations. For Mitchell, "a conservative vision of modernization –in which elites encoded into Brazilian political culture racial prohibitions as well as other controls on social behavior-

[26] Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality,* 88.

survived, reproduced itself, and has maintained its power within both modernization and race relations as the dominant discourse."[27] Despite this very general statement to explain years of race relations, Mitchell presents a more dynamic analysis of changing intellectual conceptualizations of the role of Afro-Brazilians for the progress and modernization of Brazil. Intellectuals like Gilberto Freyre and Mario Reale challenged the assumptions of scientific racism and eugenics that portrayed certain groups, especially blacks, as "drags" to Brazil's progress, a characterization that led to their social and political exclusion. Freyre and Reale, on the contrary, saw in the presence and inclusion of Afro-Brazilians the specificity –and exceptionality- of Brazil. While Freyre believed in the power of miscegenation, Reale concluded that a strong interventionist state would regulate the political and social conflicts inherent to the contradictions of a modern society. The modernity portrayed in COHAB's drawing is a white middle class modernity. Brazilians of color are absolutely invisible except the drawing of an afro-Brazilian girl who actually is an element of disruption of the domestic order. Yet, the photographs of the female crowd around the social worker present in COHAB's reports tells a different story, one in which race is not a drag or an obstacle to modernity. The central place of the social worker showing and introducing the squatters into their potential new home represented the power of the state and the political and technical elites. The pictures show the Freyrian "controlled modernization, in which that process might somehow preserve the paternalistic relationships that had been the hallmark of former regimes," as well as the strength of the state, so close to Reale's thinking.[28]

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[27] Michael Mitchell, "Miguel Reale and the Impact of Conservative Modernization on Brazilian Race Relations," *Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil*, ed. Michael Hanchard (reference), 116-137, especially 122-128.

[28] Michael Mitchell, passim. The citation belongs to Medeiros, 1984, reproduced by Mitchell.

In Argentina, the racial question was more mediated than in Brazil; and actually the issue of blackness was less central. This, however, did not preclude racial connotations to appear in more mediated forms, especially as a way to emphasize and denigrate the rural origins of Perón's working-class supporters. The set of drawings and blueprints for VL1-2 and CGB attached to the MCBA loan proposal to the IDB imagined a warm spatial arrangement in which a white middle class socialized in the areas designed for that purpose. [Figures 20-21] The human figures that appeared in the drawings looked more like the imaginary about Buenos Aires that *porteños* helped to consolidated by the 1940s, that of a white, European-descendent city -the "Paris of South America."[29] These human figures, however, are not particular to Buenos Aires. They are part of conventional signs that architects use to show that their imagined space –the ones portrayed in their drawings- are actually spaces for human beings. [30]

These default images, which have a minimum of detail, represents a particular way of seeing, one in which the architect or the planner represents himself as a neutral observer who is more concern with the detail of the work than with the particularities of the individual. The contrast between the degree of detail in the buildings and the lack of it for the future residents is meaningful. These sanitized, "neutral" imagines of the drawings occluded the fact that VL1-2 and CGB were intended for low-income populations, therefore, people of an ethnic component probably different with that of older *porteño*

[29] On this the racialized middle-class imaginary in Argentina, see Enrique Garguin, "Los argentinos descendemos de los barcos?": The Racial Articulation of Middle-Class Identity in Argentina, 1920-1960," in *The Making of the Middle Class: Toward a Transnational History*, ed. A. Ricardo López and Barbara Weinstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012): 355-376.

[30] These images were not intended for the new resident but for other experts, those who would participate in the project as well as IDB evaluators. The representations do not intend to show images of domesticity, interiors, but of the complexes as a whole. These figures that represent actual humans have a minimum of detail and actually can be seen in other popular housing projects', as it is the case with the project of the Smithsons' for England described in Chapter 4.

citizen.[31] In this way, the modernity imagined in the housing projects was white and middle class.

Architecture and urbanism were not only important to social transformation but also to the construction of political and social imaginaries. At the same time, those social and political imaginaries nourished aesthetic and design choices. The question that comes up in Rio's case is about the election of single-family homes for the *vilas*, particularly considering that public housing during the Vargas era had been built in a high modernist language. Unfortunately, the research did not reveal any significant debate about aesthetics. The evidence indicates that since the beginning of negotiations IDB and USAID missions demanded Guanabara authorities build economic homes. The embryo design was also part of the initial conversations as local and foreign authorities were interested on providing the core structure and allow the residents to add and expand. The embryo-type, which implied the possibility of spatial expansion, limited other kind of formal resolutions such as the multi-story apartment buildings. It could have also been the case that the availability of lands in remote rural suburbs allowed for a horizontal growth instead of vertical, highly densified apartment buildings. The layouts and pictures show, however, a rather crowded mass of houses tightly distributed within the given limits of the plot. Actually, the construction of modernist buildings could have liberated more land for public and recreational use. It might have been the case that high modernism could have looked particularly odd in such isolated rural landscape but

[31] This is certainly not a criticism to this architects in particular, who were actually committed to a social architecture one in which social housing was central. Besides, as James Scott has pointed out, the whole modernist project historically developed that top-down, vanguardist attitude. Many years later, Architect Lestard articulated a self-criticism about his role at the CMV when consulted what kind of society or future user the architects at the CMV imagined for VL1-2. "Probably none," he said, "although we were worried about an architecture for the people. But we were also young and good architects and probably wanted to get the cover of Summa." Summa was the most important journal of architecture at that time in Argentina. Few years after his participation in CMV, Lestard, now with his studio, won the cover of SUMMA.

Brasília, built precisely in an isolated rural landscape, is a good counter example to this statement.

The reasons that led to the single-family home, I would argue, lie in Lacerda's conservative modernization in a moment of strong reaction to political, social, and cultural radicalization in the first half of the 1960s. High modernism was symbolically too attached to both the Vargas past and Kubitschek's vision of the future. The single-family home emphasized privacy and domesticity in contrast to the emphasis on public space and sociability of high urbanism. The dissonance between Lacerda and modernist aesthetics can be seen in Affonso Reidy's resignation as the head of architecture at the Department of Popular Housing of the Federal District (Departamento de Habitação Popular do Distrito Federal). Reidy, who had designed the Museum of Modern Art in Rio and the housing complexes of Pedregulho, objected to Lacerda's obstructions to his public housing project designed in Gávea in which the governor wanted to build a highway and the campus of the Pontificia Universidad Católica (PUC). In that sense, the election of the design of the *Vilas,* which reinforced a disciplinizing imaginary of white-middle class domesticity and respectability for former slum residents is consistent with an administration characterized by its modernizing impulses framed within conservative standards. In this backdrop, the *vilas* might well have symbolized economic austerity, rationalization, and executive efficiency as a counterpoint to the unrestrained grandiloquence of the welfare state and overspending that Lacerda associated with Vargas' populism and Kubitscheck's developmentalism.

In the case of Buenos Aires, the CMV used two very different languages to develop the neighborhood units. VL1-2 was inspired in contemporary debates that had

begun to undermine the influence of the modernist movement. As Chapter 4 has shown, the notion behind the housing program was to build a city through the creation of tall slab buildings arranged in such a manner that would allow for new forms of circulation and sociability. CGB presented a more traditional layout of single-family homes. In the case of VL1-2, the whole incorporation of such a significant portion of land that represented the urbanization of Parque Almirante Brown, meant for the architects of the CMV an unprecedented opportunity to build a city and make a significant contribution to the city.[32] There was a formal condition that influenced the design of tall towers, as the IDB demanded the achievement of high densities in a relatively small footprint. The particular solution for VL1-2 imposed an urban design that directly challenged the city's traditional urban grid. As Gorelik has argued, the urban grid and the *plaza* in Buenos Aires were key cultural artifacts that embedded the republican ideals of a democratic (and democratrizing) urban space of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.[33] As a result, VL1-2 manifested a modernizing attempt to situate Buenos Aires within the European reformist movement in architecture. This reformist architecture that sought to build a city more adequate for human beings, ironically, made use of a brutalist style that reinforced authoritarian spatial arrangements.

In comparison, the design of CGB was less spectacular and offered a more simple solution: relatively small single-family homes built in the ground floor, organized in housing strips. The location, in a rather isolated suburban area, did not offer the same

[32] Architect Allende, from the CMV, recognized tensions with the technical experts of the Oficina del Plan Regulador, who have formalized the need to urbanized the Bañado de Flores in their Master Plans. Disagreements began at the early stage of the project because the people at OPRBA wanted to have greater involvement in the design of the housing complexes. This professional dispute evidences the opportunity that the urbanization of the PAB represented. Personal interview with architect Allende, August 2009.
[33] Adrián Gorelik, *La grilla y el parque: Espacio público y cultura urbana en Buenos Aires, 1887-1936* (Bernal: Univesidad Nacional de Quilmes/Prometeo, 1998).

excitement in terms of impact and significance as that of Parque Almirante Brown. Moreover, CGB was for families of a lower income than those that qualified for VL 1-2 - which reinforces our general argument that the state and the market operated a spatial segregation based on income). According to architect Allende, the head of CMV's technical area, CGB's design was the outcome of conversations with CMV's team of sociologists and social workers who deliberated about the adequate urban arrangement for former squatters of rural origins. According to this version, squatters were still emotionally attached to the land and their spatial practices attached to their rural environment. This made the *villero* more inclined to live in the ground level, close to the land. The construction of backyards, for instance, was the spatial materialization of the technical imagination. Yet, urban backyards were not the same thing of rural patios, at least for those who published the CGB manual as they advised the soon to be residents not to use the backyard to rear poultry, or expand the home, or even to storage things- practices that the manual might associated with a rural than an urban environment.[34]

This understanding was not exclusive to the team of experts gathered at the CMV. In 1956, the Extension Program of the University of Buenos Aires (UBA) established the Centre for Integrated Community Development (CDI; Centro de Desarrollo Integral) in Isla Maciel a working-class neighborhood located in Greater Buenos Aires, bordering the capital city.[35] The CDI organized interdisciplinary groups of scholars and students to work together with the residents to find solutions to the most urgent social needs.

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[34] *Para entrar en el presente*, p. X.

[35] I explore Acosta's projecy more in depth in Leandro Benmergui, "The Transnationalization of the 'Housing Problem': Social Sciences and Developmentalism in Postwar Argentina," in *Infrastructures of Home and City: Dilemmas of Urban Housing from High Modernism to Neoliberalism*, ed. by Edward Murphy and and Najib Hourani (Farnham: Ashgate, forthcoming).

Pediatricians and doctors, psychologists, social workers, educators, social scientists, and architects involved in this program saw their participation as a way to bring knowledge and society together. They understood their expertise and practice as committed to the betterment of the most deprived sectors of Argentine society, especially those living in the *villas*. In 1957, the CDI asked sociologist Germani to study the population of Isla Maciel to have a more scientific, empirical assessment of the population of the neighborhood.

In 1960, Wladimiro Acosta, a modernist architect and a professor at the University of Buenos Aires School of Architecture and Urbanism, developed a housing project for the poor families living in Maciel. In his project, large balconies and terraces became centerpieces as the architect sought to recreate in the urban setting what he assumed was central of the rural immigrants' everyday life now living in Maciel: the *patio*. Acosta believed the humble *ranchos* that populated the slum were actually the reproduction of the rural home in the urban setting and he sought to reelaborate rural space in a modernist way.

For Acosta, as for other Latin American modernist architects, modernism was not the adoption of a foreign aesthetic language but the application of a modernist attitude, a humanist belief in the social uses of architecture for the betterment of human life through the rationalization of space and the uses of technological innovation rooted in the local.[36] The housing program had to respond to a careful assessment of the living conditions of the *villa* population. Following this principle, Acosta gathered a group of young students,

[36] On Acosta, Arnoldo Gaite, *Wladimiro Acosta: textos, proyectos, y obras testimonios sobre el maestro* (Buenos Aires: Nobuko, 2007); Anahí Ballent, "Acosta en la ciudad. Del City-Block a Figueroa Alcorta: el edificio para 'El Hogar Obrero,'" in *Wladimiro Acosta 1900-1967*, Homenaje realizado en la FADU (Buenos Aires, 1987), 32-37; Jorge Francisco Liernur, *Arquitectura en la Argentina del siglo XX: la construcción de la modernidad* (Buenos Aires: Fondo Nacional de las Artes, 2001).

some of them involved later in the CMV, and asked them to conduct a careful study of the *villa* residents and their built environment.[37] To do so, the architects visited the *villas* to establish personal contact with the residents and their places and they engaged in conversations with the social workers and CDI authorities. Also important to the understanding of the residents was the study that Gino Germani had conducted in Maciel in 1957, which preliminary results the sociologist presented at the ECLA meeting in Santiago in 1959.

After gathering all this information, Acosta concluded that the residents of the *villa* organized their spatial experience around the *rancho* (a precarious ranch house), allegedly the traditional form of housing in rural areas. As a space of sociability, the *patio* (terrace) of packed dirt yard was as important as the interior space. The project emphasized the use of stairs rather than elevators, which determined the maximum height of the building, a decision that came not only from the evaluation of maintenance costs but especially from Acosta's assumption that the *villa* residents were unfamiliar with the use of elevators. But as a member of Acosta's team recalls, social workers discredited this lack of knowledge of elevators noting that most of the women worked as domestic workers for middle class families that lived in tall apartment buildings.[38]

The example of Maciel and Acosta's project, which was never built, showed the extent to which the experts; misconceptions and assumptions about the *villa* resident could have an impact in the actual design of the housing project. In CGB, as in Maciel, the experts assumed that poor resident, or the slum dweller, still reproduced the spatial

[37] By 1960 social housing was a hot topic among architects. The Pan American Congress of Architects celebrated in Buenos Aires that year dedicated a central part of its programming to this issue and in its resolution called for a social architecture; Ramón Gutiérrez, Jorge Tartarini, and Rubens Stagno, *Congresos panamericanos de arquitectos, 1920-2000: aportes para su historia* (Buenos Aires: CEDODAL, 2007).
[38] Architect Javier Sánchez Gomez, interview by author, June 2011.

conventions and arrangements of their places of origin. Less progressive versions of these stereotypes were part of the conventional repertoire of anti-peronist hatred manifestations. Many residents of Buenos Aires accused the new residents of the housing complexes built during Perón's administration of turning the apartments bathtubs into mini-gardens and taking the parquet flooring to fuel *asados* (barbeques). This prejudice against the popular sectors reflected a class bias that connoted more subtlety ethnic and even racial prejudices.[39] The biased images of people cultivating in their houses or making *asados* with the flooring sought to reinforce the prejudice that Perón received support from the poor recent migrants of the Peronist masses, derogatorily characterized as "cabecitas negras" (earth-colored faces).[40] In this way class prejudice also reproduced in more subtle ways ethnic and, therefore racial, prejudice.

Life in the Housing Complexes

As the *Wall Street Journal's* article cited in the introduction to this chapter shows, criticism about the situation in Rio's *vilas* among Brazilians and US authorities and the press appeared few years after their inauguration. A USAID mission, articles in local newspapers, and anthropological studies all pointed out the difficult situation that relocated *favelados* were experiencing after their arrival in their new neighborhoods. Among the problems that piled up in the *vilas* were, besides the traumatic eradication in itself, spatial segregation and isolation, lack of job opportunities close to the residences,

[39] On the relationship between race and ethnicity in Latin America, Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America* (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997)
[40] Rosa Aboy article and dissertation. Rosa Aboy, "The Right to a Home." *Journal of Urban History* 33, no. 3 (March 1, 2007): 493–518 and Rosa Aboy, *Viviendas Para El Pueblo: Espacio Urbano Y Sociabilidad En El Barrio Los Perales: 1946-1955*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005).

deficient transportation, abandonment and neglect from the government, and the high rate of delinquency in mortgage payment.[41]

In June 1966, Lawrence Selman –at that time a US student with interests in Anthropology- conducted research field in VK and Vila Esperança to evaluate the impact of the residents' recent relocation in the short term in both neighborhoods and between them.[42] He found that thirty-six percent of VK's population and a fifth of VE's residents expressed desire to return to the favela. *Journal do Brasil* (JB) even mentioned that twenty percent of VK's dwellers had actually left the complex. In comparison, more people in VK were dissatisfied than in VE even when VK was a better urban project than Esperança that lacked most of the collective infrastructure, including public and recreational spaces. Salmen attributed this to most of the residents of VE being relocated from the same *favela* –João Candido—and could keep most of their social and economic networks. In addition, proximity to their original *favelas* implied proximity to their workplace, the opposite to VK.

Internal USAID/HUDO reports revealed frustration among supervisors about the state of abandonment and official neglect, "maintenance of streets and public services in Vila Kennedy has been less than satisfactory," while trash collection happened only sporadically. Streets lacked paving and, as the reported commented, "they need, but seldom get, careful maintenance. Consequently, heavy rains every year do maximum

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[41] "Vila Kennedy fracassa como experiência para acabar com as favelas," *Jornal do Brasil,* 7 july 1969, p19; Bernard Wagner, David McVoy, and Gordon Edwards, *Programa Para o Desenvolvimento Urbano e Habitacional da Guanabara: Relatório e Recomendações da Equipe de Habitação e Desenvolvimento Urbano da A.I.D., 1o De Julho De 1966*. mimeographed, 1966; Leon Emanuel Ickowicz, "Deterioração Física de Conjuntos Nacionais Construidos pela COHAB-GB," MA diss. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 1977.

[42] The Instituto de Pesquisa Economica hired Salmen for this summer to conduct his research on the impact of relocation in the *Vilas.* At that time, he was still a student interested in Anthropology. Lawrence Salmen, "A Perspective on the Resettlement of Squatters in Brazil" *América Latina (Rio De Janeiro)* 12, no. 1 (March 1969): 73–95; personal interview with author, Bethesda, Maryland, 2011.

damage. Vehicular and pedestrian traffic become difficult."[43] The article in the *JB* described what they saw as images already seen in the favelas: kids walking barefoot, apparently malnourished. Dwellers were certainly upset by the abandonment and the decline of interest from the government.

In VE, residents complained about the lack of recreational areas and open spaces in both the whole complex and individual homes. According to Salmen, kids in VE play in the only available area, which was in close proximity to vehicular traffic. As a result, people at VE complained about the high concentration of residents in a relatively small plot which, as Salmen noted, affected the privacy of the home. In VK urban design was more careful about open spaces and recreational areas although in the first years there were many works that were still pending. In the first four years, VK actually lacked a secondary school. Residents also complained about the sense of monotony, closure, and confinement in the design of the *vilas.* As chapter 3 showed, COHAB architects had to develop new housing types and eventually they had to redesign the whole block as a concept, which was later reelaborated in the quadra-bloque in Cidade de Deus. Young people in the *vilas* showed a low morale, according to Salmen, given the lack of areas for recreation and sociability. The lack of job opportunities close by also affected young inhabitants. Security issues such as walking at night were also a matter of concern among youth, especially females.

[43] USAID officials slightly tried to relativize the situation they had found in VK by saying that it was not different from what they saw in other areas of Rio. This might have been possible, but truth is that VK had been inaugurated only few years before actually to overcome such problems; File memorandum, "Inspection of Vila Kennedy," December 5, 1967, Folder entilted Project 512-11-830-264.1, National Housing Bank, Low Cost Housing – Guanabara FY 67, entry 400, brazil subj/proj 56-73; acc # 75-0162, box 25, RG 286, NACP.

Despite original plans, residents soon engaged in clientelistic relationships with the housing authority agents. As Valladares showed in her doctoral work, these practices were "invisible, that implied inventiveness, expertise and discretion and that possess a rationality and logic of its own," allowed a more personal treatment and gave the resident some space for negotiation and benefit. For the agents this implied personal favors, getting their homes painted or their car fixed, for instance.[44] The agent, eventually, could become an electoral boss or provide a political clientele to any given candidate.

In any case, relocation had been traumatic. People lost their social and affective networks, they were far from the beach, and certainly far away from workplaces. Residents were nostalgic about the sense of community and familiarity they found in the *favelas* in contrast to the "anonymity" of the *vila.*[45] To make things worse, governmental plans to attract industries did not developed as expected creating a serious spatial segregation. Activities such *biscate*, street commerce, was still limited in scale. As a result, people had to keep, or look for, jobs in the city. But VK and VA were poorly planned in terms of transportation and commuting to workplaces in the city's downtown or South Zone took an average of an hour-and-half to two hours in old buses that usually got broken.[46] The trip was surely tortuous: the main artery between VK and the city's downtown was still unpaved. Many people, especially men, opted to stay in the city during the week to save money and time, which also affected women who had to stay at

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[44] Licia do Prado Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa: análise do programa de remoção de favelas do Rio De Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1978): 121-122.
[45] Salmen, 82.
[46] Conselho de Moradores da Vila Kennedy, *Vila Kennedy – Transporte,* cited in Cecília Azevedo, "Essa Pobre Menina Moça: a Estátua Da Liberdade Da Vila Kennedy," in *Cidade Vaidosa: Imagens Urbanas Do Rio De Janeiro*, ed. by Paulo Knauss and Ana Maria Mauad (Rio de Janeiro: Sette Letras, 1999): 111. As we have mentioned in chapter 3, poor urban planning became evident from the beginning. Even Sandra Cavalcanti had to recognize this fact in a personal letter to military president Castelo Branco at the time when the president offered Cavalcanti the direction of the recently created Banco Nacional de Habitação.

home. In some cases, extended families or neighbors would take care of kids so their mothers could go to their works. In this way, relocation affected women in particular ways. As Salmen pointed out, "More than a loss of income and a less varied experience, it seems likely that this change has deprived the woman of a good part of what little independence she formerly had. Where she was once able to obtain some pocket money with which to enjoy the amenities of social life, she is now dependent n her husband."[47]

This problem of transportation created an extra economic burden as commuting costs increased dramatically. Transportation and mortgages were thus new spending for an already limited domestic budget. Unemployment grew in VK to a twenty-three percent and almost a third in VE. Households had to disburse money to pay mortgage plus expensive transportation costs, compromises that were hard to keep up. Financial delinquency became one of the most serious problems for residents, and COHAB and state authorities. In VK delinquency reached more than sixty percent and in VE, forty percent.[48] According to Valladares, a large number of residents that could not afford their homes faced eviction.[49] Others found alternative options, including the transfer of rights on the home (cessão de direitos), voluntary leaving their dwellings. In this later case, the mechanism implied an economic benefit for the "seller." To transfer the rights on the home, the holder of the house had to prove payment consistency. In practice, however, the "seller" is way behind in payments so the "buyer" was responsible for past due debt. This gave the original residents a sum of cash which they used to go back to the favela,

[47] Salmen, 82.
[48] Salmen, 79. Licia do Prado Valladares also acknowledges a study from CENPHA that determined delinquency in seventy seven percent. "Condições de vida em conjuntos habitacionais de interesse social, 1970." This latter figure includes other housing programs undertaken few years after.
[49] Valladares's analysis includes other historical cases of housing complexes built years after under the direction of the federal government through CHISAM.

open a small business, or build a modest house in the suburbs of Greater Rio. These transactions showed, as Valladares noted at that time, that the former *favelados* were far from marginal. As a result of the transference of homes, the *vilas* began to change its social composition as families of a relatively higher income (police members, low-ranking military, state employees, more skilled workers) began to move in. Valadares associates the improvements in the homes and the flourishing of new commercial life in the *vilas* as a result of this process of social selection.[50] Likewise, Salmen found a relationship between the "willingness to stay in the *vila* and a family's per capita income. That, it is clear that the more income the family had, the better it was to afford the costs of rent and commuting and the greater its contentment with life in Vila Kennedy."[51]

Still, a fully negative assessment of the project would neglect the fact that many families were willing to move and found in the *vilas,* despite the many problems, a better place to live. In Lacerda's archive there are many letters from people asking the governor for a home. In Chapter 3, I have analyzed these letters in terms of the continuity of clientelistic practices even for an administration that introduced itself as overcoming the populist past. But these letters also revealed that people actually wanted to live in the *vilas.* Squatters may have wanted to reach their dream of homeownership and middle-class respectability. Leaving behind the *favelado* stigma and actually having a concrete a solid roof was not a marginal detail: modernization may have been as attractive for the squatter as it was for the policymaker.

Many residents expressed high opinions of their in the homes and neighborhood and a personal improvement in their situation. The homes were made of concrete served

[50] Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa,* 77-78.
[51] Salmen, 83.

with water, sewage, and electricity. Salmen actually did his interviews just months after the copious rains that so badly affected many favelas in January and February of 1966, causing landslides and displacements. It is not surprising that residents felt particularly protected in their homes. People commented about the quality of the surroundings and the quality of the air in contrast to the *favela*. The article in the JB emphasized how people put effort and time in planting flowers and trees, embellishing their fronts, and even expanding their homes. USAID supervisors also used these examples to stress how people adapted quickly and positively to their new environment. In governmental reports, still during Lacerda's time, the pictures of the *vilas* showed happy families in festival scenes, people playing sports, kids playing together. Those same pictures, certainly part of a governmental dossier, also showed how people had decorated and embellished the houses' front and improved the surroundings. [Figures 16-17] As we mentioned before, *O Globo* had several articles narrating the celebration of Mother's Day in VA and VK. These latter images could have been produced to support the relocation theory but it is also true that for many residents who could afford the mortgages and commuting costs, living in the *vilas* was a way to get rid of the *favelado* stigma. As Salmen pointed out, the former *favelado* "now has an opportunity to gain a foothold, however tenuous, into the ranks of the 'respectable middle class.' At last, he can plan, work, and defend his gains with some hope that society and its institutions may assist him in his efforts to improve his own condition."[52] In 1968, VK's residents inaugurated their own *bloco carnavalesco*, which later became samba school, *Unidos da Vila Kennedy* (popularly known as A Princesinha da Zona Oeste) whose flag reproduced the image of the Statue of Liberty. [Figure 18]

[52] Salmen, 89.

Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano

The occupation of VL1-2 and CGB occurred in a context marked by the radicalization of politics and everyday life, in the period from the end of the military dictatorship to the return of Perón to power. This backdrop is important because both housing complexes were caught between the arbitrary policies of the military and the internal dispute within Peronism for spaces of power. By then, the *villa* population became an important in the political agenda of the radical left and social Catholicism, including the *curas villeros* of the movement of third world priests. As a result, VL1-2 and CGB became ground of radical politics.[53]

An original resident of VL1-2 recalled that after being selected and he was assigned the new home, he hurried to sign the conditional bill of sale [boleto de compraventa] and as soon he received the keys of the unit immediately took a taxi to the complex. That was his first visit to the site. He had taken a set of warm clothes and a sleeping bag. Time was of the essence. There were rumors that slum residents were squatting ["tomando"] units. In following days, a group of people like him organized a system of shifts to guard the apartment against occupations. They had a gun to defend their property.[54] In CGB, few days before the inauguration of President Cámpora in May 1973, the army mobilized troops and tanks to evict illegal occupants who were taking the homes to force the CMV to fulfill their original compromises. Such practices would increase in the following years until the military coup in 1976, following which there was an aggressive campaign of slum eradication and repression against the *villas.*

[53] VL1-2 first 1,000 units became available after inauguration in 1970 and more upon completion in the following years. Occupation in CGB began in 1973, months before the inauguration of President Cámpora.
[54] Personal interviews with Villa Lugano residents, July-August 2008.

The *tomas* were part of both the struggles of the organized *villero* movement and the own struggles within the Peronist movement that were entering into a cycle of violent feud. In CGB, occupations happened just few days after the inauguration of Cámpora. The new peronist president –who prepared the terrain for Perón's comeback few months after—had won the election with the support of the Peronist Left. The Peronist Youth (Juventud Peronista; JP) sought to hegemonize the mobilization of the different expressions of the "campo popular," which included the *villero* movement. The creation of the *Movimiento Villero Peronista* in 1973, an organization of Montoneros –the peronist paramilitary arm—showed the strong ascendancy of the Peronist left, especially the JP by incorporating the Frente Villero de Liberación Nacional (The Villa Front for National Liberation).[55] *El Descamisado*, periodical of *Montoneros*, the revolutionary front of the JP, covered the occupations in CGB. The journal denounced corruption and political clientelism in the distribution of homes.[56] The occupations were organized and were part of the agenda of the *Movimiento Villero Peronista* to gain prominence with the *villero* movement and also as a challenge to the right-wing forces within peronism.[57] For that reason, *El Descamisado* denounced the corruption of local leaderships, connected

[55] The Frente Villero de Liberación Nacional was an organization representative of the slums while the Movimiento Villero Peronista was a more rigid, verticalist group; see Alicia Zicardi, "El Tercer Gobierno Peronista y Las Villas Miseria De La Ciudad De Buenos Aires (1973-1976)." *Revista Mexicana De Sociología* 46, no. 4 (October 1, 1984): 145–172; Marta Bellardi, *Villas miseria: origen, erradicación y respuestas populares* (Buenos Aires: CEAL, 1986); Patricia Dávolos, Marcela Jabbaz, Estela Molina, *Movimiento villero y Estado, 1966-1976* (Buenos Aires: CEAL, 1987).

[56] La Nación, 17 and 19 May 1973; La Opinión 20 and 23 May 1973 (cited in Yujnovsky) and "Desalojos: última hazaña de la dictadura," *El Descamisado*, no. 2, 29 May 1973. *El Descamisado* was the press organization of Montoneros and the Juventud Peronista between 1973 and 1974, period in which published fourty seven numbers.

[57] The Movimiento Peronista Villero was part of the Tendencia Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Tendency) which gathered peronist organizations representing diverse social sectors, including Juventud Peronista Regionales (JPR); Juventud Universitaria Peronista (JUP); Juventud de Trabajadores Peronistas (JTP); Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios (UES); Movimiento de Inquilinos Peronistas (MIP) and armed organizations, including Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR), Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP), and Peronismo de Base (PB).

with influential political figures in the Municipality, themselves connected to right-wing union leaders (i.e. the Metal Workers Union). Announcing that the corruption in the assignments of homes was collusion between these actors, *El Descamisado* established its vanguardist position and delimited the lines between loyalty and treason, "This is so that people know about the methods and learn to better differentiate, between their authentic leaders and the traitors."[58]

Political radicalization was also taking place at every level of the bureaucratic structure, as it was the case in the CMV.[59] A group of workers of the housing agency (especially those whose task involved a direct relationship with *villero* population) pressed for the unionization of the CMV and the formation of a representative body. This internal division at the interior of the CMV came from young workers, mostly middle-class professionals or university students with connections with JP and Montoneros. As most of them worked in the Community Development section, directly involved with squatters, they established political or working relationships with the *villas*. The *Mesas de Trabajo* were the name of that space in which members of the *villa* and the CMV workers met and coordinated works in the slums, as it was the case in the urbnization of the Villa 7 in the neighborhood Justo Suárez, anlyzed below. By the time Cámpora was to assume the presidency, this internal commission within the CMV pressed for the removal of the agencies' directors, becoming the *de facto* authority. This leftist-peronist CMV was, however, in conflict with the right-wing Ministry of Social Welfare (MBS; Ministerio de

[58] Ibid. The article intended to link the relationship between the leader of an local *unidad básica* –the basic political peronist unit in every neighborhood- and councilman in the MCBA. That councilman, Mariano Martín, was a member of José Ignacio Rucci, the leader of the metalworker union, who Montoneros killed in 1973 to force Perón into a leftist turn. "Esto sirve para que el pueblo conozca los métodos y diferencie cada día mejor entre sus auténticos dirigentes y los traidores.... Los falsos peronistas buscaron la complicidad de algunos dirigentes del gremio metalúrgico y de Mariano Martin, presidente la Cámara de Representantes de la Municipalidad de la Capital."

[59] Patricia Dávolos et.al., *Movimiento villero y Estado*.

Bienestar Social), responsible for housing policy at the national level.[60] José López Rega was the minister appointed by Perón. He had been Perón's personal assistant, and represented the peronist-right wing. In this sense, the rightist MBS and the leftist CMV represented two irreconcilable factions. Yet the former subsumed the capacity of the CMV. In broader way, Perón's rightward turn forced the left into taking a more clandestine approach.

As a result, the "tomas" in VL and CGB indicate the degree to which the housing question became part of the broader history of political radicalization and violence in Argentina in the 1970s. Working class neighborhoods and slums were the place where the peronist masses lived, from where the new Patria Peronista was to be forged. The high number of *villeros* and activist disappeared during the last military dictatorship (1976-1983), which included many residents of VL 1-2 and CGB, are good indicators of the degree of political mobilization.

From the point of view of the people's experience of their new built environment, it is possible to argue that in the following decades CGB deteriorated as part of the more structural decline of Argentine working classes along with the urban environment. New squatter settlements and those state-organized temporary dwellings, part of broader eradication programs of the dictatorships, contributed in the emergence of new segregated spaces, increasing inequality, and political subjection to clientelist politics. CGB, or "Barrio BID" as it is currently known, is now situated in one of the toughest areas of Greater Buenos Aires. Crime, delinquency, narco-trafficking, and police abuse are the main problems that the working population that has to deal with. This status quo

[60] The MBS was in charge of the slum eradication program and the implementation and execution of low-income housing with funds from the recently inaugurated National Housing Fund (FONAVI; Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda).

is useful to local authorities and governments in power, which recruit vast political clienteles. At the same time, this is an area for potential social and political conflict: here began the popular upheavals and lootings in December 2001 that led to the resignation of President De la Rua and the end of the neoliberal era in Argentina.[61]

In the case of Villa Lugano, in the long-term, architects and experts recognized the housing complex became a deteriorated space rather than the city they were expecting to build. Whereas the program emphasized the use of public spaces to enhance social and democratic life, those areas then became dangerous places, the meeting point for gangs and petty crime. This outcome was not entirely a problem of architecture or planning as both are inserted into the structural situation of the country. Yet, housing complexes inspired by the ideas of Team X in several parts of the world, received strong criticism for their poor outcomes. Particularly in Buenos Aires, VL 1-2 residents expressed their discomfort with the neighborhood. Among the mentioned problems were that the gigantic scale and the morphology of the project, which basically established a central axis enclosed by a tall mass of concrete buildings, created a sense of claustrophobia and enclosure. The whole project appeared to the residents as an external imposition or as the bureaucratic decision of technocrats not very much informed about resident's necessities. According to a research undertaken by a group of UBA's architects, anthropologists, and psychologists at Lugano, residents also expressed a sense of nostalgia for the traditional grid, neighborhood, blocks, and *plazas*, which reflected a sense of estrangement with the

[61] Javier Auyero and his assistants based their research in sample taken in Barrio BID for his work on the popular upheavals during December 2001. Javier Auyero, *Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina: The Gray Zone of State Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

urban design.[62] This has contributed to a sense of isolation, expressed by terms like "ghetto" or "island" which, in recent years, is also connected to feelings of insecurity.

Design might have also been a factor in the increasing levels of insecurity and gang sociability that residents complained about, especially in a context in which residents are particular sensitive to crime. The spatial labyrinthine design, dispositions of the columns, stairs, shadowy areas, insufficient public lightning, and abandoned stores created spaces for hiding and ambush. Women, in particular, expressed more apprehension, as they felt even more unsafe with the built environment. The original idea of creating a vibrant social and commercial life on the first floor never worked. People kept walking at the ground level and avoided the use of bridges, as they did not seem useful. They are now insecure and conducive to robbery and assault especially at night. Green spaces, in addition, did not favor sociability: according to a group of UBA architects these places became more empty spaces rather recreational areas. As it happens with other large-scale complexes in Buenos Aires and abroad, VL1-2 was very expensive in terms of maintenance, leading to physical deterioration, poor lightening, broken elevators, and structural problems. Yet, VL1-2 are better in terms of maintenance in comparison to nearby housing complexes built in the l970s. Better construction specifications and materials guaranteed, in comparison, a better result. [63]

Finally, many experts have argued that VL1-2 failed in creating a collective identity as a community. People used to identify themselves as "municipal (workers)", "military," and "police," but not as *luganenses* or members of the Conjunto Savio (as it is

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[62] Jorge Sarquis, *Itinerarios del proyecto: la investigación proyectual como forma de conocimiento en arquitectura*, volume 2 (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Nobuko, 2003), 133-221.

[63] The Conjunto Piedrabuena (197x) is a good example of the rapid deterioration. In an interview with representatives of the construction company that worked in that complex recognized they used a low quality clay to save costs. Interview August 2009.

now known).[64] According to UBA's study, contemporary forms of identity are in relation to the building or tower of residence, age group, music band, or soccer team. In my own research, however, I did find some kind of self-identification when I asked residents about their opinions of the people of the other housing complexes located in the area (Conjuntos Villa Soldatti and Piedrabuena).[65] In this case, the interviewed differentiated from those other inhabitants by stressing the supposedly ethnic origin of the people of the other complexes. People in Soldatti or Piedrabuena were, according to the interviewed in Lugano, "bolitas" and "paraguas" (derogatory term for Bolivian and Parguayan nationals). The stigmatization also stressed the *villero* origin of the people of Soldati or Piedrabuena. The people in Lugano, on the contrary, paid for their homes. In this way, residents expressed their sense of difference in social and ethnic terms and hide the fact that many came from slums.[66] Yet, as it was the case in Rio de Janeiro with the *vilas*, most of the original residents I talked to expressed a sense of pride for having achieved their dream of the "casa propia." Social mobility through homeownership, recognized the people in my sample, was a definitive moment in their experience. The neighborhood might have had many problems but the homes still provided a sense of respectability and security.

[64] Instead of an overarching identity, subcultures have their own forms of identification according to tower of residence, age group, and the like.
[65] Note explaining the origins of these complexes and the reasons that explain their bad quality.
[66] Note on the representativity of the sample. These insights reproduce certain issues that came in informal conversations with residents.

Building for and with the Poor: Alternative Urban Planning Experiences in Rio and Buenos Aires

As a way of conclusion, I will briefly refer to the experience of the Companhia de Desenvolvemento Comunitario (CODESCO) in the urbanization of Brás de Pina, in Guanabara (1968-1971) and the construction of the Barrio Justo Suárez, in Buenos Aires (1971-1974). Both experiences represented alternative urban interventions to the politics of eradication and relocation in large-scale housing projects. In both cases, they were built by progressive leftist actors (religious and political) and were supported by local organizations. They were also realized thanks to a transnational context in which the experience of poor urban residents and their solutions for shelter began to be evaluated positively under the distinction to past experience. Poor urban residents were not anymore the expression of tradition and marginality but rather a mass of workers that produced, circulated, and consumed the city. Borrowing from anthropologist William Mangin, slums became the solution rather than a problem. This positive valuation of popular knowledge and poor people's practices was certainly part of the context of political radicalization in which many professionals and experts decided to abandon their place of privilege to work with and for the poor. In the field of social housing, this implied a challenge to top-down approaches considered not only economically and socially irrational, but also authoritarian and repressive. As a result, these housing initiatives offered another vision of modernization, one that posited the transformative power in the very hands of the working classes.[67]

[67] CODESCO's experience has already been analyzed in other works and put in a broader context by Licia do Prado Valladares, who contextualized the experience within the ideological shift of the late 1960s described above. My analysis builds upon her insights and the following wokrs: Gilda Blank, "Brás de Pina: experiência de urbanização de favela," in *Habitação em questão,* ed. Licia do Prado Valladares (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1980), 93-124; Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, "Como projetar de baixo para cima

In the Brazilian case, CODESCO was a public agency that received the support from the Negrão de Lima administration (1965-1971) to implement an innovative housing program that would make use of a small sum of USAID funds earmarked for that purpose. The *favelas* Brás de Pina, Morro União, and Mata Machado became the object of CODESCO's intervention.[68] Negrão de Lima was the last governor of Guanabara chosen directly by popular suffrage during the military dictatorship. He authorized the formation of CODESCO as a political gesture to progressive forces. In authorizing the urbanization of *favelas* of relative small size, he was cultivating a more popular image. In this sense, CODESCO not only openly challenged Lacerda's eradication and relocation programs, but also allowed the governor to assume the paternity of a project that represented an alternative to the housing policies of the federal government. The military dictatorship actually took Lacerda's housing policy and projected it into the federal level. The creation of CHISAM (Coordenação de Habitação de Interesse Social da Area Metropolitana do Grande Rio) actually reinvigorated the program of slum eradication in Rio.[69]

At the same time, there was a more favorable climate among certain sectors about the situation of *favelados.* Rio's middle classes became slightly more sympathetic for the plight of *favelados* after the exceptional rains and landslides that occurred in early 1966

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uma experiência e favela," *Revista de Administração Municipal* (Rio de Janeiro), no. 156 (Jul-Sept 1980): 6-27; Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976): 240-245; Luiz Antonio Machado da Silva, Paulo Magalhães, and Elsa Veloso de Almeida. "Mata Machado: aspectos de las luchas sociales en una favela carioca." *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 46, no. 4 (October 1984): 173–189.

[68] Negrão de Lima had been major of Rio de Janeiro when the city was still the capital district, when President Kubitschek assigned him in that position. Politically, Negrão de Lima responded to Kubistcheck and the PSD.

[69] Janice Perlam, *The Myth of Marginality;* Alejandro Portes, "Housing Policy, Urban Poverty, and the State: The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 1972-1976," in *Latin American Research Review*14, No. 2 (1979), pp. 3-24; A recent evaluation on CHISAM eradication policies, Janice Perlman, *Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio De Janeiro* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mario Sergio Brum.

and then again in early 1967, which killed many favelados and left many more dislocated. USAID also became more hesitant about the eradication and relocation in housing complexes. The "Wagner Report" was the result of a USAID mission to Guanabara to evaluate a housing and urban development program.[70] It criticized the construction of the *Vilas* in the same way we have detailed in the previous section and argued that a careful analysis would have shown that the cost of rehabilitating slums was lower than eradicating and building new complexes.[71] This assessment actually recognized that all kind of improvements the residents did to their houses and the slums in general were capital investment in addition to social improvement, "as a result, a rehabilitation program it is not only desirable from a social point of view but also economically viable."[72] Adding to the climate against eradication was the fact that *favelado* organizations showed their ability to oppose eradications and made urban rehabilitation their political objective, although the repressive policies of the military regime were increasingly imposing limits to social mobilizations.

CODESCO's director, Silvio Ferraz, journalist and sociologist whose firsthand contact with the *favelado* situation began when he got involved with the situation in Pasmado before its eradication and contacted a group of young architects of the architectural firm QUADRA. The leading figure in QUADRA was Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos who had been involved with the neighborhood association in Brás de

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[70] Early that year, Bernard Wagner, David McVoy, and Gordon Edwards, USAID/HUDO representatives, met with Brazilian counterparts to evaluate a program for the creation of a permanent agency in charge of comprehensive urban planning, the organization of a pilot program for favelas, the expansion of Cidade de Deus, and financial aid for the creation of industries close to housing complexes. Bernard Wagner, David McVoy, and Gordon Edwards, *Programa para o desenvolvimento urbano e habitacional da Guanabara: relatório e recomendações da Equipe de Habitação e Desenvolvimento Urbano da A.I.D., 1o de julho de 1966*, mimeo.

[71] This solution, however, would have produced a distinct class mixture in "visible" lands of the city like Lagoa, also imposing an obstacle to the economic interests of realtors and developers.

[72] Ibid., 15.

Pina, located in North Rio, neighboring Cordovil, Vila da Penha, and Irajá. While still a student of architecture, Carlos Nelson had closely followed the resistance to eviction which had been organized in the favelas. There, a group of Catholic priests joined the neighborhood associations in repudiating Lacerda's visit to announce the relocation. This case was a victory in a moment when the Federação de Favelas do Rio de Janeiro (FAFEG) was in formation.[73] Carlos Nelson and his colleagues believed that architecture had to serve the necessities of the *favelados*, working for and with them and made themselves available to Brás de Pina's neighborhood association to work with them in improving their built environment.[74]

Brás de Pina became the pilot experience. The program insisted on the collaborative work between architects and experts, and *favelados* in a community development project based on self-help. The process, in broad terms, implied the whole urbanization of the slum, spatial rearrangements, and the construction or redesign of homes. Urbanization works included installing basic infrastructure (sewage, water,

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[73] Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos biography is in itself an interesting case in which different ideas for architecture of social interest for poor residents converged. At the same time he was working at CODESCO and with FAFEG he got in touch with the circuits of intellectual production on *favelas*, especially through his relationship with Luiz Machado da Silva and with US anthropologist Anthony Leeds. Leeds was by then teaching in the recently created Master in Social Anthropology at the Museu Nacional (1969) and organized an intellectual space of discussion and teaching on favelas in his house in which participated most of the scholars that would later become renown in the field, including Licia do Prado Valladares, Janice Perlman, Elizabeth Leeds and Paul Silverstein (the latter two working as Peace Corps volunteers), Lawrence Salmen, Diana Brown, Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, and Rogério Aroeira Neves; Licia Valladares, *A Invenção da favela: Do mito de origem a favela.com*. (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2005). Carlos Nelson's approach to the social and cultural aspects of poor cariocas led him to pursue a degree in anthropology. The architect studied anthropology in the 1970s under the direction of Gilberto Velho and Roberto da Matta to explore the way in which poor urban residents perceived and represented their built environment; see Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, "Como e quando pode um arquiteto virar antropólogo?" in *O desafio da cidade* ed. Gilberto Velho (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1980): 37-57.

[74] Licia do Prado Valladares, *Passa-se uma casa*, 134. Other architects within QUADRA were Rogério Aroeira Neves, Sylvia Lavenère-Wanderley, Sueli de Azevedo, and Fernando Caseiro de Almeida. Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, *Movimentos urbanos no Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1981). By the time CODESCO approached QUADRA, the Pontificia Universidade Católica (PUC) created the Centro de Pesquisas Habitacionais (Research Center on Housing – CENPHA) and commissioned the architects the direction of a social survey in Brás de Pina, Morro União, and Mata Machado in 1966. Valladares, a student at CENPHA, volunteered as surveyor.

electricity), paving, and reordering of streets and blocks when required. In some cases, works required the relocation of slum houses to other areas within the same *favela.* One of the central aspects of the project was to give slum residents land rights to formalize their situation. The assumption, shared among other architects and reformers working with squatter communities in third world countries, was that once land tenure was granted, then residents would take more active steps toward the improvement of their property.[75]Thus, CODESCO, with BNH financing, bought lands and re-sold them to the residents with low-interest rates. In this way, such innovative project did not challenge the very core of the capitalist system (which they would agree was the cause behind the *favelado* situation) of private property and prescribed an assistentialist approach that seemed to have given good results.

In every aspect of the project *favelados* participated not only by providing labor but also, and most important for CODESCO's experts, in the decision-making process. Families were actually required to design their own homes according to their preferences. In order to establish a way of representing their preferences, CODESCO team of architects, which included students of architecture and engineering, provided residents with a grid sheet and asked them to draw their ideal layout. Residents returned more than three hundred designs in total. In a majority of cases, the ideal design reproduced middle-classes spatial arrangements like hallways [*pasillo*] or balconys [*varanda*].[76] For Carlos Nelson, this spatial imagination made sense since male *favela* residents actually built middle-classes homes in Rio and *faveladas* worked in those houses as domestics. This

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[75] John F.C. Turner and Robert Fichter, eds. *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process*. New York: Macmillan, 1972; Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter in An Urbanizing World* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964); and Peter Ward, *Self-Help Housing: A Critique* (Bronx: H.W. Wilson, 1982).

[76] Carlos Nelson Ferreira dos Santos, "Como projetar de baixo para cima uma experiência e favela," 18-19

experience allowed the architect to understand the importance which squatters gave to certain symbolic elements and that could make less sense to the expert's eyes. Popular knowledge and everyday spatial practices dictated what was important and what was less convenient in the design of the homes, despite the *rational* opinion of the "doutores." As Carlos Nelson put it, "the solutions to everyday needs are given by the very act of living them. The rational discourse or their representations through logical designs are not necessary."[77]

To simplify the problem of design, the architects came up with three different models which they presented to the neighborhood association so that resident could choose from. While a few chose the more rational solution, many stayed with their own design. But the most popular model was a house of 55 m^2 with living room, two bedrooms, bathroom, kitchen, balcony, and service area; almost a conventional middle class apartment. Then construction of the homes occurred with residents investing their own labor and experts providing technical assistance. To keep costs low, CODESCO bought building materials in bulk and offered low interest rates for the residents. In that way, as Janice Perlman pointed out, the project rested in the notion that by offering the security of tenure possession individual residents would unleash their full potential in improving their house and working together with others in their built environment, transforming a slum into a community and neighborhood. In this way, ownership, but also community and solidarity would work in building a more fair and progressive urban space and life. *Favelados*, in this perspective, were not a mass of helpless and marginal people but rather the very own agents of their social and living transformation.

[77] Ibid, 19. "É que as soluções das necessidades quotidianas são dadas pela própria ação de vive-las. O discurso racional ou suas representações através de desenhos lógicos não são necessarios."

CODESCO's life, however, was short. The institutional weakness within the Guanabara government and the increasing hostility of the federal administration led to the programs end, although Brás de Pina, Morro União, and Mata Machado proved to be positive experiences and which showed that there were actually alternative paths to the goal of modernization of housing.

In Buenos Aires, a similar experience of promotion of homeownership and the active participation of the squatter in a self-help project was found in the urbanization of the villa 7, between 1971-1974, which gathered together villa residents, architects, and experts.[78] The urbanization of this small slum (122 families) involved the relocation of the residents in a housing project designed and partially built by the residents, and which was one block from their original *villa.* Like in Rio, the political conjuncture was central. The housing program was a curious project of slum rehabilitation in the midst of the aggressive eradication policy the dictatorship enacted since the launching of the Plan de Erradicación de Viviendas. By 1971, organized resistance against the dictatorship made evident that the military had to negotiate a transition to a democratic government. The Gran Acuerdo Nacional (GAN) [Great National Deal] established a space of negotiation between political parties and the military to come up with a orderly transition. The great question was how to integrate the Peronist party to Argentina's political life. By then, we have seen, the *villero* movement organized to resist eradications, especially with the support of the radical left, mostly Peronista, and the movement of *curas villeros.* In this context Major Saturnino Ruiz–appointed by the military—authorized a group of

[78] Davolos et.al.; "Plan Piloto de Realojamiento Barrio de Emergencia N° 7," *Summa* 72 (1974): 57-60; "Barrio Justo Suárez: relato de una experiencia de participación," *Trama, revista de aqruitectura* (Buenos Aires), vol 2, no.3 (1982): 10-28; "Villa 7," *Dos Puntos, revista de temas de la arquitectura y la ciudad* (Buenos Aires), no. 10 (July 1983): 33-36; Oscar Yujnovsky, 215.

architects and experts, connected with the JP, to establish a pilot plan of urban rehabilitation. The villa 7 fitted perfect for the architects and for the government. It was a small settlement in Buenos Aires in a traditional working class area in Mataderos (in the city's west), one block from the meat packing company Lisandro de la Torre. The slum was relatively new (18 years) and was mostly composed of *porteño* families. For the architects, the small size would allow them to develop a housing program that would cheapen construction costs, create a culture of cooperativism, facilitate the collective sprit, and the strengthening of community and solidarity ties.[79] For the government, it offered a low-risk opportunity to show political openness and the gesture of good will toward residents.

While in the case of Brás de Pina, in Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Nelson approached the *favela* drawn by the mobilization of the *favelados* to resist eradication, in the case of Villa 7 it was a group of militant, leftist Peronist architects leaded by Osvaldo "Cholo" Cedrón that were looking for a slum to carry out the housing program.[80] The Municipality of Buenos Aires gave support to the project by hiring these architects and providing the institutional support of the CMV and its team of experts, sociologists, and social workers.[81]After initial contact with the neighborhood council (Junta Vecinal), dominated by the Movimiento Villero Peronista, all the participants established a "mesa de trabajo," a series of meetings and to talk about the project, hear about residents' needs,

[79] Manuel Cangiano, *Tramas.*
[80] "Para construir las casas de los villeros nadie major que el pueblo villero," *El Descamisado,* no. 32 (24 December 1973): 21.
[81] Architect Osvaldo "Cholo" Cedrón, the coordinator of the Project, was also brother of filmmaker Jorge Cedrón, who was married to the Major's daughter. Many people suggest that this is one of the reasons that explain why a government appointed by the military government gave space for such experience.

define possible designs, and organize the works.[82] In the beginning, the residents hesitated about the good intentions of these middle-class experts, the "experimental" character of the project, and their own capacity to contribute in any way to the project. As Marcelo Cangiano, part of the CMV team in Justo Suarez put it, "our role in the project was as difficult to understand to the residents as it was the understanding of their own participatory role." The architect's challenge was to assume "a technical role to service those who need our wisdom (sabiduría) and enters into a creative conversation with the user and who interprets him [the user]."[83]

According to Marcelo Cangiano, an architect that participated in the experience, the whole project was inspired by the attitude and the assumptions behind the project Vladimiro Acosta had established for Isla Maciel (1960), commented above.[84] They took from Acosta's project the notion that the design had to come up from the residents' own understanding of their space and their everyday spatial practices. Any formal solution had to come up from the careful analysis of the material and symbolic needs of the squatters. There was consensus that relocation had to be in a very close location. There was a terrain available just one block from the villa 7. But given the size of the terrain was smaller than the villa, any solution to house all the families had to include the construction of apartment buildings. This was unanimously rejected at first as residents wanted to live in "chalecitos," middle class single-units homes. People also resented that apartment buildings did not offer the possibility to make additions or transform it

[82] The other architects were, among others, Alberto Compagnucci and Osvaldo Cedrón (coordinators), Ana Azzari, Sara Fortuna. The team of experts had the support of the CMV, which provided architects, engenieer, a sociologist, and two social workers.
[83] Cangiano, 22."Entonces el arquitecto, restringida su capacidad de maniobra al servisio de su propio ego, acepta a veces asumir el rol de técnico al servicio de los que necesitan su sabiduría y entra en un diálogo creador con el usuario y con quienes lo interpretan."
[84] Cangiano, 15.

according to family changing necessities and eliminated the possibility of having a front or back yard.

The solution was the construction of five strips of three and four-story buildings with no elevators and one ten-story apartment building, all served with circulation areas and green spaces that would reproduce the recreational zones for sociability already present in the slum. As it was the case with Acosta's project for Isla Maciel, the architects also assumed that the villa residents were used to a type of housing linked with rural life, as the "ranchos" they had improvised in the slum seemed to prove. As a result, the architects came up with a design that looked for the "elimination of superfluous areas, such as hallways and use that space in places of more variable use."[85] The apartments' layout was open could adapt it to according to their own spatial needs. Internal walls would be made of furniture or other elements, allowing flexibility and adaptability. In addition, the layout included a balcony that would serve as a sort of backyard.

The plan originally included the construction of common service areas to save costs and to promote sociability. To the surprise of CMV's personnel, residents rejected this idea when they discussed about a common laundry area. They said they were "fed up of sharing," as they did in the *villa* where they shared water faucets and other "common" areas. In this sense, the expectative of getting a new home came with the desires of living a more individualist, intimate life. On a different matter, squatters initially rejected childcare services but the increasing presence of women in the meetings with CMV authorities established that as a top priority.

[85] "Las coincidencias eran muchas y la idea de eliminar lugares superfluos tales como pasillos e incluir esta superficie en lugares de uso más variado nos pareció totalmente válidas," Cangiano, 15-16.

To gain the initial confidence of the squatters, the CMV team speeded up urgent improvements much needed in the *villa*. Installation of water faucets and paving contributed to the creation of a sense of collaboration while professionals and dwellers worked together in project. At the same time, squatter demanded of CMV authorities that the project had to create job opportunities. As a result, a group of workers that lived in the *villa* organized and managed a cooperative that produced prefabricated brick panels used in the dwellings' fronts. This cooperative organization became an example of the positive impact of self-management, especially suitable for smaller *villas.*

When López Rega imposed a tighter control in the CMV's internal situation getting rid of radical elements, the agency's team in Justo Suárez quit in 1973. By then, most of construction works were almost finished or well in advance, and by 1974 the project was completed. The balance was mixed. Collaborative and self-help experiences like the experience of Justo Suárez were not repeated again in until the late 1990s. In the short term, however, many activists and residents remembered the great influence the project had in creating a dynamic of work between the *villeros* and the members of the CMV, especially through the "mesas de enlace," in the context of the politization and radicalization of everyday life.

Conclusions

Taken together, the experience of CODESCO and Barrio Justo Suárez were possible thanks to the emergence of a new transnational context of ideas that emerged to overcome the premises of modernization theory and the characterizations of poor urban dwellers as marginals. During the 1960s, scholars, architects, and experts went to the

slums of Latin America (and also Africa and South Asia) to conduct detailed ethnographies and research work that provided a more dynamic account of the settlements.[86] This interdisciplinary way of understanding the poor was part of the determination to think about the individual practices as part of a more integral project to service the needs of the most deprived. Now influenced by *dependentismo,* many Latin American progressive professionals and experts realized that the promises of modernization and developmentalism not only did not occur, but also were responsible for the expansion of social inequality.

The housing problem could not be solved just by providing homes, although such policy and the formalization of the situation of squatters remained important. As William Mangin put it in an influential article that challenged the stereotypes associated with poverty and spaces of inequality, *favelas* and *villas* were not the problem but rather the solution for shelter.[87] By the end of the decade, architect John F.C. Tuner who was working in the barriadas of Lima and was in close contact with Peruvian anthropologist Jose Matos Mar, came to the conclusion that slums improve over time.[88] In Lima, Turner saw that squatter settlements began as simple and basic land occupations. In later stages, squatters built their homes, improved their environment, claimed governments for specific improvements, and managed to get water, and their streets paved. With time,

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[86] See, for instance, Janice Perlman, *The Myth of Poverty*; Wayne Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975); Barney S. Rush, *From Favela to Conjunto: The Experience of Squatters Removed to Low Cost Housing in Rio de Janeiro* (PhD. Diss. Harvard University, 1974); Paul Silberstein, "Favela Living: Personal Solution to Larger Problems," *América Latina* (Rio de Janeiro), vol. 12, no. 3 (1969); Larissa Lomnitz, *Networks and Marginality: Life in a Mexican Shantytown* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Susan Eckstein, *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Lisa Peattie, *The View from the Barrio* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968).

[87] William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review* 2, no. 3 (1967): 65–98.

[88] Turner, like Carlos Nelson in Brazil, developed a strong anthropological sensibility for knowing and interpreting the needs of popular sector.

homes underwent transformation according to material capacities and needs. For squatter, an improvement in their personal situation did not translate into geographical mobility but in upgrading their houses and surroundings.[89]

By investing their labor into the improvement of their homes and built environments, squatters were making a direct capital investment. Valued as such, self-help housing became an alternative to the more expensive and socially disruptive policy of slum eradication and relation in new housing complexes. More important, experiences such as the ones undertook by CODESCO and the team of CMV's architects in Justo Suárez showed the importance of attempting to understand housing less from the perspective of the expert or the policy makers and rather from the point of view of the dweller. In the decades to follow Turner expanded the "Freedom to Build" movement while international organisms like the UN and the World Bank generalized this approach to cope with the problem of housing in developing countries.[90] And yet, as the letters of *favelados* to governor Lacerda soliciting homes in the *Vilas*, many poor people still wanted to leave the slum and move to a more middle-class "respectable" home.[91]

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[89] John F.C. Turner, *Programação Habitacional e Favelas* (*Cadernos CENPHA*), complete.
[90] John Turner and Robert Fichter, eds., *Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process* (New York: Macmillan, 1972). By then, of course, criticism amounted to self-help as a way to over-exploit the already exploited worker. Nevertheless, in the following decades states opted to invest in slum rehabilitation instead of housing complexes.
[91] Decades later, the construction of large-scale housing complexes was completely abandoned by the state. On the contrary, in-situ slum rehabilitation expanded to the point that in the middle of the 1990s, the government of Rio de Janeiro began an ambitious program of *favela* rehabilitation with the financial support of the IDB. The favela-bairro program.

Figure 39 –"This house is yours! Keep it, enlarge it, and embellish it. It's your duty…," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), p. 3.

Figure 40 – "Go to the Social Service's office and have your child transfer to the local school," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p.5.



Figure 41 – "Keep your home and surroundings neat and clean," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p.6.

Figure 42 – "This is no workplace! Use your home only as a residence. There are other appropriate places for work and commerce," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p 7.

Figure 43 –On the top, "You can add on to your house to make your family more comfortable. Ask the engineering office and start today;" at the bottom, "Don't make any change of your building without authorization from the engineering office," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p.8.



Figure 44 – "Hang your clothes only in the backyard," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 9.

Figure 45 – "FIRE! Always check the gas nozzles and don't leave gasoline or alcohol in your children's reach," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p.12.

Figure 46 – "Use household's appliances appropriately. Do not waste water, electricity, gas, etc," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 13.

Figure 47 – At the top, "Register all family events with social services: marriages, death, contagious deceases," at the bottom, "Inform the social services of every birth," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 15.



Figure 48 – "Housewife, mother: Look for the Secretary of the Social Services' office to learn about the preparation of food and care for your children," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 16.

A UNIÃO FAZ A FÔRÇA!

PARTICIPE DAS REUNIÕES COM O REPRESENTANTE DA SUA RUA, COLABORANDO COM O CONSELHO DE MORADORES

Figure 49 – "IN UNITY THERE IS STRENGH! Participate in meetings with your street's representative and work together with the neighborhood association," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 19.

A VILA SERÁ BELA E AGRADÁVEL COM A COLABORAÇÃO DE CADA UM DOS MORADORES!



Figure 50 – "The Vila will be beautiful and pleasant if all the residents do their part," Secretaria de Serviços Sociais - COHAB-GB, *Manual do Propriétario* (Rio de Janeiro: COHAB, 1965), p. 20.

Figure 51 - A Social Workers doing a house demonstration in Favela de Bom Jesús, eradicated to Vila Aliança; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social (mimeo), July 1962.



Figure 52 - House demonstration in Bom Jesús; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social (mimeo), July 1962.

Figure 53 - Vila Aliança - A favelada visits the site; Estado da Guanabara-COHAB, Plano de recuperação de favelas e de habitações de interesse social (mimeo), July 1962.

Figure 54 - Vila Aliança; Companhia de habitação popular, *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 55 - Vila Kennedy; *A COHAB através de números e imagenss*, (mimeo), c. 1965.

Figure 56 - Unidos da Vila Kennedy, logo of Vila Kennedy's samba school.



Figure 57 - "These keys that we are giving you serve to enter into the present, this present in which every human being has the right, that of light, air, the comforts and simplicities of modern life, a home worthy of our time." Comisión Municipal de la Vivienda, Para entrar en el presente (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, nod.)

Figure 58 - Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development Bank; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965)

Figure 59 - Villa Lugano I-II, drawings attached to the loan proposal to the Inter-American Development Bank; Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Solicitud de préstamo al Banco Interamericano de Desarollo (Buenos Aires: Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1965)

Figure 60 – CMV's jeep and military trucks used to remove the illegal occupants in CGB; "Pidieron casa les dieron tanque," *El Descamisado*, no. 1, May 23, 1973.

CONCLUSION

It has been my central argument that the processes that led to the modernization of the Latin American city in the postwar era also produced a landscape of urban poverty and inequality. After 1945, and especially in the early 1960s, cities like Rio and Buenos Aires achieved significant improvement of urban infrastructure. In Rio, overpasses, tunnels, and land reclamation helped to overcome the obstacles imposed by geography. Bottlenecks of vehicular traffic were relieved. The expansion of the water and sewage systems as well as the expansion of energy distribution secured the provision of basic public utilities to commercial centers and residential neighborhoods. In Buenos Aires, the urbanization of the Bañado de Flores incorporated a huge area to the urban fabric, greatly expanding the city's green spaces, while diminishing the frequency of flooding. The newly habitable land was made available for the construction of housing complexes for working families as well as recreation zones for the entire city. In Rio, and most especially in Buenos Aires, the growing financial sector expanded access to long-term credit, and the associated political economy and political culture of homeownership Urbanists in Rio and São Paulo, in collaboration with their transnational partners, secured the technical expertise, political will, and financing to restructure the city spaces and urban civism.

At the same time, social transformation led to the emergence of new middle sectors that were the consumers and white-collar managers of new "modern" urban-industrial economic enterprises. The new corporate employers — often subsidiaries of

international corporations that sought a presence in the Latin American marketplace—left their imprint in the cities. In Buenos Aires, firms like Fiat, Olivetti, and others erected office towers in international style, providing the city skyline with a more cosmopolitan look and accelerating the rise of a middle-class managerial, consumerist workforce. This process of cosmpolitanization and mass consumption also led to the vibrancy of urban life in Rio and Buenos Aires. Commercial galleries, cinemas, and cafes spread rapidly in certain areas of the cities and captivated the imagination of residents and non-residents alike. Rising incomes allowed middle classes to move into neighborhoods remade by newly constructed high-rise apartment buildings, as it was the case with Copacabana and other "noble" neighborhoods of Rio's South Zone. For many residents of the Marvelous City, the move to these once-distant neighborhoods was emblematic of the broader process of mobility associated with modernity. The expansion of fashionable neighborhoods situated in close proximity to the white-sand beaches, a picturesque lagoon, or a verdant urban forest, however, put increasing stress of an urban infrastructure that also strained to accommodate population increases in working-class and industrial areas, as well as in the "unregulated" spaces of hillsides and mangroves. Unable to escape the scourge of overcrowding, irregularity, and unreliable public services, the middle class residents of Copacabana came to know the limitations of an urban modernization, marred by the craven interest of realtors and the construction industry, the inadequacies of municipal government, and the competing demands of popular classes

As I have suggested, the underside of urban modernization was the dramatic expansion of squatter settlements in the interstices of the cities' geography and law. The

number of new squatter settlements and of squatters was unprecedented, particularly the percentages relative to the larger population. Favelas in Rio grew in the hills of the city and in the suburbs to the North. In Buenos Aires, *villas miserias* occupied available public and unutilized lands within and beyond the city limits, particularly to the suburbs of Greater Buenos Aires where new industries appeared close to the city. In most cases, slums were the response of the poor to their problem the solution for shelter for working classes individuals and families that could not afford a formal dwelling in the city but needed to live close to their workplaces. Squatters lived in a state of vulnerability that came from inequality in general, the illegal occupation of public or private lands and, the subjection to the power of local bosses, authorities, or politicians. This did not preclude squatters to find ways to push for their interests, albeit in a context of unequal relations of power.

Meanwhile, predominant social imaginaries attached to these slums among middle and upper classes, and also among experts and policymakers, journalists and the public in general characterized them as places of moral decadence, pathology, disease, and crime. At the same time, an emergent, postwar sociological understanding of slums and slumdwellers emerged as a way to provide a more scientific, empirical interpretation of the sociological phenomena of urban *under*-development. Built transnationally through the circulation and encounter of figures, ideas, and networks, different actors that included scholars, experts, policymakers, and international organization of the Americas, sought to come up with a more legible and more universalizing understanding of slums and slumification. In a global postwar context in which the use of applied science, technology, and planning for the rational solution of the problems of humanity,

development and modernization became a new credo among nations and state elites in the globe. Fed with modernization theory and the developmentalism of the ECLA, but also from other sources such as Catholic reformism –as it was the case in Brazil with Économie et Humanisme- such experts, scholars, and policymakers were called upon to understand and act upon the problem of housing for low-income populations.

As a social problem, slums came to epitomize the urban problem, itself characterized as a consequence of the peculiar structural situation of Latin American economies and the challenges of development for late industrializers. For many scholars, architects, and even urban planners, the urban slum represented an enclave of rural poverty in the modern city. The slum dweller, therefore, was understood as a traditional personality whose attitudes were at tension with the urban setting. For these scholars, the *rancho* or the *barraco* were not only forms of vernacular architecture brought to the city by recent rural migrants. Physical attributes of the home were a manifestation of a whole behavioral and attitudinal predispositions of the slums dweller in the city: displacement, dislocation, and disjuncture. In a historical moment when intellectuals, experts, politicians, and policymakers who spoke from a variety of ideological perspectives shared an understanding and optimism about the historical opportunity to overcome "underdevelopment," the house became also a problem of development.

This recognition, however, did not suppose one particular answer but multiple ones. In Rio de Janeiro and most especially in Buenos Aires, local and international authorities placed an emphasis on establishing the market mechanisms for the expansion of a national mortgage market and financial system that could channel domestic funds for an expanded and improved housing stock. As this policy targeted particularly those

sectors with a possibility to generate a surplus to be spent in housing, it left aside a large number of lower income individuals and families who lived precarious lives, especially in the context of uncontrolled inflation. To meet the housing needs of the latter group, the local governments of Rio and Buenos Aires reached out, in the 1960s, to foreign institutions for economic and technical assistance, to implement large-scale housing programs particularly in the form of housing complexes. In a global geopolitical context in which actions in the field of foreign affairs were measured according to the field of power defined by the Cold War, the United States made dollars available for the expansion of capitalism as well as for the execution of programs of social reform to appease potential explosions of social discontent. US assistance for programs such as low-income housing, or community development and aided self-help projects, belong to such rationale of providing means to "underdeveloped" societies for a pacific social reform. Moreover, if new housing and a new built environment was to bring not only a formal urban dweller, but a consumer and a citizen, this would also imply that housing was an element it the political maturation of former squatters.

The construction of housing complexes such as the Vilas in Rio and Villa Lugano 1-2 and Ciudad General Belgrano in Buenos Aires to relocate low-income residents, most of them former squatters, condensed all these different aspects delineated above. These complexes were conceived within a transnational sociological imaginary about the character of the squatter and the urban poor as well as around the expectations about new built environments and homeownership as agent of modernization. These new planned housing were made possible thanks to the economic and technical assistance channeled to Argentine authorities under the umbrella of the Alliance for Progress and the hemispheric

encounters organized by multilateral organizations including the OAS. In planning the modernization of the mortgage market, the expansion of homeownership among poor residents, and the provisions of modern homes, local authorities and international agencies sought to spread a particular way of life, one that promoted an ideal image of white, middle class domesticity. In the regularization of the housing conditions of former squatters, experts and policymakers intended to build both a "decent" home and its worker-citizen-consumer-resident. And, as a result, a politically moderated and responsible urban resident would deflect the threat of social revolutions.

And yet, the modern Latin American city —or more generally, the “Third-World" city — became a built environment of huge contrasts. The planning and building of modern residences for the well-off and poor alike did not solve the problem of housing. By the middle of the 1970s, the urban residential dwelling in both cities at the end of the era of modernization did not become the rationalized, commodified and democratized space that early post-war planners and policymakers had envisioned. Still, these housing developments in Rio and Buenos Aires differed in outcome with public housing projects in US cities like Chicago or New York, where they became a machine for racial segregation. In Rio, housing projects slid into informality because that was the particular logic of Rio. But did not mean they utterly failed. Actually, there were many ways in which the housing developments facilitated improvements for residents.

In the 1980s, wondrous apartment buildings and planned worker housing developments stood alongside new chaotic land invasions and squatter settlements. During the military regimes, slums and housing complexes in Rio and Buenos Aires became the object of “dirty war" surveillance and countersubversion, as well as the more

conventional practices of systemic police brutality. The expansion of transnational nacrotrafficking networks into the South Atlantic would exact a heavy toll on the poor and their neighborhoods. In the neoliberal era, new gated communities would reinforce spatial segregation, this time of the wealthiest urban residents. As a result, the popular housing intended to alleviate the housing problem during the era of developmentalism were affected by the same historical conditions that defined the Latin American urban societies and their cityscape since the 1960s. In other words, the plans and hopes for modernity through housing may have been partially fulfilled, but a *poverty of housing* became an intrinsic part of the modern Latin American urban landscape. It is in the sense that slums in Latin America, as in other cities of the so-called Third World were not the result of a failed or incomplete modernization but actually the result of the way in which modernization occurred in the region.

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Oral Interviews

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